by Bill Yenne
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, and the Soviet Union gradually unravelled through the end of 1991, the world breathed a sigh of relief. Having hung over the heads of the world’s population for four decades, the Cold War was over.
However, the world was still filled with bellicose dictators, and sinister new threats were even then crawling from their dank, dark holes in Southwest Asia.
A B-52G of the 1708th Provisional Bombardment Wing takes off on a mission during Operation Desert Storm. USAF
THE EARLY YEARS of the twentieth century’s final decade were marked by major changes in the world, and in the U.S. Air Force deployment of the Stratofortress. Even as the Soviet Union disintegrated, and the Cold War came to an end, the United States fought the Gulf War, its most successful major campaign since World War II—and the Stratofortress was back in sustained combat operations for the first time in two decades.
On October 2, 1990, Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, ordered his army to invade and occupy the oil-rich neighboring state of Kuwait. During Iraq’s war with Iran, which had consumed most of the previous decade, Hussein had become deeply indebted to Kuwait and other countries and decided that Kuwait’s oil wealth was needed to stave off bankruptcy. Hussein used the tenuous claim that Kuwait should have been part of the modern state of Iraq when it was created in 1932 as a pretext for his annexation.
The international community reacted with a United Nations resolution ordering Iraq to withdraw and with a massive military buildup by a broad coalition of world powers aimed initially at preventing an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia and secondarily at ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
The United States part of this buildup, designated as Operation Desert Shield, saw the deployment of massive quantities of military hardware that had been developed during the Cold War to blunt a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.
The U.S. Air Force role involved the deployment of mainly tactical air power, specifically fighters for air defense and strike aircraft for potential operations against the possible invasion of Saudi Arabia. The Strategic Air Command contribution was in the deployment of tanker aircraft to refuel Coalition aircraft.
Simultaneous with Desert Shield, the Coalition forces prepared for the operation to liberate Kuwait. For the United States, which played the predominant role, this would be known as Operation Desert Storm. The opening phase would involve a massive tactical campaign against Iraqis in Kuwait, as well as a strategic air campaign against Iraq itself.
The overall Coalition commander for Desert Storm was General Norman Schwarzkopf of the U.S. Army—also commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM)—with the air campaign, called Operation Instant Thunder, under the command of U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Chuck Horner, commander of United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF).
On August 9, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, ordered that Stratofortresses also be deployed for possible action. By August 13, B-52Gs from the 62nd Bombardment Wing at Carswell AFB and the 69th Bombardment Squadron at Loring AFB, among others, had been deployed to the island of Diego Garcia, a British territory in the Indian Ocean, 3,000 miles south of Kuwait. On August 24, SAC Headquarters issued Special Order GB-084, transferring operational control of its assigned B-52Gs and KC-135s to Horner’s CENTAF.
Ordnancemen use an MJ-1 bomb loader to upload M117 750-pound bombs on a BUFF during Operation Desert Shield. USAF
The B-52G was the dedicated Stratofortress type that was to be used in the Gulf War. Diego Garcia would be a key forward operating location, with the bombers operated by the 4300th Provisional Bombardment Wing, but others were added as the operation progressed.
Over the next several months, the B-52Gs flew a number of training sorties over Saudi Arabia, as well as over the Indian Ocean. The intended armament included Cluster Bombardment Units (CBU), as well as M117 general-purpose 750-pound highexplosive bombs.
Two views of a weapons systems officer programming the computers and guidance systems that direct the pilot of a B-52G Stratofortress. USAF
The Desert Storm air offensive began on the night of January 16–17, 1991, with the initial targets being Iraqi radar and air defenses, followed by Command, Control, and Communications (C3) facilities. During the first twenty-four hours 2,775 sorties were flown by Coalition strike aircraft.
As part of this effort, the first Stratofortress mission of the Gulf War began on the afternoon of January 16, when seven B-52Gs took off from Barksdale AFB in Louisiana on a marathon thrity-five-hour, nonstop, 14,000-mile round-trip flight. At the time, it was the longest strike mission in the history of aerial warfare. It was the type of capability that had been purposely demonstrated by B-52s in Operation Power Flite three decades earlier.
According to the Department of Defense Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, the aircraft launched thirty-five AGM-86C CALCM cruise missiles against “military communications sites and power generation and transmission facilities” in southern Iraq. The CALCM had only just been declared operational earlier in January 1991.
Overshadowed by the milestone mission from Barksdale is the fact that fifteen bombers from the 4300th Provisional Bombardment Wing also struck Iraq on the same date.
Over the next two days, thirty-one B-52G sorties launched from the United States struck Republican Guard elements as well as the Tawakalna Mechanized Infantry Division, beginning a pattern of the B-52Gs being tasked with attacking Iraqi ground forces. The targets, like those being attacked by other Coalition aircraft, were designated within specific “kill boxes” that were overlaid on known Iraqi troop concentrations inside Kuwait.
The Coalition Combined OPLAN (Operational Plan), and the USCINCCENT (Commander in Chief, CENTCOM) OPLAN called for “continuous B-52 strikes, TACAIR (tactical air) attacks, and attack helicopter operations.” In anticipation of the eventual ground offensive, “The bridges, roads and rail line. . . will be cut to block withdrawal of [Iraqi Republican Guard troops] and to form a kill zone north of Kuwait.”
A close-up view of M117 750-pound bombs loaded into the bomb bay of a B-52G prior to a bombing mission during Operation Desert Storm. DoD photo, PH3 Chester Falkenhainer
A B-52G of the 1708th Provisional Bombardment Wing, armed with Mk 82 500-pound bombs, takes off from Prince Abdulla AB in Saudi Arabia. USAF photo, Sgt. Donald McMichael
A B-52G takes off from RAF Fairford on a mission during Operation Desert Storm. USAF photo, Senior Airman Chris Putman
A B-52G of the 410th Bombardment Wing from K. I. Sawyer AFB, Michigan, armed with Mk 82 500-pound bombs on the wing pylons. USAF photo, Sgt. Donald McMichael
While the first missions originated from Barksdale AFB and Diego Garcia, other early missions were also flown from Wurtsmith AFB in Michigan. On the first day of the air campaign, the Spanish government approved offensive operations from its Moròn AB, which is roughly the same distance from Kuwait as Diego Garcia. On January 18, ten B-52Gs flying from Wurtsmith AFB, deployed to Moròn after striking their targets in Kuwait.
While the Coalition and the United Nations mandate for Operation Desert Storm brought an almost limitless level of support for the Gulf War from most countries in Europe and the Middle East, when it came to the mighty Stratofortress, there was a great deal of reticence. As Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen write in the Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, “There were some exceptions to this unprecedented extension of staging and overflight rights, most notably the basing of B-52s requiring bases with extensive runway and ramp operating areas and access to specialized logistical support. The stationing of B-52s overseas raised political concerns for several potential host nations. Throughout the aircraft’s history, host foreign governments had allowed B-52 basing only under limited conditions because of the B-52s’ link with nuclear weapons and their widely publicized role in the Vietnam War. These restrictions and the concerns that drove them proved resistant to change.
A view of the roll control spoiler panel with one
of the flaps torn off on the wing of a B-52G from the 1708th Bombardment Wing and other battle damage sustained during Operation Desert Storm. USAF photo, Sergeant Rose Reynolds
On a mission during Operation Desert Storm, two SAC B-52G Stratofortresses prepare to take off from Prince Abdulla AB at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. USAF photo, Sgt. Rose Reynolds
“During Desert Shield, the U.S. Air Force proposed B-52 basing in several countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Spain, but no moves took place until the air campaign began. It is unclear who was more reluctant: the potential host governments or American officials who did not wish to press them on a potentially delicate issue at a time when weightier matters appeared to be at stake. Certainly the base in Saudi Arabia proposed for B-52 basing raised such concerns, given that Iraq had already accused Saudi Arabia of allowing Westerners to desecrate the Muslim holy places. To minimize the problem, B-52s deployed to their wartime operating bases, but with no publicity and only after the air campaign began. Some B-52s flying from Diego Garcia or Wurtsmith AFB in the United States landed in the theater after the initial attacks of the air campaign.”
Of course, the Iraqis had proven in Kuwait that “desecration” was the least of the hardships imposed upon the people in a country that they occupied.
In fact, B-52s did operate out of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. The 1708th Provisional Bombardment Wing was formed at Prince Abdulla AB in Jeddah in August 1990 and was composed of B-52Gs and crews from several Stateside squadrons. One of these aircraft flew twenty-nine missions, the most of any Stratofortress in the war. In addition, small numbers of BUFFs were also attached to SAC’s 1701st and 1703rd Provisional Air Refueling Wings at Jeddah and King Khalid Military City, respectively.
In the meantime, Turkey also authorized United States air operations from its territory, and these began on the second day of the air war. These were effectively a forward deployment by the United States Air Forces in Europe, which operated under the umbrella of the 7440th Composite Wing, also called Joint Task Force (JTF) Proven Force, and which did not include any Stratofortresses among its assets. These aircraft operated against targets within Iraq from to Incirlik AB.
On February 2, the New York Times announced “France agrees to allow American B-52s based in Britain to enter its airspace for raids against Iraq, and to refuel at a French military base enroute.”
The base in Britain was RAF Fairford, a Royal Air Force base in Gloucestershire, which had hosted American units since World War II and SAC bombers since 1950. It had not been used prior to February because routing the strike missions around French airspace would have been a distance greater than that from Moròn or Diego Garcia. The 806th Provisional Bombardment Wing was formed at Fairford to operate these BUFFs. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ordered them to fly against targets inside Iraq in support of JTF Proven Force, while the Diego Garcia–and Moròn-based BUFFs targeted Kuwait and southern Iraq.
On February 3, with eight BUFFs operating out of Fairford, Cheney ordered an additional dozen B-52Gs to Moròn. By February 6, the U.S. Air Force noted a total of seventy-one Stratofortresses supporting Desert Storm. A total of 457 strike sorties had been flown in January, and the Air Force reported that “the current daily sortie rate for the B-52s exceeds the highest previously planned wartime rates.”
The B-52Gs were also used to drop armor-sensing mines, and three BUFFs were diverted to attack an armored column during the Iraqi assault on the Saudi town of Al-Khafji on January 31. Other BUFF missions were tasked against strategic targets within Iraq itself, such as the military production plant at Habbaniyah in Al-Anbar Province, near Baghdad. On January 29, B-52Gs struck the ammunition storage facility at Ar-Rumaylah near Basra in southern Iraq, setting off an immense explosion that the Department of Defense Final Report colorfully describes as “the equivalent of an erupting volcano.”
As a counterpoint to the effectiveness of the American strategic bomber, Saddam Hussein turned to his arsenal of tactical ballistic missiles, including Soviet-made R-300/SS-1c Scud-B weapons and home-built knock offs. Striking their targets without warning at supersonic speeds, the Scuds delivered a fear factor that went beyond their questionable tactical usefulness. On January 22, when a Scud hit a residential area in Tel Aviv, killing three Israelis, CENTAF diverted considerable resources to prevent the Scud menace from widening the war to include Israel. Because they are launched from mobile launchers, the Scuds were hard to find and presented a perplexing problem for Coalition air power. B-52Gs were among the assets diverted to attacking suspected Scud “hide sites” and support facilities at airfields in western Iraq.
A crew from the 1708th Bombardment Wing’s aircraft battle damage repair section works on a battle damaged B-52G. USAF photo, Sgt. Rose Reynolds
Coalition air power struck at night as well as by day. In the Department of Defense Final Report, it is noted that “the Coalition’s ability to fight at night made it difficult for the Iraqis to use the cover of darkness to maintain and repair equipment, and replenish supplies. This was a key advantage helping to keep pressure on the Iraqis 24 hours a day.”
The Gulf War was fought by generals who had been front-line captains in Vietnam, and an important historical subtext to their strategic thinking was not to make many of the mistakes that had been made in the 1960s. To begin with, the Gulf War was not fought as a “sublimited war,” nor were minute tactical details micromanaged from Washington, as they had been by the Johnson administration.
However, in one sense, the Gulf War was like the Vietnam War, and this was with respect to the deployment of the B-52 force. In Vietnam, the strategic Stratofortresses were tasked with tactical Arc Light missions in the south, while tactical fighter-bombers flew ostensibly strategic Rolling Thunder missions against North Vietnam. In the Gulf War, the principal use of the BUFF was against troop concentrations.
The back story to this decision was articulated by Lt. Col. David Deptula. An original member of the famed “Black Hole” strategic planning group, he was the principal deputy for strategic targeting to CENTCOM war plans chief Maj. Gen. Buster Glosson. In a December 1991 interview for the Gulf War Air Power Survey Project, he recalled that “attempts by air planners to employ B-52Gs outside the Kuwait theater (on munitions storage sites in Iraq, for example) ran into much opposition from the CENTCOM leadership, particularly General Schwarzkopf. Army and Marine commanders, meanwhile, had restricted the employment of attack helicopters until the approach of the ground war.”
In their Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report, Keaney and Cohen write that “Tensions between the Air Force and American ground commanders persisted because the commanders did not understand that many decisions causing them problems were Schwarzkopf’s and not Horner’s. Sometimes Schwarzkopf’s decisions did please the ground commanders. For example, they liked to see B-52s dropping bombs in front of their positions, and Schwarzkopf often obliged. As [Marine Corps] General [Walter] Boomer noted later, ground commanders like himself had been closer to B-52 strikes in Vietnam than any Air Force officer and knew their psychological impact first hand. Schwarzkopf ordered extensive B-52 bombing of Iraqi troops (who were dispersed and dug in) despite reservations on the part of Air Force officers who preferred to use the big bombers against more vulnerable area targets like supply depots.”
Keaney and Cohen go on to add that the BUFF did become “one of the most sought-after aircraft by the ground commanders for strikes against Iraqi ground forces.” As had been the case during Arc Light operations in Vietnam, the ability of the BUFF to release an immense bomb load on a relatively compact target area had a devastating effect on enemy morale. This was taken into account by air and ground commanders alike.
A view of the battle damaged tail section of a B-52G from the 1708th Bombardment Wing. USAF photo, Sgt. Rose Reynolds
Sergeant Brian Land checks a .50-caliber tail turret gun on a B-52G. While two BUFF tail gunners scored kills during Operation Linebacker II in 1972, no kills were scored
with tail guns in Operation Desert Storm nineteen years later. USAF photo, Chief Master Sgt. Don Sutherland
A B-52G from the 1708th Bombardment Wing at Prince Abdulla AB in Saudi Arabia is prepared for a mission. USAF photo, Sgt. Donald McMichael
A B-52G takes off on March 10, 1991, for its return flight to the United States after being deployed for Operation Desert Storm. The first Gulf War saw the longest strike mission in the history of aerial warfare when BUFFs took off from Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, fired AGM-86C Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missiles on Iraqi forces, and returned to Barksdale, thirty-five hours later. USAF photo, Sgt. Donald McMichael
Volant Solo psychological warfare operations took advantage of this fact. For example, on January 29, Volant Solo EC-130s flew over the positions of the Iraqi 20th Infantry Division ahead of the BUFF strikes dropping “personalized” leaflets that warned them of the incoming attacks. As noted in the U.S. Air Force Gulf War Air Power Survey, the leaflets read “If you want to live, leave now. Do not allow anyone to stop you. Save yourself by fleeing south. If you choose to stay, you choose death.”
The next day, after the B-52G strikes, the EC-130s dropped more leaflets. These read “We told you that you were to be bombed and you were. We are telling you again that you will be bombed tomorrow. Leave now. Flee south or die.”
As noted in the Department of Defense Final Report, senior Iraqi officers who were captured and debriefed after the war “frequently commented their troops also were terrified of B-52Gs, and could clearly see and hear their strikes, even when miles away.”
