Today, the Indian diaspora plays an increasingly important role in India’s domestic growth and realisation of its aspirations in international affairs. The effects of migration on India are manifold. Devesh Kapur (2011) convincingly shows that it has strengthened Indian democracy, facilitated flow of expertise to India and helped in integrating the country into the world economy. Generally speaking, the diaspora’s value lies in three fundamental aspects: economic, political and image-building. First of all, it is an important source of capital for India’s development, in a form of both remittances and foreign direct investments (FDI). India is the largest recipient of private money transfers in the world; it most likely will retain this position in the future. According to the World Bank, in 2013, US$ 71 billion was transferred to India by Indian migrants (World Bank, 2013). The remittances India receives have increased steadily from US$ 15.8 billion, in 2002, to US$ 69 billion, in 2012. Total remittances received during the decade of 2002–12 amounted to US$ 427 billion, which is actually more than the total inflow of foreign direct investments to India in those years (US$ 237 billion) and earnings from export of IT services.
Money transfers from the diaspora are important sources of foreign exchange reserves for the Indian government. It played a particularly crucial role after the 2008 global financial crisis, when FDI inflow decreased considerably (see Figure 3.1). Importantly, remittances are a major or additional source of income for many families in India. Although countrywide information on remittances is not available, it is estimated that a significant proportion of financial resources from the diaspora is sent by an increasing number of unskilled and semi-skilled Indian workers employed in the Persian Gulf countries and Malaysia (MOIA, 2013: p.36). According to the World Bank, in 2011, remittances contributed to almost 3.9 per cent of India’s GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2011: p.32).
Figure 3.1. Remittances and FDI Inflow to India 2002–2012
Source: World Development Indicators, 2014
Moreover, overseas Indians also contribute to the hike in the recent inflow of foreign investments to India. For instance, it was estimated that the Indian diaspora contributed 9 per cent, or US$ 4 billion, to the country’s foreign direct investment in 2002 (Kadekar, 2012: p.7). Importantly, migrants from India often occupy managerial positions in some of the biggest transnational corporations (e.g., the CEO of Microsoft) and can influence investment decisions of their companies. Interestingly, the small country of Mauritius, which is home to a considerable Indian community, is the largest source of FDI to India in recent years. On the other hand, India has emerged as one of the largest investors in Britain, where it has a very strong Indian community.
The second important value of overseas Indians for the country is the increasing political and economic influence they have accumulated, especially in developed Western countries. The Indian community comprises one of the most affluent groups in the US, Canada and the UK and they merit influential positions in academia, business and media. Along with their growing numbers and prestige, overseas Indians have become increasingly influential political groups in several countries, including the US. Some Indian-American lobbying groups (i.e., US-India Political Action Committee, USINPAC) in Washington have played a supportive role in Indo-US rapprochement over the last decade, including successful support for the US-India nuclear deal of 2006. It is even regarded by some as the “next most influential lobby group in the US” after the Jewish lobby (Kamar, 2007).
In countries like the UK or Germany, people of Indian origin have become members of parliament and thus created important links between India and their new homeland. They act as intermediaries between the two states and explain Indian concerns and interests to foreign audiences. People of Indian origin become a natural bridge between India and many Western countries, narrowing the natural geographic and cultural distance. In general, it can be said that India has close and intense relations with countries that became a new home to significant Indian communities. It is no coincidence that India’s recent engagement with the US, Canada and Australia happened only after the emergence of strong Indian communities there. As observed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): “One of the strongest assets of the US relationship with India is the expanding connection between Indian and American people” (CSIS, 2007: p.23). In this sense, they have become a strong asset for the Indian government and a vital soft power tool.
Finally, the significance of the Indian diaspora is its contribution in building a positive image of India abroad. They frequently bring their tradition and culture to new places and become a natural bridge between Indian and foreign societies. Quite often, overseas Indians are the first contact points for foreigners with Indian civilisation, and they can create a positive image of India. These Indian expats act as natural brokers and interpreters between different societies and make foreigners more familiar with the Indian system of values, norms and aesthetics. In many Western societies, robust Indian communities contribute to the emergence of a new image of India as a modern, aspirational, inspirational and fast-growing country. In fact, they are Brand India Ambassadors abroad. In practice, these groups become, usually, default partners for Indian diplomatic missions and government bodies in organising cultural events, promoting campaigns and lobbying for India’s interests. As their prosperity and influences grow in many countries, their value for India’s foreign policy will only grow.
Conclusion
This chapter analysed major soft power tools employed by the Indian government to increase its global attractiveness and shape opinions and preferences in other countries. Several general comments seem appropriate here. First, each of these tools underwent a phase of expansions and development in the last 15 years. Along with the strengthened use of cultural diplomacy, India also discovered the utility of its diaspora for domestic and foreign interests and directed more resources to be used for foreign assistance and public diplomacy. The Indian government has simultaneously developed new or strengthened existing institutions whose major task is to project a positive image of India and increase the country’s attractiveness to others. This confirms the shift towards greater reliance on soft power in Indian foreign policy that took place since the early 2000s. In the last years, India changed its approach from a “passive soft power” to an “active soft power”, and more deliberately and vigorously, it uses this capital through special policy tools and mechanisms to realise its interests in its foreign policy (Thussu, 2013: p.4).
Second, India does not simply follow or replicate the Western approach to soft power; on the contrary, it assertively stresses its different and unique model based on “mutual benefit” and partnerships with other countries. It does not pursue aggressive cultural promotion or development assistance based on conditionality. Instead, India tries to act in consonance with foreign partners and take its cues from others’ requests. It presents “soft use” of soft power. In this way, it can better escape controversies and concerns customarily associated with the use of soft power by the great powers. Its benign approach to soft power decreases resentment and criticism from foreign partners. This augurs well for the policy’s success.
Finally, India is still at the early stages of developing its soft power toolbox. It is evolving new institutional solutions and needs more time to streamline the process to act in more effective and productive way. The new government’s aligning of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs with the Ministry of External Affairs or merging of the Public Diplomacy Division with the External Publicity Division, though justified and probably positive, reveals the institutional flux in the Indian system. Moreover, India still lacks a major TV news channel to reach global audiences and promote the desired Indian perspective. Development cooperation needs more transparency and predictability to better serve image-building purposes. The network of Indian Cultural Centres abroad, though expanded substantially, lags behind similar networks of China, the UK or France. If India wants to emerge as a major soft power, it nee
ds more resources, constant decision-maker attention and better coordination actions.
5
Effectiveness of Indian Soft Power Strategy
Assessing a country’s soft power and the effectiveness of its use in foreign policy is never easy. As the first chapter shows, due to its very nature, soft power is less tangible and measurable than hard power. To what extent has India’s reputation and credibility influenced or changed other countries’ policies towards it? Has India’s power of attraction brought any tangible benefits thus far? Have India’s soft power tools been well designed and implemented in conducting foreign policy? Has this “softer use of power” been any more effective than previous hard power approaches? What are shortcomings of the new strategy? How can we tell whether if this approach is working?
This chapter tries to find the answers to the above questions using several methods and tools. First, it presents existing indices and rankings measuring soft power of chosen countries that put India’s strengths in a comparative perspective. Second, it analyses international public opinion polls to see the international image of India and current attractiveness to foreign audiences. To complement this picture with more tangible results, this chapter will then consider the attractiveness of India for tourists, students, migrants and investors. This is followed by an analysis of the role of soft power for realisation of Indian interests in the international arena. Finally, two different case studies – Afghanistan and Poland – are analysed to give a detailed picture on the effectiveness of specific soft power tools and policies.
Soft Power Ranking
Probably the easiest, but also the least accurate, way to measure India’s soft power is through rankings that assess this element of state standing. There are several direct and indirect indices that can be of help in this regard. Interestingly, India does not perform well in any of these rankings.
First of all, “Brand India” is still not well known abroad: the result is that it is evaluated rather poorly. In 2009, the composite nation branding survey – Anholt-GfKRoper Nation Brand Index, ranked India in 26th place, between Egypt and Poland, among the 50 top countries (Lee, 2010c: 11). In the more recent edition, in 2013, India was placed even lower: in 31st place out of the top 50. The most attractive states in the index were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Canada. All of India’s BRIC partners were classified higher: Brazil – 20th, Russia – 22nd, China – 23rd (Simon Anholt website, 2013). A similar ranking done by a private company, Future Brand, Country Brand Index 2012–13, did not even include India among its top 25 countries (it was 42nd).
India performs below expectations in other relevant rankings. In the third edition of the complex IfG-Monocole Soft Power Index, in2012, India was ranked 36th among 40 countries classified, better only than Malaysia, the UAE, Egypt and Indonesia (McClory, 2013). The index was topped by the UK, the US, and Germany, and other emerging powers were far ahead of India: Brazil – 17th, China – 22nd, Russia – 28th, South Africa – 34th. India’s position has not changed substantially from previous editions of this ranking, as it was ranked 23rd out of 26 classified countries in 2010 and 27th out of 30 countries in the ranking’s second edition, in 2011 (McClory, 2010, 2011).
Another similar index, developed by Ernst and Young, exclusively for emerging markets—its Rapid-growth markets soft power index, ranked India at second position in 2010, after China but ahead of Russia, Brazil or South Africa. This high position is thanks to knowledge of English, presence of Indians on the TIME 100 list, and relatively high scores in the rule of law, freedom index and immigration categories. It was less positively assessed in other categories: voter turnout, university rankings, tourist inflow, weak performance in the world Olympics and little international popularity of Hindi language. (Ernst and Young, 2012).
In the Good Country Index, measuring a country’s overall contribution to global goods, presented for the first time in 2014, India was ranked 81st out of 125 countries assessed, between Kazakhstan and Belarus. The ranking was topped by Ireland, Finland and Switzerland; other P-5 countries were ranked at: the UK – 7th, France – 11th, the US – 21st; Russia – 95th, and China – 107th. This makes India’s position quite distant but better than other emerging powers such as China and Russia, but well behind regional powers like Japan (25th), South Africa (44th) or Brazil (49th). India is especially well evaluated when it comes to its contribution to health and wellbeing – 37th – thanks to its substantial food aid, pharmaceutical export and voluntary excess donation to the WHO; for international peace and security it is rated – 44th – due to its contribution to peacekeeping troops and dues in arrears to UN peace keeping budgets; and culture – 53rd – mainly due to export of creative goods and creative services. It scores particularly poorly in other categories: prosperity and equality (117th), and planet and climate (107th) (GCI Website, 2014).
Another index that seems relevant for assessing country’s soft power is the Global Peace Index (GPI), prepared by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), an independent think tank. In the seventh edition of the ranking, released on 17 June 2014, India was ranked at 143 out of 162 countries classified; situated between Egypt and Guinea-Bissau. The top three most peaceful countries were Iceland, Denmark and Austria; New Zealand, Canada and Japan were the only non-European countries in the top 10. The three least peaceful countries in 2013 were South Sudan, Afghanistan and Syria. All major powers and members of the UN Security Council were classified relatively low: France – 47th, the UK – 48th, the US – 101st, China – 108th, and Russia – 152nd, which suggests that a larger global role corresponds to a greater use of military power. South Asia remained at the bottom of the overall regional ranking (GPI, 2014). India scored the worst in the following categories: conflicts, nuclear and heavy weapons, terrorist activity, political terror, access to weapons, and perceived criminality in the society; its best scores were in GPI indicators like weapons import, jailed population, security officers and police, armed services personnel, and displaced population. The authors see little hope of improving India’s situation in the short-term. According to the report “the nature of both the external and internal conflicts in India precludes a quick resolution. The greatest threat to peace are all a result of longstanding issues and their roots are so well entrenched that it will take years of strong policymaking to resolve them” (GPI, 2014: p.30).
Mixed Image of India Abroad
If a country’s soft power is its attractiveness and credibility, then one of most natural measures of assessing its strength is its international image and perceptions of it abroad. There are several regular, regional, and global surveys comparing such opinions across countries. For India, results of these opinion polls are mixed and inconclusive.
One of the most comprehensive and reliable global polls tracking countries’ perceptions is the BBC World Service Poll. The survey, released on June 2014, presents the perception of 16 countries and the European Union in 23 surveyed nations on all continents. India was ranked in 12th position (only better than Russia, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran) with 38 per cent respondents, on average, having a “mainly positive” view of India’s influences, and 36 per cent holding a “mostly negative” opinion (BBC, 2014). The most favourable views about India are found among African countries, and the least favourable are countries in Western Europe (see Figure 5.1). The top three countries with the best opinion of India were Russia (net rating +44 per cent), Nigeria (+42 per cent) and Japan (+25 per cent); and the three with worst opinions were Germany (-52 per cent), Pakistan (-37 per cent) and Spain (-30 per cent).
Other regional surveys confirm the opinion about India being divided. In 2006, the Chicago Council on World Affairs conducted a poll in Australia, China, South Korea and the US. It found that these nations were divided on the opinion of whether India’s rise was a good
Figure 5.1. Views of India’s influence. By Country 2014
Source: BBC 2014
development for
the world or not (Hall, 2012: 1108). The respondents in these four countries held different views when assessing India as an expanding economic and military power. Modest majorities in all countries saw the expansion of Indian economic power as a mainly positive development (in China – 56 per cent mainly positive, in the United States and South Korea – 53 per cent mainly positive). Some worries about an economically more powerful India were expressed in China (26 per cent mainly negative), followed by the United States (39 percent mainly negative), and South Korea (44 per cent mainly negative). Opinions were more negative about the prospect of growing Indian military power. Here, only in China were people quite comfortable with a significantly more militarily powerful India (56 per cent believed it was mainly positive and 26 per cent mainly negative). This contrasts with the 69 per cent and 71 per cent in the United States and South Korea, respectively, who regard India’s military build-up negatively (Chicago Council, 2006: 46). The survey also showed, generally, a low level of trust toward India in the region. When asked whether they trust India to act responsibly in the world, only Australian respondents gave an overall positive response (68 per cent). In the United States and South Korea, fewer than 50 per cent trust India either somewhat or a great deal; and in China, 68 per cent say they do not trust India either at all or very much. The silver lining was that, despite such ratings, India slightly outperformed China (ibid). Respondents were divided, but leaning toward the negative, on questions regarding desirability of India’s influence in the world and judging trust that India will keep its commitments. Interestingly, however, India was seen as playing a positive role in resolution of key problems facing Asia across the region. Pluralities of Americans (50 per cent), South Koreans (50 per cent), and Chinese (48 per cent) say India’s role is either somewhat or very positive.
India’s Soft Power Page 15
