by Peter Hart
Major General Walker and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Brudenell White, could not accept that this failure was irreversible. Captain Jess went forward to see what was happening for himself. When he got there he found the outlook worse than his darkest imaginings.
The scene in the tunnel I shall never forget – men leaning against the walls in the darkness without a word, and what their thoughts must have been God only knows, but they must have been a hundred times worse than mine, and I knew how hopeless was the job – with no chance of surprise in it. However it had to be tried. I found Bennett in the forward firing line doing his best to reorganise his men, who were more or less stunned. The groans of the wounded still in the recesses, and the awful blackness and silence, were enough to take the heart out of anyone. Bennett himself wanted to lead the first line in the new attack as he felt it his duty. I would not agree as I pointed out it was his duty to feed with reinforcements the daring men who went out first. We eventually got the wounded and dying out, which I shall never forget as they nearly all had three or four wounds, but seldom a groan as they were pulled out of the recesses and along the bumpy dark tunnel floor.32
Captain Carl Jess, Headquarters, 2nd Australian Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
Major Bennett had no choice but to set about reorganising his men for the second attempt. He knew it was a waste of lives, but, despite having tried to get the assault cancelled, he was not willing to disobey a direct order.
The tunnels were cleared of wounded; officers were given fresh orders for the attack and a commencement was made to reorganise the men ready for the charge. In the dark and crowded tunnels this took two hours to accomplish. But at last everything was ready. Everyone in those tunnels knew they were embarking on a forlorn hope. They knew the Turks were waiting to mow them down the moment they showed themselves. Still, they decided to give the best that was in them to make a success of the venture. The signal was given.33
Major Henry Gordon Bennett, 6th (Victoria) Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
There had been countless frustrations and delays, but at last they were ready. So it was that Bennett watched his men go to their deaths when the new attack was finally launched at 03.53.
The enemy answered it with a hail of lead from the trench 20 yards away. Our men scrambled from the posts, only to be shot down. A few survived, to find themselves alone on reaching the enemy trench. As they essayed to return, they too were hit. For the second time the assault had failed, not because the men were unwilling to face the danger, but because it was physically impossible to succeed.34
Major Henry Gordon Bennett, 6th (Victoria) Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
This time it was Captain Jess who rang brigade headquarters, at 04.10, to tell Brigadier General John Forsyth that the attempt had failed. Jess then found himself trapped in a circular nightmare as Walker and Brudenell White at divisional headquarters still refused to accept defeat.
Forsyth informed Divisional Headquarters who I believe nearly went mad. Anyway he was ordered to come round and reorganise the Battalion and supervise another attack personally. When he arrived I shall never forget his face. He knew as well as I did that the men were by this time unnerved, had been for about 36 hours without sleep, and that to attempt such an attack in daylight was slaughter. However he was ordered to do it and we had to try. We had no idea of our losses and could only withdraw right out of the trench and reorganise. The sight on the terraces in rear of Quinn’s Post would make anyone’s heart bleed to see the weary nerve-strained men moving listlessly into their places and alongside them the dressing place with scores of badly wounded men, two in particular writhing about in the death throes.35
Captain Carl Jess, Headquarters, 2nd Australian Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
Yet for a while it seemed that, come what may, the 6th Battalion would again be put to the sword.
At about 8 o’clock Major Glasford came round from Division and I put it to him that the men were not fit and it would be sheer murder to put them at it in daylight. To make matters worse, with the dawn No. 3 Section attempted to attack the Chessboard, and this with our big breakout on the left brought a hell of an artillery fire on to our already shattered trenches. At about 9 o’clock we received word from General Walker that no further effort would be required of the 6th that day but we were asked if any other Battalion was better fitted for the job – as if any men in the world could have done more. Forsyth replied and said that all Battalions of the Brigade were the same type of men. Forsyth took it much to heart.36
Captain Carl Jess, Headquarters, 2nd Australian Brigade, 1st Division, AIF
All in all, the 6th Battalion lost eighty killed and sixty-six wounded. It was a dreadful episode, now largely forgotten, but surely worthy of remembrance.
The failure of the 6th Battalion would have terrible consequences for the interlinked assaults planned to follow on The Nek, the Chessboard, Dead Man’s Ridge and from Quinn’s Post. These attacks were already heavily reliant for their success on the New Zealand Brigade capturing Chunuk Bair and then launching a simultaneous attack down through Battleship Hill on to Baby 700. Indeed, unless the New Zealanders took the Turkish positions from the rear, these attacks were doomed to fail. At ANZAC Corps headquarters Birdwood and Skeen considered the situation reports: they knew the New Zealanders were well behind schedule and still struggling up Rhododendron Ridge. It was a difficult decision. As Skeen put it: ‘It is not the Light Horse I am anxious about. I think they will be all right. What I hope is that they will help the New Zealanders.’37 Birdwood decided to proceed on the grounds that the frontal assault would prevent the Turkish garrison from moving reserves to block the New Zealanders. This surely was a sacrifice too far.
So it was that the 3rd Light Horse Brigade went over the top at The Nek and into legend. They would go over in four waves, 150 men in each, and with the 8th Light Horse having the dubious honour of going over the top first. The slow preliminary bombardment blazed into life at 04.00 with shells pouring down on to the Turkish trenches at both The Nek and the Chessboard. As ever, the barrage appeared more destructive than it was and its effect was further diminished when it ended prematurely at 04.23. Controversy surrounds this issue, but the relative inaccuracy of timepieces in 1915, coupled with some inadequate synchronisation, are the most likely reasons for the curtailment. In all probability it made little difference to the outcome. Forewarned, the Turks cocked their rifles, put their machine guns into position and waited for the assault. In a courageous gesture, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander White insisted on leading his men over the top; however, by so doing he was neglecting his primary role of providing tactical leadership. Perhaps the Light Horse should have attacked immediately the barrage stopped, but the confusion was too great, the time too short to react quickly enough. The first wave leapt over the parapet at 04.30; in front of them lay The Nek, just twenty-five yards across at its narrowest point, with sixty bare yards to cross to the Turkish trenches.
They were waiting ready for us and simply gave us a solid wall of lead. I was in the first line to advance and we did not get 10 yards. Every one fell like lumps of meat. All your pals that had been with you for months and months blown and shot out of all recognition. I got mine shortly after I got over the bank and it felt like a million ton hammer falling on my shoulder. I was really awfully lucky as the bullet went in just below the shoulder blade round by my throat and came out just a tiny way from my spine low down on the back. It was simply murder.38
Sergeant Cliff Pinnock, 8th (Victoria) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
Fire poured in from right, left and straight ahead. No question about the presence of machine guns this time: the open ground of The Nek was alive with bullets. The whole wave was down in the dust and dirt in thirty seconds. The gallant White and all the officers who attacked with him were killed in seconds.39 In the chaos one of the yellow and red signal flags intended to indicate progress had been reported briefly fluttering in the T
urkish front line on the right flank of the attack. This meant nothing – whoever was carrying it had surely been butchered – but the report would engender false optimism in higher authorities, with fatal consequences for the men in the third wave. Meanwhile, the second wave went over the top just two minutes after the first. With them was Lieutenant Andrew Crawford.
There was the din of rifles, machine guns and bombs. On mounting the parapet just in front of us was a double row of Turks with bayonets fixed, firing at us. Most of the first wave were down: either killed, wounded, or had taken cover. I was soon laid out with a couple of bullet wounds in my body and a graze on my head. I could not move and was eventually dragged back into our trenches, while the Turks seemed to pause for a few minutes, realising that they had stopped the attack.40
Lieutenant Andrew Crawford, 8th (Victoria) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
Trooper Alex Borthwick was already shot through the buttocks when he was badly menaced by the bombs lobbed by the Turks into No Man’s Land.
It hurt for a moment but I thought to myself, ‘I am wounded and have a good excuse to retire!’ But finding it was nothing I had to continue to lie there while the Turks from their trenches 10 yards away were throwing bombs on to the top of my ridge. How I escaped being killed I don’t know. The bombs are round like a cricket ball and one rolled over my neck, bumped alongside my body and burst a little lower down the hill. The bombs killed a lot of men that day. They make frightful, ghastly wounds.41
Trooper Alex Borthwick, 8th (Victoria) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
The charge had been a complete failure and Lieutenant Colonel Noel Brazier of the 10th Light Horse, whose men would form the third and fourth waves, rushed back to brigade headquarters to try to get the attack abandoned. But now the question of the cursed signal flag briefly seen in the Turkish front line obscured all reason, for Brazier was ordered to follow up this supposed success by the 8th Light Horse. And of course Colonel White could not support his efforts as he was dead. In the absence of Brigadier General Hughes, it fell to his brigade major, Lieutenant Colonel Jack Antill, brusquely to order them to push on. So it was that the third wave went over at 04.45. By now they all knew it was hopeless.
I was in between the Sergeant and the Sergeant Major. The Sergeant said to me, being the youngest fellow in the regiment, ‘Now listen to me lad, there is no hope for us, so as soon as you get over the top lie down!’ I was pushed down – I wasn’t allowed to lie down! Fortunately we got into a groove in the land and we laid there all day until night came and we crawled back into the trench.42
Trooper Charles Williams, 10th (Western Australia) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
Brazier tried his best to stop the fourth wave charging and indeed had angry confrontations with both Antill and Hughes. Tragically, while he was arguing back at the brigade headquarters, in all the uncertainty the fourth wave went over without clear orders at about 05.15. With them was Sergeant Sanderson of the 10th Light Horse.
The rhododendron bushes had been cut off with machine gun fire and were all spiky. The Turks were two-deep in the trench ahead. There was at least one machine gun on the left and any number in the various trenches on the Chessboard. The men who were going out were absolutely certain that they were going to be killed, and they expected to be killed right away. The thing that struck a man most was if he wasn’t knocked in the first 3 yards.43
Sergeant William Sanderson, 10th (Western Australia) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
Trooper James Fitzmaurice did slightly better than that – he got about twenty yards before he took cover.
As soon as we went over we went to ground and kept your nose to the ground – never moved, if you lifted your head at all you would have got it. We were fortunate; we were in a little depression. You were just waiting for orders, listening. We were there about three-quarters of an hour and then we got the order to retire. That was passed along the line several times and we retired, turned round on our bellies and crawled back with our noses that close to the ground, you know you couldn’t get any closer! And fell back into our trenches.44
Trooper James Fitzmaurice, 10th (Western Australia) Light Horse, 3rd Light Horse Brigade, AIF
A secondary follow-up attack by the 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, planned to burst out of Monash Valley between Russell’s Top and Pope’s Hill, was entirely conditional on success at The Nek. In the confusion, however, at 05.10 the go-ahead was given by the staff of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. The result was a predictable failure as the Turks threw bombs down the steep slopes to deadly effect. The attempt was soon abandoned. There was no way through The Nek on 7 August.
Meanwhile, the 1st Light Horse were launching an audacious but suicidal attack from Pope’s Hill across Waterfall Gully and directed against the Turkish trenches on Dead Man’s Ridge, with the Chessboard immediately behind it. Lieutenant Geoffrey Harris and his men had set off to climb stealthily up Waterfall Gully at 03.30 in an effort to be in position at Zero Hour at 04.30. Against all the odds they had some initial success.
I fell in my little party of twelve bomb throwers and twelve riflemen with fixed bayonets in support. The latter had orders not to fire a shot without orders, but to use the cold steel. We marched silently down our communication trenches to the gully, where we waited 10 minutes while the engineers opened the barbed wire entanglements for us to get through. Then up to the waterfall, which we scaled, to be met by a shower of Turkish bombs before we had time to get into any sort of order. I immediately gave the order to charge and we quickly took the first two lines of trenches in our course bombing the Turks out. Our bombers went on and took the third line trenches on a narrow front and we could just see the Turks getting back along their communication trenches. It was just breaking daylight when we went over the hill to be met by the crescent trench, full of Turks, half out their trench, waiting for us. Machine guns were barking on three sides of us. Seeing that we could get no further, I gave the order ‘Down!’ and went to earth just as a bullet hit my shoulder. Sergeant Ellis went down on my right – killed instantly, riddled with bullets at close range. Luckily, I fell in a small depression out of sight of the Turks.45
Lieutenant Geoffrey Harris, 1st (New South Wales) Light Horse, 1st Light Horse Brigade, AIF
Harris managed to get back safely. All over Dead Man’s Ridge the scattered parties of the 1st Light Horse tried to consolidate their tenuous position clinging to the steep slopes.
At present I am lying on the side of the hill trying to keep under a bit of cover. Bombs are terrible. Dead all around. God keep and protect me. I am not scared but it’s hell. Could not hold position. Bombed out of it. I was dodging bombs all the time. Writing this as I rest on the way back. Suppose we will have another go again later on. It’s hell right enough. Where I was lying on the hill there were four dead chaps beside and in front of me. No one living – bombs, I think. Don’t think we ran when we retreated. We damned well walked. Most of us, especially the survivors of the charge, are very weak and feel sore and bruised all over the body where stones hit us as they were chucked up by exploding bombs. Four or five of our wounded chaps are still lying out under the Turks’ trenches. I would volunteer to go and have a cut for them but it’s sheer suicide and I could no more carry a man at present than fly. I’m too sore and feel very weak.46
Corporal David Lindsay, 1st (New South Wales) Light Horse, 1st Light Horse Brigade, AIF
At one point some of them managed to gain a foothold on a couple of bays in the Turkish trenches. This just triggered more slaughter on both sides.
Notwithstanding the great losses they suffered, eight or ten of their men managed to penetrate a covered area of our trench. All the same very few of them, and of those who came to their aid, managed to escape, with the remainder being toppled. The battle ended at 07.00 and, as it was a very violent battle, we suffered 52 dead and 166 wounded. I submit also the information that the artillery fire on our trenches, fo
llowing the repulse of the enemy, resulted in the partial destruction of our trenches and caused most of our casualties.47
Major Halis Bey, 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment, 9th Division, Fifth Army
In the end the 1st Light Horse were forced to retreat with nothing achieved. The attempt by the 2nd Light Horse surging out from Quinn’s Post towards the Chessboard was also repulsed as the fifty men in the first wave were cut down by machine guns not only from directly in front of them, but from German Officer’s Trench and Dead Man’s Ridge on either side. Their commanding officer, Major G. H. Bourne, had the strength of mind to call off the attack, thereby avoiding further pointless slaughter.
All of these attacks had been failures: they had been pursued with the utmost gallantry, but as serious operations of war they represented unprofessional madness. Men cannot advance against massed machine gun fire; courage alone cannot win through. Furthermore, utter failures effortlessly dealt with by local garrisons, do not divert reinforcements. The sacrifice of the 8th and 10th Light Horse at The Nek (372 casualties, of which 234 were dead) has attained a particular notoriety due to populist Australian attempts to link the slaughter there with the British failure to progress as planned at Suvla. This is a red herring: their slender hopes of success on The Nek rested on the New Zealanders’ capture of Chunuk Bair and had nothing whatsoever to do with the British at Suvla. Moreover, the Gallipoli campaign had many similar disasters that few now choose to recall. Who now remembers the Turkish attack with an almost identical butcher’s bill on the very same ground on 29–30 June? On that occasion it was the self-same Light Horsemen that revelled in dealing out the death and destruction; war is full of tragic ironies.
THE NEXT CHAPTER in the saga of the great Anzac breakout would take place on 8 August. The assaulting columns had failed to achieve their objectives by dawn on 7 August, but there was still hope that they might yet prosper before the Turkish reserves could arrive in force next day. As part of a general advance the Wellington Battalion, supported by the 7th Gloucestershires and 8th Welsh Regiment, were to spearhead a renewed attack on Chunuk Bair after an artillery bombardment and massed machine gun fire commencing at 03.30. To general surprise, this seems to have caused the Turks temporarily to withdraw from the summit.
