7. Gordon M. Berger, “Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945” in Peter Duus, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 6, The Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 105–6.
8. Cited in Tanaka Hiromi, “Kyoz no gunshin Tg Heihachir,” in This is Yomiuri (Sept. 1993), p. 220.
9. Kat Kanji, “Kokka minjinron no seishinka,” in Kokuhon (Jan. 26, 1926).
10. Ogasawara’s Tg gensui shden first appeared in a limited edition in the spring of 1921; it was reissued in an inexpensive popular edition in 1925. See Tanaka Hiromi, “Kyoz no gunshin Tg Heihachir,” pp. 234–35.
11. Tanaka, “Kyoz no gunshin Tg Heihachir,” pp. 225, 236, 239.
12. Answer to Japan, Southwest Pacific Area, July 1, 1944, p. 9. From the Bonner F. Fellers collection at the Hoover Institution.
13. Kiyozawa Retsu, Gendai Nihon bunmeishi, dai sankan, gaikshi (Ty Keizai Shinpsha, 1941), p. 437; Stephen Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 2–3.
14. MNN, p. 417.
15. NH, pp. 59–60, cited with the permission of the author.
16. Masuda Tomoko, “Tenn, kindai,” in Nihonshi, yonkan (Heibonsha, 1994), p. 1243–44.
17. On the first floor of Hirohito’s redesigned palace were waiting rooms and a large (twenty-mat-size), chastely furnished audience chamber, partitioned into two sections. A telephone manned by a chamberlain was mounted on a wall in the carpeted corridor leading from the reception rooms to the outer audience chamber. When Hirohito was ready to receive someone, he or an aide would phone, signaling the guest to advance into the “outer room.” The guest would bow slightly on entering, bow again after stepping into the “inner room,” and execute a very deep bow before the imperial table. Exiting in the emperor’s presence required doing the “crab walk,” making sure, that is, to retreat by walking sideways to the door so as never to turn one’s back to him.
Hirohito’s audience chamber, which doubled as his lecture room, contained a mantelpiece screening a recessed electric heater. In front of the mantelpiece were his chair and desk. A long oval table abutted the desk. Display shelves lined one wall, painted in a traditional pattern of royal purple waves with golden plovers and mist above. The same design adorned the wall behind his seat.
Above this audience room on the second floor were his study, library, and office, where the imperial seals were stored and only high court officials and chamberlain were allowed. There he would read and counter-sign documents that required his sanction. See Nihon Gendaishi Shiry Kenkykai, “Okabe Nagaakira shi danwa kiroku,” n.d., pp. 11–12. I am indebted to historian Okabe Makio for a copy of this record.
18. NH, pp. 5–6.
19. KYN, dai ikkan, p. 81.
20. Suzuki, Kshitsu seido: Meiji kara sengo made, p. 168. According to Makino (p. 317) Prime Minister Tanaka had asked Chinda to ask the emperor to say a kind word to Mizuno.
21. Ibid.
22. Kojima, Tenn, dai nikan, p. 33; Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931 (Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 197–205.
23. MNN, p. 322.
24. NH, pp. 22–24.
25. Ibid., p. 23.
26. KYN, dai sankan, p. 23; MNN, pp. 336–37; and NH, p. 23.
27. Okabe Nagakage, Okabe Nagakage nikki: Shwa shoki kazoku kanry no kiroku. Shy Kurabu, ed. (Kashiwa Shob, 1993), pp. 60–61.
28. NH, p. 24 and n. 261; also MNN, p. 350.
29. Ibid., p. 19.
30. Bix, “The Shwa Emperor’s ‘Monologue’ and the Problem of War Responsibility,” Journal of Japanese Studies 18, no. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 338–42.
31. Ibid., pp. 341–42; and the discussion in Fujiwara, Awaya et al., Tettei kensh: ‘Shwa tenn dokuhakuroku’ (tsuki Shoten 1991), pp. 33–34.
32. Railroad Minister Ogawa Heikichi, nettled by the anachronism of the emperor’s action, remarked, “It is most irrational in the present era for the prime minister to be forced into confinement due to the emperor’s anger.” Cited in Masuda, “Tenn: kindai,” p. 1244.
33. Ik Toshiya, “Shwa tenn, kych gurpu no Tanaka naikaku tkaku und,” in Rekishi hyron 496 (Aug. 1991), pp. 16–17, as cited in Bix, p. 342.
34. Watanabe Osamu, Sengo seiji shi no naka no tennsei (Aoki Shoten, 1990), p. 86.
35. Uchida’s instruction stated that “Manchuria is Japan’s outer rampart…. We have not the least intention of making Manchuria into a protectorate or committing territorial aggression against it.” However, because the “Kuomintang government…has levied taxes, stirred up strikes against foreigners…and taken many extreme actions similar to those of the communists, the imperial government cannot ignore the intrusion into the Three Eastern Provinces of the southern forces who have such tendencies.” Gaimush hen, Nihon gaik nenpy narabi shuy monjo II (Hara Shob, 1969), pp. 117–19.
36. Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg (Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), writes (p. 523) that, “The International Military Tribunal construed the Briand-Kellogg Pact as making aggressive war criminal, as well as illegal, and as affording the juridical basis for the punishment of individuals who initiated and waged wars of aggression in violation of its terms.” The Tokyo tribunal took the same position. See “Trial of Japanese War Criminals: Documents” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), pp. 14–15.
37. For the text of the treaty see FRUS, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 153–56.
38. Kiyozawa, Gendai Nihon bunmeishi, dai sankan, gaikshi, pp. 435–37.
39. Hatsue Shinohara, “An Intellectual Foundation for the Road to Pearl Harbor: Quincy Wright and Tachi Sakutar.” Paper presented at the Conference on The United States and Japan in World War II, Hofstra University, Dec. 1991.
40. The treaty was signed in Paris (August 27, 1928) and ratified in Japan (June 27, 1929) with the government declaring that it understood the offending phrase did not apply to Japan. It went into force on July 24, 1929.
41. Suzuki, Kshitsu seido, pp. 168–70.
42. In “A View of International Law in the Kellogg-Briand Pact” and “Britain’s New Monroe Doctrine and the Effect of the No-War Treaty,” both published in 1928, Tachi belabored the obvious point that the signatories to the pact had renounced war “as an instrument of national policy,” but not the right of self-defense. Focusing on the interpretive notes that France, Great Britain, and the United States exchanged prior to signing the Pact on August 27, 1928, he observed that:
Britain does not recognize the application of the No-War Pact in regions where it claims to have a vital interest…. If other countries recognize this claim of Britain, it will lead to a situation where the United States too will claim that war based on the principle of the Monroe Doctrine is not prohibited by the No War Pact. I have to acknowledge, therefore, that, in addition to cases of the activation of the right of self-defense, wars exist that cannot be prohibited by the Pact in connection with the Monroe Doctrine of the United States and the New Monroe-ism of Britain.
Tachi Sakutar, “Eikoku no shin-Monrshugi sengen,” in Gaik jih 577 (Dec. 15, 1928), p. 3. See also Quincy Wright, “The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties,” in American Journal of International Law 23 (1929), p. 105.
43. KYN, dai sankan, pp. 41, 53, 55, 79, 83, 89, and 228.
44. Shinohara, pp. 6–7.
45. Ibid., p. 11.
46. Sasaki, Gendai tennsei no kigen to kin, p. 91.
47. Ik Toshiya, “Kokusai renmei ni okeru anzen hosh rongi to Nihon, 1927–1931,” in Tokyo Bunka Tanki Daigaku Kiy, dai 16 g (1999), pp. 31–31.
48. “Nara Takeji kaisroku (san),” p. 385.
49. Masuda Tomoko, “Seit naikakusei no hkai,” in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyjo, ed., Gendai Nihon shakai, 4 rekishiteki zentei (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), p. 188.
50. Masuda Tomoko, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron: rikken kunshusei no saihen to Nihon fuashizumu,” in Shiriizu Nihon
gendaishi 3, kz to hend, gendai shakai e no tenkei (Iwanami Shoten, 1993), pp. 245–46.
51. Sentenced to death in late 1933, Sagoya, along with fellow murderer and Shinto lay priest Inoue Nissh, was pardoned in Hirohito’s great amnesty of 1940. Sagoya served only six years in prison; Inoue served eight. See NH, p. 59, and Konsaisu Nihon jinmei jiten, kaiteiban (Sanseid, 1991), p. 565.
52. Yamada Akira, Gunbi kakuch no kindaishi: Nihongun no boch to hkai (Yoshikawa Kbunkan, 1997), p. 10.
53. Masuda, “Sait Makoto kyokoku itchi naikakuron,” p. 247.
54. Ibid., pp. 247–248.
55. Otabe Yji, “Kaisetsu: Mansh jihen to tenn, kych,” p. 256, citing KYN, dai gokan, p. 103.
56. Cited in Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” in James W. Morley, ed., Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932. Selected translations from Taiheiy sens e no michi: kaisen gaik shi (Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 177.
57. Parks M. Coble, Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931–1937 (Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 24–25.
58. Otabe, “Kaisetsu: Mansh jihen to tenn, kych,” p. 257; Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” pp. 189–92.
59. Ibid., p. 179, citing from Harada nikki, bekkan, p. 356.
60. Ibid., pp. 185–86.
61. James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930–1938 (Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 109.
62. Three days later, at Hirohito’s insistence, Makino again discussed the problem of military discipline with Chief Aide-de-Camp Nara and Grand Chamberlain Suzuki, but took no further action. See Hatano Sumio, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 109; MNN, entries of August 19 and 21, 1931; and Harada nikki, dai nikan, pp. 39–40.
63. By practicing austerity in a time of acute depression, while insisting that his bureaucratic servants do likewise, Hirohito probably imagined that he was setting a good example, when he was really contributing to the demoralization of the bureaucracy. On the salary reduction issue, see Otabe, “Kaisetsu: Mansh jihen to tenn, kych,” in KYN, dai gokan, p. 255, citing Kawai’s entries of May 27 and 30.
64. KYN, dai gokan, p. 152.
65. The Army General Staff officers who hosted the meeting were Gens. Kanaya Hanz, Ninomiya Harushige, Hata Shunroku, and Tatekawa Yoshitsugu. Their guests from the Navy General Staff were Adms. Oikawa Koshir, Taniguchi Naomi, Nagano Osami, and Kond Nobutake. The navy’s “special organ” in Manchuria was not established until Jan. 27, 1932. See Shinmy Takeo, ed., Kaigun sens kent kaigi kiroku: Taiheiy sens kaisen no keii (Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1976), pp. 118–19; Kketsu, Nihon kaigun no shsen ksaku—Ajia taiheiy sens no saikent, pp. 10–11; Hata Ikuhiko, ed., Nihon rikukaigun sg jiten, p. 452.
66. KYN, dai gokan, p. 153.
67. Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” pp. 109, 136 n. 4, citing “Nara Takeji nikki,” entries of Sept. 8, 10, 11, 1931. Around this time Assistant Imperial Household Minister Sekiya also warned Minami not to let the situation get out of control. Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” pp. 110, 136 n. 7, citing MNN, entry of Sept. 15, 1931.
68. Kunegi Toshihir, “Shidehara Kijr—‘heiwa gaik’ no honne to tatemae,” in Yoshida Yutaka et al., Haisen zengo: Shwa tenn to gonin no shidsha (Aoki Shoten, 1995), pp. 89–90.
69. Seki, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” p. 205; Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 110.
70. Arai Naoyuki, “Tenn hd no nani ga kawari, nani ga kawaranakatta no ka,” in Nihon Jynarisuto Kaigi, ed., Yameru masu komi to Nihon (Kbunky, 1995), pp. 181, 182, 189.
71. Fujiwara, Shwa tenn no jgonen sens, pp. 63–74.
CHAPTER 7
THE MANCHURIAN TRANSFORMATION
1. Eguchi Keiichi, Jgonen sens shshi, shinpan (Aoki Shoten, 1991), pp. 36–37.
2. Hatano Sumio, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” Tochigi shigaku 5 (1991), p. 110, citing “Nara nikki,” Sept. 19, 1931.
3. On Sept. 19, 1931, General Nara told Army Minister Minami that, “Although the Kwantung Army can independently determine the sphere of action of its duties as specified in its regulations, it must await the decision of the cabinet if its actions go beyond that sphere. If large-scale troop movements are necessary, we may need to convene an imperial conference.” KYN, dai gokan, p. 156; Yamada, Dai gensui Shwa tenn, pp. 49, 83.
4. Harada nikki, dai nikan, p. 64; Fujiwara, Shwa Tenn no jgonen sens, p. 68. Chang Hsueh-liang’s forces probably numbered closer to 130,000.
5. All present were core members of the Jichikai (Association of the eleventh), a group of titled peers, of whom Kido was the most active. Formed in 1922 and representing the reform faction of the titled nobility, they shared Konoe’s view that Nationalist China denoted merely a region of raw territory to be used to secure Japan’s survival.
6. Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 101.
7. Fujiwara, Shwa tenn no jgonen sens, p. 72.
8. Eguchi, Jgonen sensshshi, shinpan, p. 40.
9. Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 114, citing “Nara nikki,” Sept. 21, 1931.
10. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sh),” in Ch kron (Sept. 1990), pp. 340–41.
11. Eguchi, Jgonen sens shshi, shinpan, p. 41.
12. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sh),” p. 342.
13. Gary B. Ostrower, Collective Insecurity: The United States and the League of Nations During the Early Thirties (London: Associated University Presses, 1993), pp. 94–96.
14. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 344.
15. Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 122.
16. Ibid., citing Nara, Oct. 8, 1931.
17. “Nara Takeji jijbukanch nikki (sho),” p. 345.
18. Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 129, citing MNN, Nov. 8, 1931. Hsi Hsia (Ko-min) graduated from a Japanese army cadet school in 1911 and later served with Chang Tso-lin. After Sept. 18, he declared the independence of Kirin Province and soon joined the Manchukuo puppet regime.
19. Ibid., pp. 129–30.
20. Masuda Tomoko, “Seit naikakusei no hkai,” in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyjo, ed., Gendai Nihon shakai, 4 rekishiteki zentei (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), pp. 193–94.
21. Ostrower, Collective Insecurity, pp. 94–96.
22. Shimada Toshihiko, “The Extension of Hostilities, 1931–1932,” in Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932 (Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 287; Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” pp. 121–22, 123, n. 64.
23. After World War II the New York Times, on June 24, 1946, accused Shidehara of being an “accomplice of the militarists,” who had “helped to confuse the world about an event which the Japanese later extolled as the beginning of the Second World War.”
24. Seki Hiroharu, “The Manchurian Incident, 1931,” p. 164. After the failure of the March coup incident, many middle-echelon officers became convinced that military action in Manchuria was the essential precondition to political reform at home.
25. Harada nikki, dai nikan, p. 81, cited in Hatano, “Mansh jihen to ‘kych’ seiryoku,” p. 126.
26. KYN, dai gokan, p. 265.
27. Otabe Yji, “Nii ten niiroku jiken, shubsha wa dare ka,” in Fujiwara Akira et al., eds, Nihon kindaishi no kyoz to jitsuz 3, Mansh jihen—haisen (suki Shoten, 1989), p. 81; and, in the same volume, Abe Hirozumi, “Nihon ni fuashizumu wa nakatta no ka,” p. 206.
28. Ik Toshiya, “Seit seiji wa naze owatta no ka,” in Fujiwara et al., eds., Nihon kindaishi no kyoz to jitsuz 3, pp. 68–70. Ik discusses Inukai’s speech of Nov. 3, 1931, to a general meeting of Seiykai members.
29. KYN, dai gokan, pp. 219–20.
30. Ibid. , p. 225.
31. Ibid., entry of Dec. 27, 1931, p. 227.
32. Aoyama Teruaki, “Ima, naze Tg Heihachir ka?” in Bunka hyron 436 (Dec. 1989), p. 68.
33. ISN, dai ikkan, p.
47. Hirohito regarded their ennoblement as “no big deal.” See Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 445.
34. Masuda, “Seit naikaku no hkai,” in Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyjo, ed., Gendai Nihon Shakai, 4 rekishiteki zentei, pp. 204–205.
35. Miyaji Masato, “Seijishi ni okeru tenn no kin,” in Rekishigaku Kenkykai, ed., Tenn to tennsei o kangaeru (Aoki Shoten, 1986), p. 98; Masuda, “Seit naikakusei no hkai,” p. 214.
36. Japan Times, Jan. 12, 1932, reported that the emperor also notified the Sun Goddess of his safe deliverance from the assassin by performing rites at the Kashikodokoro (Place of Awe) within the palace, and by dispatching messengers to the Grand Shrine at Ise and to the Mausoleum of Emperor Jimmu in Nara prefecture.
37. Kido Kichi nikki, j, p. 127, entry of Jan. 8, 1932; Otabe Yji, “Kaisetsu: g ten ichig jiken zengo no tenn, kych,” in KYN, dai rokkan, p. 273.
38. Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933–41 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), p. 8.
39. Katsuno Shun, Shwa tenn no sens (Tosho Shuppansha, 1990), p. 60.
40. Walter Lafeber, The Clash: A History of U.S.-Japan Relations (W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), p. 172.
41. Shimada, “The Extension of Hostilities, 1931–1932,” pp. 306–7.
42. Fujiwara Akira, “Nitch sens ni okeru horyo gyakusatsu,” in Kikan senss sekinin kenky 9 (Autumn 1995), p. 18.
43. Ibid., p. 19.
44. Ibid.
45. In his “Monologue,” Hirohito noted that he had brought an end to the fighting in Shanghai. “When the suspension of hostilities occurred on March 3,” it was “because I had expressly ordered Shirakawa beforehand not to expand the conflict.” His decisive action in an area where Britain and the United States had substantial interests should be contrasted with his silence and lack of reflection about having sanctioned the aggression in Manchuria. See STD, p. 28; Fujiwara Akira et al., Tettei kensh: Shwa tenn ‘dokuhakuroku’ (tsuki Shoten, 1991), p. 82.
Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan Page 75
