GAS, GERMS, OR NUKES: WHICH IS MORE LIKELY FOR A LONE WOLF WMD ATTACK?
I discussed earlier why I believe lone wolves are prime candidates for using weapons of mass destruction. These reasons range from a lack of any self-constraints concerning casualties or reactions as lone wolves decide upon an attack to the ability to think outside the box and design creative, innovative, and dangerous attacks. However, since WMDs include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, it is important to determine which of these is more likely to be used by the individual terrorist.
Of the three different, basic types of WMDs, chemical weapons are the easiest for a lone wolf with a background in chemistry to produce. Chemical agents are “poisons that incapacitate, injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the skin, eyes, lungs, blood, nerves, or other organs.”52 The precursor chemicals for the production of many chemical warfare agents are readily available from commercial chemical suppliers, and several chemical weapons, such as sarin, tabun, and VX gas, can be made either at home or in a small laboratory. As is true for terrorist groups, a lone wolf still has obstacles to overcome in terms of dispersing chemical agents. If not done properly, as in the case of Aum Shinrikyo, the attack is compromised. Yet, with information on how to effectively disperse chemical agents available from the Internet and other sources, this is not an insurmountable obstacle for a lone wolf.
Acquiring, producing, and dispersing biological agents is somewhat more difficult, but it's still within the ability of those lone wolves with scientific backgrounds. While Bruce Ivins had the expertise to produce the particular strain of anthrax that he sent through the mail to his various targets, not every lone wolf who chooses to use bioweapons needs to be a Fort Detrick microbiologist. As with chemical weapons, there is enough publicly available information on the Internet and in other sources to help the lone wolf who wants to launch a bioterrorist attack. One of the major differences between chemical and biological weapons is that chemical weapons are primarily manmade (such as sarin nerve gas), while biological weapons are comprised of living organisms such as bacteria and viruses as well as toxins derived from plants or animals. Biological warfare agents involve “the deliberate use of disease and natural poisons to incapacitate or kill people.”53 Among the biological agents that could be used by lone wolves are bacterial agents such as anthrax, viral agents such as smallpox, and toxin agents such as ricin. An important distinction to make regarding biological agents is that some, such as anthrax, cause infectious but not contagious diseases, while others, such as smallpox, cause infectious and contagious diseases. People exposed to anthrax, therefore, do not have to be quarantined, but those exposed to smallpox will have to be isolated from others. Contagious diseases can also spread around the world as one person passes the disease to another. The mass-killing potential of biological agents makes these attractive weapons for lone wolves.
There is, however, a great deal of uncertainty regarding how exactly a bioterrorist attack will unfold. Bioterrorism is characterized by much more uncertainty regarding tactics, targets, weapons, and scenarios than is the case for conventional terrorism, the terrorism that we are all more familiar with because it has happened so many times before. Conventional terrorism includes tactics such as hijackings, bombings, shootings, kidnappings, barricade/hostage incidents, suicide airplane attacks, and the like. The targets of conventional terrorist attacks include governments, militaries, businesses, and society, while the weapons used by conventional terrorists are, among other things, explosives, guns, knives, and rocket-propelled grenades. And with many different types of conventional terrorist attacks occurring over the years, ranging from simultaneous car and truck bombings to assassinations and hijackings, we know of thousands of different scenarios that may occur.
But it is an entirely different story when we look at the world of bioterrorism. Since there has never been a bioterrorist attack with large numbers of casualties, perpetrated either by a lone wolf or a terrorist group, there is no substantial track record of previous major bioterrorist incidents to guide us in planning for this threat. We really don't know what tactics, targets, weapons, or scenarios will be associated with current and future bioterrorists. In terms of tactics, lone wolves could disperse anthrax spores from a low-flying airplane or crop duster, or they might release a biological agent from the ground in an aerosol device such as a spray can. They could place ricin in the heating, ventilation, air-conditioning (HVAC) system of a building, or they could infect somebody with smallpox and watch it spread around the world. The targets could be the usual suspects, such as governments, militaries, businesses, and the general public, or it could be the economy. A viable target could be agriculture, for example, in the form of destroying crops and livestock. The weapons for a lone wolf bioterrorist attack could be any one biological agent or a combination of several different biological agents, including anthrax, smallpox, botulinum toxin, ricin, and/or new, novel agents that are genetically engineered. And when it comes to scenarios, we are confronted with basically a blank slate. We know of the anthrax letter attacks, but almost everything else when assessing what terrorists are likely to do with bioweapons is pure speculation, since we just do not have a database or history of major incidents to analyze. All this works to the advantage of the lone wolf perpetrating a bioterrorist attack. Furthermore, since biological agents are invisible, odorless, and tasteless, and symptoms of a biological-agent attack may not appear for hours or even days, a lone wolf could thus unleash these agents without raising suspicions at the scene of the attack.
The technological barriers for a lone wolf interested in producing and disseminating a biological agent are not insurmountable. As one microbiologist writes:
Today, anyone with a high school education can use widely available protocols and prepackaged kits to modify the sequence of a gene or replace genes within a microorganism; one can also purchase small, disposable, self-contained bioreactors for propagating viruses and microorganisms. Such advances continue to lower the barriers to biologic-weapons development.54
Former secretary of the navy Richard Danzig agrees, noting:
Compared to working with nuclear materials, the challenges of developing the requisite know-how and obtaining the required equipment for bioterrorism are modest. The hurdles that impede obtaining an effective biological weapon will vary from pathogen to pathogen, according to the mode of distribution and the efficiency desired by an attacker. But all these hurdles are being lowered by the dissemination of knowledge, techniques, and equipment.55
The most difficult, and therefore least probable, of the weapons of mass destruction that could be used by a lone wolf is a nuclear weapon. The appeal of such a weapon to a terrorist lies in its killing potential. Nuclear weapons “can be more than a million times more powerful than the same weight of conventional explosives, create shock waves, high pressures, flying debris, and extreme heat—the same mechanisms by which conventional explosives injure and kill, albeit at vastly increased scale.”56 Nuclear explosions also create radiation, which can kill or injure exposed people at the instant of detonation. There is also the risk of fallout, which can spread over an area much greater than that affected by the bomb's immediate radius. Fallout can also lead to long-term, delayed medical problems, including cancer and genetic abnormalities.57
Yet the technological, logistical, and financial obstacles involved in acquiring or building and using nuclear weapons would seem to be too much for a lone wolf to overcome. Nuclear weapons are much more expensive to produce than chemical or biological weapons, and the technology needed to devise such weapons is not widely available. It is also much more difficult for a lone wolf to transport a nuclear device to a target site without being discovered through radiation detectors and other security devices than it would be for a lone wolf to transport a chemical or biological weapon. While a lone wolf could attempt to attack a nuclear power plant with a conventional explosive, the tight security in place at most nuclear plants would be diff
icult for a lone wolf to penetrate. Furthermore, a conventional explosive is unlikely to do much damage to nuclear-reactor plants because they are built to resist damage by explosives and even the impact of commercial aircraft.58
There has been much discussion in policy and academic circles regarding terrorists building a crude nuclear device or stealing a nuclear weapon. Distinguished political scientist Graham Allison observed that “nuclear terrorists are most likely to use a small weapon stolen from the arsenal of one of the nuclear states.”59 However, one of the world's leading terrorism experts, Brian Michael Jenkins, disputes this argument, noting, “While the possibility that some talented team of terrorists conceivably might someday design and build a crude nuclear device cannot be entirely dismissed, no terrorist group, not even those with potential access to poorly guarded nuclear sites like Russia's Chechens or those with hundreds of millions of dollars to spend like al Qaeda, has come close.”60 Both Allison and Jenkins were referring to groups or cells of terrorists and not to lone wolf operatives, for which obtaining and using a nuclear weapon would be even more difficult. Lone wolves are, however, capable of setting off a “dirty bomb,” which is not a nuclear bomb but rather a conventional explosive filled with radioactive material. While such an attack would not kill large numbers of people, except for those killed by the initial blast, it would still cause widespread panic and health problems related to airborne radiation.
Given how dangerous lone wolves can be, their creativity and innovation make them difficult to ignore. Yet there is a missing link in the story of lone wolf terrorism. Unlike many terrorist groups that have female members or even female leaders, the majority of lone wolves have been male. Why, then, have we not had many female lone wolves, and should we expect this to change in the coming years?
When it comes to explaining lone wolf terrorism, the absence of women is one of the more perplexing issues. After all, women have played significant roles in terrorist groups throughout history, and a few have ascended to leadership positions. Terrorists as diverse as the Russian revolutionary group Narodnaya Volya, the German leftist Baader-Meinhof Gang, the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the Palestinian al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, to name just a few, have all had women in their ranks. Women have been used in various roles within terrorist organizations, including providing logistical support, joining their male comrades in violent attacks, and even becoming suicide bombers themselves. Women have been involved in virtually every type of terrorist tactic used by a group, ranging from hijackings and midair plane bombings to armed assaults and kidnappings.
Yet with only a few exceptions, all lone wolf terrorists have been male. It is not as though women are excluded from becoming lone wolves. This form of terrorism is an equal-opportunity employer. No barriers would seem to exist in preventing a woman from venturing out on her own to blow up a building, hijack a plane, or initiate a mass shooting. Why, then, has lone wolf terrorism been a male-dominated activity? In order to answer this question, we have to first examine the role of women in various terrorist groups both today and in earlier periods for any clues as to why women have not acted as lone wolf terrorists.
FEMALE PARTICIPATION IN TERRORIST GROUPS
When women began embarking on suicide operations in recent years as members of various terrorist movements, people were understandably shocked. The public had grown accustomed to male suicide bombers, but the idea that a woman would also blow herself up in order to kill innocent victims was mind-boggling. The concept of a female terrorist was still something most people had a hard time grasping, despite the fact that women had participated in terrorist groups for a long time. Beginning with the Russian terrorists in the late-nineteenth century and continuing today with both Islamic and non-Islamic militant groups, women have consistently been integral players in the world of terrorism.
Terrorism was rampant in Russia in the 1880s, as the first modern terrorist group, Narodnaya Volya (“The People's Will”), waged a relentless campaign of dynamite bombings against government officials, culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Dynamite, which was invented in 1867 by Swedish chemist Alfred Nobel, was a godsend for anarchists and other militants, since it was a powerful weapon that was easy to conceal. Nobel was so dismayed to see his invention used for violent purposes—he had intended it to be used for peaceful endeavors such as construction—that he left millions of dollars in his will to establish the annual Nobel Prizes, including the Nobel Peace Prize. The Russian terrorists embraced dynamite because, in addition to its wide availability and easy use, it had an important symbolic value. Since the assailant was usually killed along with the targeted person, it separated the terrorists from common criminals, who would be afraid to use such a weapon.1 It also inspired admiration among some segments of the public, since the perpetrators were basically sacrificing their lives in the attacks.
Women were quite prominent in Narodnaya Volya. There were ten females among the twenty-nine members of the original executive committee.2 Throughout the 1880s, women participated directly in the group's operations.3 Nearly a quarter of all Russian terrorists during this period were women.4 It was a woman, in fact, who inspired the Russian terrorist movement. As I noted in chapter 1, Vera Zasulich's proclamation that she was a “terrorist, not a killer” after shooting a police commander in 1878 made her a heroine throughout Russia. Narodnaya Volya was eventually crushed by the new regime of Tsar Alexander III, after the assassination of his father, Tsar Alexander II. This led to a reduction in terrorist attacks. Terrorism, however, was revived in Russia in the early 1900s by the Socialist Revolutionary Party, with women once again being very active. In fact, from 1905 to 1908, there were eleven terrorist attacks committed by Socialist Revolutionary women.5
It would be several decades, however, before women once again became prominent in terrorist activities. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a surge in terrorism around the world, with many spectacular incidents captivating public attention. Palestinian militants were at the forefront of this violence. In July 1968, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al plane on a flight from Rome to Tel Aviv and diverted it to Algeria. Later that same year, the PFLP attacked an El Al plane at the Athens airport, killing one passenger. There were more attacks on El Al airliners in 1969, including a hijacking in August, in which two PFLP terrorists seized the plane on a flight from Rome to Athens and diverted it to Damascus. After allowing the passengers and crew to disembark, the two terrorists blew up the plane's cockpit. One of the terrorists was a woman, and she quickly gained notoriety and, in some places around the world, admiration. Leila Khaled instantly became the most famous female terrorist of her time. People were mesmerized by the concept of women seizing and blowing up planes or doing other dangerous things thought to be the sole province of men.
It didn't hurt that Leila Khaled was beautiful, smart, and daring. As one observer noted, “She became a sex symbol for her violence; she shattered a million and one taboos overnight; and she revolutionized the thinking of hundreds of other angry young women around the world.”6 Her value to the PFLP was so high that when she was captured during another hijacking less than a year later, the PFLP went all out to gain her release. Khaled and another PFLP member hijacked an El Al plane bound for New York on September 6, 1970. (The PFLP also hijacked three other planes [from Pan American World Airways, Trans World Airlines, and Swissair] bound for New York from European cities on that same day, making it the most spectacular hijacking in terrorism history until the 9/11 hijacking-suicide attacks in the United States.) Israeli security guards on the plane were able to kill Khaled's fellow hijacker and capture her while the plane was still airborne. The plane then landed in London, where British authorities arrested Khaled. The PFLP wanted her released but didn't feel that the British hostages they were holding from the three other hijacked planes would be enough to use as bargaining chips. They wante
d something more important, so they came up with a simple solution—hijack a British plane! They did that a few days later and then used the hostages from the British Overseas Airlines Corporation airliner to eventually win Khaled's release.7
Another female hijacker who gained publicity around the world was Julienne Busic, who, along with her husband, Zvonko, and three other Croatian extremists, seized a Trans World Airlines plane flying from New York to Chicago in September 1976. They demanded that a manifesto promoting the cause of Croatian independence from the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav federation be published in several newspapers and that pro-Croatian independence leaflets they had carried with them be dropped by helicopters flying over cities across the United States and Europe. To demonstrate their willingness to kill passengers if their demands weren't met, they told the authorities that they had a bomb aboard the plane and that another explosive device, as well as the manifesto that they wanted published, could be found in a locker across the street from Grand Central Station in New York City. The police located the bomb and took it to a demolition area, where they attempted to trigger it by remote control. When nothing happened after fifteen minutes, the bomb experts approached the device without wearing protective gear, and it exploded, killing one officer and injuring three others.
Meanwhile, the hijacked plane embarked on a long odyssey that included stops in Montreal, Gander, Newfoundland, Reykjavík, and finally Paris, where French authorities shot out the tires from the plane so it could not take off again. Before the ordeal was over, the Croatian independence manifesto was published in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times. Leaflets were also dropped over North American cities as well as London and Paris. The hijackers surrendered in Paris and were sent back to the United States. The most remarkable aspect of the hijacking was that the terrorists had no weapons onboard. The “bombs” they claimed they had turned out to be fake, some of them made from clay.8
Lone Wolf Terrorism Page 12
