by Edmund Burke
PART VI. TREATY OF CHUNAR.
I. That the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, being vested with the illegal powers before recited, did, on the 19th of September, 1781, enter into a treaty with the Vizier at Chunar, — which treaty (as the said Hastings relates) was drawn up “from a series of requisitions presented to him [the said Hastings] by the Vizier,” and by him received “with an instant and unqualified assent to each article”; and that the said Hastings assigns his reasons for such ready assent in the following words: “I considered the subjects of his [the Vizier’s] requests as essential to the reputation of our government, and no less to our interest than his.”
II. That in the said treaty of Chunar the third article is as follows.
“That, as Fyzoola Khân has by his breach of treaty forfeited the protection of the English government, and causes by his continuance in his present independent state great alarm and detriment to the Nabob Vizier, he be permitted, when time shall suit, to resume his lands, and pay him in money, through the Resident, the amount stipulated by treaty, after deducting the amount and charges of the troops he stands engaged to furnish by treaty; which amount shall be passed to the account of the Company during the continuance of the present war.”
III. That, for the better elucidation of his policy in the several articles of the treaty above mentioned, the said Hastings did send to the Council of Calcutta (now consisting of Edward Wheler and John Macpherson, Esquires) two different copies of the said treaty, with explanatory minutes opposed to each article; and that the minute opposed to the third article is thus expressed.
“The conduct of Fyzoola Khân, in refusing the aid demanded, though (1.) not an absolute breach of treaty, was evasive and uncandid. (2.) The demand was made for five thousand cavalry. (3.) The engagement, in the treaty is literally for five thousand horse and foot. Fyzoola Khân could not be ignorant that we had no occasion for any succors of infantry from him, and that cavalry would be of the most essential service. (4.) So scrupulous an attention to literal expression, when a more liberal interpretation would have been highly useful and acceptable to us, strongly marks his unfriendly disposition, though it may not impeach his fidelity, and leaves him little claim to any exertions from us for the continuance of his jaghires. But (5.) I am of opinion that neither the Vizier’s nor the Company’s interests would be promoted by depriving Fyzoola Khân of his independency, and I have (6.) therefore reserved the execution of this agreement to an indefinite term; and our government may always interpose to prevent any ill effects from it.”
IV. That, in his aforesaid authentic evidence of his own purposes, motives, and principles, in the third article of the treaty of Chunar, the said Hastings hath established divers matters of weighty and serious crimination against himself.
1st. That the said Hastings doth acknowledge therein, that he did, in a public instrument, solemnly recognize, “as a breach of treaty,” and as such did subject to the consequent penalties, an act which he, the said Hastings, did at the same time think, and did immediately declare, to be “no breach of treaty”; and by so falsely and unjustly proceeding against a person under the Company’s guaranty, the said Hastings, on his own confession, did himself break the faith of the said guaranty.
2d. That, in justifying this breach of the Company’s faith, the said Hastings doth wholly abandon his second peremptory demand for the three thousand horse, and the protest consequent thereon; and the said Hastings doth thereby himself condemn the violence and injustice of the same.
3dly. That, in recurring to the original demand of five thousand horse as the ground of his justification, the said Hastings doth falsely assert “the engagement in the treaty to be literally FIVE thousand horse and foot,” whereas it is in fact for TWO or THREE thousand men; and the said Hastings doth thereby wilfully attempt to deceive and mislead his employers, which is an high crime and misdemeanor in a servant of so great trust.
4thly. That, with a view to his further justification, the said Hastings doth advance a principle that “a scrupulous attention to the literal expression” of a guarantied treaty “leaves” to the person so observing the same “but little claim to the exertions” of a guaranty on his behalf; that such a principle is utterly subversive of all faith of guaranties, and is therefore highly criminal in the first executive member of a government that must necessarily stand in that mutual relation to many.
5thly. That the said Hastings doth profess his opinion of an article to which he gave an “instant and unqualified assent,” that it was a measure “by which neither the Vizier’s nor the Company’s interests would be promoted,” but from which, without some interposition, “ill effects” must be expected; and that the said Hastings doth thereby charge himself with a high breach of trust towards his employers.
6thly. That the said Hastings having thus confessed that consciously and wilfully (from what motives he hath not chosen to confess) he did give his formal sanction to a measure both of injustice and impolicy, he, the said Hastings, doth urge in his defence, that he did at the same time insert words “reserving the execution of the said agreement to an indefinite term,” with an intent that it might in truth be never executed at all, — but that “our government might always interpose,” without right, by means of an indirect and undue influence, to prevent the ill effects following from a collusive surrender of a clear and authorized right to interpose; and the said Hastings doth thereby declare himself to have introduced a principle of duplicity, deceit, and double-dealing into a public engagement, which ought in its essence to be clear, open, and explicit; that such a declaration tends to shake and overthrow the confidence of all in the most solemn instruments of any person so declaring, and is therefore an high crime and misdemeanor in the first executive member of government, by whom all treaties and other engagements of the state are principally to be conducted.
V. That, by the explanatory minute aforesaid, the said Warren Hastings doth further, in the most direct manner, contradict his own assertions in the very letter which inclosed the said minute to his colleagues; for that one of the articles to which he there gave “an instant and unqualified assent, as no less to our interest than to the Vizier’s” he doth here declare unequivocally to be neither to our interests nor the Vizier’s; and the “unqualified assent” given to the said article is now so qualified as wholly to defeat itself. That by such irreconcilable contradictions the said Hastings doth incur the suspicion of much criminal misrepresentation in other like cases of unwitnessed conferences; and in the present instance (as far as it extends) the said Hastings doth prove himself to have given an account both of his actions and motives by his own confession untrue, for the purpose of deceiving his employers, which is an high crime and misdemeanor in a servant of so great trust.
VI. That the said third article of the treaty of Chunar, as it thus stands explained by the said Hastings himself, doth on the whole appear designed to hold the protection of the Company in suspense; that it acknowledges all right of interference to cease, but leaves it to our discretion to determine when it will suit our conveniency to give the Vizier the liberty of acting on the principles by us already admitted; that it is dexterously constructed to balance the desires of one man, rapacious and profuse, against the fears of another, described as “of extreme pusillanimity and wealthy,” but that, whatever may have been the secret objects of the artifice and intrigue confessed to form its very essence, it must on the very face of it necessarily implicate the Company in a breach of faith, whichever might be the event, as they must equally break their faith either by withdrawing their guaranty unjustly or by continuing that guaranty in contradiction to this treaty of Chunar; that it thus tends to hold out to India, and to the whole world, that the public principle of the English government is a deliberate system of injustice joined with falsehood, of impolicy, of bad faith, and treachery; and that the said article is therefore in the highest degree derogatory to the honor, and injurious to the interests of this nation.
PAR
T VII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE TREATY OF CHUNAR.
I. That, in consequence of the treaty of Chunar, the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, did send official instructions respecting the various articles of the said treaty to the said Resident, Middleton; and that, in a postscript, the said Hastings did forbid the resumption of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân’s jaghire, “until circumstances may render it more expedient and easy to be attempted than the present more material pursuits of government make it appear”: thereby intimating a positive limitation of the indefinite term in the explanatory minute above recited, and confining the suspension of the article to the pressure of the war.
II. That, soon after the date of the said instructions, and within two months of the signature of the treaty of Chunar, the said Hastings did cause Sir Elijah Impey, Knight, his Majesty’s chief-justice at Fort William, to discredit the justice of the crown of Great Britain by making him the channel of unwarrantable communication, and did, through the said Sir Elijah, signify to the Resident, Middleton, his, the said Hastings’s, “approbation of a subsidy from Fyzoola Khân.”
III. That the Resident, in answer, represents the proper equivalent for two thousand horse and one thousand foot (the forces offered to Mr. Johnson by Fyzoola Khân) to be twelve lacs, or 120,000l. sterling and upwards, each year; which the said Resident supposes is considerably beyond what he, Fyzoola Khân, will voluntarily pay: “however, if it is your wish that the claim should be made, I am ready to take it up, and you may he assured nothing in my power shall be left undone to carry it through.”
IV. That the reply of the said Hastings doth not appear; but that it does appear on record that “a negotiation” (Mr. Johnson’s) “was begun for Fyzoola Khân’s cavalry to act with General Goddard, and, on his [Fyzoola Khân’s] evading it, that a sum of money was demanded.”
V. That, in the months of February, March, and April, the Resident, Middleton, did repeatedly propose the resumption of Fyzoola Khân’s jaghire, agreeably to the treaty of Chunar; and that, driven to extremity (as the said Hastings supposes) “by the public menaces and denunciations of the Resident and minister,” Hyder Beg Khân, a creature of the said Hastings, and both the minister and Resident acting professedly on and under the treaty of Chunar, “the Nabob Fyzoola Khân made such preparations, and such a disposition of his family and wealth, as evidently manifested either an intended or an expected rupture.”
VI. That on the 6th of May the said Hastings did send his confidential agent and friend, Major Palmer, on a private commission to Lucknow; and that the said Palmer was charged with secret instructions relative to Fyzoola Khân, but of what import cannot be ascertained, the said Hastings in his public instructions having inserted only the name of Fyzoola Khân, as a mere reference (according to the explanation of the said Hastings) to what he had verbally communicated to the said Palmer; and that the said Hastings was thereby guilty of a criminal concealment.
VII. That some time about the month of August an engagement happened between a body of Fyzoola Khân’s cavalry and a part of the Vizier’s army, in which the latter were beaten, and their guns taken; that the Resident, Middleton, did represent the same but as a slight and accidental affray; that it was acknowledged the troops of the Vizier were the aggressors; that it did appear to the board, and to the said Hastings himself, an affair of more considerable magnitude; and that they did make the concealment thereof an article of charge against the Resident, Middleton, though the said Resident did in truth acquaint them with the same, but in a cursory manner.
VIII. That, immediately after the said “fray” at Daranagur, the Vizier (who was “but a cipher in the hands” of the minister and the Resident, both of them directly appointed and supported by the said Hastings) did make of Fyzoola Khân a new demand, equally contrary to the true intent and meaning of the treaty as his former requisitions: which new demand was for the detachment in garrison at Daranagur to be cantoned as a stationary force at Lucknow, the capital of the Vizier; whereas he, the Vizier, had only a right to demand an occasional aid to join his army in the field or in garrison during a war. But the said new demand being evaded, or rather refused, agreeably to the fair construction of the treaty, by the Nabob Fyzoola Khân, the matter was for the present dropped.
IX. That in the letter in which the Resident, Middleton, did mention “what he calls the fray” aforesaid, the said Middleton did again apply for the resumption of the jaghire of Rampoor; and that, the objections against the measure being now removed, (by the separate peace with Sindia,) he desired to know if the board “would give assurances of their support to the Vizier, in case, which” (says the Resident) “I think very probable, his [the Vizier’s] own strength should be found unequal to the undertaking.”
X. That, although the said Warren Hastings did make the foregoing application a new charge against the Resident, Middleton, yet the said Hastings did only criminate the said Middleton for a proposal tending “at such a crisis to increase the number of our enemies,” and did in no degree, either in his articles of charge or in his accompanying minutes, express any disapprobation whatever of the principle; that, in truth, the whole proceedings of the said Resident were the natural result of the treaty of Chunar; that the said proceedings were from time to time communicated to the said Hastings; that, as he nowhere charges any disobedience of orders on Mr. Middleton with respect to Fyzoola Khân, it may be justly inferred that the said Hastings did not interfere to check the proceedings of the said Middleton on that subject; and that by such criminal neglect the said Hastings did make the guilt of the said Middleton, whatever it might be, his own.
PART VIII. PECUNIARY COMMUTATION OF THE STIPULATED AID.
I. That on the charges and for the misdemeanors above specified, together with divers other accusations, the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, in September, 1782, did remove the aforesaid Middleton from his office of Resident at Oude, and did appoint thereto John Bristow, Esquire, whom he had twice before, without cause, recalled from the same; and that about the same time the said Hastings did believe the mind of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân to be so irritated, in consequence of the above-recited conduct of the late Resident, Middleton, and of his, the said Hastings’s, own criminal neglect, that he, the said Hastings, found it necessary to write to Fyzoola Khân, assuring him “of the favorable disposition of the government toward him, while he shall not have forfeited it by any improper conduct”; but that the said assurances of the Governor-General did not tend, as soon after appeared, to raise much confidence in the Nabob, over whom a public instrument of the same Hastings was still holding the terrors of a deprivation of his jaghire, and an exile “among his other faithless brethren across the Ganges.”
II. That, on the subject of Fyzoola Khân, the said Hastings, in his instructions to the new Resident, Bristow, did leave him to be guided by his own discretion; but he adds, “Be careful to prevent the Vizier’s affairs from being involved with new difficulties, while he has already so many to oppress him”: thereby plainly hinting at some more decisive measures, whenever the Vizier should be less oppressed with difficulties.
III. That the Resident, Bristow, after acquainting the Governor-General with his intentions, did under the said instructions renew the aforesaid claim for a sum of money, but with much caution and circumspection, distantly sounding Allif Khân, the vakeel (or envoy) of Fyzoola Khân at the court of the Vizier; that “Allif Khân wrote to his master on the subject, and in answer he was directed not to agree to the granting of any pecuniary aid.”
IV. That the Resident, Bristow, did then openly depute Major Palmer aforesaid, with the concurrence of the Vizier, and the approbation of the Governor-General, to the Nabob Fyzoola Khân, at Rampoor; and that the said Palmer was to “endeavor to convince the Nabob that all doubts of his attachment to the Vizier are ceased, and whatever claims may be made on him are founded upon the basis of his interest and advantage and a plan of establishing his right to the possession of his jaghire.”
That the sudden ceasi
ng of the said doubts, without any inquiry of the slightest kind, doth warrant a strong presumption of the Resident’s conviction that they never really existed, but were artfully feigned, as a pretence for some harsh interposition; and that the indecent mockery of establishing, as a matter of favor, for a pecuniary consideration, rights which were never impeached but by the treaty of Chunar, (an instrument recorded by Warren Hastings himself to be founded on falsehood and injustice,) doth powerfully prove the true purpose and object of all the duplicity, deceit, and double-dealing with which that treaty was projected and executed.
V. That the said Palmer was instructed by the Resident, Bristow, with the subsequent approbation of the Governor-General, “to obtain from Fyzoola Khân an annual tribute”; to which the Resident adds,— “If you can procure from him, over and above this, a peshcush [or fine] of at least five lacs, it would be rendering an essential service to the Vizier, and add to the confidence his Excellency would hereafter repose in the attachment of the Nabob Fyzoola Khân.” And that the said Governor-General, Hastings, did give the following extraordinary ground of calculation, as the basis of the said Palmer’s negotiation for the annual tribute aforesaid.
“It was certainly understood, at the time the treaty was concluded, (of which this stipulation was a part,) that it applied solely to cavalry: as the Nabob Vizier, possessing the service of our forces, could not possibly require infantry, and least of all such infantry as Fyzoola Khân could furnish; and a single horseman included in the aid which Fyzoola Khân might furnish would prove a literal compliance with the said stipulation. The number, therefore, of horse implied by it ought at least to be ascertained: we will suppose five thousand, and, allowing the exigency for their attendance to exist only in the proportion of one year in five, reduce the demand to one thousand for the computation of the subsidy, which, at the rate of fifty rupees per man, will amount to fifty thousand per mensem. This may serve for the basis of this article in the negotiation upon it.”
