97 Peter Wright, interviewed by John Ware on Panorama, BBC1, 13 Oct. 1988. See above, p. 518.
98 Ziegler, Wilson, pp. 476–7.
99 Security Service Archives.
100 Rimington, Open Secret, p. 190.
Chapter 5: Counter-Terrorism and Protective Security in the Later 1970s
1 Security Service Archives.
2 McGladdery, Provisional IRA in England, pp. 102–4. The Security Service file on the Balcombe Street siege contains no indication that the Security Service provided significant support to the Met in bringing the siege to an end.
3 Security Service Archives.
4 Security Service Archives.
5 Parl. Deb. (Commons), 25 March 1976, col. 647.
6 Security Service Archives.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Security Service Archives.
10 See above, pp. 604–5.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 Security Service Archives.
14 Security Service Archives.
15 Donoughue wrote on 17 February 1977: ‘How “responsible” is it not to have a long-term policy?’ Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, vol. 2, p. 149.
16 Security Service Archives. It was noted in 1978 that, for earlier entrants, ‘We have to rely on volunteers and cannot order a staff officer to serve there [Northern Ireland]. At the moment we have only five volunteers, two of whom are unwilling to go until the latter part of this year.’ Security Service Archives.
17 Security Service Archives. See above, p. 603.
18 Security Service Archives. FX Branch was originally to be called FZ. Its name was changed because of the fear that, in handwritten form, FZ might be confused with F2.
19 Initially F Branch included Sections F1, F2 and F3, while Sections F4, F5 and F6 belonged to FX Branch. Security Service Archives.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Security Service Archives.
22 Security Service Archives.
23 Security Service Archives. The main exceptions were Iraqis, Libyans and the staff of Middle Eastern embassies in London.
24 Donoughue, Downing Street Diary, vol. 2, p. 248.
25 Security Service Archives.
26 Security Service Archives.
27 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive, pp. 506–8. Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive II, p. 255.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 The last PIRA mainland killing of the 1970s was of a passer-by killed by a bomb placed outside the London home of the Conservative MP Hugh Fraser on 22 October 1975.
30 Statistics in Bew and Gillespie, Northern Ireland. ‘Deaths arising from the Troubles’ were as follows: 1974 – 220; 1975 – 275; 1976 – 297; 1977 – 112; 1978 – 81; 1979 – 113.
31 Anderson, Cahill, pp. 314–15.
32 Security Service Archives.
33 Taylor, Provos, p. 210.
34 Security Service Archives.
35 Security Service Archives.
36 Security Service Archives.
37 Security Service Archives.
38 Security Service Archives.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Security Service Archives.
41 The British Minister to NATO, Paul Holmer, had been selected as a PIRA target after plans to assassinate the ambassador to NATO, Sir John Killick, fell through. Security Service Archives.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Security Service Archives.
44 Coogan, IRA, pp. 467–8.
45 Security Service Archives.
46 The Service discounted later press reports that Lord Mountbatten had been warned not to go to Ireland earlier in the summer by Sir Maurice Oldfield, former Chief of SIS. Security Service Archives.
47 English, Armed Struggle, pp. 219–21, 224.
48 Security Service Archives.
49 Security Service Archives.
50 Security Service Archives.
51 Security Service Archives.
52 Security Service Archives.
53 Security Service Archives.
54 Wood, Crimes of Loyalty, pp. 330–31.
55 Security Service Archives.
56 Security Service Archives. Wood, Crimes of Loyalty, p. 329.
57 McMahon, British Spies and Irish Rebels, pp. 265–7.
58 Security Service Archives.
59 Security Service Archives.
60 Security Service Archives.
61 Security Service Archives.
62 Security Service Archives.
Chapter 6: The Callaghan Government and Subversion
1 Beckett, Enemy Within, p. 182.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 See above, pp. 527–31, 535; below, pp. 659, 664–5.
4 Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 352–4.
5 Security Service Archives.
6 See below, p. 711.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Security Service Archives.
10 Clarke, Hope and Glory, pp. 349–50.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 Security Service Archives.
14 Security Service Archives.
15 Security Service Archives.
16 Security Service Archives.
17 Beckett, Enemy Within, pp. 182–3.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 JIC (A) (71) 16, ‘The Security of the United Kingdom Base in a situation leading to a threat of general war’, 23 March 1971, TNA CAB 186/8. I am grateful to Professor Peter Hennessy for this reference.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 See above, pp. 412–14.
22 McSmith, Faces of Labour, pp. 89–90.
23 Benn, Against the Tide, pp. 20–21.
24 Seyd, Rise and Fall of the Labour Left, pp. 50–53. McSmith, Faces of Labour, pp. 101–5.
25 Security Service Archives.
26 Security Service Archives.
27 Security Service Archives.
28 Morgan, Callaghan, pp. 702–3. While Callaghan was foreign secretary in 1975, the Security Service had been informed that he had been ‘most interested’ in a Service report on ‘Trotskyist activities’ in his constituency but had minuted that the Trotskyists were ‘all running for cover at present’ rather than attacking him. Security Service Archives.
29 Security Service Archives.
30 Security Service Archives. Early work in F1A had included investigating constituencies where ‘there are grounds for suspecting that left-wing militants are attempting to remove right-wing Labour MPs’; Security Service Archives.
31 Security Service Archives.
32 Security Service Archives.
33 Security Service Archives.
34 Security Service Archives.
35 Beckett, Enemy Within, pp. 185–6.
36 McSmith, Faces of Labour, p. 106.
37 Seyd, Rise and Fall of the Labour Left, pp. 50–51.
38 McSmith, Faces of Labour, pp. 107–8.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Security Service Archives.
41 Security Service Archives.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Security Service Archives.
44 Security Service Archives.
45 Security Service Archives.
46 Security Service Archives.
47 Westlake, Kinnock, p. 316.
48 Security Service Archives.
49 McSmith, Faces of Labour, p. 107.
50 Westlake, Kinnock, p. 318n.
51 Security Service Archives.
52 Note of a meeting at Chequers, 26 June 1977, TNA PREM 15/1491, s. B12.
53 Note by Callaghan on memo sent to him on Grunwick dispute, TNA PREM 16/1491.
54 Security Service Archives.
55 Security Service Archives.
56
‘August 8 Day of Action Called Off’, Daily Telegraph, 1 Aug. 1977.
57 Security Service Archives.
58 ‘Unions ready for defeat at Grunwick’, Sunday Telegraph, 11 Sept. 1977.
59 Security Service Archives.
60 Security Service Archives.
61 ‘Up to 104% pay rise needed, police tell Home Office’, The Times, 27 Aug. 1977.
62 Denis Healey (Chancellor) to Callaghan, 21 Oct. 1977 (reporting what Rees had told him Police Commissioners said about reaction to a 10 per cent pay rise); Note of a telephone conversation between Prime Minister and Home Secretary, 23 Oct. 1977. TNA PREM 16/1406.
63 Comments by Callaghan of ‘Final version’ of Home Secretary’s speech sent to 10 Downing Street on 25 Oct. 1977, TNA PREM 16/1406.
64 Police Supplement, 4 Nov. 1977; copy in TNA PREM 16/1406.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Security Service Archives.
67 Security Service Archives.
68 Security Service Archives.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Security Service Archives.
71 Morgan, Callaghan, p. 674.
72 Security Service Archives.
73 See below, p. 681.
74 See above, pp. 579–81, 583–4.
75 Rimington, Open Secret, p. 95.
76 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 Security Service Archives.
79 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
80 See below, pp. 670–72.
Chapter 7: The Thatcher Government and Subversion
1 Security Service Archives.
2 Security Service Archives.
3 Security Service Archives.
4 Security Service Archives.
5 Rothschild was at the time scheming unsuccessfully to become Thatcher’s security adviser. He also hoped, in vain, to become the next ‘C’. Rose, Elusive Rothschild, pp. 250–51.
6 Security Service Archives. When Director F briefed the PUS at the Department of Employment about the work of the unit, both were concerned about its ability to live up to ministerial expectations. Security Service Archives.
7 Security Service Archives.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, pp. 116–20.
10 ‘ “I’m not to blame for Rover” – Red Robbo’, BBC Online, 28 March 2000.
11 Security Service Archives.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 Security Service Archives. In March 1980 Deverell sought help in identifying open-source evidence of union militants’ membership of subversive organizations, particularly in the civil service unions and the NUM, above all in South Wales where the leadership appeared to be pushing for industrial action for political reasons in the face of clear opposition from the rank and file.
14 Security Service Archives.
15 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 267.
16 Security Service Archives.
17 Security Service Archives.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 Security Service Archives.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Security Service Archives.
22 For examples, see Andrew and Gordievsky (eds), Instructions from the Centre.
23 Security Service Archives.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 Security Service Archives.
26 Security Service Archives.
27 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 277–8.
28 Security Service Archives.
29 Security Service Archives. Kent was not, however, always even-handed. In 1983 he praised the Morning Star for its ‘steady, honest and generous coverage of the whole disarmament case’. Julian Lewis, ‘When is a Smear Not a Smear?’, Salisbury Review, Oct. 1984.
30 Security Service Archives.
31 Security Service Archives.
32 Security Service Archives.
33 Security Service Archives.
34 Security Service Archives.
35 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
36 Security Service Archives.
37 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
38 Security Service Archives.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Security Service Archives. Director F noted on 26 June that, though the NUM and Coal Board were due to hold talks in the following week, ‘there was still little room for optimism about the outcome.’ Security Service Archives.
41 See above, p. 598. Security Service Archives.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Milne, Enemy Within, pp. 341–2. ‘MI5’s Official Secrets’, Observer, 3 Jan. 1988.
44 Milne, Enemy Within, p. 342.
45 Recollections of Dame Stella Rimington. ‘Unaffiliated subversive’ was a ‘special category’ which required the approval of an officer with the rank of assistant director or above, defined as ‘UK citizen or foreigner who is not a member of, or sympathetic to, one subversive organisation, but who threatens parliamentary democracy’; Security Service Archives.
46 Security Service Archives.
47 Security Service Archives.
48 Recollections of Dame Stella Rimington.
49 Milne, Enemy Within, ch. 4; a summary of Windsor’s libel action appears on the website of his lawyers, Carter-Ruck; Parl. Deb. (Commons), 12 June 1991.
50 Recollections of Dame Stella Rimington. Security Service Archives.
51 Security Service Archives.
52 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 363.
53 Ibid., pp. 365–8.
54 Security Service Archives.
55 Security Service Archives.
56 Security Service Archives.
57 Security Service Archives.
58 See above, p. 599.
59 Security Service Archives.
60 Milne, Enemy Within, p. 268.
61 Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, p. 308.
62 Security Service Archives.
63 Security Service Archives.
64 Security Service Archives. Director FX had reported to the Directors’ Meeting on 24 July that Ramelson had a low opinion of the current CPGB industrial organizer and was trying to persuade the Party to ‘extend their influence in the miners’ strike’. Security Service Archives.
65 Security Service Archives.
66 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 369 and n.
67 Duff said later that the decision to seek an HOW on Cox was ‘a matter of judgement’, and implied that his judgement would have been different. Security Service Archives. He also commented that a paper on the CND file on subversive influence in CND may have concentrated ‘rather too much on CND activities as such’.
68 Security Service Archives.
69 Security Service Archives.
70 Security Service Archives.
71 Security Service Archives.
72 Security Service Archives.
73 Security Service Archives.
74 Scotsman, 2 July 1986. Security Service Archives.
75 Security Service Archives.
76 Security Service Archives.
77 Security Service Archives.
78 Security Service Archives.
79 Security Service Archives.
Chapter 8: Counter-Terrorism and Protective Security in the Early 1980s
1 Security Service Archives.
2 See above, p. 647.
3 Security Service Archives.
4 Recollections of a former Security Service officer.
5 See above, pp. 653–4.
6 Security Service Archives.
7 See above, p. 600.
8 Security Service Archives.
9 Security Service Archives.
10 Security Service Archives.
11 See above, pp. 620–21.
12 Security Service Archives.
13 Security Servic
e Archives.
14 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 90. According to Peter de la Billière, that strategy was subsequently slightly modified: ‘After extensive discussions in the COBR, Whitelaw decided that an assault on the Embassy would be justified if two or more of the hostages were killed. One death, he ruled, could occur as the result of an accident, and negotiations might carry on after it; but if a second hostage were murdered, and more were threatened, that would be sufficient cause for an attack.’ de la Billière, Looking for Trouble, p. 322.
15 See above, pp. 613, 655.
16 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 89. On the origins of Service involvement in COBR, see above, p. 614.
17 Security Service Archives.
18 Security Service Archives.
19 Security Service Archives.
20 Security Service Archives.
21 Security Service Archives.
22 Security Service Archives.
23 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 90.
24 Security Service Archives.
25 de la Billière, Looking for Trouble, p. 326.
26 Ibid., pp. 333–5.
27 Security Service Archives.
28 Parl. Deb. (Commons), 6 May 1980, cols 28–35.
29 Security Service Archives.
30 Security Service Archives.
31 See above, pp. 555–6.
32 The first full-scale British counter-terrorist exercise in 1973 had been devised to deal with the threat of aircraft hijacking. See above, p. 615.
33 Security Service Archives.
34 Thatcher, Downing Street Years, p. 89.
35 Security Service Archives.
36 In December 1980 the DG (Sir Howard Smith) told the Home Secretary (Willie Whitelaw) that ‘At the present time the Libyans were the biggest threat and I hoped that everything possible would be done in Tripoli to see that undesirables do not get visas. At the same time we must recognise that some would get through the net and if they did I hoped that the Home Secretary would be prepared to follow up a vigorous policy towards undesirables who turned up here.’ Security Service Archives.
37 Security Service Archives.
38 Security Service Archives.
39 Security Service Archives.
40 Security Service Archives.
41 Security Service Archives.
42 Security Service Archives.
43 Security Service Archives.
44 Security Service Archives.
45 Security Service Archives. The Hampshire Special Branch found 3 grams of thallium hidden in a Portsmouth building. Security Service Archives.
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