It was clear to Bruce and to ministers at home that a much larger effort would be needed to conquer the Windward Islands. This major expedition will be discussed in the next chapter, but we must first return to Saint Domingue to recount British fortunes on the colony which, as has been related, was in such a state of anarchy that sections of the population were seeking British help. It is important to note that Saint Domingue was that part of the island of St Domingo that belonged to the French. This made up little more than a third of the whole island, the western tract of land with two long peninsulas (see map 4). Within its 12,000 square miles, Saint Domingue had close to 200 towns; the largest were Cap Français and Port au Prince. Much of the wealth was in the hands of the white planters, although in the months prior to the British intervention the Republican Commissioners had transferred at least some of this white power to the mulattoes and the enormous potential strength of the blacks as successors to both was starting to be felt. Attitudes to the British were polarised; many of the planters favoured the ‘English’ or at least the French King, but the ‘non-proprietors’ often had Republican sympathies. Marcus Rainsford declared that the most intelligent of the planters favoured Britain, but he also thought that those planters who supported the French Commissioners mostly did so ‘probably from principle’. Any conflict would have to be fought out in an environment alien to newly arrived Europeans. Although the terrain reminded visitors of Switzerland, the climate was hot, humid, damp and oppressive, encouraging a lifestyle, according to the French Governor, of ‘laziness and debauchery’. Hector McLean, a British Inspector of Hospitals on the island, believed the colony to be remarkably unhealthy with ‘fever in each treacherous breeze’.
It was into this ‘hornets’ nest’ that Dundas plunged. He and General Sir Adam Williamson, Governor of Jamaica, had been encouraged by the Saint Domingue emissaries and particularly the planter Pierre François Venault de Charmilly. It is unclear whether Charmilly or his allies had the permission of the inhabitants to transfer their island from France to England, but the signature of the document effectively committed Britain to the protection of Saint Domingue. Fortescue describes this as a blunder, but modern historians have been more guarded as to the justification for British action. Geggus invokes the British desire to check the growing influence of the mulattoes and blacks – even at the ‘eleventh hour’ – but he also acknowledges that Pitt and Dundas’s decision to intervene ‘defies any simple explanation’. Chances of success on the island were not clear-cut. On the one hand, many of the whites had been aggrieved by the behaviour of France, at least some of the mulattoes were antagonised by the Commissaires’ reliance on the blacks, and many of the blacks favoured their Royalist masters over the Republicans. Conversely, large areas of land had been desolated, the counter-revolutionary forces were not concentrated, and significant parts of the island were inhabited by alienated blacks and mulattoes with Republican sympathies. In the north, the black troops of Toussaint Louverture were becoming more organised.4
The first British landing on 20 September 1793 was at Jérémie on the southern peninsula. This was a propitious place to take the first step as the local white planters were under imminent threat from the mulatto leader André Rigaud’s marauding army of slaves and mulattoes, and were desperate to treat on any terms. From his Jamaican garrison, Williamson raised a force of just under 700 men made up of the 13th Regiment, two flank companies of the 49th and a detachment of artillery. The men were boarded on the men-of-war of Commodore John Ford’s squadron under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Whitelocke of the 13th and were landed uneventfully at Jérémie where, according to Williamson, ‘…colours were hoisted at both forts with two salutes of Twenty-one guns and answered by the Commodore and his squadron. The troops were received with the loudest acclamation from all ranks’. Shouts of ‘Vive les Anglais!’ resounded, a banquet was prepared and even a song composed to honour the invaders. The locals swore allegiance to the British King.
The capture of Jérémie gave control of the Grand Anse, a significant acquisition, and a greater prize immediately followed. Ford had been informed by a captured French officer that the inhabitants of Môle St Nicolas would also readily surrender to the British if they were promised support and protection. Accordingly, the commodore sailed across the Bight of Léogane and the Môle, one of the strongest naval bases in the New World, and its extensive dependencies, fell into British hands on the 22nd. Fifty marines took immediate command of the garrison and Williamson quickly sent to Jérémie for the grenadier company of the 19th and then further strengthened the garrison with five companies of the 49th from Jamaica. British gains included large quantities of stores and ordnance and the French Regiment of Dillon. This easy acquisition would not be so simple to retain; a recurrent theme of warfare in the Caribbean. The local population were not trustworthy and the local British commissioner thought a garrison of 500 men necessary. The people were anxious, he reported; ‘it requires that no difficulties should appear among us’.
A small reverse at the beginning of October was a salutary reminder of the difficulties of cooperating with local factions. Tiburon, the neighbouring port to Jérémie, was important for the security of Grand Anse. It was decided that Whitelocke would attack from the sea whilst a sympathetic local planter, Morin Duval, leader of the colonial ‘Army of the Grand Anse’, would lead 500 men against the town from the landside. Whitelocke’s troops were repelled from the beach by musket fire and, having initially underestimated the enemy’s strength, were forced to retreat with the loss of around 20 men. The British, and later historians including Fortescue, were quick to blame Duval for the failure, but it seems that the two forces were poorly coordinated and ill-fated; Whitelocke had landed three miles distant from the planned point of disembarkation and, according to Rainsford, the wind intercepted Duval’s signal and the local commander spent most of the day lost.5
Following the fall of the Môle, a number of other parishes clamoured for British protection. The reasons for this were probably the increasingly aggressive stance of the Spanish, whose plans to conquer the island were frustrated by lack of troops, the apparent support of Sonthonax for the blacks, and the news of the fall of the key naval base of Toulon. The commander of the Môle received submissions from St Marc and Gonaives in the Bight of Léogane, Verrettes and Petite Rivière to the east of St Marc, and Léogane and smaller towns in the south.
Reinforced only by a paltry 200 more troops from Jamaica, the British were reduced to sending small bodies of men, often measured in tens and twenties, to occupy these new possessions. At St Marc, Brevet Major Thomas Brisbane arrived with a force 50 strong to face down and force the surrender of a hundred or so French troops drawn up in the main square. The garrisons of the Môle and Jérémie were weakened to only a few hundred men and there were too few available for Brisbane to accept the surrender of Mirebalais. Overtures from Jacmel and other key towns in the south also had to be ignored. The capture of Léogane and its hinterland should have been a valuable asset, the sugar estates little affected by previous conflict, but the lack of British manpower allowed southern raiders to burn the land. Nevertheless, the gains were judged adequate for Ford to summon Sonthonax to yield up Port au Prince and Williamson was confident enough of the capital’s eventual submission to send the 20th Regiment to Jérémie to be available to take possession.6
In reality, the British grip was weak. They had the support of a number of irregular corps of French colonists and of a body of ex-slaves led by the able Jean Kina. Britain and Spain co-existed on the left bank of the Artibonite, but it was unlikely that the Spanish could be persuaded to take offensive action. The mulattoes mostly remained suspicious, dissatisfied by British failure to grant them equal rights to the whites. Williamson and Ford had possession, if not control, of one-third of Saint Domingue. With only 800 soldiers in the colony, to press any advantage they needed either Republican defection or their own reinforcement. In the event, neither happened. Dund
as had become distracted by events in Europe, notably in Flanders and at Toulon, and also by preparations for an expedition against the Windward Islands. In December, the minister announced the planned departure of two regiments from Ireland to Saint Domingue, but these were delayed for several months by the usual problems of sickness and poor weather. The only reinforcement actually received was of 400 men of the First Royals from Jamaica, a garrison that was now also dangerously weak.7
Lacking the resources to make a decisive military push, the British resorted to bluff; Ford twice appeared off Port au Prince in January and March threatening a bombardment and demanding the town’s surrender, but he withdrew on each occasion without taking action. Bribes were offered to selected French generals. There was an unsavoury element to the British occupation described by Geggus as a mixture of ‘cynicism, greed, impotence and empty threats’. However, where a military force could be deployed there was the potential for decisive action and even glory. Lieutenant Colonel John Whitelocke’s capture of the strategically important stronghold of Tiburon on 2 and 3 February 1794 was, in Williamson’s view, ‘spirited and well done’. Commanding a small force of a few hundred men just arrived from Jamaica, Whitelocke planned to attack Tiburon from the beach. He instructed colonial auxiliaries camped at Irois to move to cut off the Republicans’ retreat to the west. On the evening of the 2nd, a broadside from the three frigates appeared to clear the shoreline of enemy troops.
Just before dark I [Whitelocke] ordered the Flank Companies to land and take possession of a house about 150 paces from the Beach, and well situated for Defence, and to protect landing of the whole. Major [Brent] Spencer commanded the Flank Companies and was not annoyed until the Moment the Boats grounded, when the Brigands appeared in Line on the Beach, and fired on the troops, who, by the Major’s Orders, were on Shore in an Instant, charged, and in a minute routed the Enemy and surrounded the Post.
Whitelocke landed at daylight with the 13th and 20th Regiments, the Marines, and British Legion. He estimated the enemy’s strength to have been 650 blacks and 200 mulattoes and whites. Around 50 were killed and wounded, 150 surrendered and the remainder escaped, the colonists failing to cut off their retreat as planned. British losses were limited.
Perhaps believing that an offensive strategy was the best way of concealing his true weakness, Williamson decided to reduce enemy posts around Port au Prince to clear the ground for an attack on the capital. Two weeks after the capture of Tiburon, the same force attacked the Fort l’Acul. In another combined operation, the plan was for Whitelocke to march on the place from Léogane, around six miles to the east, whilst 200 colonial troops commanded by the Baron de Montalembert were to land and attack the fort from the sea at an appointed hour. Marching at four in the morning, Whitelocke led his small force of flank companies, the 13th Regiment, a detachment of Royal Artillery, around fifty colonial troops, two howitzers and two 4-pounders to within cannon shot of the fort, on the opposite flank of which the larger body of colonials were to commence their attack. Captain John Vincent was sent with the flank companies of the 49th and 120 colonial troops to support the latter. Unfortunately alcohol now played a vital role as one of the captains of the transports became intoxicated and Montalembert was unable to land. Ashore, the two opposing forces exchanged artillery fire. Realising that his colonial allies could do no more than serve as a diversion, holding the attention of the 200 blacks and mulattoes on the beach, Whitelocke decided to storm the fort.
About half past four, P. M., Major Spencer was ordered, with Two Flank Companies, to join Captain Vincent to advance and fire on the fort which he did according to a signal given, and Lieutenant-Colonel Whitelocke advanced in front under the Fire of Two Guns loaded with Grape, and a heavy Fire of Musketry. They ascended the Hill, which was rendered as difficult as possible by Trees placed in all Directions, gallantly pushed on with fixed bayonets, and drove the Enemy from their Works. Many of the enemy were killed; and had the Colonial corps been landed, not a man would have escaped.
The garrison was thought to have numbered around 600 men led by a Frenchman, De Lille, who, according to Williamson, was supposed to have murdered 300 of his fellow whites. The brigands fired the fort, accidentally setting light to an artillery wagon, which exploded causing a number of casualties including two British officers. Total British losses were five killed and 32 wounded.8
The British were apparently in the ascendency; the people of nearby Grand Goâve raised the Union Jack and took an oath of allegiance. There was, however, a growing realisation on the part of many of the inhabitants that Williamson’s small army, never numbering more than 900 effective soldiers, was not sufficient to give them real protection. Promised reinforcements never appeared and distrust of the British grew. In Port au Prince, there was black insurrection; one of the French regular regiments was forced to seek British help at Léogane. Here and at l’Acul the garrisons were reduced to a skeleton by disease. The Republicans had lost ground but, encouraged by British inaction and the general unrest, they launched a major counter-attack. On 16 April, Rigaud threw 2,000 men, mostly insurrected blacks, against Tiburon. After the mulatto leader surrounded the fort at three in the morning, the defenders fought bravely for six hours, their task being made more desperate by the destruction of the powder magazine by a suicide agent. The Chevalier de Sevre, a local creole, made a sortie from the fort, ably supported by Jean Kina’s black corps, and the enemy were eventually driven off. The intensity of the fighting was well demonstrated by the besieged force expending 40,000 rounds of ball cartridge. Of the 60 British troops of the 30th Foot in the garrison, 28 were killed. A similar number of colonial troops fell. The equally determined attackers left 170 men dead on the field. A frigate arrived the following day to provide naval protection whilst repairs to the fort were undertaken; a salutary reminder of the vital role of the navy in supporting isolated garrisons.9
The British were starting to suffer setbacks. In early April, mulattoes at Jean-Rabel, one of Whitelocke’s outlying posts, rose up and surrendered to the Republicans. German settlers at Bombarde also rebelled and Whitelocke decided to take them by surprise. A force of 200 men composed mainly of marines performing garrison duty at the Môle were led by Major Brent Spencer. The British officer was accompanied by two Frenchmen, Monsieur Deneux, a major of artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Charmilly, whose knowledge of the language was likely to be useful. Setting off at nine at night, the small force marched 15 miles through woods and mountains. When they arrived at Bombarde at three in the morning, they found it defended by 150 Germans armed with three pieces of cannon. Rainsford recounts the outcome.
Colonel Markham with half the detachment attacked the redoubt in the flank while the remainder approached the gate. The enemy suffered them to arrive within half-gun shot, when having three times called – ‘Qui vive?’ – Colonel Spencer answered ‘England’ and immediately the assailants received a fire perfectly well directed and kept up with so much order and briskness that the enterprise was obliged to be immediately abandoned. Several of the officers advanced as far as the ditch, supported by some grenadiers, but not being sufficiently numerous, all retired in confusion.
Spencer lost 40 men killed, wounded or taken prisoner, a significant number in view of the vulnerability of the Môle garrison. British weakness was becoming increasingly clear to the Republicans and the semi-autonomous groups who supported them. Two days later, around 1,500 blacks and mulattoes under the command of the black leader Pompé attempted to storm Fort l’Acul. The attackers showed the same valour as at Tiburon but were routed by the 400 men of Montalembert’s Légion and Léogane militia who made free use of the bayonet.10
With the situation becoming critical, the arrival of the long-awaited reinforcements at Môle St Nicolas, 1,500 men under Major General John Whyte, boosted the British cause. In Rainsford’s words, ‘All spirits were now resumed…’ The troops were detached by General Charles Grey, whose major operations to windward will shortly be de
scribed. The force now at Whyte’s disposal for offensive operations was made up of the 22nd, 23rd and 41st Regiments in the transports (except for the flank companies which had been left at Martinique) and a detachment from the flank companies of regiments already in Saint Domingue. There were two obvious targets, the major Republican strongholds of Port au Prince and Cap Français. The general decided to assault the former, probably because it was more exposed, more isolated by the British blockade, and because it contained the predominant part of the Republican forces. The 45 merchant ships trapped in Port au Prince’s harbour were coveted by Commodore Ford, whose fleet sailed at midday on 30 May and anchored off the city. In addition to his regular contingent, Whyte could also call upon the support of colonial troops around Arcahaye and Léogane.
Ford’s priority was to find a safe anchorage. It was this consideration that made the assault on Fort Bizothon to the west of Port au Prince the first objective. This fort, manned by a garrison of 500 men, both dominated the coastline and controlled the main road from Léogane. As Whyte lacked a siege train, the place was bombarded from the sea on 31 May by two line of battle ships and a frigate. In the evening, after four hours’ bombardment, Whyte ordered 300 British and a number of colonial troops to be landed within a mile of the fort. Under the command of Major Brent Spencer, this small body of men advanced meeting little opposition. A violent thunderstorm now intervened and ‘taking advantage of the lucky minute afforded to them by so favourable a circumstance’ the soldiers charged with the bayonet and carried the place.
Death Before Glory Page 6
