239 Carter administration review of chemical warfare policy: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Presidential Review Memorandum, NSC-27, Subject: “Chemical Warfare” (Secret), May 19, 1977 [NSA].
239 Letter from Secretary of State Vance to Defense Secretary Brown: Jack Anderson, “Poisonous Advantage,” Washington Post, June 14, 1981, p. C7.
239 Statement by General Lennon: Lepkowski, “Chemical Warfare: One of the Dilemmas of the Arms Race,” p. 17.
240 Statement by Stephen Douglass, Jr.: Ibid.
240 Statement by Gen. Alexander Haig: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 226.
240 “Wintex” chemical warfare scenario: Ibid., pp. 230–232.
240 Administration deleted Army’s funding requests for binary weapons: Lois Ember, “Chemical Weapons: Build Up or Disarm?,” Chemical & Engineering News, December 15, 1980, p. 23.
241 Chemical Corps failed to maintain the unitary stockpile: Gordon M. Burck, “Decision-Making in the United States Nerve Gas Weapons Program,” unpublished paper, 1985.
241–42 Reports of Soviet chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: Director of Central Intelligence, Use of Toxins and Other Lethal Chemicals in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan (Secret), Special National Intelligence Estimate, Memorandum to Holders, March 2, 1983.
242 U.S.-Soviet negotiations ended after twelve rounds: “Todeswolken über Europa,” Der Spiegel, no. 8 (February 22, 1982), p. 52.
242–43 Ichord and Jackson amendments: Wayne Biddle, “Restocking the Chemical Arsenal,” New York Times Magazine, May 24, 1981, p. 36.
243 Statement by Senator Carl Levin: Senator Carl Levin, Congressional Record— Senate, September 16, 1980, p. S12643.
243–44 Congress approved funding for Pine Bluff plant: Biddle, “Restocking the Chemical Arsenal,” p. 36; Jeffrey K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Sidell, Takafuji, and Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 71.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN: BINARY DEBATE
245 Defense Science Board report: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Defense Science Board, Report of the 1980 DSB Summer Study Task Force on Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, December 1980).
245–46 Reasons for opposition to binary weapons: Author’s interview with John Isaacs.
246 Letter from twelve Senators to Chairman Tower: Letter to the Honorable John Tower, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, signed by Nancy Kassebaum, Gary Hart, David Pryor, William Proxmire, Edward Kennedy, Thad Cochran, George Mitchell, Lowell Weicker, Donald Riegle, Paul Tsongas, Walter Huddleston, and Dave Durenberger, March 12, 1982.
246 1982 congressional votes on binary weapons production: John Isaacs, “Nervous About Nerve Gas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 39, no. 10 (December 1983), pp. 7–8.
246 Technical problems with Bigeye binary VX bomb: Stephen Budiansky, “Qualified Approval for Binary Chemical Weapons,” Science, vol. 234, no. 4779 (November 21, 1986), p. 930; Keith Morrison, “Modernizing Chemical Weapons Needless,” Defense News, April 13, 1987, p. 31.
247 Intermediate-volatility agent for MLRS: Author’s interview with Sigmund R. Eckhaus.
247 XM135 Binary Chemical Warhead: Jeffrey K. Smart, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective,” in Sidell, Takafuji, and Franz, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 71.
247–48 Joint weapons testing by United States and France: Author’s interview with William C. Dee.
248 Senator Pryor letter to Senator Tower: “For the Record,” Washington Post, February 18, 1983.
248 1983 votes on binary weapons production: “Senate Floor Action: Binary Weapons Debate,” 1983 CQ Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1984), p. 11; “Conference Action: Chemical Weapons,” 1983 CQ Almanac, pp. 491–492.
249 Dorothy Bush’s criticism of Vice President’s votes: Washington Post, November 11, 1983; John Isaacs, “Mother Knows Best . . .” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1989, pp. 3–4.
249 Iranian revolution: www.bbc.co.uk/persian/revolution/.
249 Iranian “human wave” tactics: Rolf Ekéus, “Iraq’s Real Weapons Threat,” Washington Post, June 29, 2003, p. B7.
250 Project 922 at Al-Rashad: UNMOVIC, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes” (Working Document), March 6, 2003, p. 141; Bob Drogin, “Iraqi Weapons Expert Insists Search Is Futile,” Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2003, p. 1.
250 Iraqi strategic cooperation with Egypt: Dany Shoham, “Chemical and Biological Weapons in Egypt,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring–Summer 1998), p. 51; Associated Press, “CIA: Egyptian Help Key to Iraqi Chemical Weapons,” March 13, 2005.
250 Construction of SEPP: UNMOVIC, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues,” p. 141.
250 Iraqi use of tear gas and mustard: W. Andrew Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 10 (1991), p. 117.
250–51 More than thirty Western firms supplied materials and equipment: Philip Shenon, “Declaration Lists Companies That Sold Chemicals to Iraq,” New York Times, December 21, 2002; U.S. Department of State, cable from U.S. Information Service, London, to SecState, Washington, D.C., “Chemical Weapon Materials Sold to Iran and Iraq” (Unclassified), April 6, 1984; Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Had Key Role in Iraqi Buildup,” Washington Post, December 30, 2002, p. A1.
251 Karl Kolb GmbH: “Middle East Chemical Weapons,” MEDNEWS: Middle East Defense News, vol. 2, no. 2–3 (October 24, 1988), p. 4; Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 109–112.
251 Iraqi purchase of munitions: UNMOVIC, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues,” p. 141.
251 Scientists employed at Muthanna: Christophe Ayad, “Armes chimiques: Un témoignage,” Libération, April 17, 2003.
252 Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz: U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, to the Secretary of State, Subject: “Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 1, 1983 [NSA].
252 U.S. démarche to Iraqi Foreign Ministry: U.S. Department of State, Briefing Paper, “Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons” (Secret), drafted by PM/TMP, November 16, 1984 [NSA].
252 Reagan dispatched Rumsfeld to Baghdad: U.S. Department of State, cable from U.S. Embassy London to Secretary of State, “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein” (Secret), December 21, 1983 [NSA].
253 Iraq’s use of chemical weapons became more effective: Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, p. 64.
253 1983 Soviet decree to develop Novichok agents: Vil S. Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider’s View,” in Amy E. Smithson, ed., Chemical Weapons Disarmament in Russia: Problems and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, Report no. 17, October 1995), p. 23.
253–54 Development of Novichok-5: Ibid., p. 24; author’s interview with Vil S. Mirzayanov.
254 Production of Novichok agents: Mirzayanov, “Dismantling the Soviet/Russian Chemical Weapons Complex: An Insider’s View,” p. 25; James Ring Adams, “Russia’s Toxic Threat,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 1996, p. A14.
254 Pavlodar Chemical Plant: Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, “The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 136–145.
254–55 Czech development of binary agent: Jirí Matousek and Ivan Masek, “On the New Potential Supertoxic Lethal Organophosphorus Chemical Warfare Agents with Intermediary Volatility,” ASA Newsletter, 94-5 (October 7, 1994), pp. 1, 10–11; J. Bajgar, J. Fusek, and J. Vachek, “Treatment and Prophylaxis Against Nerve Agent Poisoning,” ASA Newsletter, 94-4, pp. 10–11.
255 Matousek statement: Matousek and Mas
ek, “On the New Potential Supertoxic Lethal Organophosphorus Chemical Warfare Agents,” p. 11.
255 Iranian o fensive north of Basra: Julian Perry Robinson and Jozef Goldblat, “Chemical Warfare in the Iran-Iraq War,” SIPRI Fact Sheet on Chemical Weapons, no. 1 (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 1984); Karsh, “Rational Ruthlessness,” p. 37.
255–56 Iraqi broadcast warning about use of poison gas: Department of State, confidential cable from U.S. Interests Section Baghdad to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., “Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive,” February 22, 1984.
256 Description of Majnoon marshes: Major General Edward Fursdon, “Iraqis Dig In to Secure Oil-Rich Majnoon Marshes,” Daily Telegraph, March 26, 1984, p. 4.
256 Iranian capture of Majnoon Islands: Ibid.
256–57 Iraqi counterattack on Majnoon Islands: Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp. 43–58.
257 Execution of Saddam order for chemical attack: McCarthy and Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable, pp. 63–64.
257 Iraqi use of Tabun at Majnoon Islands: Hooshang Kadivar and Stephen C. Adams, “Treatment of Chemical and Biological Warfare Injuries: Insights Derived from the 1984 Iraqi Attack on Majnoon Island,” Military Medicine, vol. 156, no. 4 (April 1991), pp. 171–177.
257–58 Evacuation of Iranian casualties to Ahwaz: Author’s interview with Colonel Jonathan Newmark.
258 White House statement of March 5, 1984: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Press Statement: Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons,” March 5, 1984.
258 U.N. investigation of Iraqi chemical attack: U.N. Secretary-General, “Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General to Investigate Allegations by the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Use of Chemical Weapons,” U.N. Security Council Document S/16433, March 26, 1984.
258 Experts examined bomb fragments, casualties: Richard M. Preece, “Iran-Iraq War: Implications for U.S. Policy,” CRS Issue Brief (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service), October 14, 1987, p. 8.
258 Results of chemical analyses: U.N. Secretary-General, “Report of the Specialists Appointed by the Secretary-General,” p. 9; Eliot Marshall, “Iraq’s Chemical Warfare: Case Proved,” Science, vol. 224 (April 13, 1984), pp. 130–131.
259 Nerve-agent casualties not “photogenic” for propaganda purposes: Author’s interview with Colonel Jonathan Newmark.
259 Tepid Western response to Iraqi chemical warfare: R. Jeffrey Smith, “Relying on Chemical Arms: Early Use Was Central to Recent Iraqi Battle Tactics,” Washington Post, August 10, 1990, p. A25.
259 Iran decision to acquire chemical weapons: Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p. 83; Paula DeSutter, “Deterring Iranian NBC Use,” Strategic Forum, no. 110 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, April 1997), p. 3.
259 U.S. interdiction of shipment of potassium fluoride: U.S. Department of State, Action Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Subject: “Iraq’s Use of Chemical Weapons: Control on U.S. Ingredients” (Confidential), March 14, 1984.
260 West German Chancellor Kohl intervened to stop deliveries: “Chemical Weapons in the Middle East,” MEDNEWS: Middle East Defense News, vol. 2, no. 2–3 (October 24, 1988), p. 4.
260 Adelman testimony: Kenneth Adelman, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, quoted in Ronald D. Stricklett, “Chemical Proliferation: The Changing Environment,” U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Document no. DPG-S-TA-85-07, June 1985, p. 1.
260 Reagan administration’s “two-track policy”: Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “The Chemical Strategy—Negotiation and Modernization,” Army Chemical Review, January 1988, pp. 23–24; Caspar W. Weinberger, “The Deterrence of Chemical Warfare,” in Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1983, section III, pp. 143–147.
260 Quote by General Bernard Rogers: “Todeswolken über Europa,” Der Spiegel, no. 8 (February 22, 1982), p. 34.
261 Vice President Bush presented first draft of CWC: Michael Krepon, “Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention,” in Roberts, ed., Chemical Disarmament and US Security, p. 81.
261 1984 votes on binary weapons production: “House Floor Action: Nerve Gas Curb,” 1984 CQ Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1985), pp. 42–43; Council for a Livable World, “Why Did the House Vote Overwhelmingly Against Nerve Gas in 1984?,” press release, May 23, 1984.
262 Quality control problems with Iraqi Tabun: UNMOVIC, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues,” p. 142.
262 Description of Muthanna production complex: Timmerman, The Death Lobby, pp. 111–112.
262 Iraqi production of Sarin at Muthanna: Ibid., p. 189.
262–63 Founding of Australia Group: See Australia Group Web site, www.australia-group.net; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, “Fact Sheet: Australia Group,” January 6, 2004, available online at www.state.gov/t/np/ rls/fs/27800.htm.
263 “Three strikes and you’re out”: Author’s interview with John Isaacs.
263 Administration launched a full-court press: Lois R. Ember, “Pentagon Pressing Hard for Binary Chemical Arms Funds,” Chemical & Engineering News, February 25, 1985, pp. 26–28; “Reagan Administration Mounts Push for Binary Chemical Weapons,” National Guard, May 1985, pp. 8–9.
263 Testimony by Pentagon officials: Author’s interview with William C. Dee.
263 Kroesen study: U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, Depart ment of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986: Binary Chemical Modernization, February 28, 1985, pp. 1455–1483.
263 Declassified version of Kroesen report: Walter Pincus, “Ex-Officers Pushed for Chemical Arms,” Washington Post, January 22, 1986, p. 4.
264 Stoessel commission report: Chemical Warfare Review Commission, Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).
264 Critics challenged credibility of the Stoessel commission: “Chemical Weapons Panel Draws Fire,” Congressional Quarterly, May 4, 1985, p. 861.
264 Representative Porter arranged for CIA briefings on Soviet threat: Walter Pincus, “2 Agencies at Odds on a Soviet Threat,” Washington Post, January 23, 1986, p. 19.
264–65 Opinion piece by Representatives Porter and Fascell: Dante B. Fascell and John E. Porter, “New Nerve-Gas Weapons That We Don’t Need,” Washington Post, June 17, 1985, p. 11.
265–66 1985 votes on binary weapons production: “Defense Authorization: Chemical Weapons,” 1985 CQ Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1986), p. 149; John Isaacs, “November—Critical Month for Arms Control,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1985, pp. 3–4.
266 Congressional conditions on binary production: “Binary Chemical Weapons Legislation: Title 1, Section 119 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for FY 1986—Conditions on Spending Funds for Binary Chemical Munitions, Approved by the House on June 19, 1985,” in U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Binary Chemical Weapons: Selected Documents, 99th Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 1.
266 Representative Porter prediction: “Defense Authorization: Nerve Gas,” 1985 CQ Almanac, p. 157.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN: SILENT SPREAD
267 NATO approval of U.S. binary production program: Bill Keller, “New Nerve Gas Plan Leaves Tests and Storage Undecided,” New York Times, August 12, 1985, p. 1; David Dickson, “Approval Seen for New U.S. Chemical Weapons,” Science, vol. 232, no. 4750 (May 2, 1986), p. 567; R. Jeffrey Smith, “Binary Deployment Remains Controversial,” Science, vol. 232, no. 4750 (May 2, 1986), p. 568.
267–68 Reagan ordered production of bi
nary projectile: John H. Cushman, “Reagan Announces U.S. Is Resuming Production of Chemical Weapons,” International Herald Tribune, July 31, 1986, p. 1; The White House, “Statement by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Speakes on the Binary Chemical Munitions Program,” July 29, 1986.
268 Failed effort to block production of binary projectile: John Isaacs, “Using Summitry to Thwart Congress,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1986, pp. 4–5.
268 Airlift of binary weapons in wartime: Stephen Budiansky, “Qualified Approval for Binary Chemical Weapons,” Science, vol. 234, no. 4779 (November 21, 1986), p. 932.
268 Conservative critics said administration had “shot itself in the foot”: Thomas F. O’Boyle, “White House Has Shot Itself in the Foot with West German Nerve-Gas Accord,” Wall Street Journal, July 29, 1986, p. 30.
269 Representative Fascell made public GAO report on Bigeye bomb: Walter Pincus, “Gas-Shell Production Ordered: Long Moratorium Is About to End,” Washington Post, July 30, 1986, p. 6.
269 French ACACIA binary weapons program: Meyer, L’arme chimique, pp. 109–110; Lepick, Les armes chimiques, p. 98; David Dickson, “France to Produce Binary Weapons?,” Science, vol. 234, November 28, 1986, p. 1070; Laurent Mossu, “Roland Dumas à Genève: La France ne fabriquera pas d’armes chimiques,” Le Figaro, February 8, 1989, p. 3.
269–70 Saddam delegated authority for chemical weapons use: McCarthy and Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars,” in Lavoy, Sagan, and Wirtz, eds., Planning the Unthinkable, p. 65.
270 Defense Intelligence Agency shared intelligence with Iraqi military: Patrick E. Tyler, “Officers Say U.S. Aided Iraq in War Despite Use of Gas,” New York Times, August 18, 2002, p. 1; Michael Dobbs, “U.S. Had Key Role in Iraqi Buildup,” Washington Post, December 30, 2002, p. A1.
270 Poor quality of Iraqi Sarin: UNMOVIC, “Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes” (Working Document), March 6, 2003, p. 73.
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