by Amy Chua
Many Americans today are bewildered—outraged—at the depth and pervasiveness of anti-Americanism in the world today. “Why do so many people want to come here if we’re so terrible?” frustrated Americans demand. “What would France be doing if it were the world’s superpower?” “Why do they hate us?” These are reasonable points. But the fact of the matter is that because the United States is the world’s sole superpower, we are going to be held to a higher standard than everyone else—market-dominant minorities always are. (The Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Indians in East Africa have been those regions’ principal economic engines, generating enormous growth over the generations. Yet if you ask ordinary Indonesians or Kenyans on the street, they will insist that these minorities are “leeches” “sucking out the wealth of the nation” and the reason for their country’s poverty.) For this reason, it is in the United States’ own interest to avoid taking actions that suggest hypocrisy, look glaringly exploitative, or display lack of concern for the rest of the world, including of course the people of Iraq.
It is easy to criticize the United States, just as it is easy to hide behind facile calls for “free market democracy.” With the international community watching, I prefer to view this moment as a critical opportunity for the United States to surprise a skeptical world. One thing, however, is clear: The United States cannot simply call for elections and universal suffrage and at the same time support an economic system that is seen as benefiting only a tiny, privileged minority—whether an ethnic or religious minority or U.S. and British companies. To do so would be a recipe for disaster. Already, according to the director of one NGO in Iraq, “Anti-Americanism is growing here. There is a strong perception that U.S. companies plan to rape the country of its resources. This is particularly dangerous as there is currently no sense of control or ownership on the part of the Iraqi people.” Once basic services and order are restored, the single most important thing for the United States to do is to change this perception: to give the Iraqi people a sense of control and ownership over their own resources and destinies. Perhaps most important of all, it is vital that the United States remain true to our word and take visible, symbolic measures to ensure that the new Iraqi government—unlike Saddam Hussein’s regime—includes the Iraqi people in the benefits of Iraq’s oil wealth.
A final clarification. This book is not about blame, but about unintended consequences. My own view, for example, is that the results of democratization in Indonesia have been disastrous. But if forced to place the blame somewhere, I would point to thirty years of plundering autocracy and crony capitalism by Suharto. Similarly, in Iraq, overnight elections might well bring undesirable results. But that is not democracy’s fault. On the contrary, if anything, the blame rests with the cruelly repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, this doesn’t take away from the reality that given the conditions that actually exist now in many postcolonial countries—conditions created by history, colonialism, divide-and-conquer policies, corruption, autocracy—the combination of laissez-faire capitalism and unrestrained majority rule may well have catastrophic consequences.
Amy Chua July 1, 2003 New Haven, CT
Notes
Introduction
1. My discussion of the kidnapping industry in the Philippines is based principally on a series of interviews I conducted in Manila during May 2001. Because law enforcement officials in the Philippines are generally thought to have close ties to kidnapping gangs, many families of kidnapped Chinese victims simply pay the demanded ransom rather than report the crime to authorities. As a result, there is little rigorous documentation of the phenomenon. For journalistic accounts, see Caroline S. Hau, “Too Much, Too Little,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 15, 2001, p. 9; Abigail L. Ho, “Chinese traders won’t flee, won’t invest either,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 6, 2001, p. 1; and Reginald Chua, “Country Held Hostage,” Straits Times, February 28, 1993, p. 7.
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2. Estimates of Chinese economic control in the Philippines vary somewhat, but usually hover between 50% and 65%. For an up-to-date, if slightly gossipy, report on the wealth and holdings of Chinese Filipino tycoons, see Wilson Lee Flores, “The Top Billionaires in the Philippines,” Philippine Star, May 16, 2001. See also “A Survey of Asian Business,” The Economist, April 7, 2001; Cecil Morella, “Ethnic Chinese Stay Ready, Hope to Ride out Crime Wave,” Agence France-Presse, April 30, 1996; and Rigoberto Tiglao, “Gung-ho in Manila,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 15, 1990, pp. 68–72.
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3. The statistics I cite relating to poverty, health, and sanitation in the Philippines are from: “Annual Poverty Indicators Survey,” released September 15, 2000, by the Income and Employment Statistics Division, National Statistics Office, Republic of Philippines; The World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); The World Bank, Entering the Twenty-First Century: World Development Report 1999/2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF Statistical Data: The Philippines (from UNICEF website, updated December 26, 2000); and Mamerto Canlas, Mariano Miranda, Jr., and James Putzel, Land, Poverty and Politics in the Philippines (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1988), pp. 52–53.
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4. Roy Gutman, “Death Camp Horrors,” Newsday, October 18, 1992, p. 3, and Laura Pitter, “Beaten and scarred for life in the Serbian ‘rape camps,’” South China Morning Post, December 27, 1992, p. 8.
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5. Bill Berkeley, The Graves Are Not Yet Full (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 2.
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6. See Margot Cohen, “Turning Point: Indonesia’s Chinese Face a Hard Choice,” Far Eastern Economic Review, July 30, 1998, p. 12.
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7. Lee Hockstader, “Massive Attack Targets Another Palestinian City,” Washington Post, April 4, 2002, p. A1.
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8. Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, “Pakistan Backs Us, Despite Warning by Afghanistan,” Boston Globe, September 16, 2001, p. A5.
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9. I borrow this phrase from Orhan Pamuk, “The Anger of the Damned,” The New York Review of Books, November 15, 2001.
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10. This story is reported in Jacques deLisle, “Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 20 (1999):179–308 (citing William Kovacic).
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11. This description is taken from Matt Biven’s hilarious and eye-opening article, “Aboard the Gravy Train: In Kazakhstan, The Farce That Is U.S. Aid,” Harper’s, August 1, 1997, p. 69. The balloon episode was never actually produced, on the grounds that it would be too expensive.
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12. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), pp. ix, xvi, 12.
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13. John Lewis Gaddis, “Democracy and Foreign Policy” (transcript of Devane Lecture, delivered at Yale University on April 17, 2001, available at http://www.yale.edu/yale300/democracy, p. 8.
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14. Thomas L. Friedman, “Today’s News Quiz,” New York Times, November 20, 2001, p. A19.
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15. See Mihai Constantin and Sabina Fati, “Vadim Tudor: Demagogue in Waiting?” CNN.com, December 9, 2000, and Andrei Filipache and Alexandru Nastase, “PRM’s Tudor Attends Antonescu Ceremony, Threatens to ‘Hang’ Hungarians,” World News Connection (NTIS, U.S. Dept. of Commerce), June 2, 2001.
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16. Ann M. Simmons, “On Zimbabwe Farms, Push Now Comes to Shove,” Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2000, p. A1 (quoting Agrippa Gava, executive director of the Zimbabwean National Liberation War Veterans Association).
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17. “Leader Urg
es Zimbabwe Blacks to Menace the White Residents,” New York Times, December 15, 2000, p. A8.
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18. Adam Roberts makes these points in “The Great Manipulator,” Times Literary Supplement, March 8, 2002, p. 78. See also Donna Harman, “Land Reform: An African Issue,” Christian Science Monitor, March 13, 2002.
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19. Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. xv.
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20. See The World Bank, Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy (New York: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2002), chapter 1.
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21. See “Interviewing Chomsky; Preparatory to Porto Alegre,” http://www.zmag.org/chomskypa.htm. Lori Wallach’s quotes are from “Brazil: World Social Forum for Global Equity, Says Activist,” Agence France-Presse, February 2, 2002, and “Lori Wallach and Others on the WTO’s Dubious ‘Doha Round,’” lists.essential.org/pipermail/tw-list/2001-November/000101.html.
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22. For various conceptions of “democracy,” see Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3d ed.) (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1950), p. 269; Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 121–22, 220–22; Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 1; and Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, “What Democracy Is . . . and Is Not,” in Geoffrey Pridham, ed., Transitions to Democracy: Comparative Perspectives From Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), pp. 3–16.
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23. Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 51–92. “The ethnic tie is simultaneously suffused with overtones of familial duty and laden with depths of familial emotion,” writes Horowitz. For various perspectives on the larger question of “what is ethnicity?,” see Harold R. Isaacs, Idols of the Tribe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 38–45; Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), pp. 11–13, 32; John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (2d ed.) (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 19–24; and John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, eds., Ethnicity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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24. See Philip Gourevitch’s magnificent book, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families (New York: Picador USA, 1998), especially chapter 4.
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Part One Preface
1. As reported in Thomas Frank, One Market under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy (New York: Doubleday, 2000), p. 12.
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2. Mitchell Landsberg, “Race, Resentment Fuel Attacks on Indians in Fiji,” Los Angeles Times, June 22, 2000, p. A3.
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3. Frank, One Market under God, p. 12.
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4. See Anna Gelpern and Malcolm Harrison, “Ideology, Practice, and Performance in Privatization,” Harvard International Law Journal 33 (1992): 240–54; Sander Thoenes, “Trust of People Key to Reform,” Financial Times, July 11, 1996, p. 3; and Jack Epstein, “Brazil’s Economy Lagging Behind,” San Francisco Chronicle, February 28, 1994, p. A8.
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Chapter 1
1. Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 96, 185, 211–12. The contemporary observer was the Britishman Maurice Collins. His account can be found in Maurice Collins, Trials in Burma (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1945), pp. 140–45.
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2. My discussion of Burma relies heavily on David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001), and Mya Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism: Economic Growth Versus Democracy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), especially pp. 156–207. An authoritative discussion of Chinese (along with Indian and British) economic dominance in colonial Burma can be found in Frank H. Golay, Ralph Anspach, M. Ruth Pfanner & Eliezer B. Ayal, Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1969), chapter 4.
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3. In describing the recent Chinese economic takeover of Mandalay and Rangoon, I draw freely on the eyewitness accounts of Anthony Davis, “Burma Casts Wary Eye on China,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 1, 1999; Anthony Davis, “China’s Shadow,” Asiaweek, May 28, 1999, p. 30; Abby Tan, “Mandalay Preparing to Shake Off Frontier Image,” Asia Today, July 1996; Steve Raymer, “British Era Fades, China Gains in Myanmar,” Los Angeles Times, April 3, 1994, p. A20; Philip Shenon, “Burmese Cry Intrusion,” New York Times, March 29, 1994, p. A4; Nirmal Ghosh, “Making Money in Mandalay,” Business Times (Singapore), July 20, 1993; and “Road to Lashio is Paved with Good Fortune for Chinese Businessmen,” Guardian (London), July 16, 1994, p. 16.
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4. “Myanmar and China: But Will the Flag Follow Trade?” The Economist, October 8, 1994, p. 35.
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5. Christopher S. Wren, “Road to Riches Starts in the Golden Triangle,” New York Times, May 11, 1998, p. A8.
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6. Ibid., p. A8. See also Tony Emerson, “Burma’s Men of Gold,” Newsweek, April 20, 1998, p. 24. The early exploits of Lo Hsing-han, Olive Yang, and other opium warlords are described in Bertil Lintner, Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), and Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1991).
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7. On Burma’s legal and illegal teak activities, see John Pomfret, “China’s Lumbering Economy Ravages Border Forests, Washington Post, March 26, 2001, p. A19. See also James Fahn, “Little the world can do to help Burma’s forests,” Nation, December 17, 1998; Raymer, “British Era Fades,” p. A20; and Rainforest Relief’s website, “Campaign to End Purchase of Teak from Burma,” November 4, 1998, http://forests.org/archive/asia/teakwee2.htm. On “May Flower” Kyaw Win, see the special report on “Burmese Tycoons” published in the Irrawaddy newsmagazine in July 2000, available at http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2000/vol8.7/report.htm.
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8. Raymer, “British Era Fades,” p. A20.
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9. See Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism, pp. 168–71, 204.
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10. Ibid., pp. 170, 204, and Emerson, “Burma’s Men of Gold,” p. 24.
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11. See Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, pp. xx, 139–40, 206, and U.S. Embassy, Rangoon, Country Commercial Guide: Burma (Myanmar) (U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service and the U.S. Department of State, 2000), chapter 2.
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12. See U.S. Embassy, Rangoon, Country Commercial Guide: Burma (Myanmar), chapter 2. See also Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, pp. 136, 206–10.
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13. See Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism, pp. 156–57, and Shenon, “Burmese Cry Intrusion,” p. A4.
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14. The descriptions in this paragraph are from Davis, “China’s Shadow,” p. 30; Raymer, “British Era Fades,” p. A20; and “Myanmar and China: But Will the Flag Follow Trade?” p. 35. On anti-Chinese hatred stemming specifically from Chinese connections with SLORC, see Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, pp. 165, 227–28, and Blaine Harden, “Grim Regime: A Special Report: For Burmese, Repression, AIDS and Denial,” New York Times, November 14, 2000, p. A1.
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15. Maung, The Burma Road to Capitalism, p. 166.
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16. Shenon, “Burmese Cry Intrusion,” p. A4.
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17. One of the best comprehensive histories of the Chinese in Southeast Asia remains Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (2d ed.) (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1965). Grand Eunuch Cheng Ho’s seven voyages to Southeast Asia are described on pp. 16–18.
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18. See Clifford Geertz, Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 24–27.
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19. Lynn Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor (Boston, Toronto, and London: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 31–33.
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20. Ibid., pp. 32–33 (citation omitted).
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21. This discussion of Chinese economic dominance in Vietnam is reproduced in large part from pp. 92–105 of my own article, Amy L. Chua, “Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development,” Yale Law Journal 108 (1998): 1–105, which in turn draws heavily on Golay et al., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia, chapter 7; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984); and Tran Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993).
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22. Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam, pp. 18–19, and Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, pp. 183–84.
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23. The statistics regarding Chinese dominance in Vietnam during the colonial era are from Golay et al., Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia, pp. 395–96, and Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam, pp. 20–21, 41, 47, 57. The anti-Chinese epithets are from Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, p. 190. The intensification of Chinese dominance during the Vietnam War is discussed in Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam, p. 80. On the branding of the Chinese as bourgeois capitalists, see Henry Kamm, “Vietnam Describes Economic Setbacks,” New York Times, November 19, 1980, p. A9, and James N. Wallace, “A Ray of Hope,” U.S. News & World Report, August 6, 1979, p. 50.
