by Greg Malone
For the defence of Canada, the Canadians were necessarily involved in the defence of Newfoundland. They were there before the Americans and had a base at the harbour in St. John’s, as well as air bases in Torbay and at Gander with the Royal Air Force (RAF). The sweeping concessions granted to the Americans by the British in Newfoundland by the Lend Lease Agreement of March 1941 generated both alarm and envy in Ottawa. It is fair to say that the Canadians finally discovered Newfoundland after the Americans’ arrival.12 Early in the war the Commission of Government had wanted to hand over the management of Newfoundland airports for military purposes entirely to the Canadians, but the plan was rejected out of hand by J.W. Herbertson at the Air Ministry in Whitehall. In his first telegram to Sir Charles Dixon at the Dominions Office on September 23, 1939 (released in 1998), Herbertson wrote:
Secret. I have always assumed that our policy was to do nothing which would tend to give Canada a greater footing in Newfoundland. To hand over the airport to the Canadian Military’s Airforce would mean the disappearance of our interests there for perhaps a considerable period at the end of which we might find it difficult to re-establish ourselves. The advantage of the present arrangement under which we control the airport is that it gives us a stranglehold over the North Atlantic Route and enables us to restrain our partners Erie and Canada. It would be a grave tactical error to do anything to weaken our position in this matter.13
Several weeks later Herbertson followed up with an equally emphatic statement on Newfoundland. It is clear that considerable discussions had taken place in the interval, resulting in a statement of Britain’s overarching ambitions in Newfoundland since at least 1933. Herbertson began his second memo of October 13, 1939, with the more formal “We,” which seemed to speak for the department:
Secret: We have always understood that it was the decided policy of H.M.G. in the U.K. that Newfoundland, the oldest British colony, should remain a separate entity and should not be absorbed by Canada. That policy has certainly governed our actions in regard to the provisions of aerodrome and marine air base facilities in Nfld. since I first went there for preliminary talks in 1933. At that time (which was shortly before the establishment of the Commission of Government) the local government was about to conclude agreements with Pan American Airways under which the latter would obtain certain exclusive rights for aviation services in the Island. I was just in time to stop this.
… We have spent large sums of money on the provision for an airport at Hattie’s Camp [Gander] and also on the marine air base at Botwood and on ancillary services. I think that it would be a great mistake to hand over the airports to the Royal Canadian Air Force for the duration of the war. It is one thing to let them in but it would be quite another thing to get them out.
Newfoundland is destined to play an important part in the operation of the Trans-Atlantic services and it is an important bargaining counter which it would be folly to allow to pass out of our control.14
Air supremacy was the fundamental consideration underlying all British policy in Newfoundland from at least the 1920s to the late 1940s. It was the key reason for taking full control in 1933—one fully reinforced by the experience of the Second World War. The value Britain placed on Newfoundland’s strategic importance is revealed in Herbertson’s casual reference to another British policy—that of using Newfoundland as a “bargaining counter” in the North Atlantic geo-political game. The imperious rejection of the commission’s and Canada’s request proved entirely impractical, however, and wartime circumstances soon forced the British not only to accept Canadian authority on the bases already on the Island but eventually to grant Canadians the prize they most wanted—a ninety-nine-year lease for a Canadian air base at Goose Bay in Labrador—a deal that was bitterly opposed in Newfoundland.
Overall, the Canadian presence was felt far less in terms of money, men and popularity than the American, but it was still a significant investment that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was anxious to profit from and protect. On August 28, 1940, he instructed O.D. Skelton at the Department of External Affairs to prepare a report “as to what the British had done in Newfoundland and what we [Canada] had done and then consider the advisability of acquiring ownership of areas in Newfoundland in which we were spending money. An effort would be made after the war to have us take over Newfoundland.”15 King’s assertiveness may have come from more than his $5 million investment in the Island. His confidence may have been buoyed by his secret understanding with President Roosevelt on Newfoundland’s position after the war. After a meeting with the US president in December 1942, King wrote in his diary that he reminded him of a previous conversation: “You said to me, some time ago, that Canada ought to possess Newfoundland.” He remembered that Roosevelt thought the island would be suitable for raising sheep.16
In response to King’s request, Hugh Keenleyside prepared a lengthy memo for Norman Robertson, the acting under-secretary of state for external affairs, on the new Canadian position in Newfoundland:
Since the outbreak of war in September 1939, Newfoundland has been playing an increasingly large part in considerations relating to Canadian defence.… It is quite clear that rather than decreasing in importance as hoped, our relations with Newfoundland during the remainder of this year and until the end of the war, will be more important than they have been in the past. With Canada taking a very large measure of responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland with Canadian military, naval and air force bases established in, and possibly operating from, Newfoundland bases, with the expenditure of some $5,000,000 by Canadian representatives in the Island immediately in prospect, with United States forces established in Newfoundland bases, and with the United Sates Government maintaining a consular representative (Consul General) in St. John’s … it is most desirable that consideration be given to … appointing an official representative of the Canadian Government to be stationed permanently, or at least until the end of the war.…
Although Newfoundland is not a Dominion it would perhaps please the people of the Island if the Canadian representative in Newfoundland were to be designated a High Commissioner.17
Unable to continue to ignore Newfoundland as irrelevant to national concerns, and with an eye to eventual annexation, Robertson presented the department’s recommendations to King in July 1941:
It is clear from an inspection of the files of the DEA for the past six months that Canada has more varied, more important and more urgent business with Newfoundland than with all the self-governing Dominions in which we maintain High Commissioners put together. It may be difficult to get a good man to go to St. John’s as High Commissioner but it is clearly a post which requires an able man who is capable of gaining the confidence and trust of Newfoundlanders. One man who I think could fit in well is C.J. Burchell, now High Commissioner in Australia. He is a Maritimer, familiar not only with the question of Dominion-Provincial relationships but with Commonwealth constitutional theory and practice—both important qualifications in view of the special problems which Newfoundland relations with Canada present. He is, however, doing a good job in Australia and he’s not been there very long. He might feel that translation to Newfoundland was not a promotion.”18
King agreed with the need for this posting, but Robertson proved to be correct about Charles Burchell. After arriving in St. John’s on a chilly November day in 1941, the new high commissioner immediately wrote to his boss and offered to return to Australia. King replied, “As much as I appreciate your offer to return to Canberra … I am convinced that you can perform a larger, national service by continuing in your present post.”19
The “larger service” was understood by all concerned as the incorporation of Newfoundland into the Canadian Confederation. And so Burchell stayed on. He moved into a spacious residence—Canada House—on the corner of Circular Road and Johnny’s Hill, and before long there was a steady stream of correspondence and requests for information between the Canadian high commissioner in Newfoundland and the B
ritish governor. The Canadians had officially arrived.
Burchell’s appointment was another constitutional anomaly for Newfoundland. Canada maintained a high commissioner as its senior diplomatic agent in other Commonwealth dominions but had never had such representation in neighbouring Newfoundland. Why Canada should suddenly recognize Newfoundland as worthy of such attention, let alone transfer one of its top diplomats to the post, and at a time when Newfoundland was in a compromised constitutional position with suspende dominion status, was no mystery to the people of Newfoundland. Burchell’s appointment was greeted with the same skepticism with which most Canadian moves towards the Island were met. The Daily News fumed:
How the appointment of a Canadian High Commissioner eliminates Dominions Office controls over the decisions of the Newfoundland Government is something inconceivable unless it be that Mr. Burchell is to stand here in the place of Lord Cranborne (the Dominions Secretary) and his officials in Downing Street. And if that be the case then the Canadian High Commissioner would become in theory the final arbiter in all questions involving Canada and Newfoundland.”20
The Fishermen-Workers Tribune went so far as to declare that “Newfoundland is to be run by a Canadian Commissioner or Board.”21
Burchell found this reception disconcerting, and on December 14 he expressed his concerns to Robertson:
I find that the attitude of the great majority of people here is that they think Canada is standing by ready to gobble Newfoundland up at the proper time. They look with great suspicion on the spending by Canada of money for the defence of Newfoundland, as apparently they fear the Greeks bringing gifts.…
I can recall some instances in which the attitude of Canada has been anything but helpful to Newfoundland and in respect of which Newfoundlanders have so many grievances.”22
Robertson responded: “It is quite clear that we can never divorce ourselves from an active interest in conditions in Newfoundland and that, in fact, we may have to take a very much closer and more immediate part in the fate of our nearest neighbour to the east.”23 Robertson’s melancholy reflection that Canada could “never divorce” itself from Newfoundland seemed an ill omen for any happy union, the inevitability of which he seemed darkly certain. If the American relationship with Newfoundland was a marriage of the heart, as was often said, it seemed certain that any marriage between Canada and Newfoundland would require a shotgun.
As the war carried on, both the Canadians and the British in Newfoundland were increasingly embarrassed by the Americans, who were far more popular than the Canadians and were clearly spending more and doing more for the Island than its British rulers had ever done. In June 1942 Paul Emrys-Evans, parliamentary under-secretary for dominions affairs in Great Britain, wrote a memo echoing Geoffrey Shakespeare’s alarm about the imperial reputation and urging the Dominions Office to speedy action:
The Americans and the Canadians are competing with one another in order to impress the Newfoundlanders. Our recent record shows no dramatic or impressive achievement and this is being noted both in Canada and in the US.
… the remarkable speed and efficiency with which the Bases and especially the Base hospitals have been built, has greatly impressed the people, while the development of the Atlantic Air Service is bound to make itself felt … a new and vigorous policy with regard to Newfoundland has become imperative.
… it is essential … that a Governor should be appointed for Newfoundland who will also be the active chairman of the Commission. He would in fact combine the duties of the King and the Prime Minister … Such men cannot be found unless they are taken from important posts, but unless they are spared for work in the Empire its future is dark indeed.24
At the time, Sir Humphrey Walwyn was still governor of Newfoundland and, before he departed in 1946, he would fill out a ten-year term, in spite of Emrys-Evans’ warnings. As soon as Clement Attlee became prime minister after the war, he appointed Sir Gordon Macdonald to the position. Sir Gordon was exactly the kind of governor that Emrys-Evans had envisaged, but by then the hour was late and the future of the British Empire would get no brighter.
On June 13, 1942, Sir Eric Machtig, responding to Emrys-Evans’ urgent concerns, outlined the situation in Newfoundland for Attlee, who was then the secretary of state for dominions affairs, and he began with this embarrassed nod to democracy:
I do agree that the Commission of Government from its nature has never been a very happy instrument for the government of a country like Newfoundland.
… we must actively consider the future after the War … the immense efforts made by the Newfoundlanders during the War in the Allied cause and the completely changed financial position, even if only temporary (they are now lending us money instead of our financing them) means that when the War ends there will be an overwhelming move in favour of the restoration of self-government. This will be difficult to resist and we ought to be prepared with our line of action.… We ought to know our own minds as regards the main issue and not rely on a Royal Commission to make them up for us. Our policy should be to bring Newfoundland into this Canadian Confederation if by any means this can be accomplished.
It is clear that public opinion in Newfoundland has always been intensely against union with Canada, but this is largely due to the fact that the Canadians have regarded them as poor relations, have done in the main little to help them and have always taken the line that circumstances would force Newfoundland into Canada in due course on Canada’s terms.
The position as I see it, is that the change which has taken place in the circumstances of Newfoundland will make it politically impossible to retain control from the UK through a Commission of Government. There will be great political pressure for the restoration of free Parliamentary institutions in Newfoundland.25
Machtig was obviously reluctant to release Newfoundland from British control and averse to restoring democracy to the Islanders, at least outside the confines of the Canadian Confederation. He was, however, correct in his assessment of local discontent. Opposition to the British Commission of Government had been muted at first. In the darkest hours of 1933, many Newfoundlanders felt that, for years, they had not been represented by their own government and that, perhaps, someone else’s government might do better. But by the late 1930s, this tacit acceptance had passed because of the commissioners’ general inaction and lack of communication. The criticism that had been simmering in the local papers had grown to an audible grumble by the opening days of the Second World War. There were frequent calls from the St. John’s Board of Trade and other organizations for a return to some form of representative government, if not full responsible government.
Perhaps the most intelligent and informed record of Newfoundlanders’ concerns throughout this period can be found in the writing of Albert Perlin, whose “Wayfarer” column in the Daily News recorded the entire drama. The fact that Canadian High Commissioner Charles Burchell quotes him extensively and frequently in his dispatches to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa is testimony enough of the soundness and influence of his views. Perlin was the subject of this dispatch, for instance, in June 1942:
I have the honour to bring to your attention extracts from recent articles by “Wayfarer” in The Daily News on the subject of the restoration of Responsible Government.…
… the Commission Government has proved itself an utter and complete failure. It sees itself as a permanent oligarchy. It has done nothing at all to prepare the people for an assumption of the responsibilities of self-government. It seems more concerned with getting a pat on the back from the Dominions Office than catering to the natural democratic rights of the people.… When you are denied self-government and you have not got good, in the form of efficient government to replace it, the urge to political independence becomes that much stronger.
It will be noted that Wayfarer suggests some form of representative government should be adopted as a major step towards the restoration of Dominion status after the war, rather t
han an immediate return to Responsible Government. He states that no one wants to do anything that would interfere with the war and that meant acceptance of the war effort.26
Newfoundland, always intensely patriotic, had thrown itself wholeheartedly into the war effort. Its support included acceptance of the status quo, the Leased Bases Agreement, and even the Goose Bay deal with Canada for the duration of the conflict. But as the war dragged on, it became incumbent on the government in Whitehall to do or say something about the increasingly absurd political situation in Newfoundland.
3
ATTLEE IN NEWFOUNDLAND:
HOLDING ON FOR BRITAIN
In the summer of 1942 Clement Attlee, the dominions secretary, came to Newfoundland for a tour of the country and a rest. He was preceded by his secretary, Alexander Clutterbuck, the author of the infamous Amulree Report. On his arrival, High Commissioner Charles Burchell wrote a confidential memo to Norman Robertson at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa:
Mr. P.A. Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office is arriving in St. John’s on Monday. He was Secretary to the Royal Commission, 1933, commonly known as the Amulree Commission.
There are few people in Newfoundland who have a good word to say for the Amulree Commission today. It is in fact exceedingly unpopular.…
The mystery to me is why Attlee should come here at the present time or even send someone from the Dominions Office, such as Clutterbuck.…
Officially I do not know anything about Clutterbuck’s visit, nor do I know what his present standing in the Dominions Office is. I am wondering if he is an important enough person for me to ask to the luncheon for the Governor General. I now have 36 invitations and 36 acceptances, as per the enclosed list. These, with my wife, my daughter and myself, make a total of 39. I have seating accommodation for exactly 40 people but that is the limit. I therefore have one seat vacant and would appreciate hearing from you by cable on Monday as to Clutterbuck’s standing and whether or not he is of sufficient importance as representing the Dominions Office to be asked to the luncheon. I do not want to make enquiries about him around here.…1
