by Greg Malone
Thank you for your note.… I am interested to know of the forthcomingness of the Canadians. They will have to make a very good offer to overcome the particularity and local prejudice of the Newfoundlanders, to say nothing of the vested interests of the Water Street Merchants.
The late Prime Minister [Churchill] always took the line that we ought to deal generously with the Newfoundlanders, the amount required for them being a drop in the ocean of our own liabilities.”6
It remained to be seen whether Newfoundland would get that “drop.” A key moment in the fate of Newfoundland had arrived. Wrong’s meeting with Lord Cranborne in San Francisco also had a stimulating effect at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. On September 25, 1945, Norman Robertson wrote another long memo to Scott Macdonald on the pros and cons of union. He noted with some unease that “individualism, sensitiveness to criticism from outside, and a general backwardness of outlook are, moreover, strongly marked characteristics of the Islanders, that would not make for tractability on their easy assimilation into the Dominion.”7
As always, the downside of the Confederation equation was the Newfoundlanders themselves. Despite these grave concerns, and after a review of Canada’s defence position on the Island and the resources involved, Robertson brought himself around to Macdonald’s position: “It is possible that we should take the initiative ourselves, rather than leave it to Newfoundland.… If the United Kingdom Government were agreeable to Union, as there is good reason to believe it would be, we might then ask that the Newfoundland people be advised accordingly and that the United Kingdom give its blessing to federation.”8
This approach of laying the cards on the table with the Newfoundlanders and allowing them to make their choice in light of British and Canadian concerns would have been the proper procedure to follow. Certainly it would have resulted in less dissonance than the path of concealment and deception that was chosen. But Robertson’s suggestion of informing the Newfoundlanders about the “solution envisaged” was too transparent for officials in London, who had little respect for Newfoundland voters and much regard for their own opinions. The high commissioner ignored that part of Robertson’s memo and seized on External Affairs’ approval of his more pro-active approach on the Island. He replied enthusiastically to Robertson:
The soundest plan would be for me to be authorized, privately and on a personal basis, to suggest to leading citizens of Newfoundland, who I already know to be generally well disposed, to proceed with the formation of a Committee to advocate Union. It would be for them to work up latent public interest in the matter and ensure that, when the Convention meets to consider the future form of Government a motion would be introduced favouring the despatch of a delegation to Ottawa to ask the Canadian Government on what terms Newfoundland could unite with the Dominion.9
Macdonald was very excited about the process he outlined. As things turned out, he had predicted exactly what would happen. But first, events had to unfold—or at least look to unfold—in as natural a way as possible. He concluded: “It would be unfortunate, I think, if any over-zealous individual should attempt a premature crusade on his own, hoping to capture the leadership. I have, therefore, refrained from giving encouragement to anyone likely to be so minded.”10 Apparently there was no need to identify for Robertson who that over-zealous confederate might be. As they drew nearer to their goal, Robertson cautioned Macdonald: “All correspondence on our Newfoundland policy should be marked ‘Confidential’ since … it may be difficult to prevent correspondence, which might conceivably be embarrassing, from becoming public unless it is given a security marking.”11
On September 10 Prime Minister Mackenzie King alerted Scott Macdonald in St. John’s to the coming negotiations with Great Britain:
Secret. The United Kingdom High Commissioner [in Ottawa, Malcolm MacDonald] has asked us whether we would be prepared to hold very confidential and informal discussions on matters relating to Newfoundland with Mr. Clutterbuck of the Dominions Office, who could arrive about the middle of this month. This is agreeable to us, and it would be convenient for you to time your visit to Ottawa accordingly. Ostensibly his mission would be for other purposes, and therefore this information is for you alone.12
The note from Lord Addison’s office back to Malcolm MacDonald on September 11 is equally conspiratorial:
Secret … Clutterbuck is arranging to cross by bomber 14 September arriving Montreal … September 15. Grateful if accommodation could be arranged for him. It is excellent that Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland will be in Ottawa at the same time, but we are a little nervous that it will come out in St. John’s that Newfoundland is under discussion. We trust however that Canadian authorities will have impressed on their High Commissioner [the] importance of saying nothing even in governmental quarters in Newfoundland which might disclose the object of his visit. You should know that we have been careful not to give Newfoundland Government any inkling of Clutterbuck’s impending visit or its object.13
These top-secret memos mark the beginning of the high-level co-operation between Great Britain and Canada to bring Newfoundland into Confederation without the knowledge of the people of Newfoundland. The conspiratorial tone of these communications indicates that all parties involved were aware that they were initiating confidential negotiations that were constitutionally, politically, democratically, and morally wrong. They were certainly against the spirit and letter of everything that the British governors were telling the people of Newfoundland. They were also contrary to the vaunted Atlantic Charter, asserting the rights of all peoples to self-determination, which the British had proclaimed with such fanfare in 1941.
Yet when Clutterbuck arrived in Ottawa, he was perplexed to find that “so far from Canadians having any positive ideas to put us, there was little or no interest even in official circles and no serious consideration has been given to the problem. However we have jollied them along and they have not been unreceptive.”14 This passive-aggressive approach to union was typical of Canada’s historical apathy and its desire to acquire Newfoundland by default or for as little cost as possible. Still, Clutterbuck was, as Peter Neary described in Gilbert and Sullivan terms, “the very model of the model Whitehall mandarin … able to reverse himself and bring the same energy and skill to one minister or policy as another. In the event, he proved as clever in negotiating the United Kingdom’s exit from the administration of Newfoundland as in 1933 and 1934 he had been in negotiating her entry.”15
By mid-October, Clutterbuck was ready with his final report to the Dominions Office on the real Canadian position. In some respects it reads like the account of a difficult and unwillingly arranged marriage, complete with arguments over the dowry:
I arrived in Ottawa on the 15th of September … to compare notes with the Canadians on the Newfoundland problem.… Those on the Canadian side were Mr. Norman Robertson (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), Mr. Hume Wrong (Associate Under-Secretary of State), Mr. MacKay (Head of the Newfoundland Division of the Department of External Affairs) and Mr. Scott Macdonald (Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland). I, for my part, was accompanied by the Deputy High Commissioner (Mr. Holmes) and the Senior Secretary at the High Commissioner’s office (Mr. Garner).
As a result of an informal approach made by Mr. Hume Wrong to Lord Cranborne at San Francisco and of certain subsequent remarks made by Mr. Mackenzie King to Lord Cranborne, we had gathered the impression that the Canadians had themselves been giving a good deal of thought to the Newfoundland problem and had certain ideas which they were anxious to discuss with us before conclusions as to future policy were reached.… I went on to explain that we were most anxious to ensure that any new Government taking over the Island would have reasonable prospects of financial stability; with this object in view we had hoped to accompany our proposals on the constitutional side by a 10-year reconstruction programme financed by a specially created Newfoundland Development Fund.… Unfortunately, these hopes had now been
dashed by the difficulties of our dollar position.… The whole Newfoundland situation would accordingly have to be reconsidered by my Government, and it would be of the greatest help to know how the position was viewed by the Canadian authorities and what was the attitude towards the future of the Island.
To my surprise, the initial reaction of the Canadian officials to this approach was almost entirely negative. They began by explaining that there was almost complete absence of interest in Canada in Newfoundland affairs. This applied not only to the Canadian public but also to Canadian Ministers and officials. The fact was that Canadians had too many problems of their own to concern themselves with Newfoundland.…
Against this general background of lack of interest it would be politically out of the question for the Canadian Government to provide us with dollars necessary to finance reconstruction in Newfoundland (all the more so as any money provided for this purpose would reduce pro tanto the funds which would otherwise be available to us for financing United Kingdom imports from Canada); similarly there could be no question of their being able under present conditions to make any direct contribution themselves to reconstruction in the Island, since this would at once get them into trouble with their own Provinces. They much appreciated our action in consulting them, but could see no prospect in the circumstance of being able to help.
… I did not conceal my disappointment at this reply and pointed out that such a position would be very unsatisfactory from the Newfoundland point of view. If we on our side were unable to help her in her reconstruction measures owing to lack of dollars, while the Canadians on their side were not disposed to do so owing to lack of interest, who could be surprised if Newfoundlanders began to think seriously of turning to the United States? …
At this stage the Canadian officials became more helpful, and I was asked what my Government’s reaction would be if the Canadian Government were to indicate to us that they would welcome a recommendation by the proposed National Convention in favour of Newfoundland joining up with Canada. In reply I said that any such invitation would be warmly received by my Government: it had always been felt … that union with Canada was the Island’s natural destiny.… It was agreed that as the next step I should have a talk with Mr. MacKay and Mr. Scott Macdonald and examine with them the financial implications of a decision by Newfoundland to enter the Canadian Confederation.… Canadian officials explained to me that it would be very desirable to avoid a situation in which special treatment would have to be given to Newfoundland, since this would certainly create difficulties with the Canadian Provinces and lead to undesirable controversy. Matters would be much easier from their point of view if Newfoundland could make both ends meet on the same financial terms as were applicable to the Canadian Provinces.16
Reporting on previous discussions between the Canadian prime minister (who was also secretary of state for external affairs at this time) and the British high commissioner, Clutterbuck noted:
The views expressed by Mr. Mackenzie King in conversation with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald were clear and decided and may be summarized as follows:
He regarded entry of Newfoundland into the Canadian Confederation as natural, desirable, and inevitable.…
On the other hand, it would be essential that the initiative should clearly be seen to come from them, and both we and Canada would have to be very careful to say and do nothing which might look like “bouncing” them, or give rise to suspicions that we were engaged in a conspiracy to achieve this result.
Even so … it was important that Newfoundlanders should take their own time and not be hurried.
At the same time … this would be a grand chance, which might not recur for a long time, of getting the Confederation question settled without it being made an issue in party politics in Newfoundland. Delay too might bring other dangers, such as a tendency for the Island to swing into the United States orbit, which would be very embarrassing.
I reported this very encouraging reaction to the Canadian group of officials, who were obviously much relieved and pleased. They admitted frankly that they had been drifting with no clear policy, and were delighted that they now had a definite objective to aim at.17
Although this description of the discussions evokes an empire in search of an emperor, Clutterbuck was probably trying to put some spine into the Attlee government’s position with Ottawa on Newfoundland. Certainly it had the effect of flattering Clutterbuck’s own efforts to reach an agreement. Ottawa for its part had definite ideas on how the British should proceed:
Canadian officials expressed the view that it would be very desirable to make it clear in the statement that Newfoundland should not count on receiving further financial assistance from the United Kingdom. This would accord with the realities of the position and would, they thought, assist Newfoundlanders to turn their thoughts to Canada.
It was left finally that each side would consider the position now reached, and that when our statement had been made in Parliament it might be useful to examine between us possible ways of influencing Newfoundland opinion behind the scenes. I said that the Secretary of State would no doubt wish to have a word himself with Mackenzie King on the matter while he was in London, and Mr. Norman Robertson said that he would also be at our disposal in London for a further talk whenever we should think one useful.18
While Clutterbuck was striking a deal over Newfoundland with the officials at External Affairs, Hugh Dalton, the new chancellor of the exchequer, was similarly engaged with officials of the Department of Finance over postwar finances. Dalton had already been to Washington and, because the United States was late in entering the war, he and Attlee had expected that the Americans would make Great Britain a gift of the war debt it owed them. Instead, the Americans extended the British a line of credit. Now in Ottawa, where Britain had more to offer—Newfoundland—the visitors hoped to achieve that same pressing goal with regard to the debt the motherland owed Canada.
The Canadians wrote off the entire $5.6 billion war debt that Great Britain owed—a magnificent “gift” in the eyes of the world. In another act of spontaneous generosity, Ottawa extended a $1.2 billion loan at 2 percent interest.19 Canada also agreed to take over the Newfoundland sterling debt. Britain had gotten everything it wanted—and, in return, it would deliver Newfoundland to its generous Canadian partner. This arrangement satisfied both Treasury and Maynard Keynes, who wrote on December 18, “It is agreed that the right long-term solution is for Newfoundland to be taken over by Canada.”20 Only one year earlier, in June 1944, Norman Robertson had told the British high commissioner that Canada would withhold future war aid to Great Britain if Canada did not get the ninety-nine-year lease it wanted at Goose Bay. Canada got Goose Bay. Now the Canadians would forgive that war debt and take the whole country.
There would have been no need for these secret top-level talks between Britain and Canada on Newfoundland’s fate if Britain had simply returned responsible government to the Island as promised by the Newfoundland Act of 1933, but both partners were unwilling to lose their advantage by leaving it to the people of Newfoundland to decide. Both had too much to gain. Newfoundland had sacrificed her territory during the war for the “good of mankind,” as Churchill implored. Now her sovereignty would be sacrificed for Canadian dollars. The Newfoundland problem was all but solved. As far as the United Kingdom and Canada were concerned, the deal was done—without any representation from the people of Newfoundland.
These irregular discussions were the ones that George Hawkins told young Jim Halley about in the hallway at Dalhousie three months later, in December 1945. A financial and a political deal had been struck between Britain and Canada, and all that remained was to play out the constitutional drama through some sort of “democratic” process. Everything would depend on the ability of Britain and the British governor in Newfoundland to control that process to assure the desired results.
The Treasury had won out over political and imperial considerations, as it was bound to do. Great
Britain was bankrupt and must divest itself of its holdings. Canada was now waiting for Newfoundland, and it would help set the terms and conditions for the coming constitutional contest. The ringing words in the Fishermen-Workers’ Tribune in 1941, when Charles Burchell was appointed to St. John’s, that “the Canadian High Commissioner would now replace the British Governor as the final arbiter of Newfoundland affairs” were entirely correct, though premature.
The chastened tone in the memo from Lord Addison to the War Cabinet reflected the new reality at the Dominions Office:
We must, I feel, adapt our policy to the changed conditions, and since we cannot now look ourselves to helping Newfoundland financially, we should now regard union with Canada as the objective to be aimed at. It would, of course, be most important that no hint that this is the solution which we envisage should be allowed to come out either here or in Newfoundland. The initiative must be left entirely to the Newfoundlanders, and we must take care to avoid any appearances of seeking to influence them in any way. At the same time, we must say or do nothing which would conflict with this objective or make it harder to achieve.
If this view is accepted, it follows that my statement in Parliament must contain a clear warning that in all probability we shall be unable to help financially in long-term reconstruction in Newfoundland.… Moreover, it may be hoped that a warning on these lines would aid the swing of opinion towards Canada.21
Newfoundland’s fate was sealed. Canada had the dollars—it was the buyer and would set the terms. Britain was the vendor and would deliver the goods—Newfoundland. The British had initially been convinced that the Confederation option could not win in any Newfoundland election, but once they discovered their penury and indebtedness to Canada, they convinced themselves of the opposite. Confederation might be made to win after all. As if to underline the agreement, three months later, in January 1946, the redoubtable Alexander Clutterbuck was knighted and appointed to Ottawa as British high commissioner to preside over the final transfer of power. The only disagreements now between the two conspirators would be on how best to execute their scheme. The first of these top-secret consultations would be about the terms of reference for the Newfoundland National Convention itself. With Canada now in a position of power, if not control, a new ease and confidence prevailed in Ottawa:
