Pyrrhus, the chivalrous king of Epirus, was quite ready to turn his back on the troubled waters of Hellenistic politics and to seek fresh adventures in the west at the call of Tarentum. Being the son-in-law of Agathocles and also a relative of Alexander the Great, this Hellenistic prince may well have dreamed of building up an empire in the west. Courageous and ambitious, a skilful soldier and an inspiring leader, he could count on the help of the Samnites, Lucanians, Bruttians, and Messapians together with the Greek cities of Tarentum, Metapontum and Heraclea, in a crusade against Rome. And perhaps he might even hope to shake the Italian confederacy, especially as Rome was distracted on her northern front, where the Gauls had only recently been defeated and some Etruscan cities were still resisting. Beguiled by his ambitions, he landed at Tarentum with a force of 25,000 professional soldiers and twenty elephants (280). Profiting by the experience of his predecessor Alexander the Molossian, he demanded that the Tarentines should hand over their citadel and give him complete control for the duration of the war; in return he promised to remain in Italy no longer than was necessary. He utilized his new powers to force the Tarentines to transfer their attention from the theatres and gymnasium to the parade ground.16
The Romans hastened to the attack, perhaps without full realization of the gravity of the situation. In the early summer of 280 one consul was busy beating out the smouldering resistance in Etruria, while his colleague, Valerius Laevinus, marched south to meet Pyrrhus in battle near Heraclea. The opposing forces were about numerically equal, but the citizen militia of Rome and her allies were face to face with a first-class professional Hellenistic army. The Roman legion met the Macedonian phalanx for the first time. The tactics employed by Pyrrhus were essentially similar to those of Alexander and Hannibal. He sought to hold or wear down the Roman infantry with the serried ranks of his phalanx, which presented to the short swords of the legionaries a hedge of projecting spearheads, almost as impenetrable as a barbed-wire entanglement; at the same time his elephants and cavalry not only prevented his line from being outflanked but also broke the enemy’s wings and turned their flanks instead. So it fell out at Heraclea. The Romans were terrified by their first encounter in battle with elephants, which untrained horses will not face. Their cavalry was driven back, and leaving 7,000 men on the field they fled to Venusia, where Aemilius, a consul of the previous year, was still stationed. But Pyrrhus, whose resources were far more limited than those of his foe, lost 4,000 men in this ‘Pyrrhic’ victory, though his cause was strengthened by the support of the Lucanians and Samnites and by the adhesion of Croton and Locri; Rhegium would have followed suit, but for the energy of the officer commanding the garrison troops.
Pyrrhus followed up his victory by a dash towards Rome, not hoping to storm the city, but perhaps anticipating like Hannibal later that the allies of Rome would rally to his cause; he may also have wished to join forces with the Etruscans. But he was disappointed. Capua and Naples shut their gates against him; Laevinus and Aemilius hung on his heels; the Latins gave no sign of disaffection; and the two legions in Etruria, having finished their task, were recalled to block his advance. When forty miles from Rome he turned back to Tarentum, while his army retired to winter quarters in Campania. In the autumn he received a Roman embassy under Fabricius, who had come to negotiate for the return of prisoners. Having received proof of the solidarity of Rome’s confederacy Pyrrhus was ready to treat and sent Cineas back to Rome with Fabricius, together with some of the prisoners on parole. He offered to restore all prisoners and to end the war, if the Romans would make peace with Tarentum, grant autonomy to the Greeks, and return all territory conquered from the Lucanians and Samnites. These terms would have severely limited the spread of Roman interests in the south and have created a Tarentine domination there. The offer was accompanied by lavish presents to the leading senators who, unaccustomed to the ways of Hellenistic diplomacy, rejected the gifts as bribes. A party in Rome favoured peace, but it was soon silenced by the oratory of the blind old censor, Appius Claudius, who rebuked the Senate for discussing terms while a victorious enemy was still on Italian soil. Pyrrhus must again try the hazard of war.17
Having failed in Campania, Pyrrhus threatened the Roman strongholds of Luceria and Venusia in Apulia and perhaps hoped to press up the Adriatic coast and detach the northern Samnites. His forces, now strengthened by contingents of Samnites and Lucanians, were about equal to the two consular armies, which were concentrated near Venusia in 279 to check his advance. He met the Romans in a second pitched battle not far from Asculum on rough ground which enabled the legionaries to resist his phalanx for a whole day. The next morning Pyrrhus drew up his troops on more level ground where the phalanx forced back the Roman line, which was rolled up by an elephant charge. The Romans avoided complete disaster by regaining their camp, and though they had lost one consul and 6,000 men Pyrrhus left 3,500 men on the field. He was, however, prevented from following up this victory by news from Greece and Sicily which made him eager to conclude peace in Italy.
A Celtic invasion of Macedonia offered Pyrrhus the opportunity of playing the role of champion of Greece with the chance of gaining the Macedonian throne, while the Syracusans sent envoys begging him to save them from the Carthaginians who were within an ace of winning the whole of Sicily. Unable to serve the cause of Hellenism in two countries at once, Pyrrhus chose the Sicilian venture and tried to rid himself of his Italian commitments by reaching terms with Fabricius who, as consul for 278, had led his troops into Campania; perhaps Pyrrhus claimed no more than immunity for Tarentum. Carthage, however, was alive to the desirability of keeping Pyrrhus engaged in Italy and sent Mago with 120 warships to remind Rome of their old alliance and to offer help against Pyrrhus. When the Romans abruptly declined this aid, Mago sailed off to visit Pyrrhus; he perhaps promised to arrange peace between Rome and the king, so that the latter would be free to return to Greece, while he threatened to wreck negotiations with Rome if Pyrrhus persisted in crossing to Sicily. His offer was rejected, and Mago returned to Rome, where he obtained an agreement which kept Rome from making peace. No defensive alliance was struck, but it was arranged that if they made an agreement against Pyrrhus, it should be with the stipulation that it should be lawful to render mutual aid in whichever country Pyrrhus attacked, i.e. a temporary suspension of the restrictions imposed by a treaty of 306 (p. 124). Whichever party might need help, Carthage was to provide ships for transport or war, and to aid Rome by sea, though she was not obliged to land troops against her will. Rome thus gained money to finance the war and a fleet to blockade Tarentum, while if Pyrrhus crossed to Sicily she was not obliged to help Carthage there. His object achieved, Mago sailed off to Syracuse, leaving en route five hundred Roman soldiers to strengthen the garrison at Rhegium. Pyrrhus meanwhile had retired to Tarentum where he left half his troops to defend his allies; with the rest he set sail for Sicily in the autumn of 278.18
During Pyrrhus’ absence the Romans gradually forced the Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians into submission; whether they were equally successful against the Italiote Greeks is more doubtful. It is recorded that Fabricius won over Heraclea in 278, that Locri revolted and Croton was captured in 277, and that the Campanian garrison of Rhegium seized Croton for themselves. After a meteoric career in Sicily, Pyrrhus decided to return to Italy; if he failed to win a great victory, which alone could restore his fortunes, he would proceed to Greece. On crossing from Sicily late in 276 he was defeated by the Punic fleet in an engagement which must have confirmed his decision to leave the west.19 He then recaptured Locri and Croton (if it is admitted that he had ever lost them). After pillaging the temple treasure of Persephone at Locri, to the superstitious horror of the Greeks, he reached Tarentum. In 275 he marched northwards with his diminished forces on a brilliantly-conceived campaign, which ended in an inglorious rearguard action. One of the consuls, Manius Curius, was near Malventum (the future Beneventum), the other was posted in Lucania. Anticipating the junction of the two armi
es Pyrrhus hastily struck at Curius, but failed to reach his objective in a night surprise. The Romans repelled his attack in open battle and captured several of his elephants.20 Before he was caught between the two Roman armies Pyrrhus withdrew to Tarentum. There he left some troops to encourage the Italiote allies whom he had failed; with the rest of his army he set sail for Greece. In the following year he withdrew his force, except for a garrison, from Tarentum, and two years later he was killed in street-fighting at Argos by a tile thrown by a woman from a house-top. His Sicilian campaign had prevented the island from becoming a Carthaginian province, while his whirlwind career in Italy had even more far-reaching effects. It sealed the fate of the Italiote Greeks, it demonstrated the rock-like solidarity of the Roman confederacy, against which Pyrrhus had flung his professional soldiers in vain, and it showed the whole Hellenistic world that the unknown barbarians of central Italy were in fact a great military and imperial state, with which Ptolemy II of Egypt now established diplomatic relations and amicitia (273).
6. THE END OF PRE-ROMAN ITALY
The fate of Magna Graecia was decided when Pyrrhus left Italy and sealed when it was known the king would never return. Rome merely had to put the finishing touches to the work of pacifying and organizing Italy. In the south the Lucanians were defeated, but received no severer punishment than the settlement of a Latin colony at Paestum (273); the Bruttians were deprived of half their forest-land though they retained some autonomy; Velia, Heraclea, Thurii and Metapontum became allies of Rome in 272, if not earlier; Croton and Locri were brought back to the Roman fold;21 the Epirote garrison of Tarentum surrendered at the approach of a consular army (272); the garrison of Campanian mercenaries in Rhegium, who had mutinied and seized the town like the Mamertines in Messina across the Straits, was stormed by Cornelius Blasio, and 300 survivors were executed in Rome (270);22 finally Apulia and Messapia were brought into alliance (267–266), the Sallentini in the heel of Italy were defeated, and land was confiscated from Brundisium which received a Latin colony some years later (244); by their possession of Rhegium and Brundisium the Romans held the keys to both the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic seas.
The exact status of these Greek cities which came into alliance with Rome is uncertain; perhaps they were generously treated as ‘equals’ and were granted protection without return, for unlike the other members of the Italian confederacy they did not have to supply troops. Shortly afterwards, however, they provided a quota of ships, which at first formed a transport service rather than a fighting force. These socii navales retained full autonomy, apart from Tarentum, which though granted the status of a socius navalis was punished for its part in the recent war by having to offer hostages and to receive a Roman legion in its citadel. This was Rome’s first standing garrison, designed to watch over southern Italy and to shut the door against any other Greek condottieri.
The Romans also settled accounts with their old enemies and rivals in central and northern Italy. A brief revolt by the Samnite Caraceni in 269 led to severe consequences. The Samnite League was dissolved and the tribal states were broken up into fragments. In fact thereafter they were seldom referred to under the general name of Samnites (which was often applied only to the Pentri); each community was named after its own town. They became isolated states, separate ‘allies’ of Rome. Further, they had to cede much territory to Rome and held less than half of what they had occupied at the beginning of the Samnite Wars. On some of this land two Latin colonies were planted as watchdogs: at Malventum (now renamed Beneventum) against the Hirpini in 268 and at Aesernia against the Pentri in 263. Further, a group of Picentes, who also had revolted, were punished by transportation to an area on the western borders of Samnium (ager Picentinus), thus confining the Samnites still further. In Etruria a Latin colony was settled at Cosa on land ceded by Vulci (273). In 265 an incident at Volsinii demonstrated the internal unrest in Etruria. Commerce had declined, the mines were becoming exhausted and expansion was prevented by Rome, so that the nobles became less wealthy and their retainers less necessary. (Arretium, however, retained a position in the industrial world by producing pottery in place of metal work.) The serfs of Volsinii turned against their masters who appealed to Rome for help. The Romans stormed the city and established the aristocracy in a new town on Lake Bolsena; the serfs perhaps were enslaved (264).23 In Umbria, which had never attained to a real unity, some of the Senones may have lingered at Sarsina until the town was taken by Rome in 268. At the same time the northern frontier was strengthened by sending a Latin colony to Ariminum in the ager Gallicus, where the Apennines reach the Adriatic coast (268).24 In the same year the Sabines were granted full franchise in place of half-citizenship. Finally, the warlike Picentes, who had become Roman allies in 299, revolted in 269 as we have seen, and were quelled the next year. Some were transported to the hills behind Salernum and Paestum; only Asculum retained a treaty of alliance, while the rest of Picenum was incorporated into the Roman state with half-franchise. Their future behaviour was watched over by a Latin colony at Firmum (264). The neighbouring Greek city of Ancona retained its alliance with Rome. Thus the whole of peninsular Italy was brought into the Roman confederacy. An epoch was ended and the history of Roman Italy begins.
7. THE ROMAN CONFEDERACY
From Ariminum and Pisa to Rhegium and Brundisium, the whole of Italy was now bound together in the Roman federation. The main lines of policy which wrought this crowning achievement of the early Republic have already been described (Chapter IV, 7), but it is well to consider the completed organization which endured nearly two hundred years until all the inhabitants of Italy received full franchise after the Social War. The two guiding principles of Roman policy were incorporation and alliance. Peoples covered by the former principle became in some sense citizens of Rome; communities grouped in alliance remained in theory independent states, whose members were politically allies (socii) and legally aliens (peregrini). But both classes alike were subject to military service under the Roman government.
First then the citizens, who fall into two clearly-defined classes: full citizens and half-citizens. The full citizens constituted three groups, two originating direct from Rome, the third formed by incorporation: (a) Those who lived in Rome itself or who had been granted individually (viritim) allotments of 3–7 iugera of public land annexed during the conquest of Italy. All these were enrolled in the four urban or thirty-one rustic tribes. (b) The Roman colonies, which comprised about three hundred Roman citizens and their families and were founded on ager publicus. The colonists formed a garrison, not least to protect the coast against hit-and-run raids, and this duty excused them military service in the Roman army. At first they constituted a strong contrast to the older inhabitants who were generally made half-citizens; but they gradually mingled. In early days they must have been subject to some local military authority and control, but its precise nature is uncertain, while the civil competence of magistrates must have been small. Later, however, when after 183 BC the size of new colonies was increased (p. 290), municipal authority was vested in praetors or duoviri. The early citizen colonies were all on the coast (Ostia; Antium 338; Tarracina 329; Minturnae and Sinuessa, 296; Sena Gallica c. 290; and Castrum Novum Etrurii, 264); and they were few in number, because the colonists found it difficult in practice to exercise their rights as Roman citizens, so that Romans preferred to share in Latin colonies which formed autonomous states. (c) Communities incorporated into the Roman state: oppida civium Romanorum, as Tusculum and cities like Lanuvium, Aricia and Nomentum, which were incorporated when the Latin League was dissolved. Called municipalities, in imitation of the proper municipalities of half-citizens, they retained their local magistrates,25 who had, however, limited judicial and financial power. Their proximity to Rome involved supervision by the Roman praetors, while they were not allowed to mint money. But they exercised full political rights in Rome and were registered in the tribes. Occasionally a new tribe would be established to include newly incorporated commun
ities (e.g. the tribes Quirina and Velina for Sabines and Picentes in 241), but generally these were enrolled in neighbouring tribes and new ones were formed only for Roman citizens who received viritane allotments. Finally, another group may be mentioned, namely centres in country districts, Conciliabula and Fora, formed by Roman citizens, originating from Rome. They had incomplete self-government and in time were often transformed into municipalities.
Secondly there were the incorporated cives sine suffragio, who enjoyed only the private rights of provocatio, commercium and conubium; they could not vote in the Roman assemblies or stand for office and were not enrolled in the thirty-five tribes. The earliest municipia had been willing allies with full local autonomy (p. 103), but gradually the status of municeps came to be regarded as an inferior limited franchise which was given to conquered peoples (e.g. Sabines and Picentes) before they were considered ripe for full citizenship. Thus their conditions varied considerably. Some were allowed no local government (e.g. Anagnia, which was taken in 306, and Capua after 211); but the majority were allowed to keep their magistrates, local municipal councils and popular assemblies. Roman law was encouraged but perhaps was not enforced. Jurisdiction was divided between the local magistrates and the Roman praetor, who exercised it in Rome itself or else locally through deputies (praefecti); it is uncertain whether such prefects or circuit judges were sent to all municipalities. The local magistrates had fairly extensive powers and their variety was maintained (e.g. meddix at Cumae, dictator at Caere, aedile at Fundi); the local authorities were not adapted to the Roman model as quickly as those of the allies. Local languages persisted and local cults survived, though under supervision by the Roman pontiffs. With certain exceptions, the municipalities were not allowed to mint money, but they enjoyed the civil rights of conubium and commercium with other Roman citizens. By this training in citizenship they were gradually raised to the privileges of full citizenship, which the Sabines, for instance, received in 268; by about 150 they had disappeared as a class. Thus full or half-citizenship was granted to a large part of central Italy from Latium to Picenum, from sea to sea, including the south of Etruria and the north of Campania.
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