Nelson the Commander

by Bennett, Geoffrey

  By 2.30 pm the battle was virtually over. The floating defences of Copenhagen had been so battered that they could no longer offer effective resistance. 'The French fought bravely,' Nelson wrote later, 'but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four.' By the time they struck their colours they had lost 1,700 officers and men killed and wounded, including Thurah of the Infodsretten, and Hauch of the Kronborg. For contrast the British casualties numbered 941, the worst sufferers being the considerably damaged Monarch and Isis.

  The action was not, however, quite finished. When the British ships sent their boats away to take possession of their prizes, they were fired on, chiefly from the shore, but to some extent from the battered enemy ships. Satisfied that he had completed the task which he had set himself, and averse to continuing a battle which could hazard Britain's ultimate purpose, the defeat of the Russian Fleet, an angry Nelson dispatched this note, under a flag of truce, to the Crown Prince of Denmark (later King Frederick VI) who was in overall command of Copenhagen's defences:

  'Lord Nelson has instructions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting, but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have defended them.'

  It was addressed: 'To the Brothers of Englishmen, the Danes'.

  Nelson has been unjustly criticized for this hastily written note. First, because he used the interlude following its despatch to make preparations for renewing the action, in particular for an assault on the Trekroner fort which the absence of the Agamemnon, Bellona and Russell, and Riou's compliance with Parker's recall, had prevented him taking earlier. Fremantle was right in saying that the note 'produced a cessation to the very severe battle, which was certainly as convenient for us as the enemy', but to say more than this is to confuse a flag of truce, which confers immunity only on its bearer and his escort, with an agreed general truce, or armistice, which Nelson could not be sure would be the outcome.

  Those who criticize the wording of the note are, perhaps, on surer ground. On the evidence of Naples, Nelson's threat was no idle one, but the Crown Prince was so reluctant to believe that any British admiral would depart from the then accepted rules and courtesies of war, by renewing an attack on an enemy who had struck his colours, that he sent General Lindholm to ask for an explanation. And by the time Lindholm arrived onboard the Elephant, Hardy and Foley had cooled Nelson's temper: he was persuaded to give this reply:

  'Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a flag of truce is humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease till he can take his prisoners out of the prizes, and consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove his prizes. Lord Nelson, with humble duty to His Royal Highness, begs leave to say that he will ever esteem it the greatest victory he ever gained, if this flag of truce may be the happy forerunner of a lasting and happy union between my most gracious Sovereign and His Majesty the King of Denmark.'

  This was, however, a matter for negotiation with his Commander-in-Chief. Nelson's more moderate tone sufficed to persuade the Crown Prince to accept the reality of his position, and to order a general cease fire. To quote one contemporary Danish authority: 'We cannot deny it, we are quite beaten. Our line of defence is destroyed. . . . The worst is the Trekroner battery can no longer be held.'

  The cease fire did more than enable Nelson to take some 3,500 prisoners, to land the wounded, and to secure his prizes which, with the exception of Arenfeldt's 60-gunned Holsteen, proved to be beyond repair and had to be burnt. To quote Fremantle, Nelson 'was aware that our ships were cut to pieces, and it would be difficult . . . to get them out [of the King's Deep]. . . . [They] were so crippled, they would not steer. . . . We counted no less than six sail-of-the-line [including Nelson's and Graves's flagships], and the Desirée fast on shore. Luckily we had to contend with an enemy much beaten . . . otherwise all these ships must have been lost.'

  Hence Mahan's judgement: 'The battle was the severest and most doubtful he [Nelson] ever fought.' (Mahan’s Life of Nelson) None the less, for the second time in less than three years he had all but annihilated his enemy. As important, he had won a battle which, but for his insistence, would never have been fought, and which, but for his refusal to obey Parker's recall, might well have ended in disaster.

  St Vincent (recently elevated from a viscountcy to an earldom) paid this just tribute:

  'It is not given to us to command success: your Lordship and the gallant officers and men under your orders most certainly deserved it, and I cannot sufficiently express my admiration of the zeal and persevering courage with which this gallant enterprise was followed up, lamenting most sincerely the loss sustained in it. . . . The highest praise is due to your Lordship, and all under your command, who were actors in this glorious attempt.'

  How richly, then, did Nelson earn the viscountcy which was his tangible reward. But, unlike their generous reaction to the Nile, others at home, whose enmity was with the French, not the Danes, proved apathetic. Except for Graves, who was made a K.B., 'all under your command' received so little recognition that Nelson was moved to protest to the Lord Mayor that this was the first time that 'the smallest services rendered by either Navy, or Army had . . . [not been] noticed by the great City of London', to whom, after all, the reopening of trade with the Baltic was of prime importance.

  Having rehoisted his flag in the St George, Nelson pressed Parker to go on into the Baltic to deal with the Russians and the Swedes. But his cautious Commander-in-Chief was determined first to ensure that, having forced open the door, it should remain so. The twenty-four hour truce must be extended into an armistice. Negotiations to achieve this were, as Nelson told Lindholm, Parker's responsibility; instead, just as he had left the fighting in Nelson's hands, so now did the Commander-in-Chief require him to do the talking. The velvet glove technique was of no avail. The Crown Prince feared the vengeance of Tsar Paul too much to yield to arguments that a restoration of friendly relations between Britain and Denmark were in the best interests of both countries. Nelson had to demand a sixteen weeks armistice - the time needed to act against the Reval squadron - sword in hand, a threat to bombard Copenhagen. The issue hung in the balance for six days, from 3 April when Nelson first landed in the capital, until the 9th.

  For how much longer the Danish Crown Prince would have continued to resist; whether Parker would have authorized Nelson to bombard the capital; or whether Parker would have conceded Nelson's view that his fleet should go on to Reval without worrying so much about its means of exit from the Baltic - such questions were not destined to be answered. The scales were tipped by the news of a wholly unforeseen event that occurred on 24 March. A group of Russian officers, tired of Paul's wayward tyranny, had demanded his abdication and, when he refused, murdered him. With this removal of the keystone to the arch of the Armed Neutrality, the Crown Prince felt free to save his country from the consequence of a renewal of hostilities with Britain, whose eighteen ships-of-the-line still swung to their anchors within sight of his capital. He signed an armistice that was to last for fourteen weeks, after which hostilities would only be resumed 'upon giving fourteen days previous notice'. Throughout this time the Danish Navy's ships were to remain 'in their present . . . situation as to armament, equipment and hostile position, and the . . . Armed Neutrality shall, so far as it related to the cooperation of Denmark, be suspended'. And, in return for releasing all prisoners of war, Parker's ships were to be allowed to obtain supplies from any Danish port.

  These terms having been conveyed speedily to London, St Vincent was required to send this grudging answer: 'Upon a consideration of all the circumstances, His Majesty has thought fit to approve.' Nelson, having borne the brunt of talks which, but for his patient skill, must have broken down before the arrival of the timely news from St Petersburg, could not allow such thoughtless words to pass without protest: 'I am sorry that t
he armistice is only approved under all considerations. . . . [I am] of opinion that every part of all was to the advantage of our King and Country.' The First Lord's reply gave honour where it was due: 'Your Lordship's whole conduct, from your first appointment to this hour, is the subject of our constant admiration. It does not become me to make comparisons: all agree there is but one Nelson.'

  Having been obliged to send the Monarch, and the Isis home for repairs, Parker sailed on into the Baltic on 12 April with his fleet reduced to seventeen sail-of-the-line. And one of these, Nelson's St George, was so much delayed by the need to reduce her draught by removing some of her guns before she could cross the shallows between Amager and Saltholm, that she was more than twenty miles from Parker's force when, off Bornholm on the evening of the 15th, there came news of a Swedish squadron being at sea. Nelson immediately ordered a boat alongside: to quote an officer who went with him in it:

  'His anxiety . . . lest the fleet should [engage the enemy] before he got onboard one of them . . . is beyond all conception. . . . It was [an] extremely cold [night], and I wished him to put on a great coat. . . . ''No, I am not cold; my anxiety for my country will keep me warm''. . . . The idea of going in a small boat, rowing six oars, without . . . anything to eat or drink, the distance about fifty leagues [sic] must convince the world that every other earthly consideration than that of serving his country was totally banished from his thoughts.'

  Since dawn on the 15th revealed no Swedish sail in sight, (numbering only six sail-of-the-line, these had wisely returned to Karlskrona as soon as they learned the strength of Parker's fleet) this incident would be scarcely worth recording, but for its consequences. Nelson did not manage to reach and rehoist his flag in the Elephant until midnight. As he told Emma later,

  'I rowed five hours in a bitter cold night. A cold struck me to the heart. On the 27th I had one of my terrible spasms of heart-stroke. . . . From that time to the end of May I brought up what everyone thought was my lungs, and I was emaciated more than you can conceive.'

  But ill-health attributable to his own carelessness was not Nelson's only cross. He chaffed and fretted because Parker would not press on into the Gulf of Finland, as the Government had ordered him to do, notwithstanding Paul's assassination. The ice which kept the Reval squadron in port must soon melt: nothing was more important than preventing these twelve ships-of-the-line from uniting with the rest of the Russian Fleet. When the spring allowed this to leave its winter quarters at Kronstadt, Parker would be powerless against a fleet more than twice the strength of his own.

  But as with the Danes, the British Commander-in-Chief was chiefly concerned to ensure that his fleet would be able to withdraw safely from the Baltic. To him the small Swedish squadron in Karlskrona, was the greater danger. To neutralize it, he anchored his fleet off this port. And he was there when the 22nd brought news that the new Tsar, the liberal Alexander I, had ordered his ships to abstain from hostilities. With no concern for the larger issue, the need to obtain guarantees which would ensure an end to the Armed Neutrality, Parker promptly ordered his ships to weigh and return to Koje Bay, to the south of Copenhagen.

  In this interlude the First Lord had time to study Parker's and Nelson's reports, and to appreciate the former's incapacity for his command. To quote from the diary of George Rose, Secretary of the Treasury:

  '22 April. Breakfasted with Lord St Vincent. . . . His Lordship entered in the late glorious victory at Copenhagen, and told me the merit of the attack rested solely with Lord Nelson, as Sir Hyde Parker had been decidedly adverse to the attempt being made . . . and that in the middle of the action Sir Hyde Parker had made the signal for discontinuing the engagement. . . . Lord St Vincent then added, Tor these and other courses . . . we have recalled Sir Hyde and Lord Nelson is to remain with the command.'

  The First Lord's orders reached Koje Bay on 5 May. Parker sailed next day for England in the frigate Blanche, never to be employed again.

  Freed from superior restraint, Nelson immediately sailed eastwards. 'My object,' he wrote, 'was to get at Reval before the frost broke up at Kronstadt, that the twelve sail-of-the-line might be destroyed. I shall now go there as a friend, but the two [Russian] fleets shall not form a junction, if not already accomplished, unless my orders permit it.' On the 8th he detached Murray in the Edgar, with five other ships, to watch Karlskrona and ensure that the Swedish Admiral accepted his advice, that he would be wiser to remain in harbour than to risk a fight with a British squadron. Six days more and Nelson anchored the greater part of his fleet, eleven sail-of-the-line, off Reval. But he was too late - not of his own fault, but Parker's. Just as he feared would happen, the ice had cleared on 29 April; the Reval squadron had sailed up the Gulf of Finland to Kronstadt on 3 May.

  The junction of the two Russian forces was, however, no longer significant. The new Tsar, having no wish to be a puppet manipulated to meet Bonaparte's ends, had already opened negotiations to end the Armed Neutrality. But, with characteristic Russian intransigence, Alexander and his Ministers would not have it supposed that they were submitting to a British fleet, even though its Admiral professed the friendliest intentions. Nelson had, after all, destroyed the fleet of their Danish ally. On 16 April Count Pahlen told him:

  'The Tsar . . . does not consider [your arrival at Reval] compatible with the lively desire manifested by His Britannic Majesty to re-establish the good intelligence so long existing between the two Monarchies. The only guarantee of the loyalty of your intentions that His Majesty [the Tsar] can accept is the prompt withdrawal of the fleet under your command, and no negotiation . . . can take place so long as a naval force is in sight of his ports.'

  Nelson's self-control on receiving this threatening letter as the culmination of his efforts to deal with the Reval squadron stands to his credit. According to Stewart:

  'He appeared to be a good deal agitated by it but said little, and did not return an immediate reply. During dinner, however, he left the table, and in less than a quarter of an hour sent for his secretary to peruse a letter which . . . he had composed.'

  After pointing out that he had carefully refrained from bringing his whole fleet to Reval, Nelson wrote to Pahlen:

  'My conduct . . . is so entirely different from what Your Excellency has expressed . . . that I have only to regret that my desire to pay a marked attention to His Imperial Majesty has been so entirely misunderstood. That being the case, I shall sail immediately into the Baltic.'

  In short, Nelson realized that it was better to swallow his own pride than risk turning an otherwise amenable Alexander against Britain; that unlike Copenhagen, this was not one of those occasions when a British battle fleet could ensure a favourable outcome to negotiations with a foreign power. To continue Stewart's words:

  'The signal for preparing to weigh was immediately made; the answer above-mentioned was sent onshore; and his Lordship caused the fleet . . . to stand as far to sea as was safe for that evening. '

  By the time Nelson returned to Koje Bay on 6 June he knew just how wise he had been to show such restraint: Russia and Sweden had dissolved the Armed Neutrality on 19 May.

  Pitt's decision to order a British fleet back into the Mediterranean in May 1798, had quickly borne fruit: in less than three months Nelson destroyed France's maritime power in that sea and wrecked Bonaparte's plan to conquer India. The British Government's decision to send a fleet into the Baltic in March 1801, when coupled with Tsar Paul's assassination, garnered as rich a harvest: in as short a time Bonaparte's attempt to undermine Britain's only effective weapon against France's military power was set at nought. And, as in 1798, this triumph was Nelson's.

  As a leader he had not only inspired his subordinates - 'What must Nelson think of us?'; he had dominated a superior whom he, fairly enough, criticized for 'his idleness . . . [there was] no criminality', without transgressing the tenets of naval discipline as he had done with Keith. He not only repeated his tactical skill, but proved that he could decisively defeat more
determined fighters than the French. To quote Graves: 'Considering the disadvantages of navigation, the approach to the enemy, their vast numbers of guns and mortars on both land and sea, I do not think there ever was a bolder attack. . . . It was worthy of our gallant and enterprising little Hero of the Nile.' And unlike Naples, he displayed exceptional skill at the difficult art of diplomacy. In Addington's words: 'Lord Nelson has shown himself as wise as he is brave, and proved that there may be united in the same person the talents of the warrior and the statesman.' Above all, perhaps, his reiterated pleas to lose no time in reaching Reval, proved not only that he was a master of maritime strategy, but that he understood the significance of that vital principle of war, the maintenance of the aim.

  Against these 'credits' must, however, be set the volatile temperament of his creative genius. The excitement of Copenhagen was followed by frustration at Parker's dilatory progress towards Reval. The exhilarating prospect of further action against the enemy was aborted by the likelihood that Paul's death would end Russia's hostility to Britain. It needed only the depression of ill-health after his night in the cold of an open boat, for Nelson's domestic worries to transcend all other thoughts. Parker's recall, and his own appointment as a commander-in-chief at the age of forty-two, gave him no satisfaction; it stopped him returning to England to take the sick leave which Parker had already approved.

  Since Emma and Horatia were the magnets, not ambition and duty, Nelson applied to be relieved. It would have been very different, he told Troubridge, 'had the command been given me in February'; now 'any other man can as well look about him as Nelson'. 'The keen air of the North kills me.' 'I did not come to the Baltic with the design of dying a natural death.' To Emma he wrote: 'I am fixed to live a country life, and to have many (I hope) years of comfort, which, God knows, I never yet had - only moments of happiness. . . . I wish for happiness to be my reward, and not titles or money.' He wanted, too, to see his brother Maurice who was seriously ill and about to die.