by Steve Coll
PRAISE FOR GHOST WARS
“Ghost Wars, Steve Coll’s objective—and terrific—account of the long and tragic history leading up to September 11, is … certainly the finest historical narrative so far on the origins of al Qaeda… . Coll’s riveting narrative makes the reader want to rip the page and yell at the American counterterrorism officials he describes—including Clarke—and tell them to watch out.”
—James Risen, The New York Times Book Review
“A long overdue look at the peaks and valleys of the CIA’s presence in Afghanistan through the decades leading to September 10, 2001 … a wellwritten, authoritative, high-altitude drama with few heroes, many villains, bags of cash, and a tragic ending—one that may not have been inevitable.”
—James Bamford, The Washington Post
“Terrifying and substantive … Coll offers a surprisingly cohesive narrative of the makings of September 11, 2001.”
—Suzy Hans, Salon
“Mr. Coll’s book is well documented … Indeed, of the more than one hundred published books dealing with the September 11th attacks … none approach Mr. Coll’s work for clarity and insight into the agency itself… . truly a page turner … an important work.”
—Andrew Wolf, The New York Sun
“Gripping new history of the events leading up to September 11, 2001 … Coll never simplifies a complex situation.”
—John Hartl, The Seattle Times
“Coll’s research is extensive; his access to senior officials of all the principal countries involved in Afghanistan is nothing short of astounding… . With this book, Coll establishes a reputation as large as that of his Post colleague, Bob Woodward.”
—Wesley K. Wark, The Globe and Mail (Toronto)
“Goes a long way toward explaining the systemic errors that caused the United States, through five administrations, to fail its most important foreign policy challenge since World War II… . A powerful book, impeccably reported, containing hundreds of interviews with the principals in the U.S. intelligence and national security establishments.”
—John Dinges, Newsday
“Steve Coll has distilled the essence of what led to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks … highly readable … Beyond that, he did it while holding one of the most demanding jobs in American journalism. That anyone could write a book while holding such a job is quite an accomplishment, writing such a compelling narrative about terrorism and the failures of American intelligence is a triumph.”
—Ray Locker, The Associated Press
“No one else I know of has been able to bring such a broad perspective to bear on the rise of bin Laden; the CIA itself would be hard put to beat his grasp of global events… . Coll’s book is deeply satisfying because … it’s an inside account written by an outsider, the most objective history I have read of the many failures of the CIA and the U.S. government in the region.”
—Ahmed Rashid, The New York Review of Books
PENGUIN BOOKS
GHOST WARS
Winner of a 1990 Pulitzer Prize for explanatory journalism, Steve Coll has been managing editor of The Washington Post since 1998 and covered Afghanistan as the Post’s South Asia bureau chief between 1989 and 1992. Coll is the author of four books, including On the Grand Trunk Road and The Taking of Getty Oil. He lives with his wife and three children in Maryland.
PENGUIN BOOKS
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First published in the United States of America by The Penguin Press,
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Published in Penguin Books 2005
1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Copyright © Steve Coll, 2004
All rights reserved
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS HAS CATALOGED THE HARDCOVER EDITION AS FOLLOWS:
Coll, Steve.
Ghost wars : the secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 / Steve Coll.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-59420-007-6 (hc.)
ISBN 0 14 30.3466 9 (pbk.)
1. Afghanistan—History—Soviet occupation, 1979–1989. 2. Afghanistan—History—1989–2001. 3. United States. Central Intelligence Agency. 4. Bin Laden, Osama, 1957– . I. Title.
DS371.2.C63 2004
958.104‘5—dc22 2003058593
Printed in the United States of America
Designed by Amanda Dewey
Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions, and do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
For Susan,
who understood
AUTHOR’S NOTE
Griff Witte, a 2000 graduate in history from Princeton University and a former reporter for the Miami Herald, worked for more than a year as my assistant on this book. He was a full partner in every respect. He contributed research, reporting, writing, editing, and ideas. He traveled to Afghanistan, Dubai, and across the United States to conduct interviews with dozens of sources. He wrote outstanding first drafts of chapters six and seventeen. His intelligence, persistence, resourcefulness, and high standards strengthened the book elsewhere in countless ways. He was an ideal collaborator and essential to the entire project.
Contents
List of Maps
Principal Characters
PROLOGUE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
September 1996
PART ONE BLOOD BROTHERS
November 1979 to February 1989
1. “We’re Going to Die Here”
2. “Lenin Taught Us”
3. “Go Raise Hell”
4. “I Loved Osama”
5. “Don’t Make It Our War”
6. “Who Is This Massoud?”
7. “The Terrorists Will Own the World”
8. “Inshallah, You Will Know My Plans”
9. “We Won”
PART TWO THE ONE-EYED MAN WAS KING
March 1989 to December 1997
10. “Serious Risks”
11. “A Rogue Elephant”
12. “We Are in Danger”
13. “A Friend of Your Enemy”
&nb
sp; 14. “Maintain a Prudent Distance”
15. “A New Generation”
16. “Slowly, Slowly Sucked into It”
17. “Dangling the Carrot”
18. “We Couldn’t Indict Him”
19. “We’re Keeping These Stingers”
20. “Does America Need the CIA?”
PART THREE THE DISTANT ENEMY
January 1998 to September 10, 2001
21. “You Are to Capture Him Alive”
22. “The Kingdom’s Interests”
23. “We Are at War”
24. “Let’s Just Blow the Thing Up”
25. “The Manson Family”
26. “That Unit Disappeared”
27. “You Crazy White Guys”
28. “Is There Any Policy?”
29. “Daring Me to Kill Them”
30. “What Face Will Omar Show to God?”
31. “Many Americans Are Going to Die”
32. “What an Unlucky Country”
Afterword
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
About the Author
LIST OF MAPS
Afghanistan
The Birth of Modern Saudi Arabia
Massoud at War, 1983–1985
Bin Laden’s Tarnak Farm
The CIA in the Panjshir, 1997–2000
PRINCIPAL CHARACTERS
The Central Intelligence Agency
FRANK ANDERSON, Director, Afghanistan Task Force, 1987–1989; Chief, Near East Division, Directorate of Operations, 1991–1994
MILTON BEARDEN, Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1986–1989
J. COFER BLACK, Chief of Station, Khartoum, 1993–1995; Director, Counterterrorist Center, 1999–2002
WILLIAM J. CASEY, Director, 1981–1987
DUANE R. “DEWEY” CLARRIDGE, Director, Counterterrorist Center, 1986–1988
JOHN DEUTCH, Director, 1995–1997
ROBERT GATES, Director, 1991–1993
HOWARD HART, Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1981–1984
JEFF O’CONNELL, Director, Counterterrorist Center, 1997–1999
JAMES PAVITT, Deputy Director, Operations, 1999–
WILLIAM PIEKNEY, Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1984–1986
PAUL PILLAR, Senior Analyst, later Deputy Director, Counterterrorist Center, 1993–1999
RICH, Chief, Bin Laden Unit, Counterterrorist Center, 1999–2001
MICHAEL F. SCHEUER, Chief, Bin Laden Unit, Counterterrorist Center, 1996–1999
GARY SCHROEN, Case Officer, Islamabad, 1978–1980; Chief of Station–designate, Kabul, 1988–1990; Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1996–1999; Deputy Chief, Near East Division, Directorate of Operations, 1999–2001
GEORGE J. TENET, Director, 1997–
THOMAS TWETTEN, Deputy Director, Operations, 1991–1993
HARRY, Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1989–1992
JAMES WOOLSEY, Director, 1993–1995
The White House
SAMUEL L. “SANDY” BERGER, Deputy National Security Adviser, 1993–1997; National Security Adviser, 1997–2000
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, National Security Adviser, 1977–1980
RICHARD CLARKE, Counterterrorism Coordinator, National Security Council, 1998–2001
ANTHONY “TONY” LAKE, National Security Adviser, 1993–1997
Department of State
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, Secretary of State, 1997–2000
KARL F. “RICK” INDERFURTH, Assistant Secretary for South Asia, 1997–2000
EDMUND MCWILLIAMS, Special Envoy to the Afghan resistance, 1988–1989
WILLIAM MILAM, Ambassador to Pakistan, 1998–2001
ROBERT OAKLEY, Ambassador to Pakistan, 1988–1991
TOM PICKERING, Undersecretary of State, 1997–2000
ROBIN RAPHEL, Assistant Secretary for South Asia, 1993–1997
GEORGE SHULTZ, Secretary of State, 1982–1989
TOM SIMONS, Ambassador to Pakistan, 1996–1998
PETER TOMSEN, Special Envoy to the Afghan resistance, 1989–1992
In Afghanistan
ABDULLAH, foreign policy aide to Ahmed Shah Massoud
MOHAMMED ATEF, Egyptian-born military commander in bin Laden’s al Qaeda
ABDULLAH AZZAM, Palestinian-born spiritual leader, headed al Qaeda precursor group until 1989
ABURRASHID DOSTUM, former communist, Uzbek militia leader, sometime ally of Massoud
MOHAMMED FAHIM, intelligence and military aide to Massoud
ABDUL HAQ, Afghan Pashtun tribal and guerrilla leader, breaks with CIA during late 1980s
JALLALADIN HAQQANNI, radical Afghan Islamist guerrilla leader, successful military commander, CIA and Saudi intelligence ally during 1980s,joins Taliban during 1990s
GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR, radical Afghan Islamist guerrilla leader, rival of Massoud
HAMID KARZAI, Afghan Pashtun tribal leader and political activist, initially backs Taliban, later joins Pashtun opposition to Taliban
MASSOUD KHALILI, schoolmate and close aide to Ahmed Shah Massoud
OSAMA BIN LADEN, Saudi-born leader of al Qaeda after 1989
AHMED SHAH MASSOUD, Tajik guerrilla commander, leads anti-Soviet resistance in northern Afghanistan, later forms Northern Alliance, leadsopposition to Taliban
PRESIDENT NAJIBULLAH, Soviet-backed Afghan communist leader
MULLAH MOHAMMED OMAR, supreme leader of the Taliban; after 1996, self-declared emir of Afghanistan
BURHANUDDIN RABBANI, Cairo-trained Islamist scholar, political leader of Massoud’s party
MULLAH MOHAMMED RABBANI, Taliban leader favored by Saudi Arabia, seen as possible moderate
AMRULLAH SALEH, intelligence aide to Massoud
ABDURRAB RASUL SAYYAF, Cairo-trained Islamist scholar, Saudi-backed guerrilla leader
AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI, Egyptian-born leader of Islamic Jihad, close ally of bin Laden after 1998
In Pakistan
GEN. MAHMOUD AHMED, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1999–2001
BENAZIR BHUTTO, Prime Minister, 1988–1990; 1993–1996
GEN. ASAD DURRANI, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1990–1992
GEN. HAMID GUL, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1987–1989
COLONEL (LATER BRIGADIER) IMAM, Afghan Bureau, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1980s through mid-1990s
GEN. PERVEZ MUSHARRAF, Chief of Army Staff, 1998–1999; military leader of Pakistan, 1999–2001
GEN. JAVED ASHRAF QAZI, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1993–1995
GEN. AKHTAR ABDUR RAHMAN, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1978–1987
GEN. NASEEM RANA, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1995–1998
NAWAZ SHARIF, Prime Minister, 1990–1993; 1997–1999
BRIGADIER MOHAMMED YOUSAF, Afghan Bureau, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1983–1987
GEN. KHWAJA ZIAUDDIN, Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence, 1998–1999
GEN. MOHAMMED ZIA-UL-HAQ, military leader of Pakistan, 1977–1988
In Saudi Arabia
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH, de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, 1996–
AHMED BADEEB, Prince Turki’s Chief of Staff, 1979–1997
SAEED BADEEB, Ahmed’s brother, director of analysis, Saudi intelligence, approximately 1983–2001
PRINCE BANDAR, Saudi Ambassador to the United States, 1983–
KING FAHD, ruler of Saudi Arabia, 1982–
KING FAISAL, ruler of Saudi Arabia, 1964–1975, father of Prince Turki
PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL, Saudi Foreign Minister, 1975–
PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL, chief of Saudi intelligence, 1977–2001
KING ABDUL AZIZ IBN SAUD, founding ruler of modern Saudi Arabia, 1901–1953
PROLOGUE
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE
September 1996
IN THE TATTERED, cargo-strewn cabin of an Ariana Afghan Airlines passenger jet streaking above Punjab toward Kabul sat a stocky, broad-faced Americ
an with short graying hair. He was a friendly man in his early fifties who spoke in a flat midwestern accent. He looked as if he might be a dentist, an acquaintance once remarked. Gary Schroen had served for twenty-six years as an officer in the Central Intelligence Agency’s clandestine services. He was now, in September 1996, chief of station in Islamabad, Pakistan. He spoke Persian and its cousin, Dari, one of Afghanistan’s two main languages. In spy terminology, Schroen was an operator. He recruited and managed paid intelligence agents, conducted espionage operations, and supervised covert actions against foreign governments and terrorist groups. A few weeks before, with approval from CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, he had made contact through intermediaries with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the celebrated anti-Soviet guerrilla commander, now defense minister in a war-battered Afghan government crumbling from within. Schroen had requested a meeting, and Massoud had accepted.1
They had not spoken in five years. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as allies battling Soviet occupation forces and their Afghan communist proxies, the CIA had pumped cash stipends as high as $200,000 a month to Massoud and his Islamic guerrilla organization, along with weapons and other supplies. Between 1989 and 1991, Schroen had personally delivered some of the cash. But the aid stopped in December 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved. The United States government decided it had no further interests in Afghanistan.
Meanwhile the country had collapsed. Kabul, once an elegant city of broad streets and walled gardens tucked spectacularly amid barren crags, had been pummelled by its warlords into a state of physical ruin and human misery that compared unfavorably to the very worst places on Earth. Armed factions within armed factions erupted seasonally in vicious urban battles, blasting down mud-brick block after mud-brick block in search of tactical advantages usually apparent only to them. Militias led by Islamic scholars who disagreed profoundly over religious minutia baked prisoners of war to death by the hundreds in discarded metal shipping containers. The city had been without electricity since 1993. Hundreds of thousands of Kabulis relied for daily bread and tea on the courageous but limited efforts of international charities. In some sections of the countryside thousands of displaced refugees died of malnutrition and preventable disease because they could not reach clinics and feeding stations. And all the while neighboring countries—Pakistan, Iran, India, Saudi Arabia—delivered pallets of guns and money to their preferred Afghan proxies. The governments of these countries sought territorial advantage over their neighbors. Money and weapons also arrived from individuals or Islamic charities seeking to extend their spiritual and political influence by proselytizing to the destitute.
