by Steve Coll
24. After the United Nations passed another round of economic sanctions against the Taliban late in December 2000, Pakistan’s foreign minister sat down with his Taliban counterpart to work out how to evade the sanctions without calling too much attention to themselves. According to minutes of the meeting discovered by Tim Judah in Kabul, Mullah Omar’s foreign envoy, Muttawakil, confessed that “the Taliban are not very optimistic of the new Bush administration,” because they believe that Bush and Clinton are “like two hands of one person.” The Pakistani minister mentioned his nervousness about Zalmay Khalilzad who had suggested Pakistan “should be declared a terrorist state.” The Pakistani envoy assured the Taliban that his government “had no intention of downgrading the Afghan embassy” in Islamabad as U.N. sanctions required, although “it would be desirable to show some superficial reduction to exhibit compliance.” In another cable discovered by Judah, which provided talking points for Pakistani ambassadors to use in defending the Taliban, the foreign ministry urged, “We should avoid any statements that may be offensive to the Taliban.” Judah, “The Taliban Papers,” Survival.
25. Statue descriptions are from Jason Elliot, An Unexpected Light, pp. 336-37. “We do not understand … are stones” is from Molly Moore, The Washington Post, March 2, 2001. According to Ramzi Binalshibh, several Saudis who were to become “muscle” hijackers on September 11 participated in the destruction. See National Commission final report, p. 527.
26. This account of Haider’s visit to Kandahar is from interviews with Pakistani and U.S. officials. All quotations are from an interview with a Pakistani official. Time, August 12, 2002, provides a similar account of the meeting, which lasted about two hours, according to those interviewed.
27. Interviews with U.S. officials.
28. Ibid.
29. The surge in threat reporting during the first three months of 2001 is from interviews with U.S., Pakistani, and Saudi officials. Tenet’s quotations are from the Joint Inquiry Committee’s final report, Appendix, p. 38. Turki said in an interview that he was “inundated by warnings from the Americans. January, February, March.We’d get reports telling us, ‘We suspect something is going to happen. Please keep on the lookout.’ ” Pakistani officials quoted Tenet similarly. Bin Laden’s remarks about the Cole, videotaped that winter at an Afghan wedding where one of his sons married a daughter of his Egyptian commander Mohammed Atef, binding their families, were broadcast on al Jazeera on March 2, 2001. “In Aden, the young man stood up for holy war and destroyed a destroyer feared by the powerful.” He described Cole as having sailed “to its doom” along a course of “false arrogance, self-conceit, and strength.” Rice and Tenet’s exchanges on draft CIA covert action authority is from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 7. Bush’s recollection from the final report, p. 199.
30. Interviews with Pakistani officials. “Because we’d have a civil war” is from an interview.
31. Interviews with U.S. officials.
32. Tenet’s visit to Islamabad is from interviews with U.S. and Pakistani officials. Some of the sources who described the visit did not attend all the meetings. The full agenda and scope of the discussions with Mahmoud remain unclear, but it is certain that Mahmoud did little in the aftermath to change ISI’s policies and practices in Afghanistan. The exact date of Tenet’s travel is also uncertain. His visit appears to have occurred in late March or April.
CHAPTER 31: “MANY AMERICANS ARE GOING TO DIE”
1. Otilie English began paid work as a Northern Alliance lobbyist on February 15, 2001. The letter to Cheney is from an interview with Haroun Amin, chargé d’affaires at the Afghan embassy in Washington, September 9, 2002 (GW). Information on Massoud’s travels is from interviews with his aides. What Massoud believed that spring is from videotaped conversation with English and Elie Krakowski, June 2001 (hereafter “English video”), and transcript of videotaped conversation among Massoud, Peter Tomsen, Hamid Karzai, and Abdul Haq, also from June 2001 (hereafter “Tomsen video”).
2. Interviews with U.S. officials and aides to Massoud.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002.
6. English video, interviews with multiple aides to Massoud.
7. English video and Tomsen video.
8. All quotations are from the English video. The translation from Dari is by Massoud’s aide Amarullah Saleh.
9. All of Massoud’s quotations, ibid.
10. Interview with Otilie English, September 3, 2002, Washington, D.C. (GW).
11. Interview with Peter Tomsen, January 21, 2002, Omaha, Nebraska (SC), and subsequent written communications from Tomsen.
12. All quotations are from an English transcript of the Tomsen video. Abdul Haq’s role in the meeting was a source of some tension. Haq did not want to meet with Massoud inside Northern Alliance territory. Haq and Hamid Karzai also disagreed somewhat about strategy toward the Taliban, according to Massoud and Karzai aides. Haq believed it was possible to negotiate with Taliban leaders and secure defections. Karzai favored talks but also was ready to participate in military action. Ultimately, Haq died because he believed he could rally Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan to his cause in October 2001 simply by calling on their tribal and personal loyalties. The CIA also remained deeply skeptical about Haq. Even as the agency embraced Karzai, its officers dismissed Haq as someone who could not produce results.
13. Bart Gellman, The Washington Post, January 20, 2002. Time, August 12, 2002, dates the conversation to the first days of spring 2001. Also, interview with a White House official.
14. Gellman, The Washington Post, January 20, 2002, and Time, August 12, 2002, have described the agenda and some of the discussion at this meeting. Armitage and Wolfowitz testified about aspects of the meeting before the Joint Inquiry Committee. Armitage quotations are from his testimony, Federal News Service, September 19, 2002. CIA slides from National Commission final report, p. 203.
15. Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz before the Joint Inquiry Committee, September 19, 2002.Wolfowitz defended the deliberate pace of the deputies committee’s work by arguing that since the September 11 hijackers had already entered the United States by July, even if the Bush administration had advanced its plans to support Massoud or attack al Qaeda, they probably would not have prevented the New York and Pentagon attacks. Of course, it could be argued equally that a robust disruption of bin Laden’s Afghanistan sanctuary might have delayed or altered the course of the attacks. Both sides of the argument rest almost entirely on speculation.
16. Wolfowitz quotation, ibid. State officials’ conclusions from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 10.
17. State Department transcript, testimony of Colin Powell before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, May 15, 2001. Late May meeting is from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 7.
18. Testimony of George Tenet, Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. Testimony of Cofer Black, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. “What worries … more deadly” from the Committee’s final report, Appendix, p. 43. Interviews with U.S. officials. Black’s “7 … 8” is from National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 2.
19. Information about NSA intercepts is from Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002. FBI threat reports from the testimony of Michael Rolince, FBI special agent in charge, Washington, D.C., Joint Inquiry Committee, September 24, 2002. State warnings are from the testimony of Richard Armitage, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 19, 2002. FAA warnings are from The New York Times, May 21, 2002.
20. Atiani quotations are from Pamela Constable, The Washington Post, July 8, 2001. The June 26 démarche is from the Joint Inquiry Committee’s final report, p. 120.
21. Bin Laden quotations are from Associated Press, June 19, 2001.
22. “I want a way” from The New York Times, May 17, 2002. Rice, Clarke, and Bush letter from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, p. 16.
23. All quotations are from Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002, except “98 percent certain” and “clear majority view,” which are from the Joint Inquiry Committee’s final report, p. 8. “Establish contact” is from the final report, p. 29.
24. Ibid.
25. Time, August 12, 2002. National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 3.
26. Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002.
27. Ibid., and testimony of George Tenet, Joint Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002. The Tenet quotations are from his testimony.
28. Testimony of unidentified CIA Counterterrorist Center officer, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 20, 2002. McLaughlin’s view and CTC officer’s fears from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 8. What Hadley said about Wolfowitz from the final report, p. 259.
29. “Threat … to Continue Indefinitely” is from “Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9/11,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, July 17, 2002. The Tenet quotation is from his Joint Inquiry testimony, October 17, 2002.
30. A copy of this section of the PDB was published by the National Commission. Tenet on delay is from staff statement no. 7, p. 8.
31. Testimony of Cofer Black, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002.
32. Tenet’s Joint Inquiry testimony, October 17, 2002.
33. Hill, Joint Inquiry statement, September 18, 2002. Also, Joint Inquiry Committee final report, p. 15. National Commission staff statement no. 10, p. 4. Final report, p. 267.
34. Statement of FBI director Robert S. Mueller, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. Backgrounds of the supporting hijackers and Tenet quotation from the Joint Inquiry Committee final report, p. 138.
35. Statement of Robert S. Mueller, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002. National Commission staff statement no. 16, based on interrogation statements by Mohammed and Binalshibh, pp. 5-19. Their statements describe debate among al Qaeda leaders about whether it was wise to attack the United States. By Mohammed’s account, bin Laden argued that the attack should go forward to support anti-Israel insurgents and to protest American troops in Saudi Arabia.
36. All financial details and flight to Karachi, from Mueller’s Joint Inquiry Committee statement, September 26, 2002.
37. Interviews with aides to Massoud and Karzai. “So disappointed” is from an interview with Daoud Yaqub, adviser to Karzai and former executive director of the Afghanistan Foundation, May 27, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).
38. Quotation is from interview with Yaqub, ibid.
39. Abdullah quotations are from Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002.
40. Interview with Yaqub, May 27, 2002, and with several other aides to Karzai and Massoud.
41. Interview with Hamid Karzai, October 21, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (SC).
42. Ibid.
CHAPTER 32: “WHAT AN UNLUCKY COUNTRY”
1. That the Counterterrorist Center knew about the journalists as they crossed Massoud’s lines is from interviews with U.S. officials.
2. These details about the assassins, as well as other aspects of the plot described in this chapter, draw on two comprehensive journalistic investigations of Massoud’s death: Jon Anderson, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002, and Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. Time, August 12, 2002, also added fresh details to the record through interviews. In addition, this chapter’s account is based on interviews in Kabul with seven aides to Massoud, several of them witnesses to the attack, and on interviews with U.S. officials who later debriefed Massoud’s aides.
3. The Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2001. The draft letter was discovered on a computer hard drive acquired by Journal reporters in Kabul during the autumn of 2001.
4. Anderson, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002, raises the possibility that Sayyaf conspired with al Qaeda to kill Massoud. Witting or unwitting, Sayyaf was a key facilitator in the operation.
5. Interviews with aides to Massoud; Anderson, ibid.; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002.
6. National Commission final report, pp. 212-213.
7. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 345-46, provide the most detailed account of this meeting available to date. Barton Gellman, The Washington Post, January 20, 2002, also described the agenda, and some participants made partial references to the discussion in Joint Inquiry Committee testimony. Benjamin and Simon raise doubts about the Cabinet’s commitment to the covert aid for Massoud and his anti-Taliban allies. “The issue of funding the hundreds of millions of dollars to finance the effort was given to the OMB and CIA to figure out,” they write, describing this as “the kind of decision that leaves much undecided, since a government agency that is told to finance a program ‘out of hide,’ out of the existing budget, frequently argues back that the issue is not a high enough priority.”
8. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, pp. 345-46. The authors say that Tenet “intervened forcefully” during the discussion and said it would be a “terrible mistake … for the director of Central Intelligence to fire a weapon like this.” That would happen, he reportedly said, “over his dead body.” Other officials deny that Tenet was so categorical. They describe him as trying to explain the risks, not argue for a particular outcome. Within weeks after September 11, the CIA did field and operate armed Predators, as did the Air Force, drawing on procedures developed in the summer of 2001. After September 11 the armed Predator was used successfully on the Afghan battlefield and later to shoot and kill a traveling party of accused terrorists in Yemen.
9. Interviews with U.S. officials. The September 4 decision on the Predator is from National Commission staff statement no. 7, p. 7. Hadley formally tasked Tenet to draft a finding for covert aid to Massoud on September 10.
10. Interviews with aides to Massoud; Anderson, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. “Is he a wrestler” is from Pyes and Rempel.
11. How the assassination unfolded, from interviews with aides to Massoud; Anderson, The New Yorker, June 10, 2002; Pyes and Rempel, Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2002. “He’s dying” from Los Angeles Times. The full quotation provided from Omar is “I saw my commander’s face and thought to myself, ‘He’s dying and I’m dying.’ “
12. The exchange with Saleh is from interviews with U.S. officials.
13. Interviews with aides to Massoud and with U.S. officials.
14. Ibid.
15. Interviews with three aides and advisers to Massoud then in Washington. September 10 deputies meeting from National Commission, staff statement no. 5, pp. 15-16.
16. Interview with Qayum Karzai, May 19, 2002, Kabul, Afghanistan (GW).
Bibliography
This book is based primarily on about two hundred interviews conducted between the autumn of 2001 and the summer of 2003 with American, Afghan, Pakistani, and Saudi participants in the events described. Many of these interviews were conducted entirely or partially on the record. Many others were held under ground rules designed to protect the identity of the source interviewed.Where these “background” rules were used, they were necessary usually because the material under discussion was highly classified or otherwise sensitive. All the interviews relied upon are indicated in the chapter notes. Where an interview was on the record, the chapter notes also indicate when and where it took place, and whether it was conducted by the author, Griff Witte, or both of us. The chapter notes also attempt to connect background interview sourcing with open material such as declassified documents and congressional hearings, as well as with previously published work by journalists and scholars. That material is inventoried below. Most of the American government documents describing the CIA’s role in Afghanistan and its campaign against al Qaeda are likely to remain classified for many years, however. Saudi and Pakistani documents may never be available. In the chapter notes and here, my aim is to make as much material as possible transparently ava
ilable to readers and researchers, given the constraints, in the hope that future writers will be able to correct and add to the preceding narrative.
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