Initially, Eban’s trip was far from helpful. France’s President Charles de Gaulle only advised the Israelis to let the major powers work things out and not to attack. In Britain, Prime Minister Harold Wilson offered his moral support for an international flotilla of ships to break the blockade and enforce free passage, but little else.
In Washington, Eban requested a statement that action against Israel would be an action against the United States. Both President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk opposed such a blanket statement. They wanted Israel to wait for the international community to act and remove the blockade. Johnson stated flatly that: “If Israel attacked, she’d do it alone.” The President suggested that Israel abide by the UN moratorium that U Thant had negotiated with Nasser, and allow them to put together the international regatta, as it came to be called, that Britain supported.
Eban replied that Israel needed more concrete assurances in exchange for waiting the two weeks. He gave pointed notice that more delay would mean the loss of their military credibility to deter future attacks, opening up the specter of continual war. Johnson did not want to commit the US further without Congressional support, but Rusk, in a private meeting with the President, noted that the US could easily lose major prestige among its allies if it failed to act.
When Eban left Washington on May 27, he took with him a promise that America would act unilaterally to open the Strait on June 14, if the international regatta failed to form. As an added show of faith, Johnson authorized the covert transfer of a photo-reconnaissance squadron of RF-4Cs from Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany to help Israel monitor Arab movements on their border. The RF-4Cs gave the Israelis night-time reconnaissance capability, something all other parties in the area lacked. In addition, orders went out to the US Sixth Fleet to move into the Eastern Mediterranean. Two separate carrier groups, one with the USS Saratoga and one with the USS America, started moving immediately toward Crete.
While the diplomacy was taking place at high levels, media rhetoric was altering the crisis hourly. The Soviets, despite assurances to Washington that they were counseling restraint to their clients, bombarded the airwaves with warnings about Israeli and US intentions. Arabs were told that thousands of US Marines and seven aircraft carriers were on their way to fight for Israel.10 The USSR also announced its intention to strengthen its small naval force in the Mediterranean as a counter to the Sixth Fleet.
Arab rhetoric was even more strident. The stated goal of Egypt’s move into the Sinai was no longer just to deter Israel from attacking Syria. The goal had become war with the Jewish state and its complete annihilation. Nasser stated flatly that in the coming inevitable war, the objective was to destroy Israel.
In Jordan, Hussein found himself in a quandary. His people were completely enthralled by the “holy war” rhetoric of vengeance and victory being shouted from every Arab radio station—staying neutral could create a backlash against him. He had no illusions about Arab military capability. No common plan, nor even coordination existed among the Arabs, a situation that could only lead to disaster. However, he also knew that any Arab attack against Israel would result in an Israeli invasion of the West Bank, something he alone could not withstand. Thus, on May 30, Hussein flew to Cairo and signed a defense pact with the Egyptian leader. The pact allowed foreign troops into Jordan—Iraq and Saudi Arabia promised troops immediately—and put Jordan’s military under an Egyptian commander in the event of war.
With the signing of the Egypt-Jordan pact, Israel found itself fully surrounded by what appeared to be an Arab unified front, bent on its destruction. General Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff, demanded immediate authorization to attack before Syria, Jordan and Egypt were fully organized. His reasoning could not be faulted. First, mobilization of the full Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was devastating to the Israeli economy, due to the expense of military actions and the lost productivity of workers called to duty. Second, sitting in defensive works, waiting for an Arab attack, was debilitating to army morale. Finally, lack of credible military action in the face of such a clear casus belli as the closing of the Strait, sent the wrong signal to their enemies and invited further aggressive action.
But, Eshkol, backed by his cabinet, refused the military’s demand, citing the US promises as reason to wait. On June 1, the Prime Minister made a radio address to his nation that heightened tensions more than helped. Flat, unemotional, devoid of inspiration, the halting address started building pressure toward a change in the Israeli government.
While Israel faced its internal problems, Washington struggled to develop a working international program to open the Strait. By June 7, however, it was becoming apparent that the idea was not going to be viable. Of the countries approached, only the Netherlands and Australia promised support. Even Great Britain declined, stating that renewed British involvement in the region after the 1956 Suez debacle would only inflame the situation. Johnson and his advisors came face to face with the fact that they would have to back up their promises to Israel with unilateral action.
US assets were skimpy for such action. North of the Suez Canal, two carrier battle groups were on station, each with one carrier and six escorts. In the Red Sea, the US had the USS Valcour, a tactical fleet command ship and three destroyers, plus the USS Intrepid, a smaller carrier that had transited the Canal on June 1, ostensibly on its way to Vietnam. New orders kept the Intrepid with the Valcour in case its aircraft were needed.
A week before the moratorium ran out events in Israel brought political matters to a head. News that four Iraqi brigades had entered Jordan drove the military to renew its demands. The resulting debate kept the military in check, but Eshkol accepted the need for changes in the government. He invited Gahal into what he termed a National Unity Government with two ministers without portfolio positions and relinquished his own duties as Minister of Defense. In his place stepped Moshe Dayan, the hero of Suez.11 Morale in Israel soared.
On June 14, 1967, the moratorium set by the United Nations ran out. There was no new accord, no new diplomatic initiatives, no compromises from Nasser, and no international effort to break the deadlock. At dawn the following day, the United States moved.
Explosion
The ship was called the Coral Sea, a 68,000-ton tanker. Normally it flew the Liberian flag, but as it approached the Strait of Tiran that Thursday morning, the Israeli flag waved from the fantail, an unmistakable challenge to Nasser’s blockade. Leading the way for the cargo ship sailed the USS Dyess, a Gearing Class destroyer, its crew closed up and ready for action. Overhead F-4 Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks from the Intrepid’s airgroup, circled and waited for any Egyptian response.
Warned of the ship’s approach, Nasser found himself in a terrible quandary. He had not really expected his blockade to be directly challenged, certainly not by the United States. His Soviet sponsors had assured him that the US was far too involved in Vietnam to risk another conflict. Worse than this miscalculation was the fact that Nasser had been bluffing with his blockade. Other than two recently emplaced coastal guns, there was nothing at the Strait to enforce the blockade. Exposing his bluff would embarrass the Egyptian President and virtually destroy his resurgent leadership among the Arabs. However, not responding would do much the same. He could only fall back on the Soviet promise to provide him direct support in the event of war.12
Radio communication with the Dyess from Egyptian authorities in Sharm el Sheikh, simply resulted in pro forma statements about free passage. Backed into a corner by his own words, Nasser felt compelled to respond. He ordered the guns to open fire.
The action, once it started, was anti-climatic—one shell hit the Coral Sea causing little damage. The Dyess returned fire with its single forward 5-inch mount, but American airpower terminated the action. Diving in, the US Navy Skyhawks obliterated the battery with bombs. Two Egyptian motor torpedo boats in Sharm el Sheikh did not budge; neither did the Egyptian Air Force. The Coral Sea and its escort sailed on.
; The brief action heralded another intense round of loud diplomatic debate. The Arabs complained bitterly about the US intervention. The Soviets, somewhat stunned by the turn of events, backed Arab complaints at the United Nations, put their armed forces on heightened alert worldwide, and ordered their reinforced Mediterranean squadron to close on the American Sixth Fleet carriers. The Soviet Fifth Eskadra flagship, the Sverdlov Class cruiser Dzerzhinski, led a mixed group of destroyers and escorts to a position just over the horizon from the USS America’s battlegroup, sailing 100 miles off the entrance to the Suez Canal.
While the superpowers raged and postured, Nasser was making decisions that would compound his problems. Deeply embarrassed by his dismal showing at the Strait, he contemplated several options. First, he could accept a fait accompli—he had gambled and lost—and endeavor to hold on to whatever prestige he could through diplomacy. Second, he could attack the Coral Sea again, this time with air power—his Tu-16 bombers could attack with standoff Kennel missiles and sink the ship before it got to Eilat. That option, however, would place his air force in more direct conflict with the Americans, with immediate Soviet aid questionable. His final option was to unleash his army against the real enemy—Israel. Such an attack would remove the embarrassment and allow him to lead the Arab world to a victory. His decision was preordained by his makeup.
The Egyptian high command, particularly Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, and his Sinai Front commander, General Abdel Mohsen Mortagui, were taken aback by Nasser’s new orders. All of their plans had been predicated on Israel attacking as it did in 1956. Their existing plan drew the Israelis into well-planned Sinai kill zones near Bir Gifgafa and Jebel Libni. Once the bulk of the IDF had been destroyed, Egyptian forces would then advance. The current Egyptian deployment in the desert was based on this plan. Significant redeployment would be required to change from a defensive posture to an offensive one.
The plan was quickly formed. The 7th Division would hold its position near the coast and support the 20th Palestinian Division in Gaza. To the deep south, the 6th Mechanized Division, supported by the 1st Armored Brigade’s three T-54 battalions and an armored task force under Major-General Saad el Shazli, would advance into the Negev, cut off and take Eilat. The 2nd Infantry Division, supported by an armored brigade from the 4th Armored Division, and its own tank brigade, would make the main attack toward Nitzana. A third armored brigade, the Presidential Brigade, a force of 100 tanks, nominally attached to the 3rd Infantry Division, was also added to the main attack. These three latter brigades, along with the artillery support, had to redeploy. This movement started on June 16 under cover of darkness, which should have concealed the movement from the Israelis.
One part of Nasser’s orders became controversial in his own camp immediately—Nasser decided not to inform his allies of the planned attack. He reasoned that bringing Syria and Jordan into the plans now would simply delay the attack and potentially compromise security. On a more personal level, he was feeling the time pressure to attack because of his own embarrassment. He informed his generals that they would announce that Israel had attacked them, initiating a massive Egyptian counter-attack. Time would be saved and secrecy maintained.
Israeli intelligence, however, aided by the night seeing capabilities of the American RF-4C reconnaissance aircraft, spotted the movement almost as soon as it started. News of the redeployment of armor and artillery forward in the Sinai galvanized the new Israeli government, with the military calling again for an immediate attack. The US sent a note of caution and restraint, suggesting that Israel allow the Egyptians to make the first overt aggressive move. The Israelis would then hold the moral high ground regardless of the outcome. Johnson, through embassy cables, again reiterated his guarantees that Israel would be protected.
Dayan was at first unwilling to withhold an Israeli attack. His primary concern was the initial air battle that the Israelis felt would precede any Arab attack. Such an attack would be costly to the Arabs, given the qualitative advantage the Israeli Air Force held, but could conceivably cause serious damage to cities and civilians. Air Force commander General Mordechai Hod stated, however, that with enough early warning, his pilots could meet the enemy in the skies, disrupting and destroying their cohesion.
There was another factor that led to Dayan’s accepting the US position. Although there was definite movement in the Sinai that presaged an attack, there was no corresponding movement in Jordan or Syria. Without an immediate worry of a three-front war, Israeli commanders could see opportunity in the coming Egyptian attack. There were three ugdot, or divisional equivalents, in place in the Sinai. Brigadier-General Yisrael Tal commanded two armored brigades and the reinforced 202nd Parachute Brigade, facing the Egyptian 7th Division. The brunt of the initial Egyptian assault would land on Brigadier-General Avraham Yoffe’s two armored brigades and Brigadier-General Ariel Sharon’s division of one armored and two mechanized infantry brigades. Both Yoffe and Sharon liked the idea of meeting the enemy armor in the open, followed by an immediate counterattack. Further south, Colonel Avraham Mendler’s independent armored brigade would have to fend off the reinforced 6th Mechanized Division’s attack on the Negev and Eilat.
Before dawn on Monday June 19, American radar aircraft off the America picked up massive air activity developing above the Sinai—Egyptian aircraft taking off and forming up. The formations turned toward the Israeli border as Nasser’s massed artillery opened fire on Israeli positions; 122mm shells and 240mm Katyusha rockets slammed down onto the Israeli defenses, while tanks and armored personnel carriers moved forward to their lines of departure.
To the north, the Egyptian attack aircraft were thrown into confusion by the sudden presence of American F-4 fighters circling conspicuously off the Suez entrance. As pilots and controllers argued the problem, Israeli Mirages swept in from the desert side and blasted through the Egyptian planes. Formations disintegrated as the MiGs struggled to ward off the unexpected attack. The Tu-16 bombers, loaded with ordnance, could not maneuver well and could not dive to low level for safety because of their own artillery barrage. They had to press on. Very few made it to their targets and those were distracted by anti-aircraft fire and did little damage. Over 30 MiGs fell from the sky, along with seven Israeli jets. The Americans fighters did not engage.
Below them, ignorant of the air battle, the Egyptian armored assault formations moved forward. Each of the three main attacking columns followed the classic Soviet style of attack: two tank battalions up front followed by a second echelon of armor and mechanized infantry. The primary assault column of the 4th Armored Division reinforced its drive with an extra tank battalion of 40 T-54s. Fully a third of Egypt’s tanks in the Sinai were involved in this attack. Further south 6th Mechanized and Task Force Shazli moved forward as well.
Initial movement went well as the T-54 battalions plowed into and through the Israeli positions blasted by their hour-long hurricane barrage. Exuberant commanders signaled their superiors in the rear with claims of an overwhelming breakthrough. Then the Israelis opened fire.
Sharon and Yoffe had moved their troops back from their border positions some five miles—the Egyptians’ opening barrage had fallen on empty desert. Now the massed tanks of the two Israeli divisions tore into the advancing Egyptian armor.
Two hours into the battle, the situation had changed completely. Egyptian aircraft had returned to their bases following the initial dogfights. While there, they fell victim to General Hod’s secret weapon—turnaround time. Whereas most air forces measured the time to refuel and rearm aircraft for further sorties in hours, the Israelis measured the time in minutes. Israeli aircraft swept in again, blasting the Egyptian combat air patrols from the sky, then shooting up runways, planes, control towers and fuel storage facilities. After several waves, the Egyptians had no air force left. On the ground, the attacking columns from the 2nd Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions streamed back toward their own lines, having lost 230 of 270 attacking tanks. Right on their
heels came the Israelis.
Ignorant of the actual state of affairs, Nasser went public, announcing that Egypt had repulsed an Israeli ground and air attack in the Sinai. Egypt had gained air superiority, he claimed, and “victorious” Egyptian tanks were advancing into Israel. He called upon his Arab brethren to join the fight.
His announcement shocked his allies. Both the Syrians and Jordanians had tentative plans for an attack into Israel, but neither was fully prepared to implement them. The Syrians had Operation Nazzer (Victory) where a divisional force would sweep around the southern end of Lake Tiberias through the town of Deganya, while a brigade attacked toward Tel Dan at the northern end of the lake. The Jordanians had Operation Tariq, which called for cutting the Jerusalem corridor from the north and taking West Jerusalem. These plans were dusted off, but it was early afternoon before Jordanian guns opened fire.
The Soviets were equally stunned by the outbreak of full-scale warfare, especially since Nasser had not informed them beforehand. They were extremely pleased at the Egyptian progress, however, and responded to the news with the obligatory vilification of Israeli and American aggression against peaceful Arabs and praising Arab military prowess in repulsing the “infamous” attack. Hours later they received their second shock when their military advisors got through to explain the real situation.
As other Arab military leaders were meeting to plan their attacks, the Egyptian position in the Sinai went from bad to worse. The 12th Infantry Brigade, defending the fortifications at Um Katef, was celebrating the announced victory as their officers were trying to make sense out of garbled and frantic radio signals from their outposts, when the first remnants of the Egyptian attack rolled into their position. The position was ostensibly a strong one, with three lines of infantry trenches and positions for artillery and armor support. But the demoralizing sight of their fleeing tankers became panic when Israeli armor blasted its way in right behind the Egyptian tanks. Isolated strongpoints fought bravely, but shock and surprise overwhelmed the Arabs. Resistance disintegrated. The Israelis paused briefly to refuel, then surged forward toward Abu Aghiela. By Tuesday morning, that fortification was in Israeli hands and the 2nd Infantry Division had virtually ceased to exist. Sharon’s division refueled, then continued west while Yoffe pivoted north toward Bir Lahfan and El Arish.
Cold War Hot: Alternate Decisions of the Cold War Page 13
