Napoleon’s efforts on behalf of the wounded are commendable indeed but they came a bit late. Had he begun this process in late September thousands of men would have left Russian unmolested and survived. Even those evacuated in the first week of October managed to reach France in relatively good condition. But now, moving thousands of wounded along the old Smolensk road became fraught with challenges. This route had been devastated by both armies during the summer campaign. ‘The road from Smolensk to Mozhaisk is completely exhausted,’ observed Napoleon. ‘It is appropriate, therefore, to have the commandants of Dorogobuzh, Gzhatsk, Vyazma and other locations to reconnoitre two parallel roads, two or three leagues to the right [from the main road], where there would be sufficient resources [for the army].’116 Napoleon instructed Marshal Victor to ‘detain all detachments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, military crews, trains of artillery, clothing, etc … at Smolensk’. The intention was to keep ‘this road open for the evacuation of hospitals and parts of the army to Smolensk, while nothing should pass from Smolensk to Moscow’.117 On 15–17 October thousands of wounded were moved from hospitals in the direction of Smolensk, and General Nansouty, who escorted these convoys, received instructions to turn back any transports he encountered on the road.118 Russian prisoners of war were also moved to Smolensk; en route, they suffered numerous abuses and mistreatment from their captors. One of them recalled that the prisoners included many innocent Muscovites. ‘Among us were many merchants and peasants because the French, upon seeing their beards, were convinced that they were Cossacks. There were also many servants and even footmen still wearing their liveries, whom the French accused of being disguised Russian soldiers.’ Anyone showing signs of fatigue or illness was simply shot by the side of the road.119
To avoid any ‘embarrassing incidents’120 at the start of the retreat, Napoleon gradually concentrated his forces. Marshal Ney, who had spent several days with his corps around Bogorodsk, was ordered to return to Moscow. Napoleon ordered Murat to observe closely the Russian camp at Tarutino, affording his troops as much rest and as good subsistence as possible. He also began redeploying the troops left in the rear and gave directions as to the manner in which the stragglers who had been assembled at Vilna, Minsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk were to rejoin the army. On 13 October a slight frost occurred and first light snow shower fell on the ruins of Moscow. Although the season remained fine, this cold spell had finally shown that the weather could change abruptly and the moment had come when it was necessary to decide what to do. ‘Let us make haste,’ he told his secretary. ‘We must be in winter quarters in twenty days’ time.’121
And yet there was no follow up and Napoleon continued to demonstrate extraordinary indecisiveness. Finally he assembled his council of war. Viceroy Eugène, Berthier, Daru, Mortier, Davout and Ney obeyed his summons; Murat and Bessieres could not attend due to their responsibilities in the advanced guard. The council first discussed the state of the army, reviewing each corps’ strengths and preparedness. One cannot but wonder how disheartening it must have been to these men to hear about the much-reduced strength of the Grande Armée. Davout’s corps was reduced from 72,000 to about 30,000, while Ney saw his corps shrink from 39,000 to just 10,000. Poniatowski’s 5th Corps numbered no more than 5,000 and Junot’s Westphalians mustered just 2,000. At least the condition of the men was largely satisfactory. The council then considered what plan of operations it would be best to adopt. This issue produced a diversity of opinion: Daru continued to insist that the army ought to remain at Moscow, while Davout, supported by Ney, strongly argued in favour of retreating along the Kalouga route that would open up to the army previously untouched provinces. In contrast, Berthier, supported by Mortier and Eugène, proposed that the army should proceed by a northern route through Volokolamsk and Zubkov to Vitebsk. Napoleon listened to all these opinions before deciding in favour of the plan to march on Kaluga. On 14 October Berthier informed Murat that Napoleon was taking the first steps to leave Moscow. ‘His Majesty desires you to reconnoitre routes so if you have to retreat before the enemy, you know these roads well. The emperor suggests making arrangements so your transports, parks and most of your infantry could depart without the enemy noticing.’122 The first trains with trophies – the regalia used in the tsarist coronations, the Ottoman standards that the Russians had captured in previous wars, the imperial eagles from the tops of the Kremlin towers, the cross of the Ivan the Great Tower and other treasures – departed from Moscow under the protection of General Claparede’s troops on 15 October.123 The following day Napoleon informed his Minister of Foreign Relations that he had made the decision to depart from Moscow and withdraw his forces to Smolensk and Vitebsk. ‘I intend on leaving on the 19th124 towards Kaluga,’ he wrote, ‘and beating the enemy army if it decides to oppose me … I will then proceed to Tula and Bryansk, or return immediately to Smolensk if the weather turns bad.’ As for the reasons for his departure, Napoleon explained that Moscow ‘no longer exists … therefore, it cannot serve as a military position for my future operations; it no longer has any significance’.125
Unaware of the emperor’s decision, many officers in Ney’s 3rd Corps, arriving in Moscow on 15 October, hoped that their return would be the precursor to a general withdrawal. ‘Two days passed over and we heard nothing of our departure,’ grumbled Montesquiou-Fezensac.126 Napoleon instead kept rallying troops and holding reviews in the court of the Kremlin. On 6 October it was the Old Guard infantry, followed by a review of the Young Guard, while a general parade was held on 8 October, only to be followed by a review of the divisions of the 1st Corps on 10–12 October. ‘We were almost constantly on duty or on parade. These tasks took up much of the day … [Reviews] exhausted the soldiers,’ recalled a Guard officer.127
On the 18th it was the turn of Ney’s 3rd Corps, and ‘the review was as imposing as circumstances would admit of,’ commented one officer. ‘The colonels rivalled each other in their efforts to display their regiments to the best advantage. No one would have imagined from their appearance how much their men had suffered and were still suffering. I am persuaded that this good outward show confirmed the emperor in his obstinacy, by inducing him to believe that, with such men, nothing was impossible.’128 But Napoleon’s experienced eye could not have ignored the meagre state of the once-imposing corps that once counted almost 40,000 men and now barely listed 10,000. As he contemplated the sight of his war-weary troops, reports circulated that gunfire had been heard in the direction of Vinkovo.129 It was some time before anyone dared to apprise Napoleon of the circumstances: ‘some from incredulity or uncertainty, and dreading the first movement of his impatience; others from love of ease, hesitating to provoke a terrible signal, or apprehensive of being sent to verify this assertion, and of exposing themselves to a fatiguing excursion.’130 But suddenly M. de Berenger, Murat’s aide-de-camp, turned up, ‘crestfallen and with a worried air’.131 He hardly took time to shake hands with Biot and simply muttered, ‘Thing are going badly!’ Berenger was rushed to the emperor who listened anxiously to his account of the surprise enemy attack at Vinkovo, where Murat barely escaped destruction.132
Chapter 10
The Die is Cast
In the evening of 14 September the disheartened officers and soldiers of the Russian army streamed through Moscow in an easterly direction. On leaving the city, the army made two unhurried marches on the Ryazan road to cross the Moskva river, about 20 miles from the capital. Despite claims by certain Russian/Soviet historians, Kutuzov had no premeditated plan of what was to become the famous flanking manoeuvre to Tarutino. Instead, it was the result of circumstances and a gradually formed consensus. At the council of war at Fili the Russian generals considered two possible directions: Barclay de Tolly suggested proceeding eastwards to Vladimir, which would secure direct communications with St Petersburg and protect the provinces east and north of Moscow. Bennigsen and Toll, on the other hand, favoured turning southwards and moving to Kaluga, which would allow the Russians to pr
otect the resources-rich provinces and threaten the enemy lines of communications.1 The latter offered many advantages but also represented a considerable threat, as Kutuzov feared that Napoleon would continue pursuing the Russian army and a flanking manoeuvre might expose it to devastating attacks by the Grande Armée.
Kutuzov’s orders on 13–14 September reveal that he initially considered accepting Barclay de Tolly’s suggestion and even made preparations to move his forces to the Vladimir road. In a letter to the commander of the 9th Reserve Regiment, for example, he noted that this unit should ‘proceed to Vladimir, where the main army is currently turning from the Ryazan road’.2 However, as it became clear that the Grande Armée had no intention of pursuing the Russians beyond Moscow, Kutuzov felt confident enough to adjust his plan. On 15 September he decided against moving to Vladimir and instead chose the opposite, southwesterly, direction. He explained to Wintzingerode that he intended to ‘make a march to the Ryazan road tomorrow and then reach the Tula road with a second march. From there I will proceed to Podolsk on the Kaluga road. With this movement I intend to turn the enemy’s attention to this army and threaten his rear. Podolsk is such a place where I hope to find [an advantageous] position and receive reinforcements, and from where I can dispatch detachments to the Mozhaisk road [to harass Napoleon’s line of communications].’3 Further details can be gleaned from Kutuzov’s letter to Emperor Alexander, the first he had written since the fall of Moscow. After explaining the factors that caused him to abandon Russia’s ancient capital, Kutuzov laid out his plan of launching a flanking manoeuvre that would take the Russian army to the Kaluga and Tula roads, which ‘will allow me to safeguard the city of Tula, where our most important munitions factory is located,4 and Bryansk, where we have an equally important casting factory’. Furthermore, the army would have not only the rich plains of the Ukraine at its rear but the whole of southern and southeastern Russia, with its abundant resources and vast pool of recruits. The flanking manoeuvre would also allow the main Russian army to maintain communications with the armies of Tormasov and Chichagov that had began to move up northwards from Volhynia to threaten the enemy’s right flank.5
On the 17th, leaving a small Cossack force under Colonel I. Efremov6 on the Ryazan road to divert the Allied advanced guard,7 Kutuzov turned westward at the Borovsk ferry on the Pakhra river and proceeded by forced marches along the river’s southern bank.8 ‘The crossing of the Moscow river [at the Borovsk ferry]’, recalled General Yermolov, ‘was accomplished with great difficulty and in incredible confusion because of the vehicles belonging to the fleeing residents of Moscow. Gunfire could be heard but the enemy did not attack.’9 Instead, General Sebastiani, who had replaced Murat at the head of the Grande Armée’s advanced guard, proceeded, seeing always before him parties of Cossacks, to the Moskva river, where the Russians burned the bridge on the 18th. By the time Sebastiani managed to move his forces across on 21 September, the Cossacks had simply ‘disappeared’ – in reality, they turned westward and proceeded by rural paths to join the main army. Realizing the potential consequences of this mistake, Sebastiani frankly sent word to Napoleon that he knew not where to find the Russian army.
Meanwhile, as it became clear that the Cossack feint was a success and the enemy had failed to detect the Russian manoeuvre, Kutuzov decided to revise his earlier plan and advance further westwards (and deeper into Napoleon’s rear) to take a position on the old Kaluga road.10 By late on 18 September, ‘despite the most appalling weather and dreadful country roads’,11 as well as alarming rates of looting carried out by soldiers,12 the Russian army was already at Podolsk,13 where it spent two days before making another forced march to reach the old Kaluga road and complete its flanking manoeuvre. On the 21st Kutuzov took up a position at the village of Krasnaya Pakhra behind the Pakhra river, with two strong advanced guards deployed around it. Miloradovich, with the 8th Corps and the 1st Cavalry Corps, halted at Desna, only some 10 miles from Moscow, while Rayevskii, with the 7th Corps and the 4th Cavalry Corps, camped at the village of Lukovnya, protecting the Russian right flank and guarding the road from Podolsk to Krasnaya Pakhra.14 At the same time Dorokhov, with the flying detachment of hussars, dragoons and Cossacks, was sent towards Mozhaisk both to reconnoitre and to harass the enemy lines of communications.15
Not everyone was pleased with Kutuzov’s flanking manoeuvre and some generals thought halting on the old Kaluga road was premature. Barclay de Tolly argued that the army should move further westwards and take a stand on the new Kaluga road, which would in effect interdict Napoleon’s lines of communication, forcing him to leave Moscow and fight.16 However, this was exactly what Kutuzov wanted to avoid for now. He was well aware that the Russian army needed time to regroup and recuperate, as well as to train and equip the newly raised units. Kutuzov argued that his position on the old Kaluga road gave him a central base that allowed him to control all the routes leading southwards from Moscow. He could therefore access the vast supplies in the southern provinces, while harassing the enemy around Moscow. ‘Currently our main concern is to replenish the troops,’ he informed the emperor on 23 September.17 By then he had already begun making arrangements to have supplies and recruits delivered to Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga, from where they could be easily absorbed into the army.18
On receiving Sebastiani’s initial report on the ‘disappearance’ of the Russian army, Napoleon was furious at the general’s failure to conduct a proper pursuit. He was particularly upset about the news of the tacit cease-fire that developed between the French and Russian outposts. ‘The advanced guard of our army was wrong in concluding a kind of suspension of hostilities with the Cossack advance posts,’ he privately complained.19 Napoleon showed Caulaincourt several letters he had received from Murat in which he quoted the Cossacks expressing both war-weariness and a readiness to desert the Russian command and serve under his (Murat’s) leadership. To Napoleon, it was clear that the Cossacks sought to flatter Murat’s ego and pull the wool over his eyes. ‘Murat, king of the Cossacks! What folly!’ the emperor scoffed. On 22 September Napoleon sent a terse letter to his brother-in-law informing him that detailed intelligence about the Russian army was needed immediately. He declared that the cease-fire was nothing but a ruse with which the Cossacks had diverted Murat’s attention. While some Cossacks had been ‘befriending’ the French on the Ryazan road, others were preoccupied attacking the Grande Armée’s lines of communication and destroying munitions convoys in the vicinity of Moscow.20 These attacks, especially a Cossack raid that inflicted heavy losses on the dragoons of the Imperial Guard at Malo-Vyazma,21 came as a surprise to Napoleon and, in the words of Caulaincourt, ‘this slight reverse irritated the emperor as much as the loss of a battle’.22 Consequently Napoleon decreed ‘the penalty of death to every officer who shall parley with the enemy’s advanced posts, without authority. His Majesty wishes that they should not correspond with the enemy, except by their cannon and muskets.’23 The emperor ordered Murat to proceed immediately to the head of the advanced guard, taking with him Poniatowski’s Polish corps in order that, being accompanied by troops who could communicate in Slavic language, he might the more easily discover the whereabouts of the Russian army.24 The reports of Cossacks raids south of Moscow led Napoleon to surmise that Kutuzov was executing a flanking movement towards the Kaluga route. ‘Particular information leads us to believe that the enemy is no longer at Podolsk,’ he wrote to Murat on 23 September.25 Therefore Murat was directeded to proceed from the Ryazan road to the Toula road (in other words, from south-east to south), and to continue his march until he procured information on the Russian army’s location. At the same time, unwilling to leave the search for the Russian army in the hands of Murat alone, Napoleon dispatched Marshal Bessieres with some 11,000 men26 in the direction of Kaluga.27 He correctly anticipated that the double object of threatening the Allies’ rear and protecting the richest provinces of the empire would compel the Russians to move beyond Podolsk towards the Kaluga road, but he
rejected suggestions that the Russians might intercept the old Smolensk road, the Grande Armée’s main line of communication. ‘The idea of marching to Mojaisk appears to his majesty as mere boasting,’ Berthier informed Mortier. ‘A victorious army, says he, would not consider itself in a proper condition to attempt such an undertaking; how then believe that a conquered one, that has abandoned its fine city, would think of such a movement.’28 Nevertheless, Napoleon still wanted detailed information on the enemy’s whereabouts: he was resolved to prevent Kutuzov from taking up a threatening position in his rear. Marshal Davout had entreated the emperor to leave Moscow at once and engage the enemy. Napoleon was disposed to follow this advice, provided it could be executed without too many protracted marches. He therefore eagerly awaited the arrival of intelligence with respect to the new positions taken up by the Russian army.29
The Burning of Moscow Page 39
