Mad Science: The Nuclear Power Experiment

by Joseph Mangano

  Then there is the issue of shipping. Filling any single permanent repository would require thousands of trips by train and truck to deliver the waste from all eighty-two operating and shut-down nuclear plants to the repository, probably taking twenty years to empty the current stock at all US plants. Many of the plants are in the east, over 2,000 miles from Yucca Mountain. All of the transportation would require tight security every inch of every trip. The waste would often travel through highly populated areas of the nation. A single mishap that would unleash the deadly contents of the truck or train would be disastrous. This could occur from mechanical failure (of the casks, truck, or train), human error (drivers falling asleep), act of sabotage, natural disaster like an earthquake or hurricane, or other scenarios. Some have given the idea of transporting massive amounts of waste the sobriquet “Mobile Chernobyl.”

  Another issue with permanent storage is the limited amount of space now planned. A huge space has been excavated at Yucca Mountain. But if all waste now stored at US nuclear plants were emptied, Yucca’s repository would be filled to capacity. And by the time it took to complete this extensive task, about twenty years, the existing 104 reactors would have produced enough waste to fill the equivalent of another Yucca. (If many more new reactors are built and operated, as some are suggesting, there would be even more waste produced.) The process of finding and developing a new site – or of at least doubling the capacity of the Yucca Mountain site – would have to begin all over again.

  The idea of a site that would require impenetrable security for thousands of years has collided with the era of terrorism. A site such as Yucca would have to be secured, and the transportation process to Yucca would have to be secured – in addition to each nuclear plant being secured. It is no secret that nuclear materials are a terrorist target; President George W. Bush mentioned that Al Qaeda had planned attacks against US nuclear plants in his 2002 State of the Union message. A permanent waste repository, along with the required transportation to the site, would certainly raise the stakes for would-be terrorists.

  The list of concerns posed by a permanent storage repository goes on. However, the idea of scrapping a single permanent waste site and leaving high level waste at individual plants is highly problematic as well. There would be no need to transport waste, but all the same problems at a single site would exist at each nuclear plant. Some of these are located close to large population centers. Some are built near earthquake fault lines or have other natural threats. Finally, the idea of operating a network of eighty-two separate permanent waste storage systems instead of one arguably makes it eighty-two times more possible that something could go wrong. Nobody can say with certainty that eighty-two small Yucca Mountains is preferable to one large Yucca Mountain.

  At the beginning of the atomic age, leaders never envisioned that high level waste storage would pose a problem. Their reasoning was that waste could be reused through a method known as reprocessing. On paper, it sounded like a great idea. But like many aspects of nuclear power production, it was a concept that had not been well thought out or sufficiently tested, and one that eventually would create considerably more problems than it solved.

  Reprocessing is a method in which uranium-235 and plutonium is separated from used nuclear fuel, so that they can be used to power reactors again. There are a number of ways that this can be done, but the most commonly used method is known by the acronym PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction). Several methods, including the bismuth phosphate approach tested during the mid-1940s at Oak Ridge and Hanford, are obsolete. But the AEC bought into this premature concept, and announced a program to encourage private industry to reprocess spent fuel.

  In 1966, the AEC allowed a company called Nuclear Fuel Services to operate a reprocessing plant at West Valley, NY, thirty miles south of Buffalo. The next year, the AEC authorized General Electric to build a spent fuel plant at Morris, IL, near the Dresden power reactors; and four years later, construction began on a reprocessing plant in Barnwell SC, close to the Savannah River Plant nuclear weapons facility. It appeared that the dream of reprocessing would become a reality.

  But the dream quickly became a nightmare. After just six years, Nuclear Fuel Services voluntarily stopped reprocessing at West Valley, because widespread contamination forced additional regulations from the AEC, which proved too costly for the company. In 1976, President Gerald Ford suspended all reprocessing of used nuclear fuel in the US, and the following year, President Jimmy Carter banned it altogether, and construction at the unfinished plant at Barnwell stopped. General Electric had already backed out of the Illinois project as West Valley closed. Spent fuel reprocessing in the US was dead.

  What happened to the great idea that would make lemonade out of lemons? Several large scale problems caused the government’s policy to change, including:

  Even though uranium and plutonium could be separated from other fuel and reused to power reactors, they represented a small portion of the spent fuel. The other radioactive chemicals in spent fuel remained, some with very long decay periods, and permanent storage was still required for a staggering amount of waste.

  Reprocessing generated huge amounts of pollution at West Valley. Some was emitted into the environment and some was stored. The carnage included enormous amounts of used fuel assemblies, liquid waste, solid waste, and low level waste. Some cleanup has occurred, but to this day, West Valley remains a large, dirty burial ground for high level nuclear waste.

  Creating more plutonium free of other radioactive chemicals was recognized as a risk to nuclear weapons control. Any theft of the separated plutonium after reprocessing would essentially hand the thieves weapons-grade fuel. In the 1970s, leaders of both parties were making efforts to limit nuclear arms, and recognized that reprocessing was creating a threat to the US and the world.

  Reprocessing proved to be much more expensive than originally planned – a common refrain for any aspect of nuclear power. The cost of building and maintaining reprocessing facilities, transporting materials to facilities, waste cleanup, and reprocessing itself was extremely costly. Private companies required taxpayer funds from Washington or would have to raise electric bills to pay the hefty tab.

  But even with this array of problems, some persisted in keeping the battered hope of reprocessing alive. Similar to the Yucca Mountain fight, policies shifted frequently, usually along party lines. In 1981, Republican President Ronald Reagan lifted the ban on reprocessing, and research on a new Integral Fast Reactor that could (allegedly) handle reprocessing began three years later at the Argonne National Lab in Illinois. But Democratic President Bill Clinton cancelled the project in 1994. Later in Clinton’s presidency, in 1999, a switch was made; the Energy Department signed a contract with Duke Energy, the French national nuclear agency COGEMA, and Stone & Webster to develop a Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility at Savannah River (still not complete). Republican George W. Bush heartily endorsed reprocessing, as part of the revival of nuclear power, and his Energy Department made sure that construction of the facility at Savannah River began in 2006.

  MOX, the latest in a series of reprocessing ideas, is slightly different than previous versions, since it would involve conversion of plutonium designed originally for nuclear weapons into appropriate form for nuclear power plants. The NRC explains its rationale for pursuing the MOX facility in South Carolina:

  The purpose of manufacturing MOX fuel is to meet the goals of the US Department of Energy’s Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program. The process of converting the fissile material into MOX fuel renders the plutonium less attractive for use in nuclear weapons.

  The attempted assurance by the NRC that converting the plutonium into MOX would make it “less attractive” badly understates the danger of having plutonium of any sort in circulation, in this case removing weapons grade plutonium, transporting it to a MOX facility, and working with it in the facility.

  In addition to the US, other countries experimented with reproc
essing on a small and experimental basis, only to abandon the technology. These included Belgium, China, Germany, and Italy. Of all the nations operating nuclear reactors, the only ones that currently reprocess used nuclear fuel are France, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Japan is planning to open a reprocessing center in 2012, although the debacle at Fukushima may cause this plan to be postponed, or even abandoned.

  The experiences in France and the United Kingdom, which lead the world in reprocessing spent fuel, are telling. The UK began reprocessing its spent fuel in the 1950s at the Sellafield plant in northwest England on the Irish Sea. Sellafield is also the site where the British manufactured its nuclear weapons. A major core meltdown occurred at the weapons reactor in October 1957, and is seen as one of the worst meltdowns in world history. At Sellafield, reprocessing has been conducted at its Magnox plant (which uses the PUREX method), its Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, and its MOX plant. It reprocesses considerable amounts of high level nuclear waste from other nations, as well as from British reactors.

  Sellafield has been the subject of numerous protests from within the UK, and has been criticized by governments in Ireland and Norway, which share the Irish Sea with Britain, for the pollution it causes. Martin Gardner, a professor at the University of Southampton, found that children born near Sellafield and those whose fathers were employed at the plant were more likely to develop cancer. The Gardner article was published in the British Medical Journal and provoked response letters in the journal, most of them critical of his methods and conclusions.

  The La Hague plant, on the Normandy coast, is unlike Sellafield, in that its sole purpose has been reprocessing high level waste, from France and other nations, since its opening in 1976. La Hague is vital to the French nuclear program, the most extensive of any nation (80% of electricity in France is generated by nuclear power plants). Once again, La Hague has been the target of various protests. A team led by Professor Jean Francois Viel of Besancon published several articles on child cancer near the La Hague plant, finding that the risk of childhood leukemia was elevated for those using local beaches and those consuming local fish.

  Since the start of the atomic era, there has been a hope that a solution for the nuclear waste problem could be found. As time went on, and problems mounted, the hope was dashed, and supplanted by another hope that somehow, technological advances to be discovered in the future would save the day. For sixty years, this hope has endured – with no magic solution, as the amount of waste has continued to mount to staggering levels. The original idea that waste could be reprocessed to isolate uranium and plutonium for additional use was not, and is not, without major problems. Even if the US opts to resurrect its long-dormant reprocessing program in the future, it will be saddled with enormous problems generated by its high level waste.

  The matter of how to safely secure sixty-six million metric tons of highly radioactive waste for thousands of years is daunting enough. But addressing the question in the future will be even more daunting; at current levels of operation, another sixty-six million metric tons will be added to the stockpile in just thirty years. Even the greatest optimist must recognize that waste poses an insoluble problem for the foreseeable future, and maybe forever. With no solution in sight, the prudent course is to first minimize the amount of waste, as whatever course is chosen for the waste will pose enormous risk to human health and safety.

  Trouble in Atomic Paradise

  The dawn of the atomic era was full of great optimism and hope. Supporters spoke enthusiastically about the positive aspects of nuclear energy. The ability of the atom to provide plentiful amounts of electricity was one theme often cited. The “clean” energy that nuclear reactors would produce – meaning there were no smoky emissions from stacks like with coal plants – was another. And the modest cost of nuclear power was still another.

  But these proclamations were based on theory, not actual experience, and ignored concerns about this new technology that were emerging at nuclear weapons plants. From the very beginning, problems plagued the atomic energy industry, and by the late 1970s these problems had turned a fast-growing industry into a stagnant one, far short of original expectations. The difficulties with nuclear power can be classified into two major categories. Unexpectedly poor financial performance is one of them, and safety hazards (epitomized by meltdowns) is the other. These two factors turned the American public against nuclear reactors, and brought growth to a halt over the past four decades.

  The AEC hope of 1,200 reactors in operation by the year 2000 failed miserably. Only 254 reactors were ordered (the last in 1978); of these, 127 were cancelled or never completed, and twenty-three others were shut down permanently, leaving the nation with just 104 early in the twenty-first century.

  The early projections of nuclear reactor costs were based on numerous assumptions, which proved to be overly optimistic. As these financial problems mounted, lenders halted their support for reactors, effectively killing growth. The various monetary matters that emerged are given below:

  Complexity. Constructing a new nuclear reactor was seen as a relatively simple matter in the mid-1950s. But this vision was based on limited use of test reactors, which were much smaller and less complex than the ones eventually built. They were also constructed and operated on government property, whereas actual reactors required site selection and preparation. Nobody had any idea of how complex a task it was to build and test a large new reactor before it was ready to produce electricity, and projected costs proved to be far short of actual ones.

  Inflation. In the 1950s, inflation was not a factor in the US economy, and not considered in projected future costs of reactors. But beginning in the mid-1960s, a steady pattern of inflation became part of American life, and the price of literally everything spiraled. The cost of nuclear reactor related materials, personnel, land, and interest on loans (among others) reached heights far above initial projections.

  Uranium Supply. All US reactors rely on uranium for fuel. While planners knew that uranium existed in the western part of the country, nobody really bothered to calculate actual supplies and future demands. By the 1970s, the domestic uranium supply was running short, forcing a huge price increase. From 1973 to 1976 alone, a time when some bragged that nuclear power would help solve the oil shortage, the price for a pound of uranium oxide had soared from $7 to $42, adding considerable cost to the cycle of preparing uranium for reactor use, and in operating reactors.

  Opposition Means Delays. In the 1960s and 1970s, the public sentiment against nuclear power grew. This meant delays in constructing reactors, increasing the fixed daily costs in the process. The Shoreham reactor on Long Island, originally slated to cost $75 million, eventually cost $2 billion to build over twenty-one years. The reactor was never allowed to operate, and the total cost of $6 billion to build, close, decommission, and decontaminate was far greater than the initially-projected costs, and passed on to Long Island ratepayers. The longest period between reactor order and startup was twenty-six years (1970 and 1996), at the Watts Bar plant in Eastern Tennessee, the last US reactor to come on line.

  Frequent Breakdowns. The original planners of nuclear reactors expected them to work with only a few minor problems. But this vision was based more on hope than reality. In the early 1970s, reactors were closed for mechanical repairs over half the time, and by the mid-1980s, only operated 57% of the time. Shut down meant no electrical production, and no electricity meant no revenue. Wall Street leaders recognized that reactors were a poor investment, and halted loans to utilities. To this day, no utility can successfully obtain a loan for constructing a new nuclear reactor from a major investor.

  Premature Shut Downs. All reactors were initially expected to operate for forty years. But a number of early reactors closed permanently, well before the forty-year mark, due to the high cost and depleted revenue from mechanical problems. Utilities were forced to raise their rates for other forms of electricity in order to pay back loans for reactors.

/>   Cost of Meltdowns. None of the atomic “founding fathers” envisioned that a large scale meltdown would occur at a US reactor. But they were wrong (see the list of meltdowns described later in this chapter). Meltdowns either forced immediate shutdown and decommissioning of reactors, or required lengthy periods of repair – all at a high cost, with no revenue to offset it. In the case of Three Mile Island, numerous legal actions, and their settlements, cost the utility considerable funds.

  New Regulations. The 1979 meltdown at Three Mile Island rattled Americans, and leaders were forced to do something to assure that it would never happen again. This chapter will later discuss a Presidential Commission that prescribed a series of enhancements in personnel management, design of reactors, safety practices, and other regulations – all of which raised the cost of operating a reactor considerably.

  Greater Security. Nuclear plant operators always enforced security measures. But as time went on, and especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, these measures were increased dramatically, in the form of more personnel, more sophisticated equipment, more extensive tactics, and greater accountability procedures. (These fast and dramatic changes were not accomplished without problems, as indicated by anecdotal stories of security guards sleeping on duty.) Once again, these marginal costs just added to the expense of nuclear power.

  Waste Disposal Costs. Nuclear plants were never supposed to house much of the radioactive waste they produced. Instead, it was to be reprocessed (reducing the volume of waste) and the rest shipped to a permanent waste repository. But reprocessing failed dismally at West Valley New York, and the idea to build other reprocessing facilities was scrapped. The selection of Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository in 1987 encountered huge opposition, and the eventual decision by President Obama to pull funds for the site – a multibillion dollar investment now a white elephant – leaves huge amounts of waste at each nuclear plant, in spent fuel pools and in dry casks after pools fill up.