by Cicero
a person: thought to be Servius Sulpicius Rufus (consul 51), who was the leading jurist of his age; cf. Cic. Brutus 152.
the most learned men: in particular, the Stoics. ‘Zeno holds that the law of nature is divine, and that it has the function of commanding what is right and forbidding the opposite’ (Cic. De Natura Deorum 1.36; for parallels see Pease’s note). ‘The law of all things ... is that which commands men, who are by nature political animals, to do the things which ought to be done and forbids them to do what ought not to be done’ (Chrysippus, SVF 3. 3T4).
its Greek name: nomos is the Greek for law; nemo means ‘I assign’ or ‘distribute’.
its Latin name: Cicero, rather unconvincingly, connects lex (law) with lego (I choose, i.e. I choose what is just and right; cf. L. 2. 11). The actual derivation is uncertain.
those six books: i.e. The Republic.
Quintus’ view: Quintus seems to have believed in providence (De Divinatione 1. 10). In De Finibus 5. 96 he endorses the position of Antiochus as expounded by Piso.
impetus: reading motu with Watt (1) 266.
I’ll grant it if you insist: as an Epicurean, Atticus did not believe that the gods ruled the world; but he makes the concession for the sake of the argument. Hence the teasing tone of what follows.
they . . . become very angry: according to Epicurus, good men did not become angry.
god is never concerned: see Epicurus in D.L. 10.
139: ‘A blessed and immortal being has no trouble itself and causes no trouble to anyone else. Hence it is devoid of anger or favour.’
the only one that participates in reason: recent studies of animal behaviour make it clear that most of the ancients seriously underestimated the reasoning power of many species. See Sorabji.
What is there . . . more divine than reason?: the saying is attributed to the Stoic Cleanthes in Cic. De Natura Deorum 1.37.
a single community shared by gods and men: for the long pedigree of this idea see Pease on De Natura Deorum 2. 154.
blood-relationships: strictly Cicero’s term (agnationes) refers only to persons under the authority of the same paterfamilias, e.g. sons, sons’ wives, and unmarried daughters.
sowing the human race: Cicero does not wish to dwell on the origin of human life; so he moves quickly on. The idea of sowing may recall God as the ‘seminal’ reason of the universe (D.L. 7. 36 on Zeno); cf. Plato, Timaeus 41e-42a and 42d.
remembers his place of origin: he recognizes that his soul has come from God. There is no reason to think that Cicero has in mind the idea that an individual soul had an earlier existence (Plato, Meno 81–6).
for man’s use: compare ‘The Stoics hold that everything produced by the earth is created for the use of men’ (De Officiis 1. 22, based on Panaetius).
Following Watt (1) 266, we have omitted the phrase frugibus atque bacis, ‘crops and fruits’, as an explanatory gloss on ‘what shoots forth from the earth’.
bis enjoyment: presumably Cicero is thinking of wool and hides.
By copying her: for example, the Stoic Poseidonius said that clever men devised the rudder by imitating fish (Seneca, Epistulae 90. 24).
senses . . . as servants and messengers: cf. Cic. De Natura Deorum 2. 140.
man alone erect: cf. De Natura Deorum 2. 140 and Pease’s note.
The Greeks . . . have no equivalent: the Latin is vultus (expression) as distinct from fades (face). As Kenter points out, the Greek prosopon could denote ‘expression’.
speech . . . the promoter of human fellowship: ratio (reason) and oratio (speech) are said to provide the bond of human society (De Officiis 1. 150).
the books which you have read: Cicero dealt with this subject in the lost R. 4.
not on opinion, but on nature: ‘nature’ here means objective reality—things as they really are.
apparently leads to the dissolution . . . : but only apparently, because the soul is supposed to survive.
those who worship a dog or a cat: the Egyptians.
nothing human is alien to them: in Terence’s Self-Punisher (77) Chremes, an old busybody, excuses his inquisitiveness by saying T am a man; I consider nothing human to be none of my business’ (homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto).
Socrates was right to curse: according to Clement of Alexandria (second century AD), Cleanthes said in his work on Pleasure, Book 2, that Socrates uttered this curse (Stromateis 2. 131).
that famous saying of Pythagoras: perhaps ‘Friends have all things in common’ (D.L. 8. 10). There is a gap in the text.
some people: i.e. the Epicureans. Actually, Epicurus said: ‘Of all the things that wisdom obtains for the blessedness of the complete life, far the greatest is friendship’ (Principal Doctrines 21); ‘All friendship is desirable in itself, even though it starts from the need of help’ (Frag. 23). Cicero himself wrote an essay on the subject; see Powell (1).
the older lot: e.g. the Presocratics and Plato.
philosophical factories: in De Finibus 5. 7 the Old Academy (represented by Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, and Crantor) and the early Peripatos (headed by Aristotle) are called factories, but without any hint of irony.
that everything right and honourable should be desired for its own sake: Cicero distinguishes (a) those who accept this thesis, (b) those who reject it (the Epicureans), and (c) those who question it (the New Academy). Within (a) he distinguishes (ai) the Old Academy (Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo), (az) the Peripatetics (Aristotle and Theophrastus), (#3) the Stoic Zeno, (#4) the Stoic Aristo. Cicero claims that (a 1) and (a 2) are virtually in agreement. In 53–5 he goes on to suggest that the gap between (a 1) and (a 2) is not unbridgeable.
the Old Academy: founded by Plato. In the third century BC its character changed under the sceptical Arcesilaus and Carneades. See Long 88–106.
Aristotle: Aristotle’s school is often referred to as the Lyceum or the Peripatos (covered walkway).
their own little gardens: a patronizing reference to the Epicureans, who held their discussions in a garden in the suburbs of Athens. Cicero was opposed to the school for several reasons; one of the most important was that it discouraged its disciples from engaging in public life.
Let us ask it to keep quiet: as Atticus will have to suspend his devotion to Epicurus ‘for a little while’, so Cicero will have to keep the troublesome Academy at a distance. See Introd. pp. xiv-xv.
the plays: e.g. The Eumenides of Aeschylus.
by some advantage or benefit: these words suggest that Cicero still has the Epicureans in mind; for they maintained that ethics was a matter of pleasure or pain. But the argument also recalls the thesis presented by Glaucon in Plato, Republic z. 359–61, viz. that injustice, if undetected, is preferable to justice.
the notorious Thirty: in Athens in the spring of 414, at the end of the Peloponnesian War, the democrats were ousted by the oligarchs. A committee of thirty was formed which set up a new council filled with their own supporters, and abolished the lawcourts. At the same time they instituted a reign of terror in which hundreds were murdered or driven out. At the end of the year the Thirty were defeated by a band of exiles under Thrasybulus; and in 403 democracy was restored.
our interrex: in 82, L. Valerius Flaccus as interrex introduced a bill which appointed Sulla dictator with unlimited powers—and not just for the usual six months. Sulla then brought in his constitutional reforms, designed to re-establish the power of the senatorial oligarchy. The system lasted little more than a decade. It was finally dismantled by Pompey and Crassus in 70.
our opponents: again, the Epicureans. For an exposition, and a critique, of their theology see Cic. De Natura Deorum 1. 18ff.
justice and injustice are differentiated by nature: this is denied in Horace’s Epicurean satire (i. 3): ‘One has to admit that laws were invented out of the fear of injustice . . . Nor can nature distinguish just from unjust in the way that she separates good things from their opposites, things to be sought from things to be shunned’ (113–14). By �
��good things’ Horace means ‘beneficial things’; thus nature can distinguish edible from poisonous fungi, but justice is a balance of advantages and disadvantages which is not ‘given’ but has to be worked out.
so-called ‘virtue’: Cicero is dissatisfied in translating the Greek arete (excellence) by the Latin virtus; for the latter was derived from vir (man) and originally meant ‘manliness’.
a tree or a horse: the virtues, or good qualities, of a tree (e.g. its height, hardness, or straightness) can all be objectively assessed. The same applies to a horse’s strength, speed, or stamina.
the qualities of young men: moral qualities (honesty, generosity, courage, etc.) are equally objective; i.e. everyone knows what is meant by those terms.
honourable: that which is honourable is ‘a praiseworthy good’ laudabile bonum). But we have already shown that a good is objectively good; therefore that which is honourable is objectively honourable.
the variety and incompatibility of men’s opinions: Cicero concedes that the character of an actual person may be controversial. But he points out (a) that conflicting opinions may arise from ill-informed or biased judgements, and (b) that the person under consideration may not be uniformly or invariably honest, generous, courageous, etc. (unless he is that unlikely creature, a Stoic sage).
duty: the English word often implies reluctance. But offcium carried the idea of kindly service as well as obligation. ‘
for its advantages, not for itself: in this section Cicero argues like the Stoics, whose moral judgements tended to be categorical (either-or). He does not consider the case where an action performed for someone else’s sake also involves an element of self-interest, however small.
if people are not seen to be grateful etc.: this reproduces the general sense of the passage. The text is corrupt.
that holy thing, friendship: Kenter sees this as a satirical swipe at the Epicureans—perhaps rightly, in view of the next sentence.
those philosophers who think it is honourable etc.: I have translated qui velle iudicium vitare nisi vitio ipso vitato (honestum) putant. So Watt (2) 242, on the basis of Eussner and Mueller.
the ultimate good: in Tusculan Disputations 5.85 Cicero divides the opinions of the various schools into simple and composite. The former are represented by the Stoics (what is honourable— honestum), the Epicureans (pleasure— voluptas), Hieronymus of Rhodes, a third-century ex-Peripatetic (freedom from pain), and Carneades (the enjoyment of the primary gifts of nature). In De Finibus 5. 20 and Academica 2. 131 we hear that this was not Carneades’ own view; nor, we may add, does it sound like a simple opinion. Composite opinions are represented by the Peripatetics (mental goods, physical goods, external goods), the Old Academy (much the same), Dinomachus and Calliphro (pleasure and what is honourable), Diodorus (what is honourable and freedom from pain).
an arbitrator: the magistrate could appoint an arbitrator (a professional lawyer) rather than one of the panel of judges, who, though respectable citizens, were not necessarily expert in questions of law. See Crook 80.
the Old Academy: see note on 37–9 above; and cf. De Finibus 5. 7, where we hear that Antiochus used to group Aristotle with the Old Academy. In De Natura Deorum 1.16 we are told that Antiochus held that the Stoics agreed in substance with the Peripatetics, differing from them only in terminology. When Cicero minimizes the differences between some of the schools, he is following Antiochus’ line; cf. 54 below.
Antiochus: for an account of Antiochus see Barnes and Glucker (1).
advantageous things: the others thought of such things as lesser goods. Zeno acknowledged their value, but (since he allowed only one ‘good’)he called them ‘advantageous’. Therefore, says Cicero, the dispute is a matter of terminology.
ultimate ends: the Latin fines meant both ‘ethical ends’ and ‘local boundaries’. Cicero proceeds to play on the two senses.
rights of possessors: Zeno is said to claim certain fines belonging to the Academy. Marcus, Quintus, and Atticus will act as arbitrators as laid down for disputes over fines in the Twelve Tables. Ownership as a result of uninterrupted possession (usucapio), as distinct from strict legal title, was recognized by Roman law. See the Twelve Tables, 6. 3; ROL iv. 461; Crook 141–2.
within five feet: a strip of land five feet wide ran between one property and another. The strip could be used for turning the plough, but possession could not be acquired on the strip itself.
the Mamilian Law: in 109 a tribune called Mamilius set up a court to try those who had accepted bribes from Jugurtha. Sallust (Jugurtha 40) gives his name as Gaius Mamilius Limetanus (‘the boundary man’). So it is probable that he was the man mentioned by Cicero, and that at this time he also brought in his law reducing the three arbitrators to one in disputes over boundaries.
the markers laid down by Socrates: as the views of Socrates were represented (whether faithfully or not) by Plato, this indicates that the decision has gone in favour of the Old Academy. Zeno receives rougher treatment in De Finibus 4. 19ff.
the highest good: by presenting the alternatives in these terms Quintus seems to be suggesting that the distinction between the two positions is so subtle that a final decision cannot be made.
means the same as this: reading idem ac hoc valet on the suggestion of Watt (in a letter).
a good man . . . a happy one: the realization is said to come as a result of wisdom or philosophy in general. But it was open to question, as we see from De Finibus 5. 11, 70, 79, 84. As so often, the dispute turns out to be a matter of terminology (and perhaps a certain amount of self-deception).
a citizen of the whole world: ‘Although the idea of world citizenship may be ascribed to Socrates (Tusc. V. 108), it owes its dissemination to the Stoa.’ So Kenter. He cites, inter alia, De Finibus 3. 64, 4. 7; Seneca, Epistulae 28. 4.
disdain, despise, and count as nothing: cf. R. 6. 16.
a kind of stockade: according to D.L. 7. 40, this was a Stoic image.
a more expansive . . . style: i.e. rhetoric. See De Finibus 2. 17, where dialectic is contrasted with rhetoric. Cicero now goes on to embrace the three types of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative (i.e. the rhetoric of display).
BOOK 2
Euripuses: the Euripus was the strait between Euboea and the Greek mainland.
nothing here except rocks: such wild scenery, which thrills the romantic, would not have given pleasure to Atticus. He was happy to find a gentler place with features to which a human being could relate.
that eminently sensible man: Ulysses, who refused the immortality offered by Calypso so that he might return home (Odyssey 1. 55–9, 5. 135–6).
Tusculum: 15 miles (24km.) south-east of Rome, 2,000 feet (nearly 610 m.) above sea level; a fashionable resort where several important Romans (including Cicero) had villas.
The last seven words in the text of section 5 have been deleted as a gloss.
her two saviours: Marius and Cicero.
Plato’s Phaedrus: in Phaedrus 230b Socrates dips his feet in the Ilissus.
Tyamis: the river Tyamis flows into the sea opposite to Corcyra (Corfu).
Amaltbeum: a shrine to Amalthea (see Index of Names). Cicero built one for himself at Arpinum (Att. 1. 16. 15).
my version of Aratus’ poem: for fragments of Cicero’s version see Traglia, 65–111.
the best authorities: in particular the Stoics.
an eternal force etc.: cf. L. 1. 21 and 33.
If [plaintiff] summon [defendant] to court: Twelve Tables 1. 1 (ROL iv. 425). The defendant was summoned to a preliminary hearing before the praetor, which is what Cicero has in mind here. If the issue was not resolved there, the case went to trial. See Crook 75–7.
