After Kishi no LDP government could ignore the division in values between liberals and progressives on one side, and conservatives on the other, especially when the division was expressed at the polls. Accordingly, divisive issues of constitutional revision and remilitarization remained off the agenda of Ikeda’s successor, Sato Eisaku (Kishi’s half brother). Prime Minister Sato’s goal was one of economic growth and national unity based on material affluence. By pursuing “consensus politics,” and encouraging forgetfulness of Japan’s militarist and colonialist past, he was able to stay in office for eight years, 1964 to 1972, longer than any other prime minister. Like his predecessor Ikeda, Sato idolized Yoshida Shigeru, and from the start of his tenure he sought to please the old emperor, as Yoshida had, by his pro-American policy and also by keeping Hirohito fully abreast of political developments.
On December 26, approximately six weeks after forming his cabinet, Sato visited the palace to brief the emperor for the first time.37 They soon developed a warm personal relationship. Thereafter (except when campaigning or traveling abroad) Sato went out of his way to report to Hirohito on international affairs, national politics, education and defense issues, the economy, and agricultural policy. He reported frequently and at length, sometimes even while visiting the palace for investiture ceremonies and imperial awards. Eager to follow, and be part of, state affairs, Hirohito plied Sato with questions.
In the mid-and late 1960s President Lyndon Johnson was beginning to escalate the war in Vietnam, and protesting Japanese students were focusing on the American bases in Okinawa from which B-52s were taking off to bomb North Vietnam. Sato fully supported the American aggression against North Vietnam. As the war intensified, the importance of both Japan and Okinawa to the United States increased. In October 1964 China tested its first atomic bomb. Exactly two years later China, which was descending into the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, test-fired a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to any target in East Asia. It soon became clear to some in Washington that in due time continental-size China would acquire a nuclear arsenal. This meant Okinawa would be more important to the United States. A rethinking of U.S.–China relations was clearly necessary.
Hirohito’s personal thoughts about the first Chinese bomb and the later missile launch are not known. It is likely, however, that neither he nor Sato questioned the usefulness of the American “nuclear umbrella” even though China was now embarked on nuclear missile development. Hirohito’s questions, according to Sato, focused on the increasingly troubled economic relationship with the United States. At such times Sato would try to keep him abreast of the progress he was making in the textile dispute. They also talked about the course of the Vietnam War, how the prime minister was dealing with student protests, and the policies of President Johnson and those of the even more inscrutable Nixon. While Hirohito appreciated Sato’s handling of foreign and domestic affairs, he would occasionally express anger at the corruption of LDP Diet members and cabinet officials.38
During Sato’s tenure in office, Hirohito moved into a new, scaled-down palace (1964), participated in the hosting of the Olympic Games in Tokyo (also in 1964), the staging of the “Meiji Centennial” ceremonies (1968), which celebrated a century of “successful modernization,” and the World Exposition in Osaka, where he and the empress twice made appearances (1970). These events strengthened pride in Japan’s economic achievements and asserted the dignity of the nation. National pride and dignity were further enhanced when Sato negotiated the retrocession of Okinawa to Japan’s control (1972). A large continuing American military presence was allowed, however, because both sides wanted the island to remain America’s “Gibraltar of the Pacific.” On the occasion of the final return ceremony in Tokyo, Hirohito met visiting foreign dignitaries and gave a short speech expressing his condolences for the sacrifices made by the people of Okinawa both during and following the war. 39
While Sat and the LDP conservatives governed, the elderly Hirohito once again could dream of becoming more active, even again the head of state. He did continue meeting foreign dignitaries and royals. As during the early, youthful years of his reign, he hosted palace receptions and elegant garden parties—though they were of course quite different gatherings. He attended national sports events and helped the LDP convey to the world the Japanese idea of peace and prosperity. In 1970 Sat suggested Hirohito travel to Europe again. Hirohito agreed and the next year, after he had turned seventy, he and Empress Nagako departed. Fifty-five years earlier, rightists had protested his grand tour. This time the protests came from the Left, and made his journey literally a rude awakening, both for him and the Japanese nation. In the seven countries he visited, but especially in the Netherlands, West Germany, and Britain, angry demonstrators hurled objects and insults at his motorcade. They clearly did not see him as a symbol of peace or regard the Japanese people as only or primarily victims of war—at that time, a view still widely held in Japan. Hirohito and Nagako returned home but the protests in Europe reminded many that “war responsibility” was not just an issue of the past.
After Hirohito’s European tour Japan turned to normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China, which was achieved by Sato’s successor, Tanaka Kakuei (1972–74). Under Tanaka, Japanese politicians continued the “double standard” in public comments on the lost war. When, on February 2, 1973, Prime Minister Tanaka was asked by a Communist Diet member whether he thought the Japan-China war had been a war of aggression, he replied blandly and blankly: “It is true that Japan once sent troops to the Chinese continent; this is a historical fact. But when you ask me straightforwardly whether that constituted, as you say, a war of aggression, it is very hard for me to answer. This is a question for future historians to evaluate.” Few Japanese found Tanaka’s evasion objectionable.40 Fewer still saw any connection between his nonreply and a need to protect Hirohito.
Hirohito had continued to receive—as a courtesy, though one in violation of the constitution—secret informal briefings on international and military affairs. These opportunities for him to convey his views to the leaders of government did not become known to the Japanese public until May 1973, when Masuhara Keikichi, the head of the Self-Defense Agency under the Tanaka cabinet, disclosed to a journalist that the emperor had counseled him to “firmly incorporate [into the expansion plan for the Self-Defense Forces] the good points of the old army and avoid the bad ones.”41 Public criticism resulted: Why had the seventy-two-year-old “symbol” emperor been secretly briefed? Hirohito’s reference to “the good points of the old army,” forced Tanaka to dismiss Masuhara and led the emperor to lament, “If something like this can become an issue, then I am nothing more than a papier-mâché doll.”42
Following this incident Tanaka and his immediate successors (Miki Takeo, Fukuda Takeo, and hira Masayoshi) ended the emperor’s military briefings by the head of the Self-Defense Forces, which had been going on since the early 1960s. Yet Hirohito’s passionate interest in all matters military, political, and diplomatic never waned. During the late 1970s, when Japanese companies were expanding their activities throughout Southeast Asia and China, helping to make Japan an economic “superpower,” high government officials continued reporting to their elderly monarch on military and diplomatic matters, and professors from different universities continued lecturing to him on foreign affairs.
By mid-1975 approximately one half the Japanese population had been born after World War II.43 The “heroic war dead” view of the lost war, which had reaffirmed the values of imperial Japan, was no longer so popular as it had been during the first two decades after independence. Whether as sightseeing tourists, or as serious pilgrims traveling to old World War II battlefields, as if to religious shrines, to collect bones, Japanese were going abroad in ever-growing numbers. In China, Southeast Asia, and the islands of the Pacific, they gradually discovered how foreigners had suffered at the hands of the Japanese military, and how many in Asia still viewed Japan as inherently mi
litaristic and aggressive. They were starting to overcome a narrow concentration on their own war sacrifices.
In September 1975 Emperor Hirohito and Empress Nagako paid their only state visit to the United States. Five years earlier Prime Minister Sato Eisaku and the emperor had discussed the idea of a trip to assuage economic frictions. The actual planning for the trip did not begin until 1973. On the eve of his departure, seventy-four-year-old Hirohito gave an exclusive interview to Newsweek journalist Bernard Krisher. As reported in the evening Asahi of September 22, 1975, one of Krisher’s eleven questions was: “It is well known that at the time of the ending of the war you took an important role. How then do you answer those who claim that you participated also in the policy process leading to the decision to open hostilities?” Hirohito replied:
Yes, I myself made the decision to end the war. The prime minister sought my opinion because he couldn’t unify the views of the cabinet…. But at the time of opening hostilities, the cabinet made the decision, and I was unable to overturn it. I believe my action was in agreement with the articles of the constitution of Japan.44
Nearly seven years after the Japanese publication of the Kido diaries, which showed that the emperor had never blindly followed the will of anyone, either cabinet or military, and the Sugiyama memo, which had revealed how highly active and interventionist a monarch he had been, Hirohito still mechanically reiterated the false litany that had helped to sustain him and conservative politics through three postwar decades: He had been a faithful constitutional monarch, who bore no responsibility for having started the war but deserved all the credit for having ended it; the Meiji constitution had required him to accept the advice of the cabinet when exercising his power of supreme command and his right to declare war and make peace. And so on.
On September 22 foreign journalists who resided in Tokyo asked Hirohito more questions. “[M]any Americans expect your majesty to say something about the Japan-U.S. war of the 1940s. How do you intend to answer this question?” Hirohito replied, “I am examining this question. Right now I prefer not to express my views.” In short, no comment. Further into the interview, he was asked: “Your Majesty, do you think the values of the Japanese people have changed over the past thirty years?” Hirohito replied, “I know various people have stated many different views since the end of the war, but seen broadly I don’t think there has been any change [of values] from prewar to postwar.”45 Hirohito’s strong emphasis on continuity could be taken as a denial that foreign occupation and reform had changed the essentials in the Japanese value-structure. Yet it could also be heard as an expression of his resolve to assert the old nonsense of the monarchy’s unchanged nature.
At the end of this interview, Hirohito was asked again about his role in starting and ending the war. “You said that you had acted in accord with the stipulations of the [Meiji] constitution. That statement seems to imply that you did not oppose the military at that time. Consequently I would like to ask your majesty whether you, personally, ever felt that Japan’s military leaders led it into a fruitless and wrong adventure?” Hirohito replied: “The facts may have been as you have stated, but as the people involved are still living, if I comment now I will be criticizing persons who were leaders of that time. I do not care to do so.”46 It was unclear as to which leaders he was referring, though clearly not to himself, for throughout the occupation Hirohito had criticized everyone around him, except for Tj and Kido, for having lost the war.
A few weeks after this series of interviews, while on his first formal state visit to Washington, Hirohito expressed his “profound sadness” over World War II to President Gerald Ford, who had visited Japan the previous year. There followed a whirlwind tour of the United States. The climax was at Disneyland, in California, where the smiling emperor made a walkabout with Mickey Mouse. Later he petted a koala bear at the San Diego Zoo.47 Photographs of the elderly emperor delighted many Americans, and seemed to confirm the false stereotype of him as a monarch who had always been peaceminded but helpless.
On returning to Tokyo, Hirohito was interviewed on television (October 31). Alerted to the war responsibility issue by the emperor’s interviews with the foreign press corps and his remark to President Ford, a Japanese newsman pounced, asking the “improper” and embarrassing question: “Your majesty, at your White House banquet you said, ‘I deeply deplore that unfortunate war.’ Does your majesty feel responsibility for the war itself, including the opening of hostilities [that is, not just for the defeat]? Also, what does your majesty think about so-called war responsibility?”
Hirohito’s face stiffened: “I can’t answer that kind of question because I haven’t thoroughly studied the literature in this field, and so don’t really appreciate the nuances of your words.” When asked about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, he said, “It’s very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped, and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima. But it couldn’t be helped because that happened in wartime.”48 Hirohito’s pretense of ignorance, as if he had been an innocent bystander to the events of his reign, was too much for many Japanese viewers. His “it couldn’t be helped” remark, denying any role in the events that had led to the tragedy of Hiroshima, especially angered professional historians. That year Inoue Kiyoshi published the first carefully documented account of Hirohito’s contributions at each stage of the China and Pacific wars. Nezu Masashi followed with the first critical biography. The work of unmasking the emperor had begun.
Three months after this interview, the Kyd News Agency surveyed three thousand men and women on the state of the monarchy. More than 80 percent responded. Nearly 57 percent of these respondents either believed that the emperor bore war responsibility or were unsure if he did. By his answers to the various interview questions, Hirohito showed, once again, that he was out of step with the feelings of the majority of the Japanese people.49
V
Hirohito’s European and American visits, together with his various press interviews, helped the Japanese people to reengage with the long-buried question of his war responsibility. But for Hirohito the foreign tours and the interviews had no such effect. For him, the event that triggered a confrontation with the past was more personal. Certain reminiscences on the war by his brother, Prince Takamatsu, had appeared in the February 1975 issue of the popular journal Bungei shunj. Hirohito seems not to have learned about the article until January 1976.50 Interviewed on the war by journalist Kase Hideaki, Prince Takamatsu implied that he had been a dove and Hirohito a reckless hawk. He told of the incident on November 30, 1941, when he had spoken to his brother for five minutes, warning him that the navy high command could feel confident only if the war lasted no longer than two years. Takamatsu also recalled warning his brother to end the war right after the Battle of Midway. And he told how, in June 1944, he had shocked a meeting of staff officers at Navy General Headquarters by telling them that “Since the absolute defense perimeter has already been destroyed…our goal should be to focus on the best way to lose the war.” Finally, Takamatsu revealed that he and Prince Konoe had considered asking the emperor to abdicate prior to surrender.51
Learning of these disclosures, Hirohito grew very upset. He felt his brother had gone too far. What could he do to save his reputation as emperor? For the first time since he dictated his “Monologue” and, with Inada Shichi and Kinoshita Michio, made the first “Record of the Emperor’s Conversations” (Haichroku), Hirohito returned to the task of setting the historical record straight. The project to record the events of his reign and define the place that he would occupy in history focused on his role during the years of war and occupation. It quickly turned into a consuming interest that haunted him for the rest of his life. By nature the least self-reflective of men, Hirohito became obsessed with his past.
In February 1976, assisted by his grand chamberlain, Irie Sukemasa, Hirohito began to make the second Haichroku. Irie worked on the revisions until his death in 1983. It is tempting to imagine Hirohito continuing, he
lped by some other aide, almost until his own death six years later. The process involved Hirohito dictating to Irie, ordering him to put in new “facts” as he, the emperor, remembered them. Hirohito would then reread Irie’s revised version of some event, correct it, and return it for polishing and copying out in ink on high-quality paper. Sometimes Hirohito would summon Irie daily or twice daily to make a change in the text. But hardly a week went by when the two old men were not at work together.
On November 10, 1976, Hirohito, now seventy-five years old, took time off from his secret history project to celebrate his fiftieth year on the throne. The state ceremony at the heavily guarded Martial Arts Hall (Budkan) in Tokyo was attended by some 7,500 dignitaries. Noticeably absent were representatives of the Socialist and Communist Parties and several prefectural governors who were opposed in principle to honoring the first twenty years of his “Shwa” reign, when he was at the height of his power. When it was over, Hirohito went back to his dictation, and to relying on Irie’s literary skills. By the end of 1976, Irie had filled more than “nine notebooks plus a conclusion” with the emperor’s revised account of events.52
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 69
