Les chansons de croisade avec leurs melodies, eds J. Bedier and P. Aubry, Luzac, Paris, 1909, pp. 8-11. Translated by Mike Routledge, Department of French, Royal Holloway, University of London.
DOCUMENT 13 THE REGULATIONS IMPOSED ON THE CRUSADERS SAILING TO LISBON, 1147
Given the diverse backgrounds of the crusading armies, discipline must have been very difficult to enforce on campaign. This is an attempt to set ground rules for conduct and may have been born out of the tensions experienced between contingents on the First Crusade. In any case, it appears to have been a success because the Second Crusade conquered Lisbon, in part because of the (relative) unity of the attacking armies.
Among these people of so many different tongues the firmest guarantees of peace and friendship were taken; and, furthermore, they sanctioned very strict laws, as, for example, a life for a life and a tooth for a tooth. They forbade all display of costly garments. Also they ordained that women should not go out in public; that the peace must be kept by all, unless they should suffer injuries recognised by the proclamation; that weekly chapters be held by the laity and the clergy separately, unless perchance some great emergency should require their meeting together; that each ship have its own priest and keep the same observances as are prescribed for parishes; that no one retain the servant or seaman of another in his employ; that everyone make weekly confession and communicate on Sunday; and so on through the rest of the obligatory articles with separate sanctions for each. Furthermore, they constituted for every thousand of the forces two elected members who were to be called judges or coniurati, through whom the cases of the constables were to be settled in accordance with the proclamation and by whom the distribution of moneys was to be carried out.
The Conquest of Lisbon (De expugnatione lyxbonensi), tr. Charles David, with a new foreword by Jonathan Phillips, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001, p. 57.
DOCUMENT 14 THE GREEKS AND THE SECOND CRUSADE, 1147-48
The attitude of the Greeks to the Second Crusade was, generally, one of hostility. They did not want large western armies outside Constantinople and they feared the impact of the crusade on their newly-imposed overlordship of the principality of Antioch. They were accused by some western writers of treachery, but here is evidence from a Byzantine source of such behaviour. Niketas Choniates was a secretary to the Byzantine emperor and wrote after the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade (1204). His style is heavily influenced by classical writers, a convention required in the elite court circles that formed his audience.
The Annals of Niketas Choniates
The passage of the king, who shortly was to be joined by his fellow Franks, was viewed with satisfaction by the Romans, like the passing of some dire portent from heaven. Once again, the emperor had the same care for his own provinces which he had formerly exercised. He did not neglect to provide them with supplies of food, and market wares were once again set out on the roadside. The Romans, following Manuel’s instructions, set up ambushes in strategic places and along the defiles of mountain passes, where they slew no small number of the enemy. When the Germans approached the gates of the cities, the citizens did not display their wares but rather let ropes down from the wall so that they could first pull up the money in payment for whatever they were hawking and then let down only as much as suited them, whether it was bread or any other saleable foodstuff. By knowingly committing these unlawful acts, they incensed the All-Seeing Eye, for cheating at the scales and for taking no pity on them as strangers, and for not even setting before them, as co-religionists, any of their own household stores, instead seizing from their throats that which was necessary to sustain the body. The worst of the inhabitants, especially those motivated by inhumanity, did not let down even the tiniest morsel but, drawing up the gold and silver, deposited the coins in their bosoms and disappeared, not to be seen again on the walls between the towers. Some, mixing lime with the barley groats, concocted a fatal mixture.
Whether all this, in truth, was commanded by the emperor, as was rumored, I do not know with certainty: it was, nonetheless, an iniquitous and unholy deed. The emperor’s purpose was neither in doubt nor was it cast in the shadow of the curtain of falsehood: he minted debased silver coinage which he offered to the Italian troops to pay for their needs. In short, every ill the emperor himself had contrived was present, and he commanded others to inflict such harm so that these things should be an indelible memorial for posterity, deferents against attacking the Romans.
Niketas Choniates, 0 City of Byzantium, The Annals of Niketas Choniates, tr. Harry Magoulias, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, MI, 1984, pp. 38-9.
DOCUMENT 15 AMALRIC’S DECISION TO TRAVEL TO CONSTANTINOPLE, 1171
William of Tyre recounts Amalric’s determination to lead this mission in person, enabling us to see the king’s power over his nobles. Amalric was received with great ceremony in Constantinople. The Franks were shown around the city and its churches and were entertained in lavish style. Discussions concerning an attack on Egypt were held and Amalric also set out the needs of his kingdom. William of Tyre provides a vivid description of the visit, but of the details agreed between the two men he only noted a treaty ‘agreeable to both the emperor and the king and put into writing, to which the seals of both were affixed’. In fact William was probably concealing the full picture from the western audience of his Historia (see above, p. 108), and the contemporary Byzantine writer, John Kinnamos (an imperial secretary), gives a succinct insight into the reality of the arrangement: Amalric had visited Constantinople in person in order to swear homage to Manuel in return for his support.
(i) William of Tyre
The king [Amalric] summoned all his nobles to him and laid before them the needs of the realm. For he perceived that the kingdom was weighed down by many troubles, that the enemies of the Christian faith were constantly increasing not only in number and valour but in wealth and riches as well. . . .
The king therefore requested the advice of his nobles as to how these evil conditions could be remedied and the kingdom saved. They advised that aid from the princes of the West should be implored to combat these troubles; they had no other plan of relief to suggest.
Accordingly, with the common consent of all, it was resolved that a delegation consisting of men of high rank be sent to explain the difficulties of the kingdom to the princes of the West and to ask their aid. The envoys were instructed to visit the pope and those illustrious lords, the emperor of the Romans, the kings of France, England, Sicily and the Spains, and also other distinguished dukes and counts and implore their assistance in combatting the imminent perils now threatening the kingdom. It was further resolved that the precarious situation of the realm be made known to the emperor of Constantinople. Since he was much nearer to us and was besides far richer than the others, he could more easily furnish the desired aid. It was specified also that the envoy sent to the emperor should be a person so gifted with wisdom, eloquence and authority that by his tact and ability he might incline the mind of that great prince to comply with our wishes.
While they were deliberating over the selection of a suitable person to undertake this important mission, the king had been consulting with some of his more intimate counsellors. He now laid before the assembly a plan which he had conceived. He declared that a mission of such importance could be undertaken by no one but himself and added that he was prepared to undergo all perils and hardships to relieve the desperate necessity of the kingdom. The nobles of the realm, though filled with admiration, were almost overcome by this proposal and protested that the task was too arduous; moreover, without the presence of the king the realm would be desolate. Amalric answered, however, ‘Let the Lord, whose minister I am, rule the kingdom; as for me, I am determined to go; no one can induce me to recall that decision.’
Accordingly, on 10 March [1171], attended by a great retinue as befitted the royal majesty, he set out on the journey.
William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done Bey
ond the Sea, ed. Emily Babcock, tr. August Krey, 2 vols, Columbia University Press, New York,
1943, vol. 2, pp. 377-83.
(ii) John Kinnamos
In the meantime, the king of Palestine came to Byzantium to petition the emperor for what he required. Obtaining what he sought, he agreed to many things, including his subjection to the emperor on those terms.
John Kinnamos, The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus, tr. Charles Brand, Columbia University Press, New York, 1976, p. 209.
DOCUMENT 16 MUSLIM AND FRANKISH MILITARY TACTICS
Walter the Chancellor was an eye-witness source from the Principality of Antioch who was concerned to record events for posterity. His writings covered the period 1114-22 and here he describes the temptation posed to the Franks by a Muslim incursion and the difficulties of Prince Roger of Antioch in persuading his men not to respond — as, of course, the Muslims hoped they would do, thereby drawing them out of formation and enabling the Christians to be defeated. William of Tyre outlines a more prudent approach — that of avoiding battle — which often gave the settlers their best results.
(i) Walter the Chancellor
While they [the Muslims] were doing their best to attack our men dreadfully, a rumour reached their ears announcing that the king’s approach was very close. They, indeed, had confidence not in the power of the Holy Ghost, but in the great numbers of their army. . . . They shook their spears, loosed their arrows and charged almost into our camp. When he saw this, the renowned prince [Roger of Antioch], riding a swift horse, unsheathed his sword and rode around his men’s encampment, declaiming: . . . If anyone dares to ride out now, he will perish by my sword.’
Indeed, on the contrary, he warned every one of them to stand before his camp, weapons in hand and mind alert, and yet not to venture in any way or to signal the start of the battle for themselves. Therefore the Persians marvelled that a race so ready for war and always intolerant of injury, who had been provoked so often by arrows, afflicted so often by jeers, was so long-suffering, because the Christians did not signal the start of battle and were already submitting as if fear had conquered them. Some of our men even considered it an act of cowardice; however some of greater perspicacity interpreted it as the purpose of the prince so that, when he was sure the time was right, they would be stronger to attack, not at the enemy’s summoning, nor in anticipation of their forces, but by the prudent disposition and enormous experience of himself and the king, whose arrival was very near. For, as experience shows, a handful of warriors with boldness and ingenuity will more often prevail in war then an ill-disciplined and unreliable multitude of armed men.
Walter the Chancellor, The Antiochene Wars, tr. Thomas Asbridge and Susan Edgington, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, pp. 92-3.
(ii) William of Tyre
The count had retired with his forces to the city of Arka and was there awaiting an opportunity to engage the enemy without too much risk. The knights of the Temple who lived in the same vicinity also remained shut up in their strongholds; they expected almost hourly to be besieged and did not wish to risk an encounter with the Turks. The brothers of the Hospital had likewise retired in alarm to their fortified castle of Krak. They felt that if, in the midst of such confusion they could defend the fortress just named from injury by the enemy, their duty had been done.
. . . During this time Saladin ranged here and there over the plain, especially the cultivated fields, and without opposition traversed the entire locality. He burned all the crops, those that had been gathered into the granaries, those still stacked in the fields, and the growing grain as well. He drove off cattle as booty and laid waste the whole country in every direction.
William of Tyre, A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea, ed. Emily Babcock, tr. August Krey, 2 vols, Columbia University Press, New York, 1943, vol. 2, pp. 447-8.
DOCUMENT 17 KNIGHT SERVICE OWED IN THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM, C. 1185-86
This is an extract from Le Livre des Assises of John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa (c. 1216-66). John was a prominent politician in the Latin East in the mid-thirteenth century who wrote a treatise on the High Court of the kingdom of Jerusalem that included a list of the military capacity of the kingdom based upon records from c. May 1185 to April 1186; in other words, just before Saladin’s victory at Hattin. For reasons of space, only a segment of the text is included here (for the full account, see the reference below), but it gives some indication of the organisation and scale of the forces of the kingdom. The numbers listed in this work would be supplemented by members of noble households visiting western knights and mercenaries. Note the mention of women on the lists — probably widows or wives whose husbands were in captivity. Sergeants were well-armed footsoldiers, not mounted knights.
The barony of the county of Jaffa and Ascalon to which Ramla, Mirabel and Ibelin belong owes 100 knights:
Jaffa 25
Ascalon 25
Ramla and Mirabel 40
Ibelin 10
The barony of the principality of Galilee owes 100 knights:
Land this side of the River Jordan 60
Land the other side of the River Jordan 40
The barony of Sidon to which Beaufort, Caesarea and Bethsan belong owes 100 knights:
Sidon and Beaufort 50
Caesarea 25
Bethsan 25
The lordship of Kerak, Montreal and Saint Abraham owes 60 knights:
Kerak and Montreal 40
Saint Abraham 20
The lordship of Count Joscelin owes 24 knights:
Chateau du Roi 4
Saint George 10
The land of Geoffrey Le Tor 6
The land of Philip Le Rous 2
The chamberlainy 2
[John then lists the services owed by the bishops of the kingdom, which totalled 34 knights; then the services owed by the cities of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Jerusalem itself owed 41 knights, Nablus 85, Acre 80, Daron 2, Beirut 21, and, listed here in full, Tyre owed 28.]
The lordship of Tyre owes 28 knights:
The Venetians 3
Simon of Marcini 3
The wife of William Le Grand 2
The wife of Gobert Vernier 1
Fulk of Falaise 2
Anseau, the son of Charles 1
Gerard Gazel 2
Henry of Maschelin 1
Adam of Arsuf 1
Denis, the son of Geoffrey 1
Raoul Le Bouteiller 2
Roger Savari 7
Simon des Molins 1
Roger Le Gaste Bouteillier 1
The total number of knights is 677 [sic 675]
[John also lists the aids, in the form of sergeants, owed by the churches and the burgesses at times of great need. A few are listed below, with the grand total of sergeants from all the dues.]
The patriarch of Jerusalem owes 500
The chapter of the Holy Sepulchre 500
The Church of St Mary of the Latins 50
The city of Acre 500
The city of Caesarea 50
The bishop of Sebastea 100
The archbishop of Tyre 150
Jaffa 100
Haifa 50
Tiberias 200
The total number of sergeants [including those not listed here], 5,175.
Peter Edbury, John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Boydell, Woodbridge, 1997, pp. 195-200.
DOCUMENT 18 THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORTRESSES AROUND ASCALON
This document reveals several aspects of Frankish military strategy. First, from the 1130s onwards there was a deliberate attempt to stifle the threat from the Muslim-held city of Ascalon. This settlement posed a serious menace to the south-west of the kingdom of Jerusalem, including the pilgrim road from Jaffa to the Holy City, and was the sole remaining Muslim-controlled port on the Levantine coast. The Franks constructed a series of castles in the vicinity of Ascalon to prevent raids on their lands and also to exert pressure on the Muslim garrison. Eventually this paid off and in 1153 the Christians took the city. Note also how
the construction of the castles increased the security of the settlers and the productivity of their lands — an important and desired consequence of this policy.
The Christians perceived that the bold incursions of the enemy showed no signs of ceasing; their forces were constantly renewed and, like the hydra, they gained increased strength after the death of their citizens. Hence after long deliberation, our people resolved to erect fortresses around about [Ascalon]. These would serve as defences against this monster which ever increased by the loss of its heads and, as often as it was destroyed, was reborn to our exceeding peril. Within these strongholds forces could be easily assembled which, from their very proximity would check the enemy’s forays. Such fortresses would also serve as bases to make frequent attacks upon the city itself. [The castles of Bethgibelin and Ibelin were built and, encouraged by their effect, Blanchegarde was constructed in 1142.]
As soon as it was finished the king [Fulk] took it under his own protection . . . and committed it to the care of wise men who had long experience in warfare. . . . Often by themselves, more often in company with men at arms from the other fortresses built with similar intent, these men used to issue forth to encounter and defeat the enemy when they tried to make raids from the city. Occasionally they even attacked the men of Ascalon on their own initiative, wrought great havoc on them and frequently triumphed over them. The result was that those who dwelt in the surrounding country began to place great reliance on this castle as well as on the other strongholds, and a great many suburban places grew up around it. Numerous families established themselves there, and tillers of the fields as well. The whole district became much more secure, because the locality was occupied and a more abundant supply of food for the surrounding country was made possible.
The Crusades 1095-1197 Page 27
