When negotiations had failed, Flamininus, unable to force Philip’s position, turned it by guile. He learnt of a track which led round behind the enemy and by this means he was able during a battle to fall on their flank. Philip was forced to retire; after considerable loss he rallied his men and withdrew along the Aoüs valley and the Zygus Pass to the vale of Tempe. The Romans could now overrun Thessaly and central Greece. Their allies, the Aetolians and Athamanes, promptly fell on Thessaly and captured Gomphi. Flamininus also approached through Epirus and the Peneus valley, but finding that many strongholds withstood him he turned south towards the Corinthian Gulf, where the allied fleet arrived after capturing Eretria. Here Flamininus brought pressure to bear on the Achaean League and at last won their support by promising to help them recover Corinth. However, Corinth and its Macedonian garrison unexpectedly resisted the attack, and shortly afterwards Argos seceded from Achaea to Philip.
With so much of Greece slipping from his grasp, notwithstanding events at Corinth and Argos, Philip was ready to seek terms; in November a conference was held at Nicaea in Locris. Polybius (xviii, 1–11) gives an interesting account of the proceedings, at which Philip’s sardonic humour found full scope. It is unnecessary to follow the details: Rome clearly pursued the same policy, and though Philip was willing to concede more than earlier in the year he stubbornly refused to surrender the ‘Fetters of Greece’, Demetrias, Chalcis and Acrocorinth. But Rome, and still more her allies, insisted on the complete evacuation of Greece; for the allies hoped to free Greece from Macedonian and Roman alike and so deprive Rome of the excuse or necessity for future intervention. The Senate refused to accept Philip’s terms, broke off the negotiations and prolonged Flamininus’ command.
Philip’s desperate efforts to retain what he still held met with little success. Unable to protect Argos he handed it over to the tyrannical king of Sparta, Nabis, who betrayed his trust. After instituting a reign of terror in Argos, Nabis calmly threw in his lot with the Romans, who thus controlled the whole Peloponnese. Next Boeotia fell away from Philip, after Flamininus had thrown a body of Roman troops into the Theban assembly to influence the voting. Thus virtually all Philip’s Greek allies, except Acarnania, Chalcis and Corinth, had been brought over to Rome; the Hellenic League was broken. This success, which had been reached partly by arms, partly by diplomacy, was due largely to Flamininus. He was a genuine admirer of Greek culture and met the Greeks on their own ground. His magnetic personality, his enthusiasm, the tact and adaptability which he displayed instead of the Romans’ all too common blunt and almost brutal self-assertiveness, all appealed to the Greeks. In his un-Roman qualities he resembled Scipio Africanus, though he lacked Scipio’s strength and loftiness of character. If Rome wished to free Greece there were few men better suited than Flamininus to accomplish this with less loss of blood and without robbing the Greeks of their remaining shreds of self-respect. Here was a Roman consul seeking their friendship and promising their freedom, not spurning their ideals and exposing their weakness.17
The end was at hand. In 197 Philip marched south with 23,000 infantry and 2,000 horse. At Pherae he came into contact with the Roman army which was slightly larger. The ground was not suited for a battle, so both armies marched westwards on the opposite sides of a range of hills named Cynoscephalae (Karadagh). Near Scotussa detachments of the two armies met unexpectedly and a general engagement ensued.18 On the rough ground on the southern slopes of Cynoscephalae the legion faced the phalanx. The right wing of each army was successful, the left was retreating. Victory hung in the balance, when an unknown tribune decided on his own initiative what ought to be done. Detaching twenty maniples from the two rear ranks of the victorious Roman right wing, he led them to the left where they outflanked the enemy and charged on them from the rear. The battle was won; to the astonishment of the Greek world the Roman legion had defeated the Macedonian phalanx. This was achieved partly owing to the nature of the ground and Philip’s lack of cavalry, but mainly through the tactical flexibility which Scipio Africanus had given to the legion. The troops employed by Flamininus were largely composed of Scipio’s veterans from Spain and Africa and there can be little doubt where the tribune had learnt his lesson in tactics. Flamininus was the victor of Cynoscephalae, but he was building on the foundations laid by another. And he was soon to realize that it was almost more difficult to make peace than war among the bickering states of Greece.
5. THE SETTLEMENT OF GREECE
After the battle the Aetolians, who had contributed largely to the victory of the Roman right wing, were eager to invade Macedon and to destroy its power once and for all. But this suited neither Rome nor Philip. Sweeping the Aetolians aside Flamininus announced that in answer to Philip’s overtures and subject to the Senate’s approval he had determined to make peace with Philip on the terms laid down at Nicaea, namely, that Philip should abandon all his dependencies outside Macedon. Philip was too clear-sighted to refuse. Further resistance might involve the extinction of the independent existence of Macedon. True, he might hope for the intervention of his ally Antiochus. But if, when the Syrian came, he was too weak to treat him as an equal, he would be regarded as a mere dependant like the kings of Bithynia and Cappadocia. How much better to retain his kingdom intact and to renew war on more equal terms if Antiochus did come later, than to risk all on a gambler’s chance.
Flamininus also was ready for peace, not only for fear that he might be superseded in his command, but for very solid impersonal reasons. To destroy Macedon utterly was to court danger on all sides. It would remove the barrier which held back the barbarian Thracians, Illyrians and Gauls from the Greek frontiers.19 If this barrier were to be removed either Rome or Greece would have to step in; but Rome was unwilling to undertake military occupation in the Balkan peninsula, while to allow the Greeks to advance in this direction would lead to interminable rivalry and confusion. Further, a prostrate Macedon would benefit not only Greek and barbarian but also Antiochus, who having wrested Coele-Syria from Ptolemy was free to re-establish his authority beyond the Taurus Mountains in Asia Minor and on the Asiatic shores of the Aegean. Although their relations with him had officially been friendly, the Romans could not but see that he had a formal right to intervene, since he was allied with Philip to share the Ptolemaic dependencies, while Rome had insisted on the restitution of the territory in Asia which Philip had occupied. But while Antiochus was not averse to seeing Macedon weakened, as that would give him supremacy in the Graeco-Oriental world, he can hardly have been eager to see the Macedonian control in the Balkans and Aegean merely replaced by that of Rome. Thus many motives, chief among them fear of Antiochus, induced Flamininus to meet Philip at Tempe, where despite the protests of Rome’s allies an armistice was concluded during which all parties were to submit all details to the Senate. The Aetolians in particular were disillusioned and embittered; the Greeks were forced to see that Rome intended to settle affairs in her own way.20
Anxiety about insurrections in Cisalpine Gaul and Spain (pp. 263ff.) and still more about Antiochus, induced Rome to conclude peace with Philip on terms not unduly severe (winter 197–196). The terms, which were expounded in a senatorial decree, showed that the peace was more than a treaty with Philip; it was a manifesto to Greece and a warning to Antiochus: all the rest of the Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and governed by their own laws; the Greek cities subject to or held by Philip were to be surrendered to Rome; he was to evacuate and free certain cities in Asia Minor; all prisoners, deserters and his fleet to be surrendered; an indemnity of 1,000 talents to be paid, half at once, half by annual instalments. Yet Philip was not humbled as Carthage had been.21
In the spring of 196 ten commissioners were sent to Greece with the senatorial decree to settle affairs there with Flamininus, who had pacified some trouble in Boeotia by a show of force. They then published the Senate’s decision, which was received with some uneasiness: what would happen to the ‘Fetters of Greece’ when surrendered to Rome? T
o allay this disquiet and to prove the sincerity of the Senate’s intentions, Flamininus staged his famous declaration at the Isthmian Games. To the assembled Greeks a herald proclaimed that a number of Greek peoples whom he named were by order of the Roman Senate and the proconsul Titus Quinctius Flamininus declared free without garrisons or tribute to be governed by their own ancestral laws. Flamininus, his ambition at last sated, was almost mobbed by the enthusiastic crowd. The proclamation, together with the Senate’s manifesto, was the high-water mark of Rome’s philhellenic policy. She proclaimed freedom for Greece, and more, she proclaimed herself to be the permanent protectress of Greek liberty throughout the world, a liberty to be respected alike by the Greeks themselves, by the conquered Philip and by the aggressive Antiochus (see further p. 233).
This glorious moment was soon followed by a reaction in Greece. Although Rome imposed no tribute or garrisons, she was still the protectress and as such proceeded to ‘settle Hellenic affairs’. The ten commissioners started on this disillusioning task and had accomplished enough by the end of the year to allow them to return to Rome, leaving Flamininus to complete the settlement. It is hardly necessary to follow the details: the Aetolians claimed back all their past conquests, but were only granted Phocis, Eastern Locris and part of Thessaly; the rest of Thessaly was grouped into four small federal states, while Euboea was made into a separate league; Corinth was added to the Achaean League. But before returning home the commission had accomplished two things of importance. An alliance was concluded with Philip, Antiochus’ former ally, so that Rome might now hope to use him against Antiochus; and secondly the disgruntled Aetolians, who were on the point of revolting, were persuaded to refer their troubles to Rome. But the commissioners could not advise the immediate evacuation of Greece, however ominous this might seem to the Greeks, who began to doubt Rome’s integrity. Friendship with Philip, the pacification of Aetolia, the continued military occupation of Greece, all pointed in one direction – Antiochus, who had crossed to Europe.
In 195 Flamininus assembled delegates from all Greek states in Corinth to confer about liberating Argos from the clutches of Nabis of Sparta. All voted in favour of this crusade, except the Aetolians whose claims had not yet been settled. An allied army and navy was launched against Sparta and the power of Nabis was broken. But Flamininus would not go as far as his allies desired; as with Philip, he wished to cripple, but not destroy. Once again it was the Romans and not the allies who dictated the terms, which included the surrender by Nabis of Argos and other towns and of his fleet, an indemnity, and the renouncing of the right to make war or alliances. At the Nemean festival the freedom of Argos was proclaimed and the city reentered the Achaean League. In the next year, 194, Flamininus persuaded the Senate, in spite of the danger from Antiochus, to redeem its pledge and to recall the army from Greece. He presided over a pan-Hellenic conference at Corinth, where he announced the Roman evacuation of Greece and amid much fatherly advice he urged the Greeks to make right use of their new freedom. The Roman garrisons were withdrawn from all towns, including the three ‘Fetters’, and Flamininus returned to Rome, where he celebrated a magnificent triumph. His ideals and ambitions were fulfilled. The Greeks were free, under a Roman protectorate. But they had paid a heavy price for their freedom and many besides the Aetolians looked askance at the settlement and the new regime. How they would respond to their fresh responsibilities the future alone would show.
XII
ROME AND ANTIOCHUS
1. THE DIPLOMATIC CONFLICT
Antiochus had landed in Europe. After conquering Palestine, he turned to his hereditary possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace, now held by Ptolemy or Philip. In 197 he started a military promenade along the coast of Asia Minor. He was checked momentarily by Rhodes, who refused him the opportunity of joining his ally Philip. But when news of Cynoscephalae arrived, the danger was past and he easily bought over the Rhodians by some territorial concessions in Caria. He gradually made his way to the Hellespont, though respecting the boundaries which he had long ago guaranteed to Attalus.1 Eumenes, Attalus’ successor, however, was alarmed to find Pergamum surrounded on all sides by the advancing tide. At his advice the cities of Smyrna and Lampsacus, who had refused to submit to Antiochus and were being taken by force, appealed for protection to Rome, although they had no substantial claim on her. The appeal was welcomed and the Senate, which was concluding peace with Philip, issued its proclamation that ‘Greeks in Europe and Asia were to be free and autonomous’. Beside this warning, which extended their philhellenic policy to Asia, the Senate tried to embarrass Antiochus by sending to him an ambassador who was to protect the interests of Egypt which Rome had conveniently neglected for three years. Undaunted, Antiochus crossed to Europe by the early summer of 196 and established himself on the Thracian coast. ‘To him this was his last conquest, the recovery of the last piece of his heritage; but in the eyes of the Romans, Thrace could only be the first stage of an invasion planned to drive them from Greece.’ (Holleaux, CAH, VIII, p. 184.)
A diplomatic duel followed which merely caused Rome and Antiochus to harden their hearts. Antiochus who had sent envoys to Flamininus at Corinth, received a brusque reply after the Isthmian Games: ‘he must abstain from attacking autonomous cities in Asia and go to war with none of them; he must evacuate those which had been subject to Ptolemy or Philip; he was forbidden to cross into Europe with an army (which he had as a matter of fact already done); for no Greek henceforth was to be attacked in war or to be enslaved to any one; finally ambassadors would wait on Antiochus.’2 These ambassadors, supported by the knowledge of Rome’s alliance with Philip, explained the situation to Antiochus in much the same terms. The king replied that he could not understand the Romans interfering in Asia when he did not in Italy; he was merely recovering his ancestral kingdom in Thrace. He then played his trump card: the Romans need not worry about Ptolemy’s possessions because he had just concluded an alliance with him. The Romans were outwitted. Though not admitting their claim to interfere, Antiochus took the wind out of their sails still more by offering to submit the cases of Lampsacus and Smyrna to the arbitration of Rhodes. Matters were thus brought to a standstill. The king would not admit, and the Romans would not abate their demands. Neither side wanted war and the question might have been settled amicably by an equitable recognition and definition of the king’s ‘sphere of influence’ in Thrace. But Rome could neither believe that his intentions were pacific, nor tolerate a great power in the east which might one day grow to rivalry and hostility. The conference was interrupted by a report of Ptolemy’s death. This was false, but it occasioned the ending of the king’s minority and his accession to the throne as Epiphanes Eucharistos (an event celebrated on the Rosetta stone).
The next year, 195, Antiochus sent an offer to Flamininus to renew conversations about arranging a treaty of friendship with Rome; when told to deal direct with the Senate, he refused. Yet he had shown that he was ready to treat on his own terms and had no evil intentions against Rome. Rome’s fears were increased by the movements of Hannibal, whose political opponents alleged, probably falsely, that he was intriguing with Antiochus. The Senate foolishly rejected Scipio’s generous advice of non-interference and thereby drove Hannibal to join Antiochus (pp. 276f). This seriously complicated the eastern situation and fanned into a flame Hannibal’s latent hatred of Rome. In 194 Scipio, elected to his second consulship, urged that Greece should remain one of the consular provinces, because he sincerely believed that it must be held a little longer as a barrier against the Syrian; to evacuate it would create a vacuum into which Antiochus with Hannibal behind him would inevitably be drawn. Scipio keenly supported a philhellenic policy, but he saw clearly the danger of pressing it to extremes. Yet to occupy Greece any longer would have strained to the breaking point the belief of the Greeks in Rome’s sincerity. So the Senate followed Flamininus’ advice and Greece was evacuated. But Scipio showed how deep his fears were by founding eight maritime colonies at unprot
ected sea-ports in southern Italy; if Hannibal should provoke an invasion of Italy, he should find it prepared.
In the winter of 194–193 Antiochus sent two envoys to propose a treaty of friendship with Rome. This was in effect an ultimatum of peace or war. If the offer was accepted, it would imply the recognition by Rome of Antiochus’ authority in Thrace and Asia; if it was rejected, war might follow. But Flamininus, as the spokesman of the Senate, proposed a compromise: let Antiochus renounce his claims either to Thrace or to the autonomous Greek cities of Asia. Of the two alternatives, Rome apparently hoped to realize the evacuation of Thrace, since Flamininus told delegates of the Asiatic towns, then in Rome, that Rome would uphold their claims unless Antiochus withdrew from Europe. It is perhaps too severe to suppose that Rome’s interference on behalf of these towns had been a mere diplomatic manoeuvre, but clearly Rome was willing to sacrifice their claims to avert war, especially as they might not suffer severely under Syrian rule. Yet it is difficult to believe that the Senate really anticipated that these terms would be acceptable to Antiochus; perhaps they were merely trying to postpone the evil day. The proposal is interesting, for it shows that Rome was now ready to adopt from the Greeks the theory of ‘spheres of influence’, and Antiochus was perhaps foolish in refusing to sacrifice his rather useless European annexe.3 But such a compromise could only be lasting if Rome could once and for all overcome her mistrust of Antiochus. In any case little was achieved; the king’s representatives, having no power to compromise, withdrew. The Romans contented themselves with sending an embassy to the east to obtain further information and to continue the negotiations. The sequel was not happy. After long delay a conference was held at Ephesus (193), where delegates from the Greek cities were instigated by Eumenes to speak out boldly.4 This merely annoyed Antiochus further, negotiations again broke down, and when the embassy returned to Rome in the late summer war was looming large on the horizon. The same year the Aetolians invited Antiochus to liberate Greece.
A History of the Roman World Page 35
