Jervis's fleet numbered fifteen sail-of-the-line, (3) six of them, including his flagship, the Victory, being three-deckers of 90-100 guns, and eight being 74s, the Captain among them, plus four frigates. Cordova had nearly double this strength; twenty-seven sail-of-the-line and ten frigates, with many of his three-deckers armed with 112 guns, and his flagship, the enormous four-decker Santisima Trinidad, mounting as many as 136.
Despite the greater strength of the Spanish fleet, Jervis did not hesitate to engage. At 8.15 am he ordered his fleet to form in single line ahead in close order (which placed the Captain three from the rear) on a south-westerly course towards the enemy, and to prepare for battle. 'Confident in the skill, valour and discipline of the officers and men I had the happiness to command, and judging that the honour of His Majesty's arms, and the circumstances of the war in these seas required a considerable degree of enterprise', he accepted the calculated risk of pitting his ships against an enemy that had done little to support Hood at Toulon, and had given no better evidence of their fighting qualities since then.
Cordova's ships were, in truth, undermanned - in complements of up to 950 some had only 80 seamen, the rest being soldiers and fresh landsmen - and their officers so 'inexperienced that the appearance of the British took them completely by surprise'. Instead of sailing in good order, closed up, they were straggling in two groups, with six ships as much as seven miles ahead of the remainder, which were in a confused mass. And this gave Jervis his opening: he could minimize his own inferior numbers by dividing the enemy into two. At 9.30 am he ordered the Culloden, Blenheim, Prince George, Irresistible, Colossus and Orion, to put on all sail and head for the gap. Belatedly the leading Spanish division altered course to port in an attempt to fall back on their main body. Jervis responded at 11 am with the signal, 'Pass through the enemy line'.
This bold approach gained the success that it deserved. Deciding that it could not, after all, close the gap in time, the Spanish van, reinforced by three ships from the main body which managed to cross ahead of Jervis's approaching fleet, but weakened by one which made off alone to the south-east, turned to a northerly course to leeward of the British, leaving their main body, now reduced to eighteen sail-of-the-line - only three more than in Jervis's fleet - to windward. And at 11.30 am HMS Culloden, Captain Thomas Troubridge (whom, incidentally, Jervis believed to be more 'capable of commanding the fleet of England' than any of his other captains, Nelson not excluded), came within range of the leading Spanish ship and opened fire. When the Culloden's consorts joined the action, the Spaniards altered to the north, so that the two fleets were passing each other on opposite courses. To counter this, Jervis ordered his ships to tack in succession. The Culloden was followed by the Blenheim, Captain Thomas Frederick, and by Rear-Admiral William Parker's flagship, the Prince George, Captain John Irwin.
The Spanish van, beating up from leeward, attempted to cut through the British line at the turning point, first between the Orion, Captain Sir James Saumarez, and the Colossus, Captain George Murray; next between the Irresistible, Captain George Martin, and Jervis's flagship, the Victory; finally, on each side of the Egmont, Captain John Sutton. But the British ships maintained such close station, and raked the enemy with such withering broadsides, that the Spanish van was driven off, except for the Oriente which, under cover of the smoke of battle, succeeded in joining her main body to windward.
The fight which, so far, had been no more than a series of brief engagements between passing ships, reached its crisis at 1 pm. Because Jervis tacked his ships in succession instead of together, his fleet had passed to the southward of both Spanish divisions before more than half the British vessels were round on to their new course. And since the Spaniards seized this chance to attempt a junction, Jervis was faced with the prospect of having to pursue a superior fleet which, except for the unlikely event of it deciding to fight, might well escape him into Cadiz.
This gave Nelson his golden moment. Ignoring the accepted dogma which required captains to maintain their allotted stations in a rigid line of battle unless otherwise ordered by the admiral, he wore the Captain out to port from her position near the rear of the British fleet and, having reversed course more than 180 degrees, (4) headed for the van of the Spanish main body. The speed with which Jervis realized and reacted to Nelson's initiative will always stand to his credit. Most admirals would have been shocked to the core of their souls by such a flagrant disregard of the Fighting Instructions, and signalled a peremptory order to the Captain to resume her station in the line. Jervis, at 1.19 pm signalled his rear ship, the Excellent, Captain Cuthbert Collingwood, (who had had the good fortune to command the Barfleur at the Glorious First of June) to leave the line and join the Captain. And by 1.30 pm these two ships were in close action with the Santisima Trinidad, which had the vital effect of slowing the Spanish fleet, still sailing in an unwieldy mass instead of in proper line of battle, for time enough to allow the Culloden, leading Jervis's line, followed by the Blenheim and Prince George, to engage them.
(Historians reluctant to allow Nelson full credit for his striking initiative on this occasion, have argued that it was both authorized and prompted by a signal which Jervis made to his ships at 12.51 pm 'to take suitable station for mutual support, and engage the enemy as coming up in succession'. But any such argument depends on more than a loose interpretation of Jervis's order; it involves total misunderstanding. There was, in truth, no evidence that Jervis intended his ships to do other than engage the enemy, each in turn after altering course to the northward, as from the van, the Culloden leading, they might manage to overhaul the Spanish main body. Nor is there any evidence that Nelson's decision to take the Captain out of the line was motivated by anything except his own clear understanding that there was no other way by which the Spanish fleet could be prevented from making good their escape.)
As certain, and far more important than this parenthetical comment were the consequences and eventual results of Nelson's brilliant manoeuvre.
'At about 2 p.m. the Culloden had stretched so far ahead as to cover the Captain from the heavy fire poured upon her by the Spanish four-decker and her companions, as they hauled up and brought their broadsides to bear. The Captain took immediate advantage of this respite to replenish her lockers with shot, and repair her running rigging. Shortly afterwards the Blenheim, passing also to windward of the Captain, afforded her a second respite. The two more immediate opponents of the Captain and Culloden had been the San Ysidro and Salvador del Mundo; these, having already lost their topmasts, and being in a crippled state, the Blenheim, by a few of her heavy broad¬sides, sent staggering astern, to be cannonaded afresh by the Prince George, Orion and other advancing ships. At 2.35 pm the Excellent, arriving abreast of the disabled Salvador del Mundo, engaged the latter for a few minutes; then passing on to the San Ysidro. This ship Collingwood engaged closely until 2.53 pm, when, after a gallant defence, she hauled down the Spanish, and hoisted the English flag. Very soon after the Excellent had quitted the much disabled Salvador del Mundo, the Irresistible and Diadem commenced an attack upon her, the 74 stationing herself upon her weather bow, and the 64 upon her lee quarter. Observing the Victory about to pass under her stern, and that the Barfleur was following close, the Salvador del Mundo hauled down her flag as soon as some of the Victory's guns began to bear upon her. At about 3.15 pm the Excellent came to close action with the 80-gun ship San Nicolas, then with her foretopmast already gone in hot action with the Captain. Passing within ten feet of her starboard side, the Excellent poured in a destructive fire, and, in compliance with the signal then flying, to fill and stand on, made sail ahead.
In lulling up to avoid Collingwood's salute, the San Nicolas ran foul of the San José, whose mizen mast had been shot away, and which had received considerable other damage. As soon as the Excellent was sufficiently advanced to be clear of her, the Captain luffed up (i.e. altered course towards the wind) as close to the wind as her shattered condition would admit
, when her foretopmast, which had already been shot through, fell over the side. With the San José in an unmanageable state, with her wheel shot away, and all her sails, shrouds, and running rigging more or less cut, with the Blenheim ahead, and the Culloden crippled astern, the obvious course for Nelson was to board the Spanish two-decker.' (The Naval History of Great Britain, by William James, Vol. II [abridged].)
As a well-judged preparative, the Captain reopened, within less than twenty yards, her larboard broadside, whose heavy fire the San Nicolas returned with spirit for several minutes - when the Captain suddenly put her helm a-starboard, and, on coming to, hooked with her larboard cat-head the starboard quarter-gallery of the San Nicolas, and, with her spritsail yard, the latter's main rigging. Nelson immediately called for boarders. In his own words:
'The soldiers of the 69th regiment, with an alacrity which will ever do them credit, were amongst the foremost on this service. The first man who jumped into the enemy's mizen chains was Captain Berry, late my first lieutenant (Captain Miller was in the very act of going also, but I directed him to remain). A soldier having broke the upper quarter-gallery window, jumped in followed by myself and others as fast as possible. I found the cabin doors fastened, and some Spanish officers fired their pistols; but having broke open the doors the soldiers fired, and the Spanish Commodore fell. Having pushed on the quarterdeck, I found Captain Berry in possession of the poop, and the Spanish ensign hauling down. I passed with my people to the forecastle, where I met two or three Spanish officers, and they delivered me their swords. A fire of pistols or muskets opening from the admiral's stern gallery of the San José, I directed the soldiers to fire into her stern; and calling to Captain Miller to send more men into the San Nicolas, directed my people to board the first-rate, which was done in an instant, Captain Berry assisting me into the main chains. At this moment a Spanish officer looked over the quarterdeck rail and said they surrendered. From this most welcome intelligence it was not long before I was on quarterdeck, where the Spanish captain presented me his sword and said the Admiral was dying of his wounds below. I asked him if the ship was surrendered. He declared she was; and on the quarterdeck of a Spanish first-rate, extravagant as the story may seem, did I receive the swords of vanquished Spaniards, which I gave to one of my barge-men, who put them with the greatest sangfroid under his arm.'
Nelson's impression that the Captain's boarding parties compelled the San Nicolas and the San José to strike their colours is understandable. In truth, their surrender was as much due to the heavy fire poured into them by the other British ships. But this does not decry the gallantry with which, crying, 'Westminster Abbey, or glorious victory', Nelson led this fierce hand-to-hand fight, first aboard one Spanish ship-of-the-line, then aboard another, by a method which he subsequently described as 'Nelson's patent bridge for boarding first-rates'. 'Nothing in the world,' wrote Sir Gilbert Elliot, the late Viceroy of Corsica who witnessed the battle from the frigate Lively, 'was ever more noble than the transaction of the Captain from beginning to end, and the glorious group of your ship and her two prizes . . . was never surpassed and I dare say never will.' When the Victory passed the interlocked group, Jervis led her company in giving three cheers for Commodore Nelson.
This hotly contested battle, which lasted rather more than two hours, delayed the junction of the two Spanish divisions, but could not prevent it entirely. By 3.52 pm the Spanish van was near enough for Jervis to decide to break off the action rather than continue it against a much superior force. At 4.15 pm he ordered his frigates to take his four prizes in tow: at 4.39 pm he signalled his battleships to reform in single line ahead in the Victory's wake. The last shots were fired shortly before 5 pm, when Nelson transferred his broad pendant to the nearest uninjured ship, HMS Irresistible.
Throughout the night the two fleets lay-to, repairing damage. Next morning they were in sight of each other, but the action was not renewed. The Spaniards had the wind and, after bearing down on the British fleet at 2.30 pm and hauling their wind as soon as Jervis hauled his, they disappeared, to take refuge in Cadiz, after nearly losing the damaged Santisima Trinidad to the 32-gun Terpsichore, Captain Richard Bowen, off Cape Spartel on 1 March.
This battle off Cape St Vincent was an undoubted British victory, even though Jervis was dissatisfied to the extent that he thought that his fleet should have secured two more prizes, 'the Santisima Trinidad and Soberano. . . . They only wanted some good fellow to get alongside them, and they were ours.' He lost no ships: only one, Nelson's Captain, lost a mast; and only the Colossus, Culloden, Egmont and Blenheim were otherwise significantly damaged. Their casualties were relatively light, too; 73 killed and some 400 wounded, the latter including Nelson who suffered 'a contusion of no consequence' from a splinter which, though superficial, caused him considerable pain for a week afterwards. The Spaniards, on the other hand, surrendered four ships, all of which lost masts, and suffered serious damage to ten more. And their casualties were high, numbering more than 400 killed and wounded in the Santisima Trinidad and the San José alone. But to ask why Jervis did not continue the action until dark on the 14th, or do more to renew it on the 15th, is being wise after the event. He was justified in engaging an enemy fleet numbering nearly twice as many ships more heavily gunned than his own, when they were divided; but to have fought the whole of it, even after four had struck, would have been more than a calculated risk. He might put his trust in the fighting skill and courage of his officers and men; but he could not know of the hopeless confusion which prevailed among the crews of Cordova's ships. So whilst hindsight may argue that Jervis could have scored a more decisive victory, no fair-minded student of naval warfare can suggest that he should have done so.
Nor did his countrymen think this of him. Whilst the Spanish 'Commander-in-Chief [was] sent to Madrid as a prisoner under an escort of horse, and the officers cannot come on shore for fear of the populace', Jervis was created Earl St Vincent and two of his admirals were made baronets. Nelson's part - his quickness in seeing opportunity and in seizing it, and his audacity in controlling it, which so brilliantly crowned the day - was specially recognized. When he went onboard the Victory at dark on 14 February, 'the Admiral received me on the quarterdeck and, having embraced me, said he could not sufficiently thank me, and used every expression to make me happy'. Nor was this all. When Jervis's first captain, Robert Calder, pointed out that Nelson's decision to wear out of the line was a breach of the Fighting Instructions, the Navy's strictest disciplinarian commented: 'It certainly was so, and if ever you commit such a breach . . . I will forgive you also.' To the First Lord, Jervis wrote: 'Commodore Nelson, who was in the rear on the starboard tack, took the lead on the larboard, and contributed very much to the fortune of the day.' This and kindred tributes, including Elliot's enthusiastic eye-witness account when he reached England with news of the victory, gained the tangible reward for which Nelson had thirsted for so long.
'Chains and medals,' he told his brother, 'are what no fortune or connection in England can obtain; and I shall feel prouder of those than all the titles in the King's power to obtain.' Likewise, 'I do not want a baronetcy . . .', the usual honour for a junior flag-officer in an important action, because he lacked the means to support a hereditary title. 'If these services have been of any value, let them be noticed . . . by appointment to the Bath.'
And so they were. Commodore Sir Horatio Nelson, K.B., (5) also received the Freedom of the City of London. But he was not promoted for his meritorious conduct - for a very good reason. On 1 April he received the delayed news that he had reached full flag rank in the ordinary course of seniority on 2 February. He was a rear-admiral of the blue before the battle of St Vincent was fought. But though he had achieved this at the age of thirty-nine, he was not exceptionally young for the times in which he lived. Christopher Parker (1762-1804) gained flag rank as early as thirty-three, and both Bartholomew Rowley (1763-1811) and Lord Hugh Seymour (1759-1801) at thirty-six. On the other hand some post
-captains were promoted when they were very much older: Thomas Hicks (1731-1801) at sixty-two, Edmund Dod (1734-1815) at sixty-three.
Two letters that Nelson received are worth quotation. Among many others Lady Parker, wife of his old Admiral, wrote in these encouraging terms: 'Your conduct on the memorable 14 February, a proud day for old England, is above all praise. . . . Long may you live, my dear Nelson, an ornament to your country and your profession.' But Lady Nelson could only write: 'Thank God, you are well. . . . My anxiety was far beyond my powers of expression. . . . Altogether, my dearest husband, my sufferings were great. . . . You have been most wonderfully protected; you have done desperate actions enough. Now may I . . . beg that you never board again.' And in her next: 'I sincerely hope . . . that all these wonderful and desperate actions - such as boarding ships - you will leave to others. With the protection of a Supreme Being, you have achieved a character and name which . . . cannot be greater; therefore rest satisfied.'
How little she understood her man. For what had this battle proved? That Nelson should have shown such physical courage was no new facet of his character; nor is it a sine qua non for a naval commander. The significance lies in his decision to turn the Captain out of the line, so as to prevent the Spaniards escaping. He had previously shown, notably in the Boreas, that he had the moral courage to disobey orders when he thought that the results would justify it - and as was in this instance abundantly proved. More important, he had now shown that he was not only a man of ambition, and a leader of a high order, but a commander with an exceptional understanding of the essence of the tactics of a naval action, as opposed to the time-hallowed instructions by which the Admiralty ordained that one should be fought, and in contrast to those of a single ship engagement of which he had previously proved himself a master.
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