Caesar: Life of a Colossus

by Adrian Goldsworthy

  when they [the Gauls] depart from the battle they hang the heads of their enemies from the necks of their horses, and, when they have brought them home, nail the spectacle to the entrances of their houses. Poseidonius says that he himself saw this spectacle in many places, and that, although at first he loathed it, afterwards, through his familiarity with it, he could bear it calmly. The heads of enemies of high repute, however, they used to embalm in cedar-oil and exhibit to strangers, and they would not deign to give them back even for a ransom of an equal weight in gold.24

  Poseidonius was a Greek philosopher who travelled in southern Gaul in the early years of the first century BC, gathering material for his ethnographic study. He later settled in Rome and it is quite possible that Caesar met him. A Gallic coin from the middle of the century actually depicts a warrior holding a severed head in one hand. Archaeologists have also discovered a gruesome trophy at Ribemont-sur-Ancre, where the corpses of many armed warriors and some horses had been fixed to a wooden structure, so that they stood upright. The heads of all these men were missing, and it is now unclear whether they were defeated enemies or some form of sacrificial offering. Caesar mentions that mounds of spoils taken from an enemy were often dedicated to the gods and could be seen in many places, for the Gauls respected the rituals and would not dare to steal anything from them. He also states that before his arrival the tribes would go to war `well-nigh every year, in the sense that they would either make wanton attacks themselves or repelling such'. Strabo described the whole Gallic race as `war-mad', and it is clear that the knights were a warrior aristocracy. A man's status was judged by the number of warriors he maintained at his own expense and who were personally bound to him by solemn oaths. The strength and fame of their retinues acted as deterrents against anyone inside or outside the tribe from attacking them, or the communities loyal to and protected by the M.25

  Much of the military activity in Gaul seems to have taken the form of raiding, but at times warfare between the tribes could be on a very large scale, as in the struggle between the Aedui and Sequani for control of the trade route along the Rhone-Saone valleys. It is very unlikely that the growth in trade with the Mediterranean world caused the tribes of Gaul to become warlike, but it certainly acted as a spur to war-making. The goods that flooded into Gaul were primarily aimed at the aristocratic market. Wine played an important role in the feasting that bonded chieftain and warrior together, and luxury goods helped to increase a man's status or could provide spectacular gifts for loyal followers. The tribes along the trade routes had best access to such goods, and could also levy tolls on trade, and the bulk of the profits went to the aristocracy, giving them the wealth to support bigger and bigger bands of warriors. Leaders needed not just riches, but a high martial reputation if they were to encourage to join and then retain famous warriors in their train. Successful raiding was one of the best ways to achieve this, and also win plunder, some of which could be given to followers to confirm their loyalty. Individual leaders and whole tribes were willing to use force to control the trade routes. In addition the slaves, which seem to have been traded so freely for wine, had to come from somewhere, encouraging raiding to take captives. An aristocrat with a strong following of warriors might often turn this against enemies of his tribe, but there was also the temptation to use force in a bid for power inside the tribe. Kings had largely disappeared amongst the tribes of central Gaul, and even elsewhere their powers were limited, but the dream of monarchic or tyrannical power still fired the imagination of many powerful leaders. The institutions of the tribe, the magistrates and senatorial council, were not always strong enough to control such men.26

  In contrast to the Roman legions, Gallic armies were clumsy forces, which rarely had the logistical ability to remain in the field for a long campaign and were difficult for their commanders to manoeuvre. Warriors were individually brave, but, apart from the retinues of great men, rarely drilled or trained collectively, and the emphasis was generally on individual prowess. The semi-professional warriors who followed powerful chieftains were comparatively few in numbers, sufficient for a raiding expedition, but never more than a small inner core in a tribal army, which consisted mainly of all those men able to provide themselves with weapons. The Romans may well have copied mail armour as well as their commonest helmet designs from Gallic originals, but they were able to manufacture them in far greater quantities. Every legionary had a sword, shield, cuirass and helmet, but only the wealthy and some of the semi-professional warriors were likely to have had all of these things. The vast majority of warriors fought without any protection apart from a shield. Swords do seem to have been fairly common, but tended to be longer than the Roman style - itself a copy of a Spanish design - and used more for slashing than thrusting. Most of the tribes raised horses for riding, which were of a smaller size than most modern mounts but of good quality. Gallic cavalry were famous, and the mounted arm of the professional Roman army would subsequently copy many aspects of equipment, training and terminology from them. However, while very effective in a charge, the cavalry of the tribes, which inevitably consisted of the wealthier warriors, often showed little enthusiasm or aptitude for such important roles as patrolling.27

  Gaul was not in the most stable of conditions when Caesar arrived. The Roman province of Transalpine Gaul was still recovering from the rebellion of the Allobroges, who had received no reward for aiding Cicero in 63 Bc and had felt no alternative but to revolt. This had been suppressed by 60 BC, but the on-going struggle between the Aedui and the Sequani was a serious matter, since it affected the security of the province and the continuance of profitable trade. Both tribes were allied to Rome, but also displayed a willingness to seek outside help in winning the conflict. Around 71 BC the Sequani had summoned the Germanic King Ariovistus to bring his warriors to their aid. About ten years later he inflicted a serious defeat on the Aedui, many of whose principal noblemen were killed in the fighting. In return he was granted land on which his followers could settle. Soon afterwards the Aedui were also raided by the Helvetii from what is now Switzerland. Around the same time Diviciacus, a druid who had held the office of Vergobret, came to Rome seeking assistance. The Senate sent a delegation of envoys to the region, but took no direct action. In 59 BC, during Caesar's own consulship, Ariovistus was recognised as both king and a `friend of the Roman people'. For the moment this diplomatic activity had brought a measure of stability to the frontiers around Transalpine Gaul, but it is worth emphasising that Caesar was entering a dynamic situation. The balance of power between - and often within - the tribes was frequently changing. By no stretch of the imagination were the tribes of Gaul mere victims, passively awaiting the onslaught of Roman imperialism. Yet they were certainly disunited and divided, and these weaknesses would be ruthlessly exploited by Caesar.28

  MIGRANTS AND

  MERCENARIES: THE FIRST

  CAMPAIGNS, 58 BC

  At the moment fear of a war in Gaul is the main topic of conversation [in Rome]; for "our brothers" the Aedui have just fought and lost a battle, and the Helvetii are without doubt armed for war and launching raids into our province.' - Cicero, 15 March 60 BC.'

  On 28 March 58 Bc a people known as the Helvetii began to gather on the banks of the River Rhone near Lake Geneva. Some 368,000 people were said to be on the move, about a quarter of them men of fighting age, and the remainder women, children and the elderly. They wished to leave their homes in what is now Switzerland and cross to the western coast of Gaul, where they planned to settle on new, more extensive and fertile lands. Their route lead directly through the Roman province of Transalpine Gaul. News had reached Caesar of the impending migration earlier in the month, and immediately prompted him to hasten to his province. Until then he had been waiting just outside Rome, keeping a close eye on the struggles in the Senate and in the Forum. The Helvetii wished to move through Transalpine Gaul, taking the easiest route to their destination. The northernmost frontier of Caesar's great province was und
er threat, and public opinion would not be kind to a proconsul who dallied outside Rome while there was a crisis in the region placed under his command. After the chances he had taken to secure himself this command, Caesar could not afford failure of any kind. He hurried north, travelling with that phenomenal speed that so often amazed contemporaries. Covering on average 90 miles a day, he was on the Rhone eight days later. A crisis could also be an opportunity.2

  The migration was not the result of a sudden impulse, but the outcome of years of planning. It had first been conceived by Orgetorix, described by Caesar as by far the `noblest and wealthiest' man in the tribe, but he seems to have played upon existing frustrations. The Helvetii were a numerous and martial people who found their homeland increasingly restrictive, hemmed in by mountains, the Roman province beyond the Rhone, and the Rhine to the east. `With things as they were their freedom to range was restricted, and there were few opportunities of waging war on their neighbours; since they were men who craved war, they were greatly frustrated.'3 Raiding was endemic in Gaul, and it was the capacity to launch plundering forays with greater ease that the Helvetii desired. However, Caesar claims that Orgetorix had an ulterior motive, believing that uniting the tribe to this purpose would help him to make himself king. The Helvetii, like many of the other tribes, had ceased to be a monarchy and appear to have been ruled by a council of chieftains and by elected leaders or magistrates. Orgetorix had won over many other nobles and evidently possessed considerable power and support, for coins were minted at this time which carried his name in the form ORCIITIRIX. With the approval of the tribal leaders he was sent on a diplomatic mission to visit other tribes and prepare the way for the migration. Finding it easier to deal with individual chieftains rather than magistrates or tribal councils, he won over Casticus of the Sequani and Dumnorix of the Aedui. These two tribes dominated central Gaul, and the Helvetii would pass through or near their territory on the journey to the west. Their support, or even their non-intervention, would make the migration easier and help the Helvetii to establish themselves once they had arrived. Orgetorix encouraged both Casticus and Dumnorix to hope for supreme kingship in their own tribes, most likely promising them support from Helvetian warriors in the aftermath of the migration. Casticus' father had in fact been sole ruler of the Sequani, and been formally acknowledged as a `friend of the Roman people' by the Senate. Dumnorix was the younger brother of the druid Diviciacus, and had built up a considerable following in the tribe. The three leaders secretly took a solemn oath - always a sinister thing in Roman eyes - binding themselves to aid the others in their enterprises. Dumnorix also married the daughter of Orgetorix, continuing his fondness for marriage alliances - his mother had already been married off to the leading man amongst the Bituriges, his half-sister and other female relatives to various chieftains in the neighbouring tribes. Allied together, the three leaders of what would be the strongest tribes in central Gaul, felt that no one would be able to oppose them.4

  The preparations of the Helvetii were thorough. Their leaders judged that at least two years - 60 and 59 BC - were needed to make themselves ready to move. Draught cattle were gathered, some apparently bought or taken from their neighbours, and the greatest amount of cereal crops planted to produce a surplus that would feed them on their journey. Worrying reports of the plan came to the notice of the Senate in Rome, no doubt forwarded on by friendly leaders in the tribes as well as the governor of Transalpine Gaul. In 60 BC it was decided to send a delegation to Gaul, including a number of men with experience in the area and family connections amongst the tribes. Contact seems to have been made with the German King Ariovistus, who had been brought into Gaul to aid the Sequani against their rivals, but who had now settled with his warriors and their families on a large tract of tribal land. Otherwise we know little of the Roman delegation's activities, but the situation did soon appear to be turning in Rome's favour. In spite of the diplomatic success of Orgetorix, word reached the other Helvetian nobleman of his wider ambitions and he was placed on trial for aspiring to tyranny. The penalty for this crime was to be burned alive, and Orgetorix decided to intimidate the other leaders. On the day appointed for his trial he arrived accompanied by his warriors, dependants and all tribesmen bound to him by social obligation or debt, which gave him a force of over 10,000 men - perhaps an eighth of the entire military strength of the Helvetii. It was to be a contest between the budding institutions of a state and traditional patterns of aristocratic leadership. No actual trial could occur under such circumstances, but the other leaders were not permanently overawed and soon began to muster a full levy of the tribe with which to crush him once and for all. However, before civil war could actually break out, Orgetorix died amidst rumours of suicide. Preparations for the migration continued in spite of this, and his death did not in any way alter the tribe's determination to go through with its plans. The Romans may not have fully appreciated that the momentum was still there even after the removal of the leader behind the plan. By May 60 BC Cicero felt that the prospect of a major war in Gaul had been averted, much to the displeasure of the consul Metellus Celer, who had been granted Transalpine Gaul as his province.'

  This is Caesar's explanation for the migration, a product of the tribe's desire for greater opportunity to raid and the personal ambition of Orgetorix. Not all scholars have been willing to accept this at face value and have suggested that he concealed the truth in order to justify his own subsequent actions. They note, for instance, that the Commentaries make no mention of Ariovistus, the Germanic king who had fought for the Sequani and subsequently settled in their lands. This leads to the suggestion that the main intention of the Helvetii was to assist the other tribes in defeating Ariovistus and his Germans. In Caesar's own consulship the German leader was named a `friend of the Roman people' by the Senate and those fond of conspiracies suggest that he needed the neutrality or even complicity of Ariovistus to deal with the Helvetii in 58 BC. Once they had been defeated, he cynically turned on the German and drove him from Gaul. In this version, Caesar did not want the Helvetii to evict Ariovistus and so deny him the excuse for intervention in Gaul.'

  None of this is convincing, for it is mainly reliant on hindsight. In the first place it is inherently unlikely that Caesar could have got away with such a massive distortion of the facts in his account, given that this was subject to hostile - and often informed - criticism. It is also unlikely that Rome would have viewed the expulsion of Ariovistus by the Helvetii entirely favourably. Their province of Transalpine Gaul was at present bordered by the Aedui and Sequani, both of whom had allied status. Ariovistus had recently been brought into the system. The province itself had just suffered a major rebellion on the part of the Allobroges and ideally required a period of stability if trade and revenue were not to suffer. The arrival of a strong tribe threatened to disturb this existing network of alliances. There was also the question of what would happen to the Helvetii's own homeland once they left. If the abandoned land were then settled by newcomers, perhaps from one of the German tribes, then this might pose a new threat to the Roman province. On the whole the Romans were suspicious of the movements of peoples, so common in Iron Age Europe, and sought to prevent these from occurring in the lands near to their own provinces. Nor was it in their interest for the tribes of Gaul to unite independently of Rome.

  Therefore Caesar would have had ample justification for intervention even if the Helvetii had intended to fight Ariovistus, and did not need to conceal this. On balance, his own account is far more plausible. Casticus and Dumnorix clearly both believed that they would gain from the arrival of the migrants, and doubtless expected support from Orgetorix against all their opponents, whether foreign or within their own tribe. Those leaders of the Sequani who had invited Ariovistus into Gaul in the first place, and the many chieftains who would appeal to Caesar for aid over the coming years, acted with the same motives. Association with a strong external force boosted a chieftain's prestige, and might well be converted in
to direct military assistance. It is misleading to speak of pro- or anti-Roman factions within the tribes - or for that matter pro- or anti-German or Helvetian groups. Each individual leader sought whatever aid he believed would be of most benefit to him, and all were engaged in the struggle for dominance within the tribe. Some leaders, and indeed the ruling councils of some tribes, decided that they were better off allied to Caesar and Rome, while other men and peoples who were their rivals acted differently.'

  Yet in the spring of 58 BC there is every sign that Caesar was wrong-footed by the Helvetii. Perhaps he had been surprised by the timing of the migration, or maybe its sheer scale. He had four legions at his command, but only one of these was in Transalpine Gaul. The remaining three were camped near Aquileia on the border of Cisalpine Gaul nearest to Illyricum. It is not known who stationed the troops there, but even if it had not been Caesar, then he had made no effort to alter this disposition. Even when he hastened to the Rhone he made no effort to send new orders to these troops. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he was still thinking very much in terms of a Balkan campaign. Perhaps it was only when he arrived near Geneva that he appreciated the full scale of the problem. The Helvetii and the allied clans who joined them in the migration had piled their possessions into wagons and set off with great purpose. Behind them they left the smouldering ruins of their towns and villages, deliberately put to the torch to discourage anyone from wavering if the journey became difficult. Caesar may have exaggerated when he claimed that every single settlement was burned, and indeed in the implication that not a single tribesman remained behind, but the upheaval was clearly a massive one.

  The figure of 368,000 migrants was said by Caesar to have been taken from captured records that the Helvetii themselves had made using Greek characters - Gallo-Greek inscriptions using the Celtic language but Greek alphabet are fairly common finds from southern Gaul and attest to the long presence and influence of Massilia. Any numbers found in an ancient text must always be treated with a degree of caution, since it is so easy for them to become distorted over the centuries as manuscripts were copied and recopied. In cases of this sort, the Roman desire to quantify military victory in the numbers of enemies killed and cities captured encouraged deliberate exaggeration. It is certainly a very high figure, suggesting a density of population considerably higher than would be expected, even in a region so overcrowded as to produce a migration. Yet in the end we know so little about ancient levels of population that it is unwise to be too dogmatic, and if we reject Caesar's figure then we have nothing with which to replace it. Modern suggestions of more `plausible' totals can never be anything more than conjectural. In the end, even if Caesar did exaggerate, or was genuinely mistaken, a substantial number of people and animals were on the move, probably in many separate parties rather than one immensely long column, which would have presented huge practical and logistical problems. However, at certain points, such as river crossings and mountain passes, there would have been a tendency for the different groups to cluster closer to each other.'