Frustrated with their inability to catch the Mad Bomber, police turned to a psychiatrist, Dr. James Brussel, in 1956, to produce one of the first-ever psychological profiles of a terrorist. Brussel surmised, based on the many letters that Metesky had sent to newspapers, police, and Con Ed over the years, as well as the phallic construction of the bombs and other facts of the case, that the bomber was a single man between forty and fifty years old, disinterested in women, an introvert, unsocial but not antisocial, egotistical, moral, honest, and religious. He was portrayed as a skilled mechanic, an immigrant or first-generation American who was neat with tools, and a present or former employee of Con Ed, with a possible motive for the bombings being that he was discharged or reprimanded. Brussel also concluded that the bomber's resentment kept growing and that it was probably a case of progressive paranoia. Some of the other characteristics in Brussel's profile of Metesky included that he was meticulous and feminine, possibly homosexual, and most likely living with his parents or sisters. Brussel also predicted that when the police finally caught up with the Mad Bomber, he would be wearing a buttoned, double-breasted suit. (Metesky was arrested at home in his pajamas but changed into a buttoned, double-breasted suit for the ride to the police precinct!)83
Brussel urged the police to publicize the profile as a way of goading Metesky to communicate with the authorities. Part of the profile was published in the New York Times and other New York newspapers on Christmas Day in 1956. Brussel soon received a call from Metesky in which he said, “This is F.P. speaking. Keep out of this or you'll be sorry.” (F.P., it would later be learned, stood for “Fair Play,” the name Metesky was using in all his communications.) Although the call was too brief to be traced, Brussel felt that it would only be a matter of time before Metesky's arrogance would cause him to make a mistake.84
Metesky's mistake occurred when the Journal-American newspaper, in conjunction with the police, published an open letter to the bomber the day after the profile had been published, urging Metesky to give himself up in return for guarantees of a fair trial and an opportunity to publish his grievances in the newspaper. Metesky, arrogant and overconfident, just as Brussel had predicted, declined the offer in his response, writing, “Where were you people when I was asking for help? Placing myself into custody would be stupid—do not insult my intelligence—bring the Con Edison to justice.” The Journal-American published his letter and requested more information from Metesky about his grievances. Metesky complied with a second letter that included the fact that he had pursued a workman's compensation claim against Con Ed. After publishing that response, the newspaper asked him for more details and dates about the compensation case so that a new and fair hearing could be held. Metesky fell into the trap and wrote back that he was injured on September 5, 1931. (In his original letters to Con Ed, Metesky claimed he was knocked down by a backdraft of hot gasses from a boiler, which later caused him to develop tuberculosis.) The authorities now had an exact date to check against Con Ed's records. They had already been given Metesky's file by an alert employee at Con Ed, who, after going through old records, noticed similarities in the wording of his original letters requesting compensation and his recent letters in the newspaper. Among the phrases that caught her attention was the threat to “take justice in my own hands.” Police had no trouble locating him, since he was still living with his sisters at the same Waterbury, Connecticut, address that was listed in his work file. The fifty-three-year-old Metesky was arrested in January 1957. He was found by psychiatrists to be “an incurable paranoid schizophrenic with a strong impulse to martyrdom” and was committed to an asylum for the criminally insane. Upon his release in December 1973 he returned to his home in Waterbury, where he died in 1994.85
As with the Fuchs case, it cannot be said that the profiling alone caught Metesky. The “Mad Bomber” was discovered by falling into the psychological trap that was placed for him with the invitation to write about his motivations to the newspapers. Fuchs was caught because he felt the mounting pressure of the government's public announcements that they were closing in on the anonymous mail bomber. But in both cases, the profiles gave the authorities a better idea of who they were dealing with and contributed to the psychological campaigns that were aimed at getting the lone wolves to make a mistake.
One of the more famous cases in which psychological profiling and psychological warfare had little effect was that of the Unabomber. Despite a seventeen-year search for Theodore Kaczynski, with numerous assessments provided by psychiatrists, psychologists, and others, the only reason he was caught was due to his jealousy over the attention that Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber, was receiving, which motivated him to threaten more bombings unless his manifesto was published in the newspapers. It was that publication, and his brother turning him in after recognizing the writing style and phrases as those of Kaczynski, that led to his capture.
Entice the Lone Wolf to Communicate
Perhaps the most important aspect of any psychological campaign against lone wolves is encouraging them to communicate in any way possible. The more information a lone wolf provides, the more likely it becomes that he or she will be identified. It worked with Metesky, who unwittingly revealed enough about himself in his communications to lead to his arrest. Sometimes no encouragement is needed, as in the case of Muharem Kurbegovic, the Alphabet Bomber, who sent in several audio tapes to the media during his terror campaign in 1974. It was those tapes that led to his identification and arrest. The same was true for Kaczynski, who desperately sought an outlet for the dissemination of his antitechnology, anti-industrial-society views. The irony is that had the Internet been accessible during his reign of terror, he probably would have used it to post his manifesto online early in his terrorist career (despite his distaste for technology). The same scenario that played out years later, when his brother turned him in after reading the manifesto in a newspaper, would have likely occurred once his brother read it online. Subsequent attacks may have therefore been prevented.
The desire to talk, which, as noted earlier, is a universal human need and can be used to identify lone wolves before they launch their first attack, can also be used after an attack to track them down. Lone wolves are dying to let somebody, anybody, know what they have done. After succeeding with an attack, there is no fun in just retreating back into their isolated world and keeping totally quiet about what has transpired. We are living in an age in which the ability to communicate and get one's message out to the world is easier than in any other time in history. Lone wolves who want to complain about perceived injustices that were done to them or to others, brag about their recent terrorist attack, or taunt the authorities do not have to bother with sending in secret notes in block letters that are cut and pasted from newspapers, magazines, or books, as kidnappers used to do in the old days when they wanted to let their victims’ families know that they had their loved ones in captivity. All they have to do now is go to their computer, or use one from a library, Internet café, or some other venue, to send out a message.
If lone wolves are not communicating on their own after an attack and need encouragement to do so, then law-enforcement agencies need to devise plans to bring them out into the open. In the Metesky case, police worked with the Journal-American to entice him to reveal more information about himself through open letters published in the newspaper. It turned out, though, that Metesky, who had already been writing letters for years to Con Ed, politicians, and others about his grievances, had always wanted to communicate but had never received a response, which reinforced his anger and resentment. In one of his published letters to the Journal-American, he promised to suspend his bombings for a while due to the newspaper's efforts on his behalf. “In about 3 weeks,” he wrote, “the N.Y. Journal American accomplished what the authorities could not do in 16 years. You stopped the bombings.”86
The Metesky case illustrates that the process of drawing out a lone wolf has to be gradual. With each letter from Metesky, th
e newspaper deftly asked for a little more information under the guise of helping him with his compensation claims. This avoided his becoming suspicious and abruptly ending the communications. In today's Internet world, the chances are that a lone wolf would probably choose an online outlet over a newspaper to conduct any communications. The challenge for law enforcement, therefore, is how to get a lone wolf to choose the authorities’ online presence over the multitude of others that comprise the virtual world of the Internet. In a way, their dilemma is the flipside of the one faced by terrorists, who want to gain the attention of the world when they commit an attack. The terrorists need to do something different or more spectacular than has been done previously in order to ensure that their activity, and therefore their message and cause, will not get lost or forgotten among the daily terrorist events occurring around the world. The authorities need to do the same, either through public announcements or some other activity, to ensure that they have the attention of the lone wolf and that he or she will begin a dialogue with them. The advice of psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists, sociologists, and others might be helpful in determining what actions or statements would have the best chance of motivating a particular type of lone wolf to begin communicating with the authorities.
COUNTER ANY “HERO STATUS” A LONE WOLF MAY BE GENERATING
There is always the risk that a lone wolf may gain a cult following after an attack. People can live vicariously through the exploits of an individual who takes on larger, more formidable foes. The Internet has only made this easier, as people can post on Facebook pages or send out tweets on Twitter in support of a lone wolf. It happened in the Eric Rudolph and Joseph Stack cases. Rudolph, the antiabortion militant who, in addition to bombing abortion clinics, set off an improvised explosive device at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, was able to elude the FBI for many years. As noted in chapter 2, there were T-shirts made supporting his activities (showcasing phrases such as “Run, Rudolph, Run” and “Eric Rudolph—Hide and Seek Champion of the World”) as well as messages posted on the Internet labeling him a hero after his arrest. “What some hatemongers and extremists are saying is, this person is a hero whose crusade against abortion and the government is noble and praiseworthy,” Abraham Foxman, the national director of the Anti-Defamation League, said after Rudolph's arrest in 2003. “What is even more troubling is that some of the chatter [on the Internet] is calling for violence or lone-wolf acts to be carried out in Rudolph's name.”87 Internet support for Stack also appeared shortly after he crashed his plane into IRS offices in Dallas. Several pro-Stack Facebook groups emerged on the Internet just hours after the attack. There were many postings describing Stack as a hero and patriot on both mainstream and extremist websites.88 His daughter initially described him as a hero but later retracted that statement.89
Countering the hero status of lone wolves is difficult, particularly in the Internet age, where positive descriptions of a terrorist can come from many different people and then get disseminated through Twitter, Facebook, and other outlets. And this support is not always based on somebody necessarily agreeing with the issue or grievance that the lone wolf is purportedly basing the attack on. Sometimes, it could just be an expression of David-and-Goliath syndrome, in which anything a lone wolf does against the big, bad government or business is viewed in a positive vein by many people. One possible way to counter this would be to emphasize the innocent victims who may have died or been injured in the lone wolf attack. Media interviews with victims and their families may lead some people to rethink their admiration for a lone wolf terrorist. Another strategy would be to avoid antagonizing those who are agreeing with the issues that the lone wolf claimed motivated the attack. Acknowledging that there are legitimate grievances that should be addressed but that there were nonviolent alternatives available to express those sentiments will not convince everybody, but it could still help defuse some of the support a lone wolf may be generating among the public.
The above are just some of the response strategies available for dealing with lone wolf terrorism. Others include preparing for the aftermath of a lone wolf bioterrorist incident. Lone wolves such as Bruce Ivins have already proven that a single individual can launch a bioterrorist attack that causes widespread fear throughout the nation. The irony of bioterrorism, however, is that, while it has the potential to cause many more casualties than “traditional” terrorist incidents, more lives can nevertheless be saved in its aftermath than in a conventional explosion. Whereas most of the fatalities in a conventional terrorist bombing occur immediately or shortly after the incident, in a bioterrorist attack the incubation period for the virus, bacterium, or toxin could be several days. As noted earlier in this chapter, accurate diagnosis and speedy treatment will be needed to save lives. The medical and health communities will therefore be playing the most significant role in responding to a potential lone wolf bioterrorist attack. There is thus a need for hospitals to have adequate supplies (or ways to quickly obtain these supplies) of antibiotics and antitoxins that can be used to treat those exposed to biological agents. Medical and emergency-services personnel also need to be trained to recognize the different symptoms of various biological agents so that those exposed can be treated quickly.90
We have seen how preventing and responding to lone wolf terrorism is a complex task requiring a mix of strategies and actions. Terrorists, whether they are lone wolves or part of a larger group or cell, will always have the advantage of reversing all perceptions of progress in the battle against terrorism with just one major successful attack. Even though it is an endless struggle, efforts must continue to improve our readiness to deal with all forms of terrorism, including those initiated by just one individual.
One of the most memorable quotes concerning the need to learn lessons from past experiences comes from the American philosopher George Santayana, who, in 1905, wrote: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1 In those brief words, he captured the essence of why it is crucial for governments, societies, and individuals to understand past mistakes so as not to repeat them in the future. Without usually acknowledging Santayana, virtually every hearing held and report issued after a major terrorist attack follows his advice. “Lessons learned” is a crucial part of any investigation into a terrorist incident. These “lessons” can include practically any issue, ranging from intelligence failures and lapses in physical security to understanding how various policies and actions by a government or military may have led to the terrorist attack.
When it comes to lone wolf terrorism, however, uncovering lessons learned becomes a little more difficult. This is due to the fact that we're dealing with an individual terrorist and not a group or state sponsor. Intelligence failures, for example, are usually not cited, since it is hard to blame an intelligence or law-enforcement agency for not knowing about a plot when the terrorist was not part of any conspiracy and had minimal or no communications with others prior to the attack. The same is true for pointing to various foreign or military policies as the cause of a terrorist incident, since some lone wolves can be oblivious to what is happening in the world yet still launch a devastating attack. There have been, nevertheless, a sufficient number of lone wolf attacks over the years from which we can derive lessons that can guide us in better understanding this growing phenomenon.
ISLAMIC MILITANTS DO NOT HAVE A MONOPOLY ON THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST THREAT
Despite all the attention that has been given to Islamic extremism since the 9/11 attacks, we have seen in this book that lone wolf terrorism is indeed a diverse threat. While there have been lone wolves ascribing to Islamic militancy, there have also been many secular, single-issue, criminal, and idiosyncratic lone wolves. In fact, the two worst lone wolf terrorist attacks in history were perpetrated by non-Islamic terrorists. Timothy McVeigh, a right-wing, antigovernment extremist, blew up the federal building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people. Anders Breivik, a right-wing, anti-Islamic extremist opposed to multic
ulturalism in Europe, was responsible for the massacre of sixty-nine people, mostly teenagers, at a Norwegian youth camp, in addition to killing eight other people in a bombing earlier that same day in Oslo.
These two incidents demonstrate how misperceptions about terrorism can dominate the public agenda. While al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups and cells have been the most active extremists around the world in recent years, lone wolves have come from all parts of the political, religious, and cultural spectrum. For every Nidal Malik Hassan (who went on a shooting rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, as a protest against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), there is a Bruce Ivins, who sent out anthrax-laden letters, in part, as a means for gaining more funding for his anthrax vaccine. For every Colleen LaRose (also known as “Jihad Jane,” who traveled to Europe to kill in the name of jihad), there is a James von Brunn, who attacked the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, due to his hatred of Jews and other minorities.
That is why any effort to understand the radicalization process as a means for preventing, or at least greatly reducing, the incidence of lone wolf terrorism is doomed to fail if it only focuses on Islamic radicalization. The process by which individuals become right-wing, antigovernment militants, white supremacists, antiabortion and environmental extremists, and so forth has to also be included in any research project or community outreach program. Otherwise, no matter how much success may be achieved regarding reducing lone wolf Islamic terrorism, we will still be left with the likes of Timothy McVeigh, Anders Breivik, and Bruce Ivins.
Lone Wolf Terrorism Page 24
