With Grenada at least temporarily secured, Abercromby soon achieved another secondary objective. The Dutch possessions of Demerara and Curaçao had offered to surrender in return for British protection. The British commander was still awaiting the arrival of his main force and he took the pragmatic decision to use the available Cork troops to intervene on Demerera. The force – 1,200 men of the 39th, 93rd and 99th Regiments under General Whyte – left Barbados and reached the South American coast on 20 April. As related by Army Physician George Pinckard, the landing at the mouth of the Demerera River was not straightforward.
At length the little fleet of sloops, schooners and other small vessels, calculated, as it was believed, for the shallow sea they had to pass, got under weigh, and stood direct for the shore. The larger ships were unable to approach near enough to give any protection to the landing. The small light vessels into which the troops and stores were removed were some of them brought with us from Barbados for the purpose – and some taken after our arrival on the coast; but, unfortunately, it proved that even these, light as they were, drew too much water for this muddy shore; for, about five o’clock, we had the mortification to learn that our little fleet was fast aground deep fixed in mud. Finding the small vessels in this dilemma, our ship, together with the others which had sailed through a very confused channel towards the fort [William Frederick] came to anchor near the entrance of the Demerera river, having the fort, also a Dutch frigate, and a number of shipping in full view before them. This was a more unhappy accident than the breaking loose of the boats with artillery stores, and might have proved of serious consequence as the troops were compelled to remain until the next flood of tide, being equally unable to reach the shore or return.
It was a relief when the fort’s Dutch governor promptly surrendered, allowing Whyte to gloss over the difficulties in his report to Abercromby, ‘…the Unanimity with which the Service was carried on between the Fleet and Army was pleasing to all concerned…’ The Dutch frigate and a cutter were added to the fleet and Whyte’s men marched on the capital Stabroek. Here, the capitulations of Demerera and the colony of Essequibo were negotiated. The neighbouring colony of Berbice soon followed suit and the Dutch garrison of all these acquisitions entered the British army.3
The arrival of Cornwallis’s convoy in mid-April meant that Abercromby had an available force of between seven and eight thousand men and enough shipping to deploy them. He was ready to attempt the first major objective of the expedition, the capture of St Lucia. Once this island was acquired, he could turn to St Vincent and also complete the subjugation of Grenada. As so often in the region, this sequence was determined more by the prevailing winds than by purely military considerations. The fleet sailed from Carlisle Bay on 21 April and anchored on the 23rd in Marin Bay on the southern part of Martinique. This stopover had been planned by Laforey and was resented by the army’s officers, who believed that all the necessary preparations could have been completed on Barbados. Moore notes in his lucid and detailed journal that both Abercromby and Christian, who had just arrived from England, disapproved of the delay. The latter’s assumption of the naval command was welcomed by both soldiers and sailors. On the evening of the 25th, the expedition sailed on for St Lucia.
Abercromby’s plan of attack was to make multiple landings on the north west of the island around Castries. This was very similar to Grey’s strategy two years earlier. Three attacks were to be launched under cover of divisions of the fleet. The first and most northerly was to be at the Bay of Anse du Cap (between the Pointe du Cap and Pigeon Island); the second at Anse du Choc, a few miles to the south; and the third at Anse la Raye, five miles to the south of Castries (see map 5).
The strength of the enemy was a matter of conjecture. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Clinton wrote home to his brother that it was thought that they were 4,000 strong and occupying the posts of Morne Fortune, Soufrière and Vieuxfort. Abercromby was later to estimate the Republican garrison on Morne Fortune to contain ‘about 2,000 well disciplined Black Troops, some Hundred Whites and a number of Black People who have taken refuge…’ This was, he admitted, only the best information to hand. French sources are not explicit, but Poyen tells us that the British attack was expected by the French Commissioner.
At St Lucia, Goyrand, who had knowledge of these [British] preparations and who realised that he would be the first to be attacked, had prepared his defence with great energy; he had built new batteries, organised two companies of cannoniers, pallisaded the forts, and requested from his comrades at Guadeloupe that which he lacked, especially flour and ammunition. He made careful observations and watched ceaselessly himself ‘with his telescope’ all the coasts of the island, to prevent any surprise…
Goyrand called on all men fit to bear arms to join him to support the cause of ‘liberté’.
The first ships were off Anse du Choc on the morning of the 26th but the remainder of the fleet was strung out all the way back to Marin Bay. The plan was for 1,900 troops under the command of Major General Alexander Campbell to land at Anse du Cap and the 14th Foot and the 42nd Highlanders were soon ashore with no enemy in sight. By the time Campbell joined them he had received a letter from Abercromby requesting him to delay the landing. This was a difficult instruction to comply with, as John Moore explains; ‘It was already part executed; to re-embark was impossible; to put off the march to Trouillac [on the Heights of Anse du Choc] till next morning, dangerous. The enemy was already apprised of our descent; they might therefore assemble, attack and tease us upon our march, perhaps completely impede it’. Moore was assertive and Campbell ill and the more junior officer’s opinion prevailed. A message was sent to Abercromby who sanctioned a night move to the south. By now, other units had landed and the march began at three o’clock in the morning. Moore’s aggressiveness paid off as Goyrand pulled his men back to Morne Fortune and the British arrived on the Heights of Anse du Choc to discover two abandoned enemy batteries. The admiral and general made the second landing at Anse du Choc on the morning of the 27th.4
With the two northern landings expedited, Abercromby now had to clear the way for an attack on the fortress of Morne Fortune. The capture of Morne Chabot, an eminence to the east of Castries and Morne Fortune, was a vital first step. This was achieved, but it was a close run affair, the attack being poorly conducted and the troops showing their inexperience. Two detachments under the command of Moore and Brigadier General John Hope were ordered to assail the Morne Chabot from two different sides. Moore set out at midnight on the 27th by the more circuitous route with seven companies of the 53rd, 200 men of Malcolm’s Rangers and 50 of Lowenstein’s Chasseurs. Hope took the more direct road with 350 men of the 57th, 150 of Malcolm’s and 50 of Lowenstein’s. The total British force amounted to around 1,100 and Goyrand’s Republican defenders near to 750. The objective was to make a simultaneous attack at dawn but, despite the difficult ascent, Moore’s column made contact with an enemy piquet one and a half hours before the appointed time and he had little option but to push on and attack alone. The terrain was difficult and the troops hesitant and Moore drove them forward, leading by example. The outcome was in the balance when the men at the front, who were reluctant to charge with the bayonet, received friendly fire from those behind them but some forward momentum was maintained and the enemy was finally forced off the summit, a number bayoneted and a handful taken prisoner.
We will return to Moore’s account in Chapter 10 but here it is sufficient to say that the officer admitted that he had never ‘made greater efforts or ever run more personal danger’. The soldiers had shown willing, but they were not the disciplined, battle-hardened warriors of Grey’s campaigns. British losses were 60 to 70 killed and wounded; Abercromby estimated that 50 of the enemy were dead. Moore informed Hope that he was in possession of Morne Chabot. The second column had only reached the bottom of the hill at the time of the attack by the first. The two commanders agreed to leave the 53rd and some riflemen on Morne Chabot and to consoli
date their position by also occupying Morne Duchazeau three miles to the south. This post was thought to be of ‘infinite importance’ as it was adjacent to and higher than the enemy stronghold of Morne Fortune and ensured communication between the troops already ashore and landing to the north of Castries and those of the third division which was to land at Anse la Raye to the south. Moore set up camp on the peak and ridge of Duchazeau and threw up advanced posts within 1,200 yards of Morne Fortune. These were only six to seven yards from the enemy’s forward positions.5
On 28 April, Major General William Morshead disembarked his 1,900 men at Anse la Raye. The coming ashore was uneventful but there was sharp skirmishing with Republican outposts before Morshead’s force was able to take up its assigned position on the Cul de Sac River to the south of Morne Fortune. Abercromby was under no illusion that the capture of the Morne would be straightforward. On 2 May, he confided to Dundas that he was daunted by what he saw; ‘…the difficulty in reducing this island will be greater than I apprehended, not from any increased number of blacks in arms but totally from the natural strength of the country’. The Morne was more of a hill than a mountain, standing at 700 feet, but it was well fortified with various works and artillery and held by Goyrand’s determined 2,000 strong garrison. A summons for its surrender on the 28th had been summarily rejected.
The first step to reduce the Morne was to clear enemy batteries from the lower slopes on the side of the Cul de Sac. This task was entrusted to Morshead and ‘to render the Success more Sure’, he was given the support of Hope’s detachment from Morne Chabot made up of 350 men of the 42nd, the light company of the 57th and 200 of Malcolm’s Rangers. The plan was for Hope to attack the Seche battery and spike the guns whilst Morshead’s two columns, 1,200 strong, were to attack the Ciceron battery; the whole were to then join up and take up a position between the Morne Fortune and the sea. John Moore was an anxious spectator of the operation on 3 May.
At daylight, I saw our troops retreating through the valley of the Cul de Sac attacked on all sides. Our people seemed, however, to move with great regularity, though the country was woody and exposed them to be much harassed. General Hope reached his point before daylight, and sent Colonel Malcolm to attack the battery. He was killed, poor fellow, before he reached it. The men, however, got in, and even turned the guns against the enemy, but they had no spikes, and were driven from it with loss by the guns from the Fortuné. Colonel Riffel [Riddle], who commanded one of General Morshead’s columns, gained one of the batteries he was ordered to attack [the Chapuis] but, daylight coming on, he, being unsupported by the other column which had never crossed the river, was attacked and obliged to retire with loss. General Morshead had the gout and had entrusted his column, which was to have supported the other two, to Brigadier-General [James] Perryn. The latter, I understand, found his men fatigued with their march to the river which runs through the Valley de Cul de Sac, had not crossed it, and left Colonel Riffel and General Hope in the lurch. The whole retired to General Morshead’s camp with the loss of about 100 officers and men killed and wounded. The Commander-in-Chief is, I understand, infinitely displeased.
Moore understood correctly. Morshead was immediately replaced by Major General Charles Graham. Perryn, described by Abercromby as a ‘madman’, was ordered to escort the foreign cavalry to Saint Domingue.6
This abject failure made it obvious that Abercromby would have to undertake a proper siege of Morne Fortune. He could not rely on help from the local population, who had mostly fled the area, or Republican weakness. He lacked Grey’s elite troops but did, however, have a substantial force. The arrival of three new regiments (the 27th, 31st, and 57th), originally intended to form a reserve force at Barbados, increased the besieging army to 12−13,000 troops. This allowed the divisions of Moore and Graham to be connected and strengthened the investment of the Morne. There was optimism that French resistance would be quickly overcome. Henry Clinton wrote home that, ‘as the enemy have neither casements nor embrasures’, he expected that the Morne would be captured within a few days. Inside the fortifications, the obdurate Goyrand already had to ration his resources, ‘…I decided to prolong my defence as long as possible and to manage the powder even more. One can’t imagine the quantity that is consumed during a siege’. He established a workshop to make cartridges. The French commissioner estimated the enemy to be 17,000 strong, not allowing for seamen and black troops. He sent out letters in English in an attempt to incite disaffection and desertion among the attackers.
Goyrand admits that his propaganda had little effect, but Abercromby had his own problems and British progress was frustratingly slow. The construction of roads in the rugged terrain was punishing work, horses were scarce, and it was difficult to get supplies to a line of investment 10 miles long and interrupted by the Morne. The men disliked the siege work and became dispirited. Foreign cavalry refused to serve as infantry and had to be re-embarked. Abercromby was distant from the front line at headquarters at Anse du Choc and his energy was badly missed. His most senior officers – men such as Moore, Hope and Knox – were worked into the ground. On 16 May, eight pieces of ordnance opened fire but with little immediate effect. More parallels were under construction and the commander hoped that he might be in possession of the Morne in 10 to 12 days. He admitted to Dundas that the enemy’s defences were ‘in a high degree difficult to be subdued’7
Despite British efforts to isolate Goyrand, a French convoy had entered the Carénage bringing vital provisions to the besieged men. Abercromby decided to tighten the screw by taking the Vigie peninsula to the north of the harbour; this would also shorten his line of attack and silence the Vigie’s batteries which were a danger to the fleet. The attack followed a land and sea bombardment.
…on the night of the 17th, the 31st Regiment, happening to be the Regiment nearest at Hand, was ordered to march immediately after it was dark to take Possession of the Vigie, where the Enemy had not apparently more than from One Hundred and Fifty to Two Hundred Men. The first Part of the Attack succeeded to our Wish, A Battery of Three Eighteen Pounders, which was feebly defended, was seized, the Guns spiked and thrown over the Precipice. There remained on the Summit of the Hill One large Gun and Field Piece, which the Regiment was ordered to take Possession of: unfortunately the Guide was wounded and the Troops became uncertain of the right Approach to the Hill: While in this Situation the Enemy’s Grape Shot took Effect to such a Degree, as induced Lieutenant-Colonel Hay to order the Regiment to retreat, which it did with considerable loss.
Poyen gives the more heroic French version of events, ‘…the brave Vacherat, Lieutenant of the Bataillon des Antilles, seeing them [the 31st]; he cried with all his strength, ‘Camarades de la Vigie, l’ennemi s’avance; faites feu!’’. Vacherat’s fellow officer, Lemaître, held his fire until the last possible moment; two further attacks were repulsed and British casualties were estimated at 800. The British return suggests less catastrophic losses, around 200 killed and wounded. Captain Lasalle de Louisenthal of Lowenstein’s Chasseurs asserts that the confusion was such that many were victims of friendly fire. Sailors watched the disaster from their ships and drew their own conclusions. William Richardson was reluctant to blame the troops, ‘…someone unknown ordered the retreat to be beat…but the villain could not be found out’. William Dillon saw the ‘splendid effects’ of British musketry in the dark but was left lamenting the loss of life. On the following day, he watched enemy troops strip the dead of their clothes.
The second failed attack in quick succession led to soul-searching in the army. John Moore was unforgiving. ‘The attack was planned in a hurry and executed without spirit or judgement. The regiments are in general extremely bad; it is hard to say whether the officers or men are worse.’ He notes that even the successful attack on Morne Chabot nearly met the same fate and implies that Abercromby had been complacent. His chief was ‘hurt and surprised’ and certainly the commander felt the need to issue general orders in which he gav
e encouragement to his men but also stressed the importance of pushing on with the bayonet until they had achieved their objective, ‘…he trusts that in future he will never be disappointed’. His officers were more explicitly rebuked, being publicly reminded of the need to display zeal, industry and courage.8
Morne Fortune was not to be saved by British ineptitude. The bombardment was starting to drain the morale of the defenders; perhaps as many as 1,700 shells were falling on the fortress each day. Goyrand was plunged into despair by his inability to find bread for the women and children – ‘useless mouths’ − or medicines or linen for his wounded. The two main water cisterns were empty. On the 24th, the British made what was to be the decisive move, the capture of an enemy post near a flèche which formed the easterly outcrop of Morne Fortune. The energetic Moore was in the thick of the action.
About six o’clock a few of the guns were turned upon the enemy’s advanced post, and particularly upon a flèche to the right of it. When these had fired a sufficient time to dislodge whatever troops were supposed to be in and about it, the Light Infantry and Grenadiers of the 27th Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond advanced. I placed myself between the two companies when we reached the top. We were fired upon by thirty or forty men from the flèche. No resistance had been expected. The General’s orders were not to advance to the flèche, as the road to it was exposed to grape-shot from the fort, but to lodge ourselves on the reverse of the height we had gained till such time as a covered road could be made to the flèche. I immediately perceived that without the flèche and the ridge on which it stood, the possession of the first height would be of no use and that the fort would not dare fire upon us for fear of hurting their own men. I therefore ordered the two columns to attack it. They advanced briskly and the enemy abandoned it; we lost two men. The flèche stood upon a narrow ridge which ran to within 500 yards of the fort.
Death Before Glory Page 15
