However, although the RAF fighters were successful in the air, a formation of bomb-carrying Me 110s reached Brooklands again and dropped six bombs on the Vickers works. The Wellington bomber assembly sheds were destroyed and there were 700 casualties inflicted, among them eighty-eight dead. It was an unintended success for the Germans because they had been after the nearby Hawker factory, which escaped unscathed. Another raid reached Rochester, where the Short Brothers factory, who were producing new, four-engine Stirling bombers, was also damaged. Although these were significant blows, neither of them contributed directly to the strategy of gaining superiority in the air by knocking out Fighter Command.
With the day’s air fighting obviously over the support squadrons from 12 Group returned to their bases in the early evening.
That night in Germany, Adolf Hitler addressed an audience of nurses and social workers at the Sportpalast in Berlin on the opening of the Kriegswinterhilfswerk. His address was, of course, well covered by the German press. Among other things in his speech, he accused the RAF of indiscriminate bombing.
The first year of the war ended in these last days. The second began and with it the new Kriegswinterhilfswerk. The successes of the first year, my Volksgenossen, are unique, so unique in fact that not only our enemies had not envisioned the course of history in this manner, but many in the German Volk were hardly able to comprehend the greatness of the occurrences and the rapidity of events … People in England today nosily inquire: ‘Well, why isn’t he coming?’ Calm yourselves: he is coming!
Nothing frightens us. We German National Socialists have graduated from the toughest school conceivable. First we were soldiers in the Great War, and then we were fighters in the resurgence of Germany. What we had to suffer in these years made us hard. Thus we cannot be intimidated by anything and nothing can surprise us.
Mr Churchill is demonstrating to us the use of his invention: the nightly air raid. He does not do this because air raids at night are particularly effective, but because his Air Force cannot penetrate German airspace during the day. While the German pilots, the German planes, fly over English land day by day, no Englishman has yet managed to as much as cross the North Sea by daylight. That is why they come at night and drop their bombs, you know it well, indiscriminately and without plan on civilian residential centres, on farmsteads, and villages.
Wherever they see a light, they drop a bomb … And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand, or four thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will now drop 150,000; 180,000; 230,000; 300,000; 400,000; yes, one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities.
His were no idle threats but while he was speaking the night sky over England was quiet, ominously so. The deceiving calm lasted until 1.30 a.m. when RDF plotted individual raiders on their way across to East Anglia. Seventy-five bombers from Luftflotte 3 were active during the following few hours, about half of them carrying out mine-laying operations while the rest made scattered raids on Liverpool, the Midlands and south Wales.
14
5 SEPTEMBER 1940
The stress of sustained battle was showing on airmen and machines on both sides of the Channel but Thursday, 5 September would bring no respite. Once again the weather was ideal for air fighting.
Beginning around 10.00 a.m. Luftflotte 2 launched numerous raids over southern England. There were at least twenty-two separate formations dispatched although two were larger than the others. Kesselring targeted the airfields of Croydon, Biggin Hill, Eastchurch, North Weald and Lympne.
Biggin Hill was still only capable of operating one squadron, 79, while 72 Squadron, Desmond Sheen’s unit, which was already down to nine serviceable Spitfires, remained at Croydon. 79 Squadron was scrambled to cover Biggin Hill and broke up a raid of thirty bombers and their escorts. Six Hurricanes met the Dorniers at 15,000 feet and scattered them so effectively that their bombing was well off target. It was obviously going to be a very busy day so reinforcements from the adjacent groups were alerted to reinforce Park’s 11 Group.
After the raid on Biggin Hill, the CO, Group Captain Grice made an aerial inspection of his airfield. One hangar, although it was only a burnt-out shell, appeared from the air to be undamaged. This, he reasoned, was why the enemy persisted with attacks. Grice arranged to have explosive charges placed in the hangar so that when the next raid occurred they could be detonated and the building brought down.1
Just after lunch, RDF tracked another large concentration of aircraft sweeping in over the Thames Estuary at extremely high altitude. These were Heinkel He 111s and Junkers Ju 88s which bombed the oil storage facility at Thameshaven and caused serious fires.
RAF fighter squadrons were scrambled from everywhere. Clawing for height over Kent, the Spitfires of 72 Squadron climbed as fast as they could. They were flying in their usual tight vic formations of three with the rear section providing two ‘weavers’ while the leader flew in the box position at the rear. It was the duty of the weavers to guard the others against being surprised by German fighters but this time the warning came too late.
Over Canterbury, Desmond Sheen heard a shout in his earphones but, before he could react, he was bounced from behind. His Spitfire shuddered from a heavy burst of cannon and machine-gun fire and flying metal struck his leg, hand and face. As he passed out, the stricken Spitfire, with large pieces missing from its port wing, heeled over into a vertical dive. Fortunately, Sheen regained consciousness just seconds later. His plane was still hurtling straight down. He tried the controls but they did not respond. He had no idea how close he was to the ground but he sensed that it could not be far away. Releasing the harness pin to rid himself of his straps, he was instantly sucked out of his seat but did not fall free. His feet were caught, stuck somehow at the top of the windscreen. Pinned by the slipstream against the top of the fuselage, he struggled with all his strength, but in vain. He was trapped; helpless and streaking down at tremendous speed.
Suddenly, for no obvious reason, his feet were released and instinctively he pulled the ripcord without even waiting to ensure that he was clear of the aircraft’s tail. With a bone-jarring snap the parachute opened at what he found out later was only about 800 feet. Sheen had only a split-second glimpse of trees beneath him before he started to crash through boughs and branches. The crown of a tree caught the top of his parachute and acted as a brake. His fall was slowed rapidly and miraculously he ended up with a simple, light landing. Physically, apart from the wounds in his leg, hand and face, he had suffered just a few extra scratches and bruises. A moment later, he noticed a policeman on a bicycle riding towards him. Upon reaching the Australian, he produced a flask and asked ‘Why didn’t you bail out earlier?’2
Sheen was taken to Queen Mary’s Hospital in Sidcup. This time he would spend six weeks in hospital and on sick leave before being able to return to his squadron on 13 October.
Meanwhile, twelve Spitfires from 234 Squadron had been scrambled from Middle Wallop. Pat Hughes was Blue Leader, his section being positioned behind Red Section at 20,000 feet. Anti-aircraft fire was sighted about forty miles off over Gravesend so they headed in that direction. The section leaders scanned the sky for bandits, but they didn’t see them in time. Suddenly, without warning, they were bounced from out of the sun by Me 109s. There seemed to be three of them – fast black shapes with white wing tips and white spinners. The squadron had been caught down-sun again!
As Pat broke into the attack, he spotted twelve more Messerschmitts flying up the Thames Estuary. They appeared to be flying in two ‘V’ formations, one of seven aircraft and the other of five. At this juncture he was joined by two Hurricanes and together they launched an attack on the advancing 109s. In the ensuing dogfight, Pat seized a fleeting chance and fired a full deflection burst, four seconds worth, at one German fighter which blew up.
Next, he went after another vic of three more 109s, selected a new vi
ctim and gave chase from dead astern. A sustained burst of fire, six seconds, caused oil from the Messerschmitt’s ruptured oil tank to splatter all over his wings. The 109 dropped away and force-landed in a field about fifteen miles south-west of Manston. The German pilot was climbing out of his cockpit as Pat departed.3
Waiting at Biggin Hill for the usual 6 p.m. raid, Group Captain Grice was almost disappointed when the Luftwaffe did not turn up. The Royal Engineers had set their charges and he could wait no longer to give the signal to demolish the burnt-out hangar. With what was probably the loudest explosion ever heard at Biggin Hill, the hangar crumbled. From the air, the destruction of the base now appeared to be complete. As he predicted, Biggin Hill did not suffer from another major air raid. Whether this was the result of Grice’s action or changing German tactics was open to conjecture.
The 5th had been another day of tenacious fighting by both sides. German losses amounted to twenty-three aircraft, although British claims were for thirty-nine at the time, while the Fighter Command lost twenty. Five Me 109s were claimed by 234 Squadron without loss. The Operations Record Book noted two victories for Pat Hughes; Bob Doe scored one; Mike Boddington one; and Jan Zurakowski one.4
According to Francis K. Mason in his remarkably detailed book Battle Over Britain, the dazed German pilot who climbed out of the cockpit of the downed Me 109 on that September afternoon was Oberleutnant Franz von Werra, who was the adjutant of II/JG3 and the only German aviator to escape from British custody and return to fight for his country. The bravado von Werra displayed among his comrades as an audacious fighter ace remained with him as a POW. He proved difficult to hold and made numerous escape attempts, on one occasion bluffing his way onto an RAF airfield and trying to take off in a Hurricane! Eventually, he was transferred to Canada with other POWs. In Nova Scotia the prisoners were transported by rail from Halifax to their new camp, but en route von Werra forced open a window and jumped from the moving train. This time he succeeded in making good his escape by crossing the nearby border into the USA which at that stage was still neutral. After returning to Germany, von Werra eventually became commanding officer of 1/JG53 on the Russian front. He shot down thirteen Russian aeroplanes to bring his tally to twenty-one before his unit was withdrawn from that front and transferred to Holland. On 25 October 1941, the engine of his Me 109 failed and the aircraft plunged into the sea near Vlissingen, where he drowned.
Mason declared that von Werra was shot down by Pat Hughes at 3.25 p.m.5 His book did not give a description of the action but the claim was repeated elsewhere in other publications including Target England – The Illustrated History of the Battle of Britain by Derek Wood, which was outstanding for its time. Earlier, Derek Wood had also been the originator and co-author with Derek Dempster of The Narrow Margin, the first detailed, day-by-day account of the Battle of Britain, which in turn formed the basis of the classic all-star film, The Battle of Britain. All of these works were groundbreaking for their time and were the forerunners of the brilliant studies existing today.
Just about every aspect of the Battle of Britain, one of world history’s pivotal campaigns, has been studied and dissected over the years. The books by Mason, Wood and Dempster, being early works on the subject, have been subjected in-depth analysis and scrutiny, and inevitably some unintended inconsistencies have been found and provoked criticism, sometimes most unfairly. Mason’s claim that von Werra was shot down by Pat Hughes contradicted an earlier account of the German ace’s capture. Franz von Werra’s story was first told in The One That Got Away by Kendal Burt and James Leaser, published in 1956, thirteen years before Mason’s book. It was also the basis of a film of the same name. There has been much confusion concerning the combat that resulted in von Werra’s fall into British hands.
Pat Hughes estimated that his Me 109 had come down about fifteen miles south-west of Manston in Kent but he may have erred in his estimate of the position because von Werra’s damaged fighter actually landed at Winchet Hill, Love’s Farm, Marden, also in Kent but some forty miles from Manston. That he force-landed at Winchet Hill cannot be disputed as his aircraft and the crash site were photographed many times and are well known. Bert and Leasor stated in The One That Got Away that von Werra was shot down shortly after 10 a.m. by Flight Lieutenant John Terrence Webster DFC of 41 Squadron. Webster was a veteran of operations over Dunkirk and by 5 September, he had been credited with the destruction of fourteen German planes.
John Webster’s combat report stated:
I was leading Blue Section 41 Squadron when large enemy formation was sighted to the port. I followed Mitor leaders [‘Mitor’ was 41 Squadron’s radio call sign] in and Blue Section delivered an attack in line astern on ME 109 attacking on the beam from above. I fired a 3 sec. burst at an 109 and saw the bullets going into the engine. This a/c dived away steeply. I then attempted to attack the rear bomber formation again using a diving quarter. I tried three successive attacks but each time was followed in by 109 and forced to break away before getting a good deflection. I did not fire at the bombers. I then dived away from the bombers and ran into several HE 113’s [sic]. I attacked these and saw one burst into flames after a 3 sec. burst from astern and directly above, using just over full deflection. After this attack I pulled up steeply and looked around.
I saw a Spitfire diving steeply chased by 3 ME 109’s. I chased after these and one broke away after a short burst from directly astern. I lost the Spitfire but followed another 109 down to ground level when I managed to get in a good burst from 48 degrees astern and saw the a/c roll on to its back and crash into the ground near Maidstone. I then returned to base.6
The Heinkel He 113 (He 100) mentioned in John Webster’s combat report was a type never actually accepted for service use by the Luftwaffe, even though it appears on numerous occasions in RAF records. Only twelve production models were built, and in a ploy to mislead Allied Intelligence these were repainted over and over with different insignia to give the impression that the type was in widespread use. Many propaganda photographs were distributed. The ruse was successful and the type featured in Allied aircraft identification leaflets, books and lectures. During the frenzy of a dogfight, the error of mistaking a normal Me 109E for a He 113 would have been easy for any pilot to make.
Was von Werra shot down in the morning or the afternoon? Fighting that morning centred on mid-Kent, around Maidstone and Ashford, while that in the afternoon appeared to be located further east over the Thames Estuary. An inquiry on this was directed to the Bundesarchiv but the reply received indicated that German records on this period were not available at that time. However, it was known that JG3 lost six aircraft and their pilots on 5 September, some in the morning and some in the afternoon. Mason suggested that 41 Squadron actually engaged JG54 that morning and named Unteroffizier Behse and Hauptmann Ultsch as the Luftwaffe pilots killed in the action. If von Werra was shot down in the afternoon, possibly one, or both, of these may have fallen to John Webster’s guns.
Characteristically, von Werra’s own accounts of what happened were not reliable because he tended to ‘colour’ his version of events to suit his audiences. On one occasion, he claimed to have shot down three British planes before colliding with another Me 109 and being forced down. Another time he claimed to have destroyed only the fighter that had attacked him. He always maintained that his plane had caught fire when it crash-landed and was gutted, but it was actually captured in a relatively undamaged condition.
Photographs of the downed machine at Winchet Hill show quite clearly that Messerschmitt Me 109E-4 (1480) did not ‘roll on to its back and crash into the ground’ as described by John Webster. Nor could it have been the He 113 that ‘burst into flames’, but it might have been the 109 that had ‘bullets going into the engine’ and ‘dived away steeply’. However, the 109 did go down near Maidstone, Winchet Hill being miles away. On the other hand, details in Pat Hughes’ combat report, which stated the time of attack as being 3.45 p.m. over Eastchurch, line up
well with other information:
I was Blue Leader. We were behind Red Section at 20,000 feet and going towards Gravesend where we had seen A.A. fire when we were attacked out of the sun by 3 Me. 109’s. As I turned to attack I saw 12 Me. 109’s in two vics of 5 and 7 coming up the Estuary. I turned and dived and was joined by 2 Hurricanes. A dogfight ensued over Eastchurch. I fired a full deflection shot at one Me. 109 and hit his ammunition tanks. He blew up and spun down. I then attacked a vic of 3 Me. 109’s, singled out one and chased him attacking from dead astern. I must have shot his oil tank away as there was oil all over my wings to the tips. E/A force landed in a field 15 miles S. W. of Manston.
He also added some extra details:
Note
These 12 ME 109’s were all silver with red spinners. The others I saw were black with white curves on wing tips and white spinners.7
Pat Hughes’ description of his combat tallies more closely with the scenario worked out by Burt and Leasor in The One Who Got Away. They also mentioned the vic formation of the German planes when they noted that leading the formation was 2/JG3’s commanding officer, Hauptmann Erich von Selle, who had on his immediate left and right two staff officers, Leutnant Heinrich Sanneman and Oberleutnant Franz von Verra, respectively. Could it have been these three that Pat attacked when he chased the Me 109 that he caused to eventually force-land? It was unusual for German fighters to fly in an element of three. The standard fighting unit was a pair.
To further complicate matters, von Werra’s low-flying aircraft was fired on by a Lewis gun at a searchlight battery site just before it crash landed. A claim was submitted by the gunners. Von Werra at no time mentioned being hit by ground fire but during the last moments of his desperate chase and forced-landing he may not have even noticed it. However, it was most unlikely that he would have been flying so low as to come within range of a Lewis gun at all had he not been pursued, or his aircraft not already damaged.
A Spitfire Pilot's Story: Pat Hughes: Battle of Britain Top Gun Page 20
