by Greg Baughen
The Battle might not be the perfect solution, but the RAF was fortunate to have any bombers that were even remotely suitable. An Air Staff that believed long-range bombing would decide future wars might not be expected to want any bombers as small as the Battle. Some wayward Air Staff thinking on the value of single-engined bombers had, by chance, gifted the RAF a potential tactical bomber. It might have been larger than it need have been, but it was not much larger than the Soviet Il-2 Sturmovik. Performance-wise, it was not the wonder high-speed bomber the Air Staff were hoping for, but it was no slower than the Ju 87 Stuka. The Sturmovik and the Stuka both went on to establish formidable reputations as close support bombers, but the Sturmovik benefitted from substantial armour and both relied on fighter protection. Both were developed in countries where the value of direct and indirect tactical air support was recognised and appreciated. If the Battle was to have any chance in its new role, it would need effective offensive weapons, protection (armour, self-sealing tanks, and fighter escorts) and an air force hierarchy that recognised the value of tactical air support.
On all these counts, there was a problem. The Air Staff only reluctantly conceded that any sort of air support for ground forces was useful. They certainly did not believe close air support on the battlefield was a proper role for the RAF. They were so sure that the Luftwaffe thought likewise that when the Army asked the RAF to give their troops an idea of what air attack was like, the Air Ministry refused. It would be pointless, they insisted, because German bombers would not be wasting their time operating anywhere near the battle zone.48
The idea of fighter escorts for any aircraft was also anathema to the Air Staff. It was not that they did not think single-seater fighters could carry enough fuel. They were simply convinced that the single-seater fighter was inherently unsuitable for the task because taking on the intercepting fighters would inevitably involve the single-seaters leaving their charges undefended. There would also always come a time when the escorts started running low on fuel and had to head for home and, as they retreated, they would be defenceless to attacks from the rear. This, the Air Staff insisted, was true at all ranges. Even over the distances existing fighters could manage, single-seater escorts did not work. If escorts were needed, bombers with more guns instead of bombs would have to do the job.49
As far as the Air Staff were concerned, the bomber, not the fighter, was the principle means of achieving air superiority. Bombers would attack enemy airfields and destroy their air force there. If the enemy was employing fighters at the front, bombing the rear would soon force these fighters to be pulled back. Friendly bombers and reconnaissance planes would then be able to operate freely without any escort. Their defensive firepower would easily deal with any remaining fighters. It was a line of thinking that was to have disastrous consequences for the future of the Fairey Battle.
Not everyone agreed. Ludlow-Hewitt was one of the few battling for fighter escorts. The Bomber Command chief did not believe he would have enough bombers to deliver the attacks on enemy columns the Army wanted and at the same time attack enemy airfields to achieve air superiority. He certainly did not think his bombers had the defensive firepower to beat off fighter attack. Only fighters could provide the protection his bombers would need, and he made it very clear that someone would have to provide them. He knew the Air Staff views on the subject. If the RAF could not provide escorts, then the French Air Force, or even the Belgian Air Force, would have to take on the responsibility. Somebody had to do it and Ludlow-Hewitt wanted this to be sorted out before his Battles were thrown into action.50
Armour and self-sealing tanks were other crucial issues. Every time low-level tactical air support was discussed, the Air Staff did not fail to underline how vulnerable low-flying aircraft were to ground fire. For the Air Staff, however, it was not a problem that needed a solution; it was a reason for not using aircraft at low-level over the battlefield. There was no discussion about possible solutions, and no effort made to speed up the fitting of self-sealing tanks. The Battle had not even been fitted with basic armour to protect the plane’s crew from fighter attack, never mind the more substantial armour it might need to protect it from ground fire. Unless something was done about these deficiencies, using the plane at low-level would inevitably result in heavy losses.
At least the Air Staff now accepted the need for some sort of tactical bomber support, even if it was only holding the ring by attacking communication targets beyond the battle zone. A few were even suggesting such operations required a specialist plane. Air Vice-Marshal Douglas argued for a more balanced bomber fleet, one which was capable of independent strategic bombing and Army support. Even before the government decided to send an army to France, he was worried that the RAF would not have anything that could support troops on the ground once the Manchester, Halifax, and Stirling heavy bombers had replaced the Battle and Blenheim.
The government’s decision to create a large army increased the need for a more flexible bomber force. Douglas suggested a new, short-range, army support bomber capable of dive-bombing and low-level attack, effectively a Battle replacement. He envisaged a small, ‘handy’ two-seater, with a range of just 500 miles, armour protection, and four forward-firing machine-guns for ground strafing.51 Self-sealing tanks were soon added to the requirement. An air-cooled engine was also preferred; with no vulnerable cooling systems, these were far more resistant to combat damage than liquid-cooled engines. Air-cooled engines often continued working when entire cylinders had been shot away, while one hole in the radiator system of a liquid-cooled engine was enough to cause the engine to seize up. This was not revolutionary thinking: in the First World War, the Sopwith Camel, with its air-cooled rotary, was the preferred option for ground-attack rather than the S.E.5a, with its liquid-cooled motor.52
These requirements demonstrated that the Air Ministry understood what was needed for a successful ground-attack plane, and there was no reason why some of these ideas could not be applied to the existing Fairey Battle. Even an air-cooled engine was not beyond the bounds of possibility. Fairey had made sure their bomber could accommodate different power plants, including air-cooled radials. One proposed variant was powered by the radial 1,000-hp Taurus and a prototype flew in 1938, but it would be some time before the Taurus became even reasonably reliable.53 The problem was not fitting a radial engine to the Battle; the problem was finding one that was powerful and reliable enough.
Far from bringing the Battle in line with the plane Douglas was proposing, many within the Air Ministry questioned whether anything like it would be needed. To many it seemed a waste of money to build large numbers of a plane that would be of limited value and only required on very rare occasions.54 Even Douglas conceded that it might be useful if the plane could contribute to the strategic bombing offensive by attacking industrial targets close to the front. As it happened, Ludlow-Hewitt had also been calling for a smaller, high-speed day bomber to give his command more options for strategic bombing, so Douglas suggested that the new bomber do both.55 To meet this requirement, specification B.11/39 was drawn up for a dual-purpose short-range strategic/tactical bomber. However, it soon became more strategic than tactical, with the required range creeping up to 600 miles, then 800 miles, while the weight was approaching 20,000 lb. The plane that was supposed to replace the Battle and the Blenheim was already far heavier than even the Blenheim IV.
By the summer of 1939, the phasing out of the Fairey Battle had begun. From a peak of seventeen squadrons, the number fell to just ten in September, with all of them in five wings in Playfair’s No. 1 Group. In the event of war, the plan had always been to send the shorter-range single-engined bombers to the continent, where more strategic targets would be within range. No. 1 Group would, however, now be going to France with a dual role. Renamed the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), it would still be a strategic force under the control of Bomber Command in the UK, but it would also be available for tactical bombing. If army commanders wanted air support
, then Air Marshal Arthur Barratt, who had the task of coordinating the Anglo-French air effort, would have to make a formal request to Bomber Command HQ in Britain. If Ludlow-Hewitt approved, then the necessary orders would be passed on to Playfair in France. It was not a system that was likely to produce speedy support when it was needed.
The expectation within the Air Ministry was that any inclination to use the AASF tactically would soon pass once the front line had settled down into the static trench warfare that had dominated the First World War. The Air Staff still expected the Battles of the AASF to play a full part in the Western Air (WA) plans that they had devised to attack German industry. Battles were pencilled in for WA 1, which had the German aircraft industry as its target; WA 5(b), which was aimed at the Ruhr; and WA 5(c), which would target oil. To ensure the AASF was capable of playing its part, the Air Staff were rather anxious to reequip the Battle squadrons as quickly as possible with something more suitable for long-range bombing, even if it was only the Blenheim IV. The fact that this plane was larger, heavier, and therefore less manoeuvrable than the Battle was not an issue: for attacking targets deep inside enemy air space, manoeuvrability was not necessary. This was where the war would be decided, or so the Air Staff believed.
3
Operational Debut and Problems
On 3 September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. No. 1 Group became the AASF and immediately set course for France and its new home in the Reims region. Ludlow-Hewitt was now insisting eighty miles was the maximum distance his bombers could penetrate, which meant that not many strategic targets would be within range even from French bases. In any case, Ludlow-Hewitt now doubted the Battle’s 250-lb bombs could inflict much damage on industrial plants. The Air Ministry did not take these concerns or restrictions too seriously. Ludlow-Hewitt was told his Battles were still a part of the Air Ministry’s plans to bomb the Ruhr and aircraft factories and oil plants outside the Ruhr, despite all of these targets involving flying far more than eighty miles inside German airspace. When pushed, Ludlow-Hewitt reluctantly conceded that it might be possible to penetrate further by flying at low level, but he was rather anxious to see how other bombers fared before risking the Battles on any missions inside Germany.1
With the German and Anglo-French long-range bomber fleets observing an unofficial truce, the question of using the Battles for strategic operations did not arise. Using the Battle tactically, however, was very possible. It was unlikely that the German Army would launch a major offensive in the west until Poland had been defeated. However, the French hoped to divert German forces from the Polish front with their own small-scale offensive and the Battle squadrons were pencilled in to support the operation. The Luftwaffe’s main bomber bases in the rear might be a little too far for the Battles to penetrate, but forward tactical airstrips, supply dumps, and reserves could be usefully attacked. If the French action triggered the transfer of forces from Poland to the Western Front, these arriving reinforcements might also be attractive targets. As soon as French reconnaissance had spotted suitable targets, the Battles would go into action.
There was much interest in London in these proposed operations. It was not how the Air Staff believed bombers should be used, but it would be an opportunity to see how the Battle would do. If missions against short-range targets were a success, then perhaps the Battle might be able to take on more distant industrial targets when the time came.2 Whatever their mission, the Battles would fly without an escort. For the Air Staff, this was set in stone. By flying in formation, the combined firepower of the Battles’ single rear-firing gun would beat off fighter attack. One, later two, Hurricane squadrons were attached to the AASF, but these were only there to defend their airfields, not to escort the bombers.
General Gamelin, the commander of the French Army, planned to launch the first of his limited offensives on 8 September. General Vuillemin, the French Air Force commander, contacted Barratt on the morning of the 7th to see if the Battle squadrons could support the advance. Barratt contacted London, got immediate approval, and instructed Playfair to have three Battle squadrons ready for operations as quickly as possible, preferably by the next day.3
Gamelin vetoed any attacks on enemy airfields in the rear, as any civilian casualties might provoke German retaliation. So far, German bombers were not interfering with French mobilisation and Gamelin wanted to keep it that way. Barratt was furious. He would not forget what he saw as a timid, spineless French attitude. However, attacks on targets closer to the front line had not been ruled out and planning for Battle operations went ahead. All five Battle wings were told to have nine aircraft at thirty minutes’ readiness, the aim being to ‘cooperate with ground forces by causing maximum possible disruption of enemy lines of communication’.4 Each plane would fly at least one sortie a day and the targets would be enemy mechanised columns, troops, transports, or any other fleeting target they came across. There would be no escort, but crews were assured French fighters would be flying patrols in the area, an early indication that few believed that the Battle’s defensive armament would be enough. As soon as the aircraft returned from their missions, they were to be refuelled, rearmed, and held at two hour’s readiness for further missions.
On 11 September, General Mouchard, the commander of the French Air Forces on the north-east front, was still expecting the Battles to provide air support. British and French commanders had no problems agreeing the AASF bombers should attack enemy troops in the battle zone, ammunition dumps further in the rear, and even enemy airfields. Gamelin repeated his objections to the last of these, but the first two did not seem to pose any risk to civilians.5
However, after a few days, the French lost interest in their offensive. After advancing a few miles against very little opposition, the French troops were ordered onto the defensive and the Battles were never called upon to support them. The reluctance to bomb any land targets soon became Allied policy; the French feared that German retaliation would wipe out their aircraft industry and the British government was just as nervous. The German Air Force was not even bombing purely military targets in Britain or France, and neither government saw any reason to disturb this unofficial truce. This was unfortunate for the Battle squadrons, as they needed to try out their tactics in a non-critical situation. Bomber Command squadrons in the UK could at least attack naval targets. The Battles had no targets they could drop bombs on and no way of discovering what did and did not work. The next opportunity for the Battle aircrews to drop bombs in anger would be the decisive German offensive in 1940.
Nevertheless, the sort of targets the Battle could attack, and the way it would attack them, had been established. Unlike the Blenheims based in Britain, the Battles would take on targets in the battle zone, including fleeting targets of opportunity, the majority of which would be within ten miles of the front line. Slessor was not enthusiastic about using the Battle squadrons like this, and warned that they were not trained for such close cooperation. Others argued that they might have to operate that close to the front simply because ‘it is about as far as the Battle will be able to get with a return ticket!’6
It seemed that tactical air support, rather than strategic bombing, would now be the Battle’s role. Playfair was soon following Ludlow-Hewitt’s advice and removing the auxiliary fuselage fuel tank.7 Ludlow-Hewitt was anxious that the Battles should be appropriately armed for their new role. The plane could still only carry 250-lb bombs, which might not be the most effective way of attacking dispersed targets in the battle zone. Forty-pound anti-personnel weapons would be far more effective against troop concentrations and Ludlow-Hewitt ordered that the Battles should be immediately adapted to carry these bombs.8 Deliveries of the necessary equipment were supposed to begin in November.9 When the equipment and bombs actually reached the squadrons is not clear, but it was not until a couple of weeks after the Germans launched their spring offensive that the anti-personnel bombs were used for the first time. Ludlow-Hewitt also agreed that passing all request
s through Bomber Command was a clumsy arrangement and seemed to accept that Barratt should control the Battle squadrons for tactical missions.10
However, Ludlow-Hewitt, possibly under pressure from the Air Staff, seemed to experience a change of heart. Firstly, he tried to claw back control of the Battle squadrons, claiming that his previous agreement to delegate operational control to Barratt only applied in an emergency.11 The AASF was still part of Bomber Command, Ludlow-Hewitt insisted, and had to be available for strategic missions. He went even further in a note, apparently written on his authority, sent to French Army and Air Force commanders. The note emphasised that British bombers were equipped and their crews were trained only for operations against German industrial targets and not (underlined in the note) for cooperating with ground forces. Only in an ‘abnormal and temporary situation of crisis’ would they support troops on the ground, and, the note stressed, this applied to all RAF bombers, including the Battles of the AASF.12 The note caused uproar. Barratt complained that it contradicted assurances that he had given the French and insisted that the note be withdrawn. This was done and the French were reassured that the Battles were in France primarily for army support, but clearly Bomber Command, and perhaps more accurately the Air Staff, did not see it this way.13
