Nelson the Commander

by Bennett, Geoffrey

  But Vansittart also reported that the defences of Kronborg and Copenhagen were much stronger than the Admiralty supposed. To Nelson's dismay, Parker decided against forcing a way into the Baltic: he would 'stay in the Kattegat and there await the time when the whole naval force [i.e. the combined Danish, Russian and Swedish Fleets - the Prussian Fleet was of no consequence] might choose to come out and fight'. This being 'a measure, in my opinion, disgraceful to our Country' - 'I wanted to get at an enemy, as soon as possible to strike a home stroke': 'Go by the Sound, or by the [Great] Belt, or anyhow; only lose not an hour' - Nelson distilled all his strategic wisdom into a forceful letter to Parker of which this is the essence:

  'Not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy: they will every hour be stronger: we never shall be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only consideration is how to get at them with the least risk to our ships. The Danes have taken every means to prevent our getting to Copenhagen by the Sound. Kronborg has been strengthened and very formidable batteries placed under the Citadel, supported by sail-of-the-line, floating batteries, etc., etc. The Government took for granted you would find no difficulty in getting off Copenhagen, and if negotiations failed, you might instantly attack; and that there would be scarcely a doubt that the Danish Fleet would be destroyed, and the capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason. But, by Mr Vansittart's account, their state of preparation exceeds this, and the Danish Government is hostile. Therefore, on your decision depends whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever.

  I begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the Sound, as if you leave that passage open, the Danish Fleet may sail and join the Dutch or French. I have no fears that, whilst their capital is menaced, 9,000 of her best men would be sent away. You are now above Kronborg: if you attack you must expect ships crippled, and one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will not bring out a cripple. This I call taking the bull by the horns. It will not, however, prevent the Reval ships, or the Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this is absolutely necessary - and still to attack Copenhagen.

  One way is to pass Kronborg and down the deepest channel past the Middle Ground, and then up the King's Channel, to attack their floating batteries, etc. This must prevent a junction between the Russians, Swedes and Danes, and may allow us to bombard Copenhagen.

  Should this be impracticable, the passage of the Belt could be accomplished in four or five days, and then the attack carried out and the junction of the Russians prevented.

  Supposing us through the Belt, would it not be possible either to go with the fleet, or to detach ten ships to Reval [in the Gulf of Finland], to destroy the Russian squadron? I see no great risk in such a detachment, leaving the remainder to the business at Copenhagen.

  The boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force.'

  This advice tipped the scales. On the 26th Parker ordered his fleet to weigh: that evening he anchored his ships only six miles from Kronborg. Head winds and calms held them there until the 30th, when at 6 am Parker again headed for the Sound. One hour later the Danish batteries to the west of the narrow strait opened fire on the leading British ships; but, contrary to expectations, those on the other shore remained silent. This allowed Parker's fleet to keep within half-a-mile of the Swedish coast and so beyond range of the Danish guns. Before noon all his ships were safely anchored off the island of Hveen, fifteen miles to the north of Copenhagen. So much for the first obstacle which, but for Nelson, Parker would have refused.

  The next one was, however, of a different order. When Parker, Nelson and Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves sailed south in a lugger to reconnoitre the defences of the Danish capital, they found that these were, indeed, formidable. (3) Guarding the entrance to Copenhagen harbour was the Trekroner fort (Not two forts as is often stated. The adjacent Lynetten fort had no guns) built on piles and mounting sixty-six 36-pounders; and on the shore to the south of the walled city was the Strickers battery (4). But the Danes had rightly appreciated that these were wholly insufficient: their Commander-in-Chief, Commodore Johan Fischer, had moored most of his ships, without their masts, in the channel immediately to seaward of the city, and added a number of floating batteries, which were large rafts carrying guns but without protection for their crews. The remainder of the Danish fleet, the Elephanten, 70, the Mars, 64, the Danmark, 74, the Trekroner, 74, the frigate Iris, 40, and two brigs, were likewise berthed in the harbour entrance.

  Parker opposed an attack on these defences, partly because of their strength and because the Danes had removed the buoys marking the channels leading to Copenhagen harbour. Nelson held a very different view: 'The Danish line . . . looks formidable to those who are children at war, but to my judgement, with ten sail-of-the-line I think I can annihilate them.' And so strongly did he urge this that his weak-willed Commander-in-Chief reached the singular, if not unique, decision that, whilst he was unwilling to do so, his second-in-command should attack the enemy with the force listed in the table below; also seven bombs, six gun-brigs and two fireships.

  NELSON'S SQUADRON AT THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN

  Elephant, 74, Capt. T. Foley Flagship of Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson

  Defiance, 74, Capt. R. Retalick Flagship of Rear-Admiral T. Graves

  Edgar, 74, Capt. G. Murray

  Monarch, 74, Capt. J. R. Mosse

  Bellona, 74, Capt. Sir T. B. Thompson

  Ganges, 74, Capt. T. F. Fremantle

  Russell, 74, Capt. W. Cuming

  Agamemnon, 64, Capt. R. D. Fancourt

  Ardent, 64, Capt. T. Bertie

  Polyphemus, 64, Capt. J. Lawford

  Glatton, 54, Capt. W. Bligh (Best known for his involvement in the mutiny in the Bounty in 1789.)

  Isis, 50, Capt. J. Walker

  Amazon, 38, Capt. E. Riou

  Desiree, 40, Capt. H. Inman

  Blanche, 36, Capt. G. E. Hamond

  Alcmene, 32, Capt. S. Sutton

  Jamaica, 26, Capt. J. Rose

  Arrow, 30, Capt. W. Bolton

  Dart, 30, Capt. J. F. Devonshire

  Cruiser, 18, Cmdr. J. Brisbane

  Harpy, 18, Cmdr. W. Birchall

  Nelson transferred his flag to the Elephant because the more heavily armed St George drew too much water for his purpose. He took Hardy with him, to advise and help, not to replace Thomas Foley in command, whereby Hardy gained the distinction of being the only captain to be present at the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar. (5) Parker retained under his own direct command four 74s and two 64s in addition to his flagship and the St George.

  On 31 March a council of war agreed the details of the plan which Nelson had outlined in the third paragraph of his letter. Fischer had two advantages denied to Brueys; being in waters which he knew well, he had berthed his vessels very close to shoal water; and having no intention of getting under way, he had moored them by bow and stern so that the distance between them was much smaller than the swinging room required by ships anchored only by the bow. Nelson could not therefore repeat the concentration on one part of the enemy line which had proved so successful at the Nile: his ships would not be able to pass inside it, nor through it. Nor could he take the enemy by surprise: Parker had already lost him this benefit. Nor could he attempt an assault with fireships: he would have needed a dozen, instead of only two, for this to be effective. But, by sailing down the Outer Deep, round the Middle Ground and then up the King's Channel, he could begin his attack against the weaker, southern end of the enemy line - without coming within range of the Stricker's battery, and without first having to run the gauntlet of the Trekroner fort. To dissuade Fischer from attempting to reinforce his southern flank, Parker's eight ships would threaten an attack from the north.

  Next morning, the wind being from the north, the Commander-in-Chief moved his whole fleet to a new anchorage only six miles from Copenhagen. From there his second-in-command
made a swift reconnaissance in the frigate Amazon, chiefly to ensure that his instructions for buoying the Outer Deep had been properly executed. At 2.30 pm, soon after his return, he ordered his squadron to weigh. Piloted by the Amazon, his ships passed safely to a new anchorage close to the southern end of the Middle Ground at 8 pm.

  Nelson spent much of that night preparing detailed instructions for his captains: most of them had been under his command for too short a time to be a band of brothers whom he could trust to act in accordance with a general plan. Edward Riou, in the Amazon, was ordered to lead four other frigates against the northern end of the enemy line. James Rose, in the frigate Jamaica, was to operate six gun-brigs against its southern flank. So, too, but independently, was Henry Inman's frigate Desirée. Nelson's ten ships-of-the-line, plus the Glatton and the Isis, were to sail down the enemy line, the leader anchoring by the stern abreast an allotted enemy vessel, the second passing on the disengaged side to anchor abreast another, the third then passing to starboard of the first two British ships and anchoring off a third Danish vessel, and so on until each British ship was in action with one of the enemy. As soon as any British vessel subdued her target, she was to weigh, pass to starboard of those ahead of her, and engage another of the enemy near the head of the Danish line. The seven bombs were to anchor to the east of the British line and throw their shells over it. The 49th Regiment, augmented by 500 sailors under Thomas Fremantle of the Ganges, was to be ready to seize the Trekroner fort as soon as its guns could be silenced.

  As happens so often in war, these plans quickly went awry. Dawn on 2 April brought a fair south-easterly wind: Nelson could ask for no better. But the local pilots whom he had managed to engage decided against risking their lives in battle, so that the masters of the British ships had to feel their way into the King's Channel. George Murray's Edgar, which was in the lead, successfully rounded the Middle Ground after Nelson gave the order to weigh at 9.30 am. But the next to follow, his old flagship, Robert Fancourt's Agamemnon, was unable to weather this shoal, and had to anchor again. Without her support, Murray was so heavily engaged by Captain Lassen's Provestenen at 10.5 that he was driven to berth the Edgar as much as 500 yards from Captain Branth's Jylland instead of Nelson's intended 250, which impelled the other British ships to engage their targets at this greater, and less immediately effective range - beyond instead of within point-blank range - as well as leaving less room for their consorts to pass on their disengaged sides.

  Nelson rectified the Agamemnon's failure by ordering John Lawford to berth the Polyphemus abreast the Provestenen, instead of heading for the Elephanten in the harbour entrance. As successfully, James Walker dropped the Isis's stern anchor abreast Captain Risbrich's Wagrien. But the Bellona, attempting to pass to starboard of these three British ships, went too close to the Middle Ground and stuck fast. So did the Russell following in her wake. Since Fancourt was no more able to warp the Agamemnon sufficiently far to windward to round the Middle Ground than Thomas Thompson and William Cuming were able to tow their ships off this shoal until after the battle, Nelson was, from the outset, deprived of three of his ten ships-of-the-line. Though much disturbed by this, he ordered Foley to keep to port of the stranded ships and anchor the Elephant in the Bellona's berth, so that Captain Braun's Dannebrog, Fischer's flagship, would not be unopposed. And he then had the satisfaction of seeing Thomas Bertie and William Bligh take the Ardent and the Glatton to their berths between the Elephant and the Edgar, whilst the Monarch, Captain James Mosse, and Fremantle's Ganges reached theirs ahead of the Elephant, where they were so quickly in action that Morse was killed shortly after giving the order to anchor abreast Captain Koefoed's Charlotte Amalia. The last to reach a berth, abreast Captain Arenfeldt's Holsteen, was Graves' flagship, Captain Retalick's Defiance which, having been ordered to bring up the rear of the British line, was now at the head of it.

  The bombs gained their station at 11.45, to open fire with their mortars, first on the enemy ships and subsequently on the town and dockyard. A strong current prevented Rose bringing his gun-brigs within range of the Provestenen, but this failure was amply compensated by Inman's handling of the Desirée which helped the Polyphemus by raking this Danish three-decker again and again. The Provestenen was, however, an exception: most of the ships in Nelson's shortened line had to deal with two targets even though many were of smaller size. Even so, the British brought some 420 guns into action against the enemy's 380, if one includes those in the Trekroner fort, but omits the Elephanten and the other ships berthed in the harbour mouth which, like Parker's squadron, were not to be involved in the battle. The Danes had, however, an important advantage denied to Nelson's ships: as soon as their guns crews were decimated by British fire, fresh men were brought off by boat from the shore. By 1 pm, when the fierce cannonade between the two lines of static vessels had lasted for more than ninety minutes, very few of the Danish weapons had been silenced.

  Nelson was not the man to be discouraged by this: 'It is warm work,' he told Stewart as the soldier paced the deck beside him, 'and this day may be the last to us at any moment; but, mark you, I would not be elsewhere for thousands.' Parker's mood was very different. His squadron could make little progress against a head wind. At noon the London was still five miles from the head of the Danish line - but close enough to see the Bellona and Russell flying signals of distress, and the Agamemnon, unable to get within range of the enemy. To Parker this spelt potential disaster. Turning to his flag captain, he said: 'I will make the signal of recall for Nelson's sake. If he is in a condition to continue the action successfully, he will disregard it: if he is not, it will be an excuse for his retreat, and no blame can be imputed to him.' But the fleet was still limited to Howe's signal book: Popham's vocabulary code was four years away. As William Domett pointed out, Parker could only hoist the flags meaning, 'Discontinue the action', which was a positive order, allowing Nelson no latitude. Parker, therefore, sent his captain of the fleet, Robert Otway, to the Elephant, with a verbal message. But long before Otway's boat could reach Nelson's flagship, Parker's growing anxiety for the outcome of a battle for whose failure he would surely be held responsible, overruled Domett's advice. Shortly after 1 pm, when the London was still three miles or more from the Elephant, the latter's 'signal lieutenant called out that . . . the signal for discontinuing the action was . . . [hoisted] by the Commander-in-Chief. He [Nelson] . . . appeared to take no notice. . . . The signal officer . . . asked if he should repeat it. ''No,'' he replied, ''acknowledge it.'' (6) Presently he called . . . to know if [his own] signal for close action was still hoisted . . . [adding] . . . ''Mind you keep it so.'' He now paced the deck, moving the stump of his lost arm in a manner which always indicated great emotion. ''Do you know,'' said he . . . ''what is shown on board the Commander-in-Chief. . . . Why, to leave off action?'' Then, shrugging up his shoulders . . . ''Leave off action? Now damn me if I do! You know, Foley . . . I have only one eye - I have a right to be blind sometimes'', and then, putting the glass to his blind eye . . . he exclaimed, ''I really do not see the signal. . . . Keep mine for closer battle flying. '' ' (Southey in his Life of Nelson)

  Parker's positive interference could have been as disastrous as the Admiralty's 'scatter' signal to Convoy PQ17 in the Second World War. To obey it, many of Nelson's ships would have had to run the gauntlet of the whole Danish fleet: to quote Graves, 'if we had discontinued the action before the enemy struck, we should all have gone aground and been destroyed'. As it was, Nelson lost the support of the Amazon and her accompanying frigates. These had been so badly mauled by the Trekroner fort that a reluctant Riou - 'What must Nelson think of us?' - whose bravery had been well established by his success in saving HMS Guardian after she had struck 'an island of ice' to the south-east of the Cape of Good Hope in 1789, thought it best to obey Parker's order. Unhappily, he had no sooner headed his ship away from the fort than he was killed by a ball from one of its guns. And had Nelson's Rear-Admiral been a lesser man than Graves
, he would have lost the support of his division: the Defiance went so far as to repeat Parker's signal, but Graves ordered this to be done in a position inferior to Nelson's for close action, indicating that the latter was the one to be obeyed.

  In the event, Nelson was no more called upon to justify his 'disobedience' on this occasion than he was after Cape St Vincent. His moral courage in rejecting Parker's order, on the clear grounds that he was in the best position to judge the progress of the battle, was rewarded soon after he put his blind eye to a use which will for all time stand as an epic example to others - and not only those whose profession is war. The British ships proved the superiority of their gunnery, especially their faster rate of fire: the stout-hearted resistance of the Danes began to weaken. Engaged by both the Elephant and Glatton, the Dannebrog caught fire, compelling Fischer to shift his broad pendant to the Holsteen. With as many as 270 killed and wounded, those who remained of Braun's crew were unable to control the flames: driven out of the line, she grounded near the Trekroner fort and later blew up. About 2 pm the transport Rendsborg broke from her moorings and was driven ashore, and the sloop Elven was so seriously damaged that she slipped her moorings and escaped into Copenhagen harbour. These casualties were quickly followed by the transports Nyborg and Aggershus, both of which sank, whilst the frigate Hjaelperen, was forced to slip her moorings and, like the Elven, seek safety in the harbour. Captain Harboe was likewise forced to cut the Sjaelland's cables, while de Thurah's Infodsretten and Arenfeldt's Holsteen were reduced to wrecks, so that Fischer had to shift his broad pendant again, this time to the Trekroner fort.