by Roy Jenkins
Yours sincerely.
H. H. Asquith c
Did this meeting take place at the time stated? There is no corroboration in the lives or memoirs of any of the supposed participants. Nor is it referred to in the memoranda which Crewe and Montagu wrote within a few days of these events, although Montagu wrote of a different meeting at a different time. On the Monday afternoon, he wrote, Asquith met McKenna, Grey, Runciman and Henderson. Furthermore it is improbable that Grey, whether in the morning or the afternoon, would have contributed to the stiffening of the Prime Minister. He was thoroughly office-weary; with Haldane already jettisoned and himself eager to go, his instinctive view was that the bell, harsh and discordant though its note might be, was tolling for Asquith too.
"His attitude towards Mr. Lloyd George’s aspirations was not quite the same as that of the closer bodyguard of Asquith,” Grey’s biographer, G. M. Trevelyan, subsequently wrote. "As between the two men (Grey) greatly preferred his old friend the outgoing Prime Minister, but he had a suspicion that the country desired a change and that the fulfilment of its desire might perhaps help on the war.”d
Beaverbrook also noted that a group of Conservative ministers visited Asquith on that morning. They were Curzon, Robert Cecil and Austen Chamberlain, and they spoke for Walter Long as well as for themselves. They assured the Prime Minister, the account continued, that they were behind him and against Lloyd George and Bonar Law. Crewe, without specifying the day or time, appeared to confirm this visit. But Chamberlain, who was a very clear witness of the small segment of these events in which he himself participated, denied that any such Monday meeting took place. The only time on which the three of them saw Asquith was on the Tuesday afternoon, and they then had quite a different purpose in view.e
If these meetings did not take place on the Monday morning then they were clearly not responsible for Asquith’s letter of protest to Lloyd George about The Times article. This must have been based upon spontaneous reaction and not upon any new estimate of his own strength.
Lloyd George replied (perhaps a little disengenuously) within an hour or so:
Dec. 4th, 1916
My dear Prime Minister,
I have not seen The Times article.1 But I hope you will not attach undue importance to these effusions. I have had these misrepresentations to put up with for months. Northcliffe frankly wants a smash. Derby and I do not. Northcliffe would like to make this and any other arrangement under your Premiership impossible. Derby and I attach great importance to your retaining your present position—effectively. I cannot restrain nor I fear influence Northcliffe.
I fully accept in letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested arrangement—subject of course to personnel.
Ever sincerely,
D. Lloyd George.f
1 He was usually an eager newspaper reader—much more so than Asquith—and, even if he had himself overlooked The Times article, it seems most unlikely that Carson and Derby, with whom he breakfasted, would not have drawn his attention to it.
Disingenuous or not, this reply was clearly conciliatory. There was no possible reason for it not being so. Lloyd George wanted to consolidate the favourable position which he believed he had secured in the previous day’s discussions, and to avoid any upset until the new arrangements had been firmly made. Nor had Asquith’s letter said that they would not be made. He had merely expressed his displeasure and warned of reconsideration. Indeed the latter part of Asquith’s letter was purposeless unless his mind was still open. This was the view of Montagu, who continued to perform his intermediary role.
“I left George and went to Downing Street,” he wrote, “ where I found Asquith very angry about the Northcliffe article. He said that Henderson’s name1 was known only to George and himself.
I reminded him that Bonar Law also knew it and had communicated it to his friends. He said he was just about to see the King. I urged him not to be put off by the Northcliffe article; he had never paid any attention to newspapers, why should he give up now because of Northcliffe? He said it was because the Northcliffe article showed quite clearly the spirit in which the arrangement was going to be worked by its authors. I told him I felt certain he was wrong, and that Lloyd George meant to work it honestly and in the spirit as well as in the letter. He promised to write to Lloyd George before he went to see the King, as in fact he did.
I do not understand why he should have gone to sec the King if he had not at that moment, about mid-day on Monday, still (been) determined to carry the matter through. ”g
1 As a member of the War Committee; the despatch of the Parliamentary Correspondent, but not the leading article, had mentioned it in this context.
Asquith’s audience with the King was at 12.30. He submitted the resignations of all his colleagues but not of himself—a normal procedure when a general reconstruction is envisaged—and received authority to form a new government. He returned to Downing Street for luncheon and then went to the House of Commons where he was to move an adjournment for three days. Bonar Law came to see him in his room there and asked whether he was still in favour of the Sunday arrangement. Beaverbrook supplied the following account of what ensued:
Asquith replied that he was not so keen on the War Council plan as he had been. When pressed he gave as reasons that all his colleagues, Liberal and Conservative, seemed to be against it, and that Lloyd George was trafficking with the Press. . . . Before the discussion could proceed further, Asquith was suddenly called to the Front Bench to answer questions.. . . After question time Asquith attempted to avoid Bonar Law and so dodge a continuation of the argument. He left the House of Commons and went to Downing Street. Bonar Law, however, was not to be put off on such a vital occasion, and with his quiet pertinacity pursued Asquith to Downing Street. When he got there he found Grey, Harcourt, and Runciman, waiting outside the Cabinet Room with the Premier inside... . He was duly admitted, but found McKenna closeted with Asquith. He then urged on the Prime Minister very strongly the necessity of standing by Sunday’s agreement on the War Council. . . . Failing to receive any satisfactory reply, Bonar Law made it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that if the War Council scheme was not adopted he would break with Asquith. He then left the Prime Minister, who still sat in sulky silence.h
This was of course a partial account. The interchanges were seen through Bonar Law’s eyes, and the arguments used fitted with Beaverbrook’s theory of Asquith’s motivation. But the description of events seems as accurate as it is dramatic. These Downing Street discussions were taking place at a most decisive moment, and McKenna’s position of apparent privilege was not without significance. Soon after they were over Asquith declined Lloyd George’s request for an interview, but wrote to him again in the following terms:
Dec. 4, 1916
My dear Lloyd George,
Thank you for your letter of this morning. The King gave me today authority to ask and accept the resignation of all my colleagues, and to form a new Government on such lines as I should submit to him.
I start therefore with a clean slate.
The first question I have to consider is the constitution of the new War Committee.
After full consideration of this matter in all its aspects, I have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible that such a Committee could be made workable and effective without the Prime Minister as its Chairman. I quite agree that it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the chairmanship to another Minister as his representative and locum tenens; but (if he is to retain the authority which corresponds to his responsibility as Prime Minister) he must continue to be, as he has always been, its permanent President. I am satisfied on reflection that any other arrangement (such for instance as the one I indicated to you in my letter of today) would be in experience impracticable and incompatible with the Prime Minister’s final and supreme control. The other question which you have raised relates to the personnel of the Com
mittee. Here again after deliberate consideration I find myself unable to agree with some of your suggestions.
I think we both agree that the First Lord of the Admiralty must, of necessity, be a member of the Committee.
I cannot (as I told you yesterday) be a party to any suggestion that Mr. Balfour should be displaced. The technical side of the Admiralty has been re-constituted with Sir John Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. I believe Mr. Balfour to be, under existing conditions, the necessary head of the Board.
I must add that Sir E. Carson (for whom personally and in every other way I have the greatest regard) is not, from the only point of view which is significant to me (namely the most effective prosecution of the War) the man best qualified among my colleagues, present and past, to be a member of the War Committee. I have only to say, in conclusion, that I am strongly of opinion that the War Committee (without any disparagement of the existing Committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient body and has done, and is doing, invaluable work) ought to be reduced in number, so that it can sit more frequently and overtake more easily the daily problems with which it has to deal. But in any reconstruction of the Committee, such as I have, and have for some time past had in view, the governing consideration to my mind is the special capacity of the men who are to sit on it for the work which it has to do.
That is a question which I must reserve for myself to decide.
Yours very sincerely,
H. H. Asquith.i
The meaning of this letter was clear. If Asquith was to remain Prime Minister he was going to reconstruct the Government as he wished, and not as Lloyd George wished. Balfour rather than Carson as First Lord of the Admiralty was to be the symbol of the difference between their two approaches. The letter also bore several marks of being written “ for the record.” Many of the parentheses sound as though they were inserted, not to give Lloyd George information, but with subsequent publication in mind.
It is therefore fair to assume that Asquith anticipated a sharp reaction from Lloyd George. He was more likely to resign than to accept the terms of the letter. But it by no means follows from this, as Beaverbrook assumed, that Asquith sent the letter off in the confident expectation that it would enable him to vindicate his own power. He had just received Bonar Law’s ultimatum. Even on the assumption that Balfour would remain with him, and perhaps the “ three C’s ” also, the formation of a new Government against the combined opposition of Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Carson, would have been a most formidable undertaking; and Asquith cannot have thought otherwise. He must have known that he was taking a heavy risk by offering this direct challenge to Lloyd George, but preferred to do so rather than to sell more and more of the substance of his power as continuing ransom for the shadow of his place. “ Il Jaut en fitiir ” was at last his reaction to a mounting series of exasperations. But it was not a complacent reaction. Asquith’s premiership was just as likely to be fmished as Lloyd George’s indiscipline. Any leader of self-respect would have felt that one or the other had to go.
After sending off his letter, Asquith dined, as on the preceding evening, with Edwin Montagu in Queen Anne’s Gate. There he “ refused to discuss the situation at all,” and Montagu “ feared the worst.” Nevertheless the fact that he chose to go there is supporting evidence for the view that he was resigned rather than falsely confident. He knew that Montagu would not approve of the letter, but he knew too that he could keep him off the subject. Had he wanted congratulation on a master-stroke he could easily have found it at McKenna’s house in Lord North Street.
Lloyd George did not receive Asquith’s letter until the following morning—Tuesday, December 5 th. He replied at length and almost at once. There was no question of his accepting the new situation. He intended to fight; and, to a much greater extent than Asquith had done, he wrote a manifesto and not a letter:
As all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further parley at your disposal.
It is with great personal regret that I have come to this conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to the contrary—insinuations which I fear are always inevitable in the case of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in any administration—I have felt a strong personal attachment to you as my chief. As you yourself said, on Sunday, we have acted together for ten years and never had a quarrel, although we have had many a grave difference on questions of policy. You have treated me with great courtesy and kindness; for all that I thank you. Nothing would have induced me to part now except an overwhelming sense that the course of action which has been pursued has put the country—and not merely the country, but throughout the world, the principles for which you and I have always stood throughout our political lives—in the greatest peril that has ever overtaken them.
As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national unity, I propose to give your Government complete support in the vigorous prosecution of the War; but unity without action is nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for that. Vigour and vision are the supreme need at this hour.j’
This letter of strong but not unexpected challenge reached Asquith soon after noon. So did one from Balfour, written from a sick-bed in Carlton Gardens. This announced, quietly but determinedly, that Balfour did not want Asquith’s backing for the Admiralty:
I am well aware that you do not personally share Lloyd George’s view in this connection. But I am quite clear that the new system should have a trial under the most favourable possible circumstances; and the mere fact that the new Chairman of the War Council did prefer, and, as far as I know, still prefers, a different arrangement is, to my mind, quite conclusive, and leaves me in no doubt as to the manner in which I can best assist the Government which I desire to support.k
It is doubtful whether Asquith fully assimilated the shift of allegiance which this letter quietly announced. He saw Balfour and Lloyd George in such different lights that, the issue of the Admiralty apart, the idea of an alliance between them hardly entered his head. In any event he had little time to give careful immediate consideration to the letter; he merely wrote a short reply pressing Balfour to reconsider his position. At 12.30 Crewe arrived at Downing Street. He had been to Buckingham Palace for a Privy Council, and he was able to inform Asquith that the King still hoped for a solution without a change of Prime Minister. Then, at one o’clock, all the Liberal ministers with the exception of the Secretary of State for War assembled. Lloyd George was resentful at the absence of a summons, but as he had chosen to work almost exclusively with Unionists during the preceding weeks this resentment was hardly justified. The business of the meeting was to consider the situation created by Lloyd George’s letter of resignation. Montagu apart, there was unanimous agreement that his challenge must be resisted, and that Asquith could best do this by resigning. The outcome, it was believed, would then turn on the attitude of the Unionist ministers. Montagu’s alternative proposal was that the King should be asked to convene a conference of Asquith, Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Henderson. “ My suggestion was derided,” he recorded, “ and McKenna most helpfully asked me if I wanted four Prime Ministers, or, if not, which one I wanted.l
The attitude of the Unionist ministers was made clear during the afternoon. At 11 o’clock in the morning they had met—Curzon, Cecil, Long and Chamberlain—in the Secretary of State’s room at the India Office. At three o’clock the “ three C’s ” were summoned to Downing Street. Asquith asked them two questions. Were they prepared to continue in a Government from which both Lloyd George and Bonar Law had resigned; and what would be their attitude towards Lloyd George if he attempted to form an administration? To the first question, in Austen Chamberlain’s words, “ we replied that our only object was to secure a Government on such lines and with such a prospect of stability that it might reasonably be expected to be capable of carrying on the war; that in our opinion his Government, weakened by the resignations of Lloyd George and Bonar Law and by all that had gone on during the past weeks, off
ered no such prospect, and we answered the question therefore with a perfectly definite negative.” “ This was evidently a great blow to him,” Chamberlain added. “ Had we replied in the affirmative, he would clearly have been prepared to make the attempt.. . . ”m
To the second question their reply was equally discouraging. In effect they said that if Lloyd George looked like succeeding, they would join him. Cecil urged Asquith to do the same, but, Chamber-lain said, Asquith “ would not allow (him) to develop this idea, which he rejected with indignation and even with scorn.” The three Unionists then crossed Downing Street for a meeting with Bonar Law. From this meeting they sent back Curzon with a formal resolution, urging Asquith’s immediate resignation, and saying that he must in any event accept and publish theirs. In the meantime Asquith had received Balfour’s second letter, written at 4.0 p.m. Once again the style was casual but the intention was firm. Balfour would offer no opposition to Lloyd George.
In these circumstances immediate resignation was the only course open to Asquith. He announced this to the Liberal ministers who had once again congregated in 10, Downing Street. Perhaps one or two of them were so blinded by hatred of Lloyd George as to believe that the move would still show up his impotence. But this was not the general view. Montagu testified that they never seriously doubted Lloyd George’s ability to form a Government. And it was certainly not Asquith’s view. He decided to resign, not as a tactical manoeuvre, but because he did not have sufficient support to carry on.
