Bismarck clearly was. On 9 March 1870 he presented a memorandum to King William in which he argued that ‘it is therefore to Germany’s political interest that the House of Hohenzollern should gain an esteem and an exalted position in the world analogous to that only of the Habsburgs after Charles V. The King remained stubbornly against the proposal and wrote sceptical marginal notes against Bismarck’s arguments. After all, the throne of Spain lacked real stability and might be overthrown by a casual pronunciamiento at any time.87 Bismarck used the occasion of a dinner in Berlin hosted by Prince Karl Anton on 15 March, which Roon and Moltke also attended, to hold an informal Crown Council, to try again to persuade the King, who maintained his ‘strong scruples’ against it.88 Bismarck’s own account of his role exceeds in its mendacity the lies we have already recorded in this book. Here it is:
‘Politically I was tolerably indifferent to the entire question. Prince Anthony [Karl Anton—JS] was more inclined than myself to carry it peacefully to the desired goal. The memoirs of his Majesty the King of Roumania are not accurately informed as regards details of the ministerial co-operation in the question. The ministerial council in the palace which he mentions did not take place. Prince Anthony was living as the King’s guest in the palace, and had invited him and some of the ministers to dinner. I scarcely think that the Spanish question was discussed at table.89
On 20 April Prince Karl Anton and Prince Leopold let Madrid know that they were no longer interested. On 13 May Bismarck wrote to Delbrück to express his rage and frustration:
The Spanish affair has taken a miserable turn. The undoubted reasons of state have been subordinated to princely private interests and ultramontane, feminine interests. My annoyance about all this has heavily burdened my nerves for weeks.90
On 21 May Bismarck returned to Berlin and on the 28th told Prince Karl Anton that he had finally changed the King’s mind. On 8 June he withdrew again to Varzin to let the royal family negotiate the candidacy without him so that as usual he could shift the blame for whatever went wrong onto princely intrigues. On 19 June Prince Leopold finally sent his acceptance letter to Madrid, which was made public on 2 July. On 5 July the new British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, paid his first visit to his new department where the long-serving and experienced Permanent Under-Secretary Edmund Hammond told him that ‘he had never during his long experience known so great a lull’.91 At 12.10 the same day the British Ambassador Layard sent a telegram in which he reported that through an indiscretion he had got news of the acceptance of the Crown of Spain by Prince Leopold.92 The following day, the new French Foreign Secretary, the Duc de Gramont, announced to the French Chamber of Deputies that the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne constituted a serious attempt to change the European Balance of Power to the detriment of the French Empire. The honour and interests of France had been severely injured. He hinted that France would regard it as grounds for war.93 Later that day, 6 July 1870, the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, Karl Freiherr von Werther (1808–92) arrived at Bad Ems, where the royal family were taking the water of the Lahn, and met Alfred Waldersee, the military attaché in Paris, who as a royal General Adjutant had joined the King there. He told Waldersee in great excitement that
‘the devil is loose in Paris. It looks like war.’ When yesterday morning he had gone to Gramont to take leave for the holidays, he found him in a very excited mood. A telegram from Madrid said that Prince Leopold Hohenzollern was supposed to be presented to the Cortes as successor to the vacant throne. Gramont was beside himself. He had complained of lack of consideration and deceit on our part and said straight out, the thing was impossible. France could never concede that, the Ministry would be questioned in the chamber. Werther was to an extent in a difficult situation because he had not heard a word about the whole business. He could only take evasive action. Luckily for him that he had previously planned this journey to Ems. I thought he ought not to have gone. The King received him almost at once after his arrival in a long audience. It is really uncomfortable that Bismarck is in Varzin. All decisions are naturally much more complicated.94
On the same day, the Crown Princess wrote to Queen Victoria, ‘After the Spanish crown had been decidedly refused by the Hohenzollerns and the King, the former have been applied to again, and, having changed their minds meanwhile, seem likely to accept it—much to the King and Queen’s annoyance …’95
The next day, 7 July 1870, Waldersee complained in his diary about Bismarck’s behaviour in the crisis:
Bismarck refused to believe in any approaching danger and was determined to stay in Varzin where he was taking the waters. The sudden prospect of war with France upset the King very much and he wanted earnestly to get the affair settled. As bad luck would have it, Prince Leopold Hohenzollern was not in Sigmaringen but had gone on a trip to the Alps. Nobody knew where he was.96
On 8 July Waldersee asked the King for permission to return to his post in view of the threat of war and the King gave him his view of the background of the previous events and then added, as Waldersee recorded:
A few months ago the Spaniards had knocked on the door again and now all of a sudden the father and son Hohenzollern have become passionately in favour of the thing to my great astonishment, whereas before they were pretty uncertain. They allowed themselves to be talked into it by Bismarck, and the Prince who had doubted that he had the guts to be King of Spain, was suddenly filled with idea that he had a mission to make Spain happy. I begged him earnestly to think it over very carefully, but when he insisted I gave him my permission as head of the family … I have Bismarck to thank for this because he took the whole matter so casually, as he has so much else. [Waldersee on the margin of the diary entry: ‘exact words’] … It was the first time I had ever heard the King talk about serious business. He developed his ideas with great clarity and without hesitation in his speech.97
This testimony—spontaneously given—makes it impossible not to think that Bismarck engineered the crisis and that the French reacted exactly as he had imagined they would. His absence in Varzin merely covered his tracks in the event that things went wrong.
When Waldersee returned to Paris on 9 July, he found the French in high excitement. At the station he ran into ‘Captain Leontiev, an assistant to the Russian attaché, Prince Wittgenstein. His first words: “you have a war; believe me, you cannot stop it.”’ In the evening, Waldersee sent a ciphered telegram to Bismarck: ‘In the War and Navy Ministries elaborate preparations are under way for the conduct of a large war. Reserves have not yet been called to the colours but it looks as if troop movements will begin tomorrow. The railroads have been advised. There seems to be an inclination to strike without mobilized troops.’98
What happened next could not happen today in the age of instant and ubiquitous communications. Because Bismarck was still in Varzin, he did not know that on 9 July 1870 Count Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, who was in Bad Ems, asked the Prussian King for direct information about the situation. The King replied that the matter concerned him as Head of the Hohenzollern family not as King of Prussia. He found it hard to refuse the Catholic Sigmaringen branch in such a matter and could not intervene. In fact, on 10 July, he wrote to Prince Karl Anton a letter in which he urged the father to convince the son, Prince Leopold, to withdraw his name. Karl Anton acted at once and on 12 July made public that the Hereditary Prince Leopold had withdrawn his name. William had also sent an urgent telegram to Varzin ordering Bismarck to come at once to Bad Ems as a matter of the greatest urgency.99
Bismarck had no idea that these developments had occurred which one can deduce from the fact that on 10 July 1870 he sent a telegram to his banker Bleichröder that it would be ‘a good idea’ to unload the railroad shares in his portfolio.100 Today that would be an example of ‘insider trading’ but it certainly confirms that on 10 July Bismarck expected a war. When he got to Berlin on the 12th, he learned for the first time that Leopold had withdrawn. In the late afternoon his carria
ge halted in the Wilhelmstrasse and a sheaf of telegraphs was shoved into his hand. Sitting there in the street he learned for the first time of Karl Anton decision and the extent of William’s involvement in his renunciation. Other messages from Paris told of ‘vaunts and taunts’ in the Paris press. Descending to the sidewalk, he thought of resigning. Prussia, he judged, had suffered a humiliation worse than Olmütz.101 Bismarck called a meeting with Moltke, Roon, and Count Eulenburg. Moltke arrived red in the face, ‘because he had now made the trip [to Berlin] for nothing, and the war which he had already firmly planned seemed to recede into the distance again … Old Roon was dejected too.’ Bismarck said: ‘Until just now I thought I was standing on the eve of the greatest of historical events, and now all I will get from it is the unpleasantness of the sudden interruption of my Kur … [to Herbert] I would urge you to work hard because there is not going to be a battlefield promotion.’102
Still Bismarck had to do something to save his face and his diplomatic situation. He went to see Gorchakov, who was briefly in Berlin on the way home from taking the waters at Wildbad. ‘Apparently he [Bismarck] spoke with Gortchakov about a diplomatic offensive which would be directed at the inflammatory speeches of Gramont. They agreed to criticize the French foreign minister indirectly by emphasizing to the European governments the restraint and moderation of the King and his ministry. In this sense Gortchakov spoke to Lord Loftus and de Launay. Loftus immediately went to see the French chargé d’affaires, Le Sourd, and urged on him that the French government should be satisfied with what they had achieved and recognize the conciliatory spirit of the Prussian King.’103
Meanwhile in Paris, Waldersee wrote an account of what happened:
On the morning of the 12th, Baron Werther came back from Ems, very tired because of the heat. Immediately after his arrival, a man from the Foreign Office, the Chief of Gramont’s cabinet, Count Faverney, appeared and asked if Werther could not visit Gramont as soon as possible. Werther replied, he would come at once. When he came back from the meeting, Solms and I were waiting for him in the Embassy. After we had heard him, we both said that war was now unavoidable. He refused to accept this view. ‘A war between France and Prussia is an event of such huge importance, so terrible a disaster for so many people, the cause is besides so trivial that it is the duty of every man of honour to seek to prevent it by every means in his power. That has been my guiding principle and for that reason I have resolved to write to the King.’ From a general human point of view he was undeniably right; as Prussian Ambassador he should have behaved to Gramont very differently. … Bismarck’s telegram which recalled the ambassador was so crude that I could hardly believe it. As Werther went to take leave of the Duke de Gramont, I accompanied him to the Foreign Ministry. When he came back to the ante-chamber, he said to me, ‘this walk marks the end of my career.’ He did not deceive himself. Bismarck never spoke to him again.
The editor of the Waldersee diary, Hans Otto Meisner, notes that this is ‘wrong. Werther was dismissed in 1871 but recalled in 1874 and sent as Ambassador to Constantinople where he served until 1877.’104 I pause here to salute Karl Freiherr von Werther for a remarkable act of civil courage, a diplomat who put his honour and his horror of war above his career and his duty to Bismarck as his chief.
If the Duc de Gramont had taken Gorchakov’s advice and been satisfied by the public and stunning victory of French diplomacy over Bismarck, again war would have been avoided but he took a further step. He ordered his ambassador who was still in Bad Ems to get a promise from the King that Prussia would take no similar action in the future. On the 13th as Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon sat together over dinner, a telegram from William I arrived from Bad Ems that reported how Ambassador Benedetti had confronted the King and insisted that the King give his solemn word that nothing of the sort would happen again. The King, offended, not only said that he could make no such promise but, when asked by Benedetti if he could have another chance to discuss the matter, refused to see the French ambassador. The King asked Bismarck ‘whether the new demand and my refusal should not be communicated to our embassies abroad and to the press’.105
Bismarck now had what he needed. He took a pencil and edited what he had received from the King to make it sound more offensive. In the original text the King had written that he had ‘let the Ambassador be told through an adjutant that he had now received from the Prince confirmation which Benedetti had already received from Paris and had nothing further to say to the Ambassador.’ Bismarck altered the phrase to make it more provocative. In Bismarck’s version it read, ‘His Majesty the King had thereupon refused to receive the French Ambassador once more and let him know through an adjutant that His Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the ambassador.’106 Years later Lucius von Ballhausen happened to be present when the three conspirators showed up at an evening in the Wilhelmstrasse and recalled the events of 1870:
After dinner as we sat around smoking cigars, Field Marshall Roon arrived, coughing and puffing and breathless. He suffered from an asthmatic condition … Later Count Moltke arrived … He received him very cordially and said, tapping him on the knee, ‘the last time we three sat together was on the 13 of July 1870. What a stroke of luck it was that the French went so far! How hard it would have been to find another equally favourable opportunity! We never altered Benedetti’s dispatch but condensed it in such way as to show the French pretensions in their full strength. Everything had been surrendered with respect to the Hohenzollern candidacy and had the French not insisted that we promise never to do so again, we might have given up yet more. I asked you both “are we ready?” You said “we are ready”.’107
On 14 July 1870 the French ministerial council decided to declare mobilization and declared war on 19 July. Bismarck claimed afterwards that his editing of the Ems Dispatch had forced Napoleon III to go to war, though evidence suggests that France had decided to fight earlier. As in the case of the Austrian war, an ill-prepared and badly organized state and army went to war without proper mobilization.
On the Prussian side the Crown Princess was not unrepresentative of the anti-French feeling that had been stirred as a result of French arrogance. On 16 July she wrote to Queen Victoria:
We have been shamelessly forced into this war, and the feeling of indignation against such an act of such crying injustice has risen in two days here to such a pitch that you would hardly believe it; there is a universal cry ‘to arms’ to resist an enemy who wantonly insults us.108
The 16th of July was the first day of mobilization of the Prussian army. Arden Bucholz writes,
By January 1870 railroad mobilization had been reduced to 20 days, 260 per cent better than 1867 with a force nearly three times as large and a mobilization and battle space area seven times larger than 1866. It delivered German forces to the French border like a factory assembly line. And allowed Moltke’s timing patterns to begin to dominate war … On the tenth day the first units disembarked on the French border, by the thirteenth day, the troops of the Second Army were assembled there, on the eighteenth the number was 300,000.109
On 19 July reserve officers were mobilized. In the Reichstag Lucius von Ballhausen, a reserve officer in the Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment, went up to the ministers’ table and asked Roon and Moltke whether he should remain in parliament or report at once. Roon smiled, ‘there’s no rush. You can stay here. There is plenty of time before the Etappen have to be set up on enemy soil and we have eight to ten days jump on the French.’110
The Prussian generals had absolute confidence in their General Staff and in its chief, Helmuth von Moltke. We can catch a little of the atmosphere two days after the French declaration of war on 19 July, from Waldersee’s diary:
Today early in the morning I arrived on the Paris express in good shape but tired by the heat and very dusty. On the platform I ran into Prince Friedrich Karl who greeted me in a very friendly way and told me to go right to Moltke where a meeting was underway. I did that, was admitted and
found Moltke with General von Podbielski and the three department chiefs, Bronsart, Verdy and Brandenstein. Moltke conveyed his respects and then pressed me for information. Afterwards I changed as quickly as possible and went to the royal palace. Radziwill was on duty and I was admitted at once. The King was cheerful and friendly as always, gave me his hand and thanked me for the reports. After asking about French conditions, he said, ‘you will stay with me.’ So my fate was decided for the near future. I was to have the good fortune going to war as the direct companion of this marvellous chief.111
The Prussian Army had recently fought a victorious war and in the interim had learned a variety of lessons. In 1866 it had expected a long bloody war but the opposite had occurred. They saw no reason not to repeat the exercise in 1870 and in the first stage of the war, they were right. Moltke in his short summary of the official history of the war gives a desolate picture of French preparations. The French went to war in a collective fit of insanity. ‘The regiments had been hurried away from their peace stations before the arrival of their complement of men and without waiting for their equipment. Meanwhile the called-out reservists accumulated in the depots, overflowed the railway stations and choked the traffic.’ The planned thrust through the Black Forest which the General Staff had expected never occurred. Careful negotiations on the Prussian side had integrated the southern German armies into the Prussian system and the resulting performance of Bavarian, Württemberg, and Baden units exceeded expectations. Prussian mobilization on the other hand proceeded exactly according to plan. The King declared war on 16 July 1870. Fourteen days later, 300,000 Prussian and allied soldiers had assembled at Mainz all ready to strike into France and, since the French had not used the flank to attack from Strasbourg across the Rhine, Moltke could make his front more compact. The mobilization plan foresaw the same three-part division of forces that had worked so well in enveloping the Austrians in 1866. Three armies under the command respectively of General von Steinmetz (First Army), Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia (Second Army), and Prince Frederick the Crown Prince (Third Army) which contained the Baden, Württemberg, and Bavarian Corps and the 11th Corps of units from Hesse, Nassau, and Saxe-Weimar, had assumed their initial positions by the beginning of August. The Order of Battle on 1 August 1870 makes instructive reading for the historian of Prussia. Not one corps, divisional, or brigade commander in the line units of the I and II Armies lacked the aristocratic ‘von’. The famous names of Prussian history show up in the distribution of commands: several von Kleists (3), von der Goltzes (2), Neidhart von Gneisenau, von Below (2), von der Osten, von Sennft-Pilsach, von Manteuffel, von Bülow (2), von Wedell, von Brandenburg (2), a colonel von Bismarck, von Wartensleben, von Alvensleben, etc. and a sprinkling of royal princes in staff and command posts. In the First and Second Armies, only Major-General Baumgarth, who commanded the 2nd Cavalry Brigade in the First Army, Lieutenant Colonel Lehmann in command of the 37th Brigade in the Hanoverian 10th Corps, and Major General Tauscher of the Saxon 3rd Infantry Brigade, lacked a title. None of the Corps Commanding Engineers, on the other hand, had a title and many of the Commanding Artillery Generals at Corps and divisional levels belonged to the bourgeoisie.112 Old Prussia went into battle equipped with new technology, transportation, weaponry, and communications.
Bismarck: A Life Page 39
