* Kinnock thought that the President showed signs of mental decline at their meeting: ‘I got the impression of an elderly man who, if I had been related to him, I would have been worried about. He read from postcards cut into shape in the palm of his hands.’ (Interview with Lord Kinnock.)
* According to Antony Acland, the new and actual Ambassador, this was not necessarily a preposterous or deliberate mistake by the President. He (Acland) was not yet well known to Reagan, and his predecessor, Oliver Wright, ‘was not wholly unlike Healey in appearance. He was dark and had bushy eyebrows.’ (Correspondence with Sir Antony Acland.)
† Reagan did not, for instance, tell Kinnock that his stance would ‘undercut our negotiating position at Geneva’. The nearest the President came to condemnation of Labour’s defence policies was when he said that they would ‘have a deep effect on NATO and on East/West relations’. (‘Summary of President’s Meeting with UK Labor Party Leader Neil Kinnock’, 27 March 1987, Chron 03/24/1987–03/29/1987, Box 92202, Sommer Files, Reagan Library.)
* Aneurin Bevan (1897–1960), educated Sirhowy Elementary School and Central Labour College; son of a miner and followed in same occupation after leaving school at thirteen; Labour MP for Ebbw Vale, 1929–60; Minister of Health, 1945–51; Treasurer, Labour Party, 1956–60. Originally a unilateralist, he changed his mind.
* There were eleven policy groups in total, each chaired by departmental ministers, who reported to the Strategy Group or ‘A-Team’.
* In a later meeting about the contents of the manifesto, Geoffrey Howe complained that there was not enough foreign policy included and demanded an encouraging reference to Conservative Members of the European Parliament. ‘This is a British election, Geoffrey,’ said Mrs Thatcher. ‘I don’t need to be reminded of that, Prime Minister,’ replied Howe snappishly. (Correspondence with John O’Sullivan.)
* Although not personally involved with any of the agencies, Young had found his much trusted special adviser, Howell James, through Tim Bell (Interview with Lord Young of Graffham). Young and James, though not umbilically linked in the manner of Tebbit and Dobbs, were effectively allies against them.
* It was McAlpine, indeed, who first suggested to the present author that Tebbit had been organizing his leadership campaign from his hospital bed after the Brighton bomb (Interview with Lord McAlpine of West Green).
† Each night during the election campaign, Young dictated his Election Diary into a tape recorder. It was later transcribed, and used as the basis for part of his memoirs, The Enterprise Years: A Businessman in the Cabinet, Headline, 1990, but never published. It is a very useful, though obviously parti pris source for the period.
* By this Young meant that the figures showed the best drop ever: the total was still far, far higher than had ever been known before the Thatcher era.
† Mrs Thatcher did, however, hold a meeting about the Alliance threat at Downing Street at the end of April. One of those present was John Major, who afterwards wrote to Mrs Thatcher to set out the ‘specific SDP/Liberal policies which would damage the self-interest of potential Tory defectors’ (Major to Thatcher, 5 May 1987, CAC: THCR 2/7/5/41). Towards the end of the campaign, Major was present at the daily press conferences as the minister with responsibility for Social Security. According to John Whittingdale, ‘that was when she first saw him … He did well in those briefings … I always thought it was during that campaign that she noticed him for the first time’ (Thatcher Memoirs Materials, CAC: THCR 4/3).
* After the title had been agreed, Stephen Sherbourne sensed that Mrs Thatcher was not completely happy with the choice and suggested a ‘zippier and more buoyant’ slogan of ‘Britain on the Move Again’. Mrs Thatcher stuck to the original. (Sherbourne to Thatcher, 7 May 1987, CAC: THCR 2/7/5/11.)
* John O’Sullivan (1942–), educated St Mary’s College, Crosby and University of London; special adviser to the Prime Minister (No. 10 Policy Unit), 1986–8. His journalistic positions have included parliamentary sketch-writer, Daily Telegraph; associate editor, The Times; editor, National Review; executive editor, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
† Mrs Thatcher’s policies on health will be discussed in Volume III.
* It was probably a blessing for everyone’s nerves that Margaret Thatcher was of the last generation not to be a habitual mobile phone user. The thought that she could pursue ministers at all times telephonically would have been more than they could have borne. An additional danger was the threat to security and confidentiality caused by mobile phone calls which could easily be hacked. The News of the World paid an expert to hack into the lines on Mrs Thatcher’s battlebus. It reported this. (News of the World, 24 May 1987.) What it did not report was that it had listened in to conversations between Stephen Sherbourne, who was on the bus, and Charles Powell in Downing Street. Since Powell, as a civil servant, was not supposed to be involved in the campaign, the contents of these chats might have been embarrassing. (Thatcher Memoirs Materials, CAC: THCR 4/3.)
† Rupert Murdoch had already decided to come to Britain for the duration of the election, without waiting to know the exact date. He wanted to be there to help Margaret Thatcher and, according to Woodrow Wyatt, ‘we [Wyatt and Margaret Thatcher] can also perhaps tell him what we would like his newspapers to be saying … “He’s marvellous,” she replied.’ (Wyatt, The Journals of Woodrow Wyatt, vol. i, 3 May 1987, p. 339.)
‡ This was a recycling of the joke Denis Healey had made about a similar ministerial meeting before the 1983 election (see here).
* Having arrived in politics relatively late in life, without ever having to be elected to anything, Young had now conceived high ambitions. At various times in his Election Diary, he speculates on whether, after the election, he could continue as employment secretary, combine the job with being party chairman, become party chairman and Leader of the House of Lords, become secretary of state for trade and industry, or become Foreign Secretary. He eschews the departments of Health and of Energy, as being demotions. He even, although he reports this idea from the mouths of others, takes pleasure in the suggestion that a special Bill could be passed allowing him to renounce his peerage, be elected to the House of Commons, and become prime minister. In fact, it seems he did later entertain the idea seriously, using Alan Clark to sound out ministerial colleagues on the subject. (Interview with Lord Ryder of Wensum.)
† Margaret Thatcher initially had reservations about the video. ‘I don’t see enough use for what I think would be rather expensive and not as good as reading the original.’ (Thatcher comment on Sherbourne note, 29 April 1987, CAC: THCR 2/7/5/24.)
* Strenuous and repeated efforts had been made to include a pledge in the manifesto to close down asylums and hand the mentally ill over to ‘care in the community’, but Mrs Thatcher resisted on the grounds that such care would, in reality, be cruel (Interview with John O’Sullivan).
* It was pointed out to Mrs Thatcher, however, that Labour’s policy would allow some local authorities discretion over the right to buy. This was ‘no right at all’. (‘Labour Manifesto 1987’ Briefing prepared by the Conservative Research Department, 20 May 1987, CAC: THCR 2/7/5/33.)
† Bryan Gould (1939–), educated Auckland University and Balliol College, Oxford; Labour MP for Southampton Test, October 1974–9; for Dagenham, 1983–94; member of the Shadow Cabinet, 1986–92.
‡ Party election broadcasts were prescribed in their maximum length and the number permitted to each party, by law. When each party’s broadcast went out, it was shown simultaneously on all television channels, so there was no escape for viewers, other than by turning off the television altogether. As a result, the broadcasts were unpopular in principle, but widely watched.
* It was unkindly pointed out that, since there were only about a hundred generations back to Homer, there certainly had not been a thousand generations of Kinnocks (or of people at university).
† Age probably did play a small part, for the first time, in Mrs Thatcher’s tetchine
ss during the campaign. Those close to her noticed that she tired more easily. ‘She used to yawn a lot in meetings,’ recalled David Young. ‘She could have done with seven hours’ sleep, but wouldn’t admit it.’ (Interview with Lord Young of Graffham.) Shortly after the election, Young said in a private interview that ‘you had to recognise she was ageing’ (Lord Young of Graffham interview, July 1987, David Butler Archive).
‡ Dismayed by Mrs Thatcher’s lack of direct knowledge of what was appearing on television during the campaign, Lord Young arranged to send her videotapes of what had happened each day. Stephen Sherbourne, knowing that she would have neither the time nor the inclination, simply put them in a drawer. (Interview with Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury.) Anyway, she would not have been able to watch any of them without descending to Bernard Ingham’s office, where the only video-player in the building was to be found.
* This decision was partly determined by Labour’s perception that its planned election broadcast about unemployment was wide of the mark, as the issue had subsided politically (see Rodney Tyler, Campaign!: The Selling of the Prime Minister, Grafton Books, 1987, p. 202).
* Wyatt’s diaries confirm this conversation, and also indicate how he developed some of his ideas. When he called Margaret Thatcher, he was staying with Lord Weinstock in the country. Tim Bell came down for lunch. After seeing Bell, Wyatt told her: ‘Tebbit is good in some ways but no good at organising. David Young is much better.’ (Wyatt, The Journals of Woodrow Wyatt, vol. i, 24 May 1987, p. 351.) It seems reasonable to conjecture that it was Bell who had put this thought into his head at that moment.
* Two people who were not supposed to help her campaign, but did, were Ronald Reagan and Charles Powell. Both assisted on the nuclear issue. Reagan spoke publicly of Labour’s ‘grievous errors’ on the subject (Reagan, Interview with Foreign Television Journalists Prior to the Venice Economic Summit, 27 May 1987, American Presidency Project (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=34337&st=&st1=)). Powell admitted that he took the Civil Service practice of scanning the manifesto for consistency with government policy to unusual lengths and suggested amendments to the defence aspect. He also proposed wording on foreign affairs and defence in Mrs Thatcher’s speeches because policy was ‘too important to leave in the hands of Central Office hacks’. (Correspondence with Lord Powell of Bayswater.)
† Literally his own book: his memoirs give a full account of that ‘miracle’ and his leading role in it.
* It was this highly charged occasion which inspired Dobbs to write his novel House of Cards (Interview with Lord Dobbs).
* Mrs Thatcher resented the fact that she was not informed of the poll before going off for her next television encounter, with Jonathan Dimbleby (see Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pp. 585–6).
* Margaret Thatcher also received from Reagan the startling news that he wanted to amend the US Constitution so that he could run for a third term as president. It was not completely clear whether he was joking. (Correspondence with Lord Powell of Bayswater.)
* Young’s only duty on the day was to inform the Tigger-ish Jeffrey Archer that if he was coming to the election-night party in Central Office he must be sure not to be photographed with Mrs Thatcher (Lord Young of Graffham, unpublished Election Diary, 11 June 1987). Tim Bell, presumably by Tebbit’s design, was not invited to the party at all. This enraged Mrs Thatcher. (Ibid., 12 June 1987.)
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