76. Essays by these researchers can be found in Rowen and Wolf, The Impoverished Superpower. See especially 1–12, 127–154.
77. Marshall, “1985–1988,” interview by Guthe, 8-35.
78. Herbert E. Meyer, “Why Is the World So Dangerous?” memorandum for the director of central intelligence, unclassified, NIC# 8640-83, November 30, 1983, 5.
79. Gates, From the Shadows, 564.
80. A. W. Marshall, letter to Richard Kaufman, Joint Economic Committee, September 18, 1975, 1.
81. “Commentary,” in Joint Economic Committee, Gorbachev’s Economic Plans, vol. 1, Study Papers, 484.
82. Marshall, letter to Thomas C. Reed, 2.
83. CIA and DIA, “Gorbachev’s Modernization Program: A Status Report,” DDB-1900-140-87, August 1987, 8.
84. S. Enders Wimbush in Augier and Watts, “Conference Report on the Past, Present, and Future of Net Assessment,” unpublished, 2009, 84.
85. Wimbush in Augier and Watts, “Conference Report on the Past, Present, and Future of Net Assessment,” 85. See also Alexander Alexiev and S. Enders Wimbush, “The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces: Historical Experience, Current Practices, and Implications for the Future—An Executive Summary,” RAND R-2930/1, August 1983.
86. John H. Cushman Jr., “Applying Military Brain to Military Brawn, Again,” New York Times, December 17, 1986, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/17/us/washington-talk-pentagon-applying-military-brain-to-military-brawn-again.html, accessed November 15, 2013.
87. Andrew W. Marshall and Charles Wolf Jr., The Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: DoD, October 1988), 26.
88. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, January 11, 1988, 8.
89. Barry Watts, notes from a discussion with A. W. Marshall on CILTS, 1996.
90. Marshall, “1985–1988,” interview by Guthe, 8-33.
91. Barry Watts, interview with Dmitry Ponomareff, May 27, 2003.
92. Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security, Spring 1988, 154–65; John Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” International Security, Spring 1988, 174–185; and Barry R. Posen, “Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?” International Security, Spring 1988, 186–202.
93. Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” 174.
94. Ibid., 184.
95. Posen, “Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?,” 187, 189.
96. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” 163, 165.
97. The debate among the authors, and later with Eliot Cohen, would persist in several successive issues of International Security.
98. Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,” International Security, Summer 1988, 50–89; and James G. Roche and Barry D. Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” Strategic Studies, June 1991, 165–209.
99. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,” 56.
100. Ibid., 55.
101. Waltz, “Thoughts on Virtual Arsenals,” in Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed World, Michael J. Mazarr, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 314–15.
102. Barry R. Posen, “Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?,” 189. The French withdrew from the alliance’s military command in 1966, and all allied troops in France were told to leave. Among other things, this significantly shifted—for the worse—NATO’s ability to send Germany supplies and reinforcements, which would now have to arrive by sea much further forward in Belgium and the Netherlands. It also led to concerns regarding the reliability of French forces in time of war.
103. Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,” 60.
104. John Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” 175, 180.
105. Ibid., 181; and Barry R. Posen, “Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?,” 187.
106. Posen, “Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?” 196.
107. Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,” 76–77.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 66.
110. Ibid., 200.
111. CIA, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, vol. 2, The Estimate, January 31, 1979, IV-11.
112. CIA, Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Support of Strategic Air Operations in Central Europe, SOV 85-10001 CX, January 1985, iii.
113. Christopher J. Bowie, “How the West Would Have Won,” Air Force Magazine, July 2007, accessed at http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/July%202007/0707west.aspx. During his service at Rand, Bowie wrote classified assessments of aspect of the NATO–Warsaw Pact air balance, and later served as the Air Force’s senior civilian strategic planner.
114. John Mearsheimer, “Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance,” 176.
115. Robert McQuie, “Force Ratios,” Phalanx, June 1993, 27.
116. Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” Spring 1988, 154.
117. Ibid., 159. However, Epstein was correct in arguing that Pentagon dynamic models, such as TACWAR, were based on the Lanchester attrition model. Skeptics of such modeling were hardly limited to ONA. In 1997 Krepinevich, then serving as a member of the National Defense Panel, asked the Marine Corps’ General Charles Krulak for his reaction. Krulak responded: “Whenever I see TACWAR, I raise the ‘Bullshit Flag.’ We don’t plan on fighting on a linear battlefield and we sure as hell don’t plan on fighting a war of attrition.”
118. F. W. Lanchester, Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm (London: Constable and Company, 1916), 39–53.
119. Robert McQuie, “Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates as a Measure of Defeat,” Army, November 1987, 33.
120. Roche and Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” 194. Their critique stems from the presentation of the Adaptive Dynamic Model in Joshua M. Epstein, The Calculus of Conventional War: Dynamic Analysis Without Lanchester Theory (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1985), 21–31.
121. Roche and Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” 185.
122. Roche and Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” 194.
123. Ibid., 194–95.
124. Andrew W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Military Power, 9.
125. Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, December 7, 1988, available at http://legacy.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/files/Documents/1988-1107.Gorbachev.pdf, accessed November 6, 2013.
126. Barry Watts, “Soviet Assessments,” notes from discussions with A. W. Marshall, September 23, 25, 2002, 2.
127. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 220, 234.
Chapter 8: The Military Revolution, 1991–2000
1. A. W. Marshall, Memorandum for Fred Iklé, “Future Security Environment Working Group: Some Themes for Special Papers and Some Concerns,” September 21, 1987. In this memo, Marshall also voiced concerns regarding the long-term prospects for stability in Mexico, and the potentially huge affect of the AIDS epidemic were it not contained.
2. Ibid.
3. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy, chief ed., Soviet Military Strategy, Harriet Fast Scott, trans. (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 3rd ed. 1975), 227. The second and third editions of Soviet Military Strategy appeared in 1963 and 1968.
4. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, “The Defense of Socialism: Experience of History and the Present Day,” Red Star, May 9, 1984, trans. FBIS, Daily Report: Soviet Union. 3, no. 091, annex no. 054 May 9, 1984, R19.
5. Marshall and Wolf, The Future Security Environment, 26. The working group included Eliot Cohen, David Epstein, Fritz Ermarth, Lawrence Gershwin, James Roche, Thomas Rona, Stephen Rosen, Dennis Ross, Notra Trulock, and Dov Zakheim.
6. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar
Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). Rosen’s book would be awarded the prestigious Furniss Award as the book making the “most outstanding contribution to security studies” for that year.
8. Andrew May, “Happy Birthday, Andy!” a collection of birthday notes compiled by Mie Augier, James G. March, and James G. Roche (Palo Alto, CA: Bonde Press, 2011), 51.
9. Aaron Friedberg, “Happy Birthday, Andy!” 2011, 20–21.
10. James March, “Happy Birthday, Andy!” 2011, 43.
11. A. W. Marshall, “1989–1993,” interview by Kurt Guthe, January 25, 1995, 9.
12. Andrew Krepinevich, meeting with Andrew Marshall, September 11, 1989.
13. The United States had first employed two F-117s in Operation Just Cause during December 1989 and January 1990, which deposed Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega.
14. The Vietnam War saw the first widespread use of PGMs, with over 10,500 laser-guided bombs (LGBs) employed between February 1972 and February 1973. Barry D. Watts, Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2007), 9.
15. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Analysis of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm,” trans. LN 006–92, October 28, 1991, p. 32.
16. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in War? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 212.
17. Thomas Mahnken and James FitzSimonds, “Strategic Management Issues,” memorandum for record, August 26, 2001. Krepinevich thought a fundamental question would center on the difference between using emerging military technologies to enhance existing forms of warfare, which he referred to as “innovation,” as opposed to displacing these forms of operation to bring about a major discontinuity, or “transformation,” in the character of warfare.
18. Kendall, a West Point graduate, would later go on to serve as the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, replacing Ashton Carter in October 2011.
19. Project Checkmate was formed in the 1970s by General David Jones to provide candid assessments by experienced operators of how a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict might playout. Warden was viewed by many as a latter-day Billy Mitchell—a brilliant, forward-thinking air power theorist who also had a habit of rubbing people the wrong way.
20. Andrew F. Krepinevich, MTR working group meeting, August 1, 1991.
21. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meetings with Andrew Marshall, August 26 and 28, 1991.
22. Moore’s “law” is the observation, first made by Gordon E. Moore in 1965, that since the invention of the integrated circuit in the late 1950s, the number of transistors that can be squeezed onto an integrated circuit or microchip had doubled roughly every two years. As of 2011 Moore’s “law” continued to hold.
23. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Meeting at DARPA, November 22, 1991.
24. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meeting with Andrew Marshall, January 14, 1991.
25. Formally known as the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, it was signed by Britain, France, the USSR, the United States, and the two Germanies on September 12, 1990. It stipulated that no foreign armed forces, nuclear weapons, or carriers for nuclear weapons would be stationed or deployed in the six states composing the former East Germany, or in Berlin. In accordance with the treaty, all Russian forces were withdrawn by August 1994.
26. Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation,” International Security 13, no. 2, Fall 1988, 134.
27. Ibid., 135.
28. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, 6.
29. Ibid., 21.
30. Ibid., 251.
31. Ibid., 252.
32. Ibid., 252.
33. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), 3. This published version of the July 1992 assessment will henceforth be cited as Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, July 1992. Updated versions will be cited as unpublished ONA papers with their dates.
34. Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, July 1992, 3.
35. Ibid., 20.
36. Ibid.
37. Andrew J. Krepinevich Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” unpublished OSNA paper, July 1993, 7.
38. Anti-access capabilities are those that deny access to major fixed-point targets, especially large forward bases, whereas area-denial capabilities threaten mobile targets over an area of operations, including maritime forces, such as aircraft carrier battle groups. See Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003); and Christopher J. Bowie, The Anti-Access Threat and Theater Air Bases (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002).
39. A. W. Marshall, comments at a workshop on a mature precision-strike regime, July 17, 2012.
40. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” unpublished paper, July 1993, 30.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Admiral William A. Owens, “Systems-of-Systems: US’ Emerging Dominant Battlefield Awareness Promises to Dissipate the ‘Fog of War,’” Armed Forces Journal International, January 1996, 47. At the time, Owens was vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
44. Commander Jan van Tol, “Brief on Early RMA Gaming Insights,” prepared for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, OSD/NA, July 14, 1995.
45. Krepinevich, “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” July 1993, 27–28.
46. A. W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions—Second Version,” OSD/NA memorandum for the record, August 23, 1993, 3–4.
47. Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, July 1992, 56.
48. Ibid., 57.
49. Marshall, “1989–1993,” interview by Guthe, 9–15.
50. Other attendees included several retired flag officers, including General Larry Welch, who had preceded McPeak as the Air Force’s chief of staff, and Wolfowitz’s military assistant, Captain Lynn Wells.
51. The account of the November 11 meeting is based on Krepinevich’s notes, compiled on that day, and a summary provided to Marshall by SAIC, a consulting firm. Ron C. St. Martin and Leine E. Whittington, “The Military Technical Revolution: Opportunities for Innovation,” Draft Report, Science Applications International Corporation, January 25, 1993.
52. The policy essentially declared that military personnel would be judged on their suitability for service, not on their sexual orientation provided that orientation was not manifested by homosexual conduct.
53. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meeting with Andrew Marshall and Clark Murdock, March 18, 1993.
54. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meeting with Andrew Marshall and Clark Murdock, March 22, 1993.
55. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meeting with Ted Warner, March 26, 1993.
56. Andrew F. Krepinevich, meeting with Ted Warner, May 21, 1993.
57. William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991, 66–82.
58. William J. Perry, “Defense in an Age of Hope,” Foreign Affairs, November–December 1996, 64–79. Absent from Perry’s 1991 and 1996 Foreign Affairs articles was any sense of a competition—in regard to adversaries’ reaction to a US advantage, or what the United States should do if rivals acquired similar advantages.
59. A. W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions,” OSD/NA memorandum for the record, July 27, 1993, 4.
60. Ibid., 1.
61. Ibid., 2.
62. Ibid., 3.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 4.
65. Ibi
d.
66. Theodor W. Galdi, “Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues,” Congressional Research Service, 95–1170 F, December 11, 1995, 10, available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95–1170.htm, accessed March 2014.
67. Ibid.
68. After Krepinevich’s 1993 assessment, the next balance completed by Marshall’s staff appears to have been one of undersea warfare in 1998; however, it is unclear whether it was forwarded to William Cohen, who replaced Perry as defense secretary in January 1997, at the beginning of the second Clinton administration.
69. Williamson R. Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., “Military Innovation in Peacetime,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 414.
70. Ibid., 415.
71. Admiral William A. Owens, “JROC: Harnessing the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1994, 55–57.
72. Admiral William A. Owens, “The Emerging US System-of-Systems,” Strategic Forum, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, No. 63, February 1996; available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF_63/forum63.html, accessed May 2, 2014. For an especially interesting critique of Owens’s system-of-systems notion, see Lieutenant General (Ret.) Paul K. Van Riper and Lieutenant Colonel F. G. Hoffman, “Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare,” National Security Studies Quarterly, Summer 1998, 1–7.
73. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Vision 2010, July 1996, 13.
74. Ibid. Joint Vision 2020, which appeared in May 2000, was even more adamant that Clausewitzian friction is inherent in military operations and it sources cannot be eliminated.
75. See Admiral William A. Owens with Ed Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 2000), 12–15.
76. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Revised Edition), McNair Paper Number 68 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies, 2004). The first edition of Clausewitzian Friction and Future War was McNair Paper 52 published in 1996.
77. A. W. Marshall, taped interview with Barry D. Watts, January 9, 2006.
The Last Warrior Page 40
