by Rod Gragg
The Federal Artillery Prepares a Killing Field
Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery for the Army of the Potomac, had just completed a three-hour inspection of his artillery when the Confederate bombardment opened. A middle-aged, bewhiskered West Pointer from Michigan, Hunt was a third generation army officer. Thoroughly professional in bearing and conduct, he had been decorated for bravery in the Mexican War, and, as a major at First Bull Run, he had organized cover fire from his artillery to protect the inexperienced, panicky Federal troops as they retreated. At the Battle of Malvern Hill, his placement and direction of the Federal artillery had shredded the Confederate ranks assaulting his batteries, proving crucial to the Federal victory. Afterward General McClellan had promoted him to chief of artillery as a brigadier general. Later, McClellan’s replacement, General Hooker, had demoted Hunt to a desk job, but after the Federal loss at Chancellorsville, he was restored as the army’s chief of artillery.
At Gettysburg, Hunt’s artillery was greatly responsible for turning back the Confederate attacks on both ends of the Federal line on July 2. That night Hunt stayed up half the night getting his guns in place, so his artillery would be ready if the Confederates attacked the center of the Federal line on July 3. He watched the incoming Confederate artillery fire with the eye of an expert, and concluded that while the barrage was grimly spectacular, it did not do the job the enemy had expected. It killed many soldiers, blew up artillery caissons, knocked horses dead in their tracks, and was frightfully unnerving to endure, but it did not destroy or demoralize the Federal army. For some reason, most of the unprecedented bombardment fell in the rear of the Federal lines, and did little harm to the rows of blue-uniformed infantrymen hunched down behind their stone and fence-rail breastworks.
Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt, commander of the Federal artillery at Gettysburg, was co-author of Instructions for Field Artillery—the field manual used by artillery officers on both sides. At Gettysburg, his expertise would prove invaluable.
Library of Congress
Hunt expected much more from his own artillery. He had placed thirty-six artillery batteries—a total of 163 guns—at key positions to defend Cemetery Ridge, and at least seventy-four of them directly supported the center of the Federal line. Hunt ordered his artillery to return the Confederate fire, and his skillfully placed line of Federal artillery poured forth a torrent of shot and shell toward the distant line of Confederate cannon—for a while. Hunt watched the Federal fire carefully, measuring it moment by moment. He wanted to be sure his guns had ample ammunition for the Confederate infantry assault that he believed would soon strike the center of the Federal line. After about a half-hour of furious return fire, he ordered the Federal artillery to cease firing to conserve ammunition. Hunt trusted his forces could handle whatever the Confederates sent across the sprawling open fields that lay in front of Cemetery Ridge: his guns had transformed the Southern route of assault into a killing field.
Decades later, General Hunt would describe in detail the careful way he had positioned the Army of the Potomac’s artillery to defend Cemetery Ridge on July 3.
On the Federal side Hancock’s corps held Cemetery Ridge with Robinson’s division, First Corps, on Hays’s right in support, and Doubleday’s at the angle between Gibbon and Caldwell. General Newton, having been assigned to the command of the First Corps, vice Reynolds, was now in charge of the ridge held by Caldwell. Compactly arranged on its crest was McGilvery’s artillery, forty-one guns, consisting of his own batteries, reenforced by others from the Artillery Reserve. Well to the right, in front of Hays and Gibbon, was the artillery of the Second Corps under its chief, Captain Hazard. Woodruff’s battery was in front of Ziegler’s Grove; on his left, in succession, Arnold’s Rhode Island, Cushing’s United States, Brown’s Rhode Island, and Rorty’s New York.
In the fight of the preceding day the two last-named batteries had been to the front and suffered severely. Lieutenant T. Fred Brown was severely wounded, and his command devolved on Lieutenant Perrin. So great had been the loss in men and horses that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to twenty-six. Daniels’s battery of horse artillery, four guns, was at the angle.
In addition, some of the guns on Cemetery Hill, and Rittenhouse’s on Little Round Top, could be brought to bear, but these were offset by batteries similarly placed on the flanks of the enemy, so that on the Second Corps line, within the space of a mile, were seventy-one guns to oppose nearly one hundred and fifty. They were on an open crest plainly visible from all parts of the opposite line. Between ten and eleven A. M., everything looking favorable at Culp’s Hill, I crossed over to Cemetery Ridge, to see what might be going on at other points. Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was covered by [Confederate] batteries already in line or going into position. They stretched—apparently in one unbroken mass—from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard, which bounded the view to the left, the ridges of which were planted thick with cannon.
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“It Was of First Importance to Subject the Enemy’s Infantry, from the First Moment of Their Advance, to Such a Crossfire”
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Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely, if ever, abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell, or to guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries and shake our infantry; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the half mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire. With such an object the cannonade would be long and followed immediately by the assault, their whole army being held in readiness to follow up a success. From the great extent of ground occupied by the enemy’s batteries, it was evident that all the artillery on our west front, whether of the army corps or the reserve, must concur as a unit, under the chief of artillery, in the defense....
It was of the first importance to subject the enemy’s infantry, from the first moment of their advance, to such a cross-fire of our artillery as would break their formation, check their impulse, and drive them back, or at least bring them to our lines in such condition as to make them an easy prey. There was neither time nor necessity for reporting this to General Meade, and beginning on the right, I instructed the chiefs of artillery and battery commanders to withhold their fire for fifteen or twenty minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us—but slowly, so that when the enemy’s ammunition was exhausted, we should have sufficient left to meet the assault.
With the U.S. Artillery’s crossed-cannon insignia affixed to his kepi, a Federal artilleryman strikes a jaunty pose. On July 3, Federal gun crews composed of such men would inflict huge casualties on Lee’s army.
Library of Congress
I had just given these orders to the last battery on Little Round Top, when the signal gun was fired, and the enemy opened with all his guns. From that point the scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, whilst the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurtling of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode to the Artillery Reserve to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased; but both the reserve and the train were gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them, then I returned to the ridge. Turning into the Taneytown pike, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had “decamped,” in the remains of a dozen exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill, but which the shells had managed to search out. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behi
nd the ridge than on its crest, which I soon reached at the position occupied by General Newton behind McGilvery’s batteries, from which we had a fine view as all our own guns were now in action.
Most of the enemy’s projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek shelter. And just here an incident already published may be repeated, as it illustrates a peculiar feature of civil war. Colonel Long, who was at the time on General Lee’s staff, had a few years before served in my mounted battery expressly to receive a course of instruction in the use of field artillery. At Appomattox, we spent several hours together, and in the course of conversation I told him I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I had heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over the whole field. He was amused at the criticism and said: “I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered, wondered what you would think about it!”
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“Most of the Enemy’s Projectiles Passed Overhead”
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I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events. As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throwing him “over and over.” He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead, and a ridge of earth where he had been lying reminded me of the backwoods practice of “barking” squirrels.
Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead. Being told that the general had gone to the cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not there, and on telling General Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault.
On my way to the Taneytown road to meet the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, I met Major Bingham, of Hancock’s staff, who informed me that General Meade’s aides were seeking me with orders to “cease firing”; so I had only anticipated his wishes. The batteries were found and brought up, and Fitzhugh’s, Cowan’s and Parsons’s were put in near the clump of trees. Meantime the enemy advanced. . . .8
Perched on a snake rail fence behind the Confederate artillery, General James Longstreet reluctantly obeyed Lee’s orders and sent the Pickett-Pettigrew Charge forward. “I do not want to make this attack…,” he told a subordinate.
DeGolyer Library, Southern Methodist University
“For God’s Sake, Come on Quick”
The Pickett-Pettigrew Charge Gets Underway
Colonel Edward Porter Alexander stood near one of his artillery batteries, which was firing away at Cemetery Ridge, and surveyed the distant Federal line by telescope. He was trying to measure the effect of the Confederate artillery bombardment, but the clouds of whitish smoke produced by his guns and the Federal return fire made it almost impossible to see anything. Meanwhile, incoming rounds peppered Alexander’s line of artillery and landed in the woods to the rear, where Pickett’s and Pettigrew’s infantry lay on the ground waiting for the order to advance. Much of the Federal artillery return fire also overshot its target—the Confederate artillery—and hit far to the rear, but many rounds landed amidst the Southern artillery batteries and the massed troops waiting in the woods.
“The air was alive with bursting shells,” a Confederate infantryman would later recall. “Fragments of shells and limbs of trees were falling in every direction. Men were being constantly wounded.” The artillery duel had transformed the midday stillness to a “screaming, shrieking, bellowing pandemonium of shells and flying fragments,” another would report. “I look around,” a Confederate officer later recollected, “[and] what a change, from order to chaos, from beauty to destruction, from life to death—levelled fences, splintered trees, furrowed ground, broken cannon, exploded caissons, slaughtered horses, mangled men.” On the far left flank of the Confederate line—on Pettigrew’s side of the assault force—the Federal shelling triggered a panic in Colonel Robert Mayo’s brigade of Virginians. Formerly Brockenbrough’s Brigade, the Virginians had survived the first day’s fighting, where their brigade had been badly shot up on McPherson’s Ridge. Now scores of them fled under the shelling—they “shamefully ran away,” in the words of an officer. They proved, however, to be the exception among the Southern troops waiting to make their assault: instead of fleeing, most flattened themselves on the ground and weathered the barrage of falling iron.
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“Pickett Said, ‘General, Shall I Advance?’”
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Propped against a tree to steady his telescope, Colonel Alexander finally spotted what he had been looking for—through the smoke of battle he could see Federal gun crews limbering up their artillery and heading for the rear—and the Federal artillery fire slackened. “At first, I thought it was only crippled guns,” he would later explain, “but, with my large glass, I discovered entire batteries limbering up & leaving their positions.” The Confederate artillery bombardment had done its work, he believed: the Federal artillery was being forced from the field. Surely the Federal infantry was also unnerved, demoralized, and ready to break. By Alexander’s reckoning, the Confederate artillery bombardment had been underway for more than forty gruelling minutes. His ammunition was running low, leaving little to support the infantry assault, and—to his dismay—he realized that his reserve ammunition was nowhere close by. For all these reasons, he believed it was time to cease fire and to notify Pickett to advance. Pulling out a scrap of paper, he hastily scribbled a note to General Pickett: “For God’s sake,” it read, “come on quick. . . .”
General Pickett received Alexander’s dispatch and took it to General Longstreet, who had picked a spot of ground from which to watch the assault. “General, shall I advance?” he asked. Longstreet, still opposed to Lee’s battle plan, looked away, nodded grimly, and said nothing. “I am going to move forward, sir,” Pickett stated, then saluted and raced away on horseback to begin the charge. Decades later, Longstreet would publish his memoirs—From Manassas to Appomattox—recalling his version of the events leading up to the Pickett-Pettigrew Charge.
I rode to a woodland hard by, to lie down and study for some new thought that might aid the assaulting column. In a few minutes report came from Alexander that he would only be able to judge of the effect of his fire by the return of that of the enemy, as his infantry was not exposed to view, and the smoke of the batteries would soon cover the field. He asked, if there was an alternative, that it be carefully considered before the batteries opened, as there was not enough artillery ammunition for this and another trial if this should not prove favorable.
He was informed that there was no alternative; that I could find no way out of it; that General Lee had considered and would listen to nothing else; that orders had gone for the guns to give signal for the batteries; that he should call the troops at the first opportunity or lull in the enemy’s fire.
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“The Effort to Speak the Order Failed”
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The signal-guns broke the silence, the blaze of the second gun mingling in the smoke of the first, and salvoes rolled to the left and repeated themselves, the enemy’s fine metal spreading its fire to the converging lines, plowing the trembling ground, plunging through the line of batteries, and cloudi
ng the heavy air. The two or three hundred guns seemed proud of their undivided honors and organized confusion. The Confederates had the benefit of converging fire into the enemy’s massed position, but the superior metal of the enemy neutralized the advantage of position. The brave and steady work progressed.
Before this the Confederates of the left were driven from their captured trenches, and hope of their effective co-operation with the battle of the right was lost, but no notice of it was sent to the right of the battle. They made some further demonstrations, but they were of little effect. Merritt’s cavalry was in rear of my right, threatening on the Emmitsburg road. Farnsworth’s brigade took position between Merritt’s and close on my right rear. Infantry regiments and batteries were broken off from my front line and posted to guard on that flank and rear.
Southern gun crews put a section of artillery to work against distant Federal positions. On Gettysburg’s third day, the Confederate artillery bombardment was terrifying in its intensity, but it did far less damage than expected.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
Not informed of the failure of the Confederates on the left and the loss of their vantage-ground, we looked with confidence for them to follow the orders of battle.
General Pickett rode to confer with Alexander, then to the ground upon which I was resting, where he was soon handed a slip of paper. After reading it he handed it to me. It read:
