MICHAEL BAIGENT was born in New Zealand in 1948, and obtained a degree in psychology from Canterbury University, Christchurch. Since 1976 he has lived in England.
RICHARD LEIGH studied at Tufts University, the University of Chicago, and the State University of New York at Stony Brook.
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Secret Germany
Staufffenberg and the True Story of Operation Valkyrie
Michael Baigent
Richard Leigh
Copyright © 2008 by Michael Baigent and the estate of Richard Leigh
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Baigent, Michael.
Secret Germany : Stauffenberg and the true story of Operation Valkyrie / Michael
Baigent, Richard Leigh.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
9781602392694
1. Schenk von Stauffenberg, Klaus Philipp, Graf, 1907-1944. 2. Generals--Germany--Biography.
3. Anti-Nazi movement--Germany--Biography. 4. Hitler,
Adolf, 1889-1945--Assassination attempt, 1944 (July 20) 5. Germany--Politics and
government--1933-1945. 6. Collective memory--Germany. I. Leigh, Richard, 1943-2007.
II. Title.
DD247.S342B35 2008
943.086’4092--dc22
[B]
2008003868
Printed in Canada
Table of Contents
Also by
Title Page
Copyright Page
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part One - THE BOMB PLOT
1 - The German Resistance
2 - Operation Valkyrie
3 - In the Wolf’s Lair
Part Two - THE RISE OF PRUSSIA
4 - Blood and Iron
Part Three - CLAUS VON STAUFFENBERG
5 - The Cult of Stefan George
6 - The New Reich
7 - The Path of Aggression
8 - Operation Barbarossa
Part Four - THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEART AND SOUL OF GERMANY
9 - After the War of Liberation
10 - Culture and Conquest
11 - Myth and Might
12 - Legislators of the World
Part Five - HEROISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
13 - In the Courtyard of the Bendlerstrasse
Notes and References
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
Although this book revolves around the charismatic figure of Colonel Count Claus von Stauffenberg, Chief of Staff of the Reich Reserve Army, it is not intended to be a conventional biography. Neither is it merely an account of the plot he conceived with a group of conspirators to kill Adolf Hitler in July 1944. Some say that had he succeeded he would have become the de Gaulle of Germany and saviour of the national soul, but even in failure he stands as an atonement for the Third Reich and a resolution of the conflicting myths of German culture. If Stauffenberg occupies centre stage in our story, it is because he throws such a clear light on the troubled past of the German-speaking people and explains the dilemma of their search for national identity.
A conventional biography of all three Stauffenberg brothers was published recently in German by Peter Hoffmann, whose book we acknowledge as a useful source of information. But our enquiry has taken us far beyond its parameters. We have viewed Stauffenberg as a reflecting medium, a lens through which we could focus the forces and circumstances that fostered the phenomenon of National Socialism and, not least, the meaning of heroism in the twentieth century.
Any approach to a corpus of historical data demands an element of selectivity. In addressing ourselves to the wider trends, we were obliged to omit some of the more detailed material we encountered in our research. We have not attempted to do full justice to the Widerstand (the German resistance to Hitler) and have deliberately avoided certain aspects of it, such as the diplomatic activities of Adam von Trott zu Solz and the civilians of Helmuth James von Moltke’s ‘Kreisau Circle’. In some cases we derive a measure of consolation from the knowledge that we have deferred to the wishes of those who agreed to talk to us. Some of the people we interviewed were reluctant to see the events of the ‘Bomb Plot’, or the Widerstand, exposed and raked over again. They were prepared to recall painful memories for us, and to re-open old wounds, precisely because they endorsed the broader issues we wanted to explore. For these people, the details of what happened were less important than the interest we showed in the tradition, the heritage, the mentality and the code of honour that made resistance to the Third Reich a moral and spiritual imperative.
Among the officers directly involved in Stauffenberg’s conspiracy we must cite the late Axel von dem Bussche who, in 1944, was prepared to sacrifice his own life in an attempt to eliminate Hitler. In the months preceding his death in 1992, Freiherr von dem Bussche displayed immense generosity in making available to us both his time and his memories. We are equally indebted to Ewald von Kleist, who was also prepared to sacrifice himself and who was actually present in the War Office on 20 July 1944. Ludwig von Hammerstein was another officer present at the scene, and we owe our thanks to him for sharing his recollections. The exploits of these men and their seemingly miraculous escape from Nazi retribution would constitute a gripping and self-contained narrative of its own.
We must thank Otto John, another eyewitness of the events at the War Office and subsequently, during the 1950s, head of West Germany’s security services. We must also thank Angela zu Solms and Nona von Haeften, whose network of friends and relations made themselves available to us—in particular Jan von Haeften, Barbara von Haeften, Gottliebe von Lehndorff and Vera von Lehndorff. Some of their accounts proved as poignant and harrowing as those of active participants in the conspiracy.
We are especially grateful to General-Major Berthold von Stauffenberg, who took time from his official duties to talk to us about his father and his family’s tradition of service. For their comments on Stefan George, we would also like to thank Harold-Victor Koch and Hans-Dietrich Fühlendorf.
An enormous debt is owed to Nadia Shah, who undertook a daunting job of translation for us, and for additional help with translation our thanks go to Belinda Hunt, Dörte McCourt and Anne Westholm.
Among others who have helped in a variety of ways, we wish to thank Sacha Abercorn, Jane Baigen
t, Peter and Christabel Bielenberg, Karl Blessing, Brie Burkeman, Pascal Cariss, Jonathan Clowes, Tony Colwell, Rolf Cyriax, Ann Evans, Patrick Janson-Smith, Sir George Kennard, Claudia Limmer, Tom Maschler, Michael and Brigitta von Preussen, Caroline Michel, Ulrike Netenjakob, Ute Oelmann and John Saul.
All extracts from the works of Stefan George are reprinted from The Works of Stefan George, translated by Olga Marx and Ernst Morwitz. Copyright © 1974 by University of North Carolina Studies in Germanic Languages and Literatures, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA. All rights reserved.
For permission to reproduce photographs we thank Archiv für Kunst und Geschichte (1, 15, 16); Bilderdienst, Süddeutscher Verlag (3, 4, 7, 8, 18, 26, 33); Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand Berlin (6); Gehlen-Memoirs ‘Der Dienst’ published 1971 by von Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz (21); Stefan George-Archiv, Stuttgart (32, 34, 36, 37); Barbara von Haeften (5); Sir George Kennard (24); Ullstein Bilderdienst (2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 35). Other photographs were taken for this book by Michael Baigent.
We also wish to acknowledge Lori Keenan, who contributed appreciably to the work’s original inspiration. And we would like to acknowledge the memory of Hauptmann Jaspers, who helped bring something of significant worth into the world.
M.B. and R.L.
February 1994
Introduction
By the spring of 1943, the Second World War was careening towards its fourth year of conflict. It would still have another two years to run, and some of the bloodiest and most bitter fighting had yet to occur. Nevertheless, the tide, in Churchill’s phrase, had at last begun to turn. In three of the most important theatres of operations, the Allies—the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States—had forced the Axis on to the defensive, and were just beginning to take the offensive themselves.
During the previous year, three decisive engagements had transformed the course of the war, dramatically reversing the flow of its momentum. The first of these was the Battle of Midway, in June 1942, when Japan’s seemingly inexorable sweep across the Pacific had been abruptly halted, and the loss of four aircraft carriers left Japanese air and sea power irreparably impaired.
On the Russian front, where Hitler’s advancing forces were locked in a titanic struggle with those of the Soviet Union, the German 6th Army’s assault on Stalingrad had ground to a halt. By the last week of November, the army was entirely encircled by the Russian counter-offensive. On 31 January 1943, the 6th, Army surrendered with its surviving 91,000 men, having already suffered nearly 200,000 casualties. Germany had previously undergone reverses, of course—in the Battle of Britain, for example, and at sea—but Stalingrad was the German war machine’s first major setback on land. It was a decisive defeat and led to the series of Russian counter-thrusts that carried the Red Army across the whole of Eastern Europe, into the pulverised ruins of Berlin.
In North Africa, the progress of the war had seesawed almost since the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. After being repeatedly thrashed by British forces, Italy’s battered and demoralised troops were reinforced by the Afrika Korps under General (later Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel, known respectfully even by his adversaries as the ‘Desert Fox’. For more than a year, Rommel and a succession of British commanders fenced with each other across the sands of Egypt and Libya. The situation was at its worst for the British in March 1942, when Tobruk, the last bastion before Alexandria and the Suez Canal, finally fell. Rommel seemed unstoppable: he had only to smash his way through the exhausted British 8th Army, and Alexandria and the canal would be his for the taking. Loss of the canal would have been a fatal blow for Britain, permanently depriving her of a crucial sea route to such distant parts of the empire as India, Australia and New Zealand. It would have allowed the Afrika Korps to fulfil Hitler’s grand design—to advance eastwards, up through Palestine, into the vital oil fields of modern-day Iraq and Iran. From here, they could have linked up with the German armies already striking down through the Ukraine and the southern regions of the Soviet Union.
Such was the daunting prospect confronting the Allies in mid-1942. But in July, Rommel’s thrust towards the Suez Canal was parried by the 8th Army under General (later Field Marshal) Sir Claude Auchinleck at the first Battle of El Alamein. Shortly thereafter, Auchinleck was replaced by a new commander, the then little-known General Bernard Law Montgomery, and during the summer and early autumn, 8th Army was massively reinforced. At last, on the night of 23-4 October, Montgomery launched his counter-offensive with the famous artillery barrage of more than eight hundred heavy guns, the most ferocious and concentrated such barrage of the war. After eleven days of sustained fighting, 8th Army broke through the German and Italian defences, and Rommel began a retreat which was to carry him westwards across Egypt and Libya into Tunisia—fifteen hundred miles back across the desert with Montgomery in hot pursuit.
Five days after Montgomery’s breakthrough at Alamein on 3 November, British, American and Free French forces had landed at the opposite end of the North African coast—at Algiers, Casablanca and Oran. According to the language employed at the time, they were to constitute the anvil on which the hammer of Montgomery’s 8th Army smashed the retreating Germans. But things did not go entirely to plan. German reinforcements were rushed into Tunisia. The soldiers of the American II Corps, moreover, were green, their discipline was lax and they offered an enticingly vulnerable soft spot on the Allied front.
On 4 February 1943, the Staff Officer in charge of operations for the German 10th Panzer Division had been seriously injured by a mine. Ten days later he was replaced by a 36-year-old aristocrat from an 800-year-old Swabian family, Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-Colonel) Claus Philipp Maria Schenk, Graf (Count) von Stauffenberg. On that same day, 10th Panzer Division attacked the American II Corps at Sidi Bou Zid. For the Americans, it was their baptism of fire, and their nominal commander, General Fredendall, was nowhere near the front—he had queasily ensconced himself in an underground bunker more than sixty miles away. Daunted by the German onslaught, most of the Americans abandoned their weapons and fled.
A much larger and even more ignominious humiliation followed five days later, at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. Held in reserve for the first day of the engagement, 10th Panzer Division joined the German assault on 20 February. Again, the Americans panicked and fled, losing nearly 2,700 killed and wounded and another 2,500 prisoners. Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander, had been reluctant to call on British support, hoping his troops would acquit themselves honourably on their own. The urgency of the situation, however, took precedence over national pride. General Fredendall was relieved of command (and packed off to the United States with a face-saving promotion). While his successor, George Patton, undertook to rebuild the tattered American morale, help was invoked and a counter-attack launched by the British 6th Armoured Division. By 22 February, the Germans had been driven back to their former positions at Mareth.
Two weeks later, 10th Panzer Division was in action again, this time striking east from Mareth in an audacious but futile attempt to halt Montgomery’s advancing 8th Army at Medenine. When Montgomery counter-attacked on 20 March, 10th Panzer offered particularly fierce resistance, and it was not until six days later that the Germans were forced to abandon their positions at Mareth. In both of these engagements, 10th Panzer’s new Staff Officer (Operations) made a dramatic impression on subordinates, colleagues and superiors alike.
In spite of all his office work, the Staff Officer (Operations) invariably found time to keep in touch with the troops. He would frequently visit regiments and battalions to discuss personal or official problems with commanding officers. By informal discussion on the spot, he would deal with a whole mass of business which would otherwise have had to be cleared up through official channels. His conversation was not, however, limited solely to official matters; he would range over history, geography, literature, and, of course, politics. Though he was clearly opposed to the existing system, he never tried to persuade
or influence anybody. He did not seem to me to be in any sense fanatical, impetuous or a go-getter trying to change everything at once ... He had the natural charm of the Swabian, which everybody found irresistible.
One of the new Staff Officer’s subordinates offers a particularly eloquent testimony:
Although I was only a twenty-two-year-old subaltern . . . I was extraordinarily impressed by Stauffenberg’s personality. He seemed to me the ideal of an officer. His manner was so frank and friendly that one did not get the impression of being a subordinate. His thoughtfulness inspired one with confidence. On the other hand, the incision with which he spoke drew respect; he was a man possessed of natural authority. It was typical of Stauffenberg’s way of going about things that he was determined to get to know personally all officers in the division, down to company commander, as soon as he could—which was why I was ordered to report to him. This was not normal procedure. He was determined that there should be close contact between the staff and the troops.1;2
On 7 April, two weeks after the German retreat from Mareth, the Allied pincers closed—the Anglo-American forces that had landed in November linked up with Montgomery’s 8th Army advancing from the east. This determined the fate of the Afrika Korps and its Italian allies, now boxed in amid Tunisia’s rocky hills and flat barren passes. On 12 May, 250,000 German and Italian troops surrendered, thereby paving the way for the invasion of Sicily and then the Italian mainland—the first Allied foothold on the continent of Europe since the evacuation at Dunkirk three years before.
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