While $1,200,000,000 in conditional aid finally arrived, all of the social programs, job creation, and public works projects that Fanmi Lavalas had intended to use it for were shelved. Latortue unconstitutionally fired five justices from the Cour de Cassation and named five replacement justices. That meant that Haiti’s ultimate appellate court would not undermine the new Interim Government of Haiti.57 Latortue fired several thousand public service employees and published their names on lists of chimères which, in the circumstances, was a death sentence. (Chimère is a loaded term, used by the Haitian oligarchy and their transnational allies to smear active supporters of Aristide and Lavalas. It accomplishes the same objective as did “communist” during the Cold War, “terrorist” in relation to the Middle East, and “democrat” in eighteenth-century France, England, and United States.)
Many of those dismissed had worked as policemen or in security and they retained their firearms to defend themselves. Meanwhile, the National Police, now fully under the control of the oligarchy, staged raids into the poor neighbourhoods where the strongest support for Lavalas was located.58 A reign of terror descended throughout Haiti. Local Lavalas leaders were assassinated or forced into hiding once their opponents realized that the oligarchy and their blan allies had finally eliminated Aristide. Those who had public profiles and could inspire poor Haitians were silenced rather than killed.59
While it imprisoned people guilty of supporting Lavalas, the Latortue government overturned the convictions of those who had carried out the massacre in Raboteau in 1994, during the Cédras regime. The trials that led to those convictions had been based on painstaking investigations and courageous testimony. They represented a watershed in Haitian history. Moreover, the convictions rested on the judgment and intelligence of ordinary Haitians who sat on the jury: the core concept of Athenian democracy.60 They were a triumph of Préval’s government and had shown that Haiti could have a functional justice system. The capricious decision to release the convicts told poor Haitians — in the words of Joegodson — that they were as vulnerable as cockroaches in the face of hens.61
MINUSTAH
On 1 June 2004, the United Nations Security Council transferred authority from the Multinational Interim Force to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, henceforth known by its French acronym MINUSTAH. It was initially established to serve for six months, but with the explicit intention of being renewed indefinitely, as has been the case. MINUSTAH included both civilian (up to 1,622 police) and military (up to 6,700 troops) components. The Security Council, while affirming its “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Haiti,” endowed MINUSTAH with extraordinary powers divided into three separate areas: to establish a secure and stable environment; to support the political process; and to monitor, protect, and report on human rights. It was specifically mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, to monitor, restructure, and reform the Haitian National Police, and to assist the transitional government in bringing about elections at all levels at the earliest possible date.62 On 9 July 2004, Prime Minister Latortue, representing Haiti, signed the agreement legalizing the existence of MINUSTAH. The agreement included an immunity clause that released MINUSTAH from legal accountability for its actions in Haiti. However, as prime minister, Latortue did not have the constitutional authority to sign an international treaty on behalf of Haiti. Consequently, the MINUSTAH presence violates both international law and Haitian sovereignty.63 During the first year of its mandate, researchers from the University of Miami, Harvard University, and the Centro de Justiça Global from Brazil all found that the United Nations forces were instead contributing to the deterioration of conditions for the majority of Haitians. The latter two institutions reported in March 2005,
These violations span a gory spectrum, from arbitrary arrest and detention, to disappearances and summary executions, to killing of scores of hospitalized patients and the subsequent disposal of their bodies at mass graves. As this report details, MINUSTAH has effectively provided cover for the police to wage a campaign of terror in Port-au-Prince’s slums. Even more distressing than MINUSTAH’s complicity in HNP abuses are credible allegations of human rights abuses perpetrated by MINUSTAH itself, as documented in this report. MINUSTAH, however, has virtually ignored these allegations as well, relegating them to obscurity and thus guaranteeing that abuses go uncorrected. In short, instead of following the specific prescription of its mandate by putting an end to impunity in Haiti, MINUSTAH’s failures have ensured its continuation.64
All subsequent critical analyses of MINUSTAH would confirm and elaborate on that judgment. If MINUSTAH were to actually fulfil its mission responsibly, it would need to investigate and report on the illegal activities of those who brought it into existence and who profit from its continuation. Spokespeople from Haiti’s poor neighbourhoods explicitly and vocally denounce MINUSTAH as a continuation of the coup d’état and an assault on Haitian democracy.
The people from the poorest neighbourhoods organized a march on 30 September 2004, to mark the anniversary of the first coup against Aristide in 1991. They demanded the return of Aristide and their elected government. The Haitian Police opened fire on the huge crowd, killing a number of people. Then, along with Labanye’s gang, the police attacked the centres of Fanmi Lavalas support, killing eighty people over the next couple of weeks and imprisoning influential radio personalities on specious charges of complicity in attacks on the police. Prime Minister Latortue ordered the United Nations forces to mount operations against the poor whom he classified as terrorists. The terror was most pronounced in slums like Bel Air and Cité Soleil. In one instance, the Haitian Police forced eleven young men to lay on the ground and then shot them each in the head. They burned homes. MINUSTAH troops looked on. In December 2004, the interim government of Prime Minister Latortue paid former members of the armed forces the first of three instalments in compensation for Aristide’s disbandment of the Army in 1995. The indemnities amounted to $29 million and were intended to reach between 5,000 and 8,000 ex-soldiers, who would not be required to hand in the arms they kept when Aristide disbanded the army in 1995. The targets of these ex-military and death squad agents were the poor who were supposed to be protected by MINUSTAH.65
In December 2004, the oligarchy’s paramilitaries, the National Police, MINUSTAH, and Labanye’s gang fought to demoralize those loyal to Aristide and Lavalas. Finally, in March 2005, Dred Wilme’s gang defeated Labanye, who was killed. Labanye’s gang dispersed. The people of Cité Soleil rejoiced at the defeat of Labanye. Interim Prime Minister Gérard Latortue publicly mourned his death.
Upon the death of Labanye, the oligarchy directly armed the police to defend their interests. Reginald Boulos asked Washington to support their vision of a private police force. Fritz Mevs, a member of one of Haiti’s wealthiest families, told the American ambassador that he worried “that funneling the arms secretly would only serve to reinforce [accurate] rumors that the elite were creating private armies.” Instead of supporting that initiative for a police force directly and explicitly under the authority of the oligarchy, Juan Gabriel Valdes, the United Nations mission chief, committed MINUSTAH to taking over the role that the Labanye gang had fulfilled on behalf of the business class. The American embassy in Port-au-Prince cabled Washington that, “In response to embassy and private sector prodding, MINUSTAH is now formulating a plan to protect the area.” The American ambassador praised MINUSTAH for showing “backbone” by incursions into the slums that killed and wounded large numbers of men, women, and children.66 By shifting the responsibility for repression onto MINUSTAH, the Haitian oligarchy and their Washington allies obscured their role. Brazil accepted the offer to act as the lead nation of the MINUSTAH mission in the interests of realizing its geopolitical ambitions. Brazil wanted to be recognized as a regional power in Latin America and, more specifically, to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council. At home, Brazil’s le
aders appealed to Brazilian nationalism. Leading the stabilization mission in Haiti was proof of their increasing prestige on the world stage. Brazilians should be proud of their country as it joined the ranks of the United States, France, Canada, the Vatican, the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Together, they formed the “core group” that controlled Haitian “democracy” on behalf of the transnational capitalist class.67
New Elections: Préval
Haiti’s interim government had to organize elections. For years, the Democratic Convergence had claimed that Aristide was a dictator held in place by criminal gangs. According to that logic, the “resignation” of Aristide should have set the stage for immediate elections. But it would take two years to organize those elections. The oligarchy and their transnational allies were well aware that Fanmi Lavalas would have, once again, won any election by a large majority. Consequently, they needed first to demoralize the poor, to imprison Lavalas candidates who could take the place of Aristide, and, finally, to manipulate the elections.
In 2005, as a result of the widespread attacks, repression, and imprisonment of political leaders, Fanmi Lavalas supporters declared their intention to boycott the coming elections. The oligarchy and Washington appeared to have won. By their standards, and for propaganda purposes, there would be “democratic” elections and their candidates would control the government and the presidency. However, a wild card appeared that changed the complexion of the elections for the poor classes. Since leaving the presidency in 2001, René Préval had dedicated himself to the development of his hometown of Marmelade and had not been involved in national politics. The Democratic Convergence and the coup leaders had largely ignored him, and he them. Now, as the elections approached, he presented himself as a candidate for his new party, called Lespwa, meaning Hope. His candidature was accepted by the Interim Government. But then the popular classes claimed him as their candidate. In Haitian culture, twins are thought to have a spiritual significance. It was believed that Aristide and Préval were twins: two people who shared one soul. A vote for Préval was, therefore, a vote for Aristide. Moreover, Préval promised the people that, if he was elected, he would allow Aristide to return to Haiti. The people saw their chance to prevail over their enemies who had stolen Aristide and destroyed their government. By the time the oligarchy understood what was happening, it was too late. In the death sport of Haitian politics, the people had scored a short-handed goal.
As the elections approached, relations between MINUSTAH and the police deteriorated. MINUSTAH officers understood that they were being used as a police force of repression in the service of the Haitian oligarchy. At one point, MINUSTAH troops blocked Haitian police from gaining access to a demonstration in Bel Air. The commander of MINUSTAH, General Ribeiro, resigned and a Brazilian general, Urano Teixa da Matta Bacellar, took his place. But the tensions remained. On 7 January 2006, Bacellar was found shot dead in his room at the Hotel Montana. The official explanation was that he had committed suicide. Many speculated that he had been murdered as a result of his unwillingness to use MINUSTAH to invade and pacify the poor neighbourhoods in advance of the elections. The Brazilian investigation and autopsy have never been released.
Boulos and Apaid favoured an invasion of the slums before the elections on the usual pretext of pacifying the bandits. But the assault was not authorized and, in its place, the residents of Cité Soleil and Bel Air organized massive nonviolent rallies in support of Préval. The armed gangs from the slums announced that they would protect voters. That exposed the fallacy at the heart of the oligarchy’s narrative; the gangs and the poor formed a block in opposition to the rich. However much they hated gang culture, the people from the poor neighbourhoods relied on the gangs to protect them from the oligarchy and their transnational blan allies in the exercise of “democracy.”
When Préval organized the last elections in November 2000, he had set up 10,000 voter registration centres throughout the country. In contrast, Latortue installed 500. Given the terrain and lack of infrastructure in Haiti, it is difficult to get around. In Cité Soleil, there were approximately 150,000 voters, but the Electoral Council sent only 52,000 voting cards. Even at that, only 30,000 votes from Cité Soleil were counted. In 2000, Préval had set up 12,000 polling stations. Latortue had 800. The poorest neighbourhoods had none. No polling station was located in Cité Soleil. When a number of polling stations did not open on the morning of the vote, the people began protesting loudly. When the foreign press began to cover the story, they eventually opened.68
Despite all of the obstacles, there was a 65 percent turnout. On 9 February, with a quarter of the votes counted, it was announced that Préval was leading with 62 percent. But on 11 February, the Electoral Council lowered his total to 49.6 percent, which would have necessitated a run-off election. Then, tens of thousands of charred ballots, cast mostly for Préval, were found in a garbage dump in Port-au-Prince. They apparently had been set alight, but a rainfall kept the fire from consuming them. The Electoral Council also found that 4.3 percent of the total ballots were blank. It was presumed they had been inserted in order to dilute Préval’s percentage to under 50 percent. By whom? American Deputy Secretary of State Roger Noriega encouraged the Electoral Council to resist the demands of the mobs that were clamouring for the declaration of Préval as president.
The people erupted in controlled but passionate and menacing protests. They knew that the Interim Government was trying to cook the elections and steal the presidency from them. Huge protests consumed Port-au-Prince, literally threatening to lay waste to the country if the election was stolen from them.69 Sociologist Alex Dupuy describes the reaction of the transnational ruling class:
At that point, ambassadors from the United States, Canada, and France who had initially insisted that the CEP [Provisional Electoral Council] continue to count the votes that would have forced a second round reluctantly agreed to join with their counterparts from Brazil and Chile and meet with UN, interim government, and CEP officials to come up with an acceptable legal solution that would grant Préval a first-round victory. The solution was found in the so-called Belgian Option suggested by the Brazilian and Chilean diplomats. According to Article 185 of the Haitian electoral decree, blank ballots must be included as part of the total votes cast, but the article does not stipulate how the votes are to be counted. The Belgian Option consisted of distributing the blank votes proportionally to each candidate rather than adding them to the total. While this solution raised everyone’s percentage, it also put Préval over the 50 percent plus one vote he needed to win in the first round. In the early morning hours of February 16, eight of the nine members of the CEP signed the agreement that declared Préval the winner.70
American ambassador Tim Carney candidly said that the validity of the election would be judged according to Préval’s cooperation in office.
The people, said to have been held in terror by Aristide, overwhelming elected the man they called his twin who promised to allow Aristide to return to Haiti. And then they rejoiced. What happened to the candidates who had rid the country of Aristide and Lavalas? Manigat received 12.4 percent of the votes. Baker, widely trumpeted as Washington’s favourite, got 8.2 percent. The paramilitary leader, Guy Philippe, who fancied himself the liberator of Haiti, managed 1.9 percent; Evans Paul, 2.5 percent. Dany Toussaint, a key traitor of Aristide, polled 0.4 percent. Gérard Gourgues, whom the Democratic Convergence had named as the head of the parallel government in 2004, refusing to recognize Aristide, got 0.3 percent of the vote. Washington’s World Bank candidate Marc Bazin, claiming to represent Lavalas, got 0.7 percent.71 Remember that these results represent the totals after the Interim Government had done all in its power to undermine Préval and push the oligarchy’s candidates.
The Limits of Transnational, Capitalist “Democracy”
Upon taking office, Préval worked to strengthen Haiti’s relationship with Venezuela and Cuba
. Venezuela offered Haiti a steady and reliable source of energy through PetroCaribe. To complement that policy, Cuba offered Préval its medical expertise. Short on money, Cuba was strong in human resources. Both Aristide and Préval had strengthened ties to Cuba in the past. Now, Préval deepened relations with an agreement that would see Cuban medical practitioners work with the Haitian state to improve health services in the most remote communities in Haiti. These initiatives, that brought Haiti into the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, directly threatened Washington’s regional political agenda. Préval attempted to assuage Washington’s concern at the same time that he worked to integrate Haiti into the Alliance that could benefit the Haitian poor over the interests of the transnational capitalists. This put Préval on a collision course with Exxon-Mobil and Chevron, which had control of the Haitian market. Under the deal, they would have to answer to the governments of both Haiti and Venezuela. Chevron appealed to Washington for help. President Bush warned Préval against aligning Haiti with Hugo Chavez. Finally, by agreeing to a complex agreement whereby Chevron would ship PetroCaribe oil from Venezuela to Haiti, Préval managed to conclude the deal.72
Préval — like all political leaders in the current context of transnational capitalism — had to choose between two constituencies: on one side, the poor of Haiti who had elected him as president and, on the other, the transnational capitalist class represented by the Haitian oligarchy and their powerful allies in Washington, Paris, and Ottawa. (Betraying the electorate can make a “democratically”-elected politician unpopular; betraying the transnational capitalist class is often fatal.) Préval managed to negotiate deals, such as PetroCaribe with Hugo Chavez, that were favourable to the Haitian people. But, once in office, he reneged on his promise to allow Aristide to return to Haiti, until the very end of his mandate. Washington and its allies worked to keep Aristide in Africa; Préval could not have prevailed without opening himself to Aristide’s fate. But Préval further excluded Lavalas from the political process. In its place, he offered a new party, Inite (Unity). Since he could not run for a third term as president, Préval’s son-in-law Jude Célestin would be the Inite candidate for the country’s highest office. Practically, Préval needed to control the Provisional Electoral Council to assure the outcome. Whatever his motivations, the consequences of his authoritarian actions in breach of his promise earned him the lasting enmity of poor Haitians.
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