by Greg Baughen
Two days after the raid, Newall was demanding that immediate steps should be taken to fit the Wellington, Hampden, and Blenheim with self-sealing tanks. The Battle was not mentioned.41 In the circumstances it was perhaps understandable; the three twin-engined bombers were engaged in daylight attacks on German naval targets and they were all suffering heavy losses, while the earlier Battle losses were not so fresh in the mind. With France suffering one of its severest winters for years, the Battles were not even flying much. However, with the squadrons preparing to fly low-level missions, their need was at least as great as any other plane—arguably, it was a lot greater.
There was now no lack of urgency about introducing self-sealing tanks. All the relevant parties were dragged from their Christmas holidays for an emergency conference and a programme drawn up for equipping all bombers with self-sealing tanks. This time the Battle was not forgotten. Trials with the Battle were now complete, but modifying the Fairey bomber was still not a priority. It was argued that the Battle’s wing tanks had already been armoured, so the plane’s need was not so great.42 It seems to have been forgotten how limited this armour protection was. The Battle was put at the bottom of the list, with the first not due for conversion until March.
In the meantime, the Battle was supposed to be getting the extra armour sent out to France. Different documents talk about different numbers of sets being sent, but all mention the urgency of increasing the armour of the Battle force.43 Despite this, it would seem that the extra armour never reached the squadrons.44 The extra gun was fitted to the rear of the bomb aimer’s position—a relatively straightforward modification that could be completed by the squadrons. However, it required a contortionist to fire it, as the gunner was facing forwards and had to bend down and then aim backwards with the help of a mirror.45 Fairey had come up with a more extensive modification, which involved sinking a well to the rear of the bomb aimer’s position so that the gunner could face rearwards. It would take three months to develop and trial, and the modifications could only be carried out by the manufacturer. With the likelihood that the Battle would have to stay in front line service for another year, Douglas was very keen to see this modification introduced. There would be no need to disrupt front line squadrons, as there were over 500 Battles sitting in stores. The stored Battles could be modified and dispatched to the front, and the Battles they replaced returned to store.46 Few shared Douglas’s enthusiasm; there was little interest in applying such a major modification to a plane that had no long-term future in Air Staff plans.47
Any extra defensive armament would help, but it could never be the solution. If the Battle was going to be used at a very low level, the ventral gun would be of little use as a defensive weapon. It would perhaps have been more useful, and far simpler, to fit more fixed forward-firing guns. At low level, ground fire was the greater danger and fixed forward-firing guns might help to suppress it. More fixed guns were needed anyway to give the Battle more offensive hitting power. This scarcely required new, radical thinking. Guns for strafing had been a common factor in all Air Ministry and War Office ground-attack proposals, and no-one thought it would be difficult fitting them. The Air Ministry’s own pamphlet on direct support for armies emphasised how ‘the moral effect of low-flying attack with machine guns against troops on the move or halted in the open can scarcely be over-estimated.’48
There was a problem with the extra weight: some equipment would have to be removed if the plane was to carry extra guns as well as armour and self-sealing tanks. As it so happened, a major review was underway about what could be removed from RAF planes, although this was more as a way of streamlining production than reducing weight. The country was trying to build as many planes as possible and it did not help if some of them were carrying equipment they did not need nor use. The reviewing committee had heard about the Battle’s change of role, and suggested that, as the plane was only going to be flying short-range low-level day missions, it could do without its autopilot (80 lb), night flying equipment (44 lb) and bombsight (34 lb).49 Indeed, there no was need to stop there. The committee were not looking into manpower savings, but the navigator/bomb aimer also now seemed redundant and there was no reason why the crew could not be reduced to the original two, saving another 200 lb. All these potential savings provided plenty of scope for more forward-firing guns.
However, the Air Ministry and Ludlow-Hewitt were still rather reluctant to drop any of the plane’s equipment. When asked to confirm the Battle’s change of role, the Air Ministry would only say that, ‘because of the peculiar strategical situation’, it was impossible to say exactly what the role of the Battle would be.50 The Ministry was determined to keep open the option of using the Battle strategically so, for the time being, the plane kept all the equipment it needed for long-range operations. Adding more fixed guns for ground strafing was not even suggested—indeed, the Air Ministry was not even happy about Battle pilots using their single fixed machine gun in their low-level strikes. Battle crews had to conserve their ammunition so that they could take on any enemy fighters that attempted to intervene, and crews were told that only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ should they strafe the target.51
Meanwhile, War Office pressure for more air support combined with the Battle’s apparent limited strategic capabilities suggested there was little point in keeping the AASF squadrons under Ludlow-Hewitt’s command. In January 1940, government insistence that more account should be taken of Army requirements, led to the creation of the British Air Forces in France (BAFF). This brought together the Air Component, already attached to the Army, and the AASF, and Barratt became the commander of the force. The Battles were no longer part of Bomber Command, so Barratt could now use the bombers as and when the British or French armies needed them.
Barratt was very mainstream in his views on air power. He broadly agreed with Air Staff policy that any tactical air support should be against communication targets in the rear, rather than targets near to or actually on the battlefield. However, even Barratt could see that there was a more useful role for bombers in the likely scenario of both Allied and German armies advancing across neutral Belgium to meet each other. In this ‘unusual situation’, delaying the most forward German troops would give friendly forces more time to take up their positions.52 The main target had to be the enemy’s leading elements, not targets deep in the rear. That meant attacking troop columns, motorised convoys and armoured fighting vehicles. These became the Battle’s priority targets.
The creation of the BAFF seemed like a major blow for Air Staff plans to use all bombers to attack industrial targets. However, the Air Staff had by no means given up hope of using the Battle strategically. The small print in the agreement provided for the return of the AASF to Bomber Command control if the Air Ministry could persuade the government that it was necessary. This did not seem a very likely scenario early in 1940. The War Office was on the offensive, the government was taking their side, and the Air Ministry was very much on the back foot.
As well as transferring the AASF to Barratt’s control, the government also made it clear to the Air Ministry that they had to make sure its squadrons were equipped with planes that were suitable for Army support, which meant replacing the Battle with the sort of plane the Army wanted. The Air Ministry was somewhat shaken by the vehemence of the government instruction. The medium-range bomber element of the B.11/39 project was rather hurriedly dropped and the project turned into a specialist, armoured, ground-attack plane. Slessor, however was made of sterner stuff, and was furious when he found out that the specification had been changed. The bomber was not supposed to attack targets on the battlefield; it had to be able to attack targets in the rear from medium altitude, and also to contribute to the strategic air offensive. This was not the Air Ministry being ‘narrow-minded’, he insisted—the generals might not realise it, but this was what the Army really needed.53 The B.11/39’s strategic capability was immediately restored. It seemed that nothing the War Office or gover
nment could say would stop the Air Ministry from believing what it wanted to believe. There was a sense of despair in War Office circles. The Air Force ‘are not thinking along our lines at all’, the Director of Military Training (Maj. Gen. Malden) complained. ‘In all conversations on the subject of direct support, I find the same. We think close co-operation is really close in, the RAF think 50 miles is close.’54
The same dogma that was driving the requirements for the long-term Battle replacement was also determining what the interim replacement the Air Ministry had promised should be capable of. The Air Ministry had been considering a Merlin-X-armoured Battle, which seemed to offer everything the War Office wanted, but this idea was soon dropped. Instead, they put forward a modified twin-engined Blenheim, a much larger plane that would become the Blenheim V, later known as the Bisley. The plane would be armoured and have a solid nose, with machine guns for strafing. However, both the armour and solid nose would be detachable, so that the plane could carry more fuel and a bomb aiming position, and be used for strategic bombing.55 With deep reservations, the War Office bowed to the Air Staff preference for a twin-engined plane, if that really was the only way of getting a specialist ground-attack plane into service quickly. Unbeknown to the War Office, it was not the quick fix they were expecting. Ensuring the Blenheim was suitable for its dual role involved a substantial redesign, and the modified Battle would have produced a much more suitable ground-attack plane far quicker.
Meanwhile, events in the North Sea were suggesting that the inferiority of the Battle when compared to other RAF bombers might not be as marked as the Air Staff were assuming. Since the beginning of the war, Blenheims, Hampdens, and Wellingtons had been operating against German naval targets in the North Sea. The mutual fire of a handful of Battles may not have been enough to beat off fighter attacks, but the Air Staff believed that twin-engined bombers, with their turrets, ought to be able to do much better. This was not borne out by operations: from the very start, losses were heavy. Initially, the Air Staff persuaded themselves that anti-aircraft fire was the problem and their theories on self-defending formations of bombers battling their way through to the target were still sound. The Wellingtons’ Heligoland Bight operation on 18 December finally put an end to such wishful thinking.
This time the evidence was indisputable—fighters had been responsible for the carnage. This was not a bombing raid on a target deep inside Germany, the formation had not even crossed the German coast. The problems experienced by the Battle had been half-expected. The massacre of the Wellingtons had not. Britain’s best, most heavily-armed bomber had been shot out of the skies just as easily as the Fairey Battle. Bomber crews demanded more armour, self-sealing tanks, and more guns. All these could be provided, but given the mauling the Wellingtons had received, few in the Air Ministry believed they would be enough to solve the problem. Bomber Command’s plans for a strategic bombing offensive had been shattered.
The early losses suffered by the Fairey Battle in France could now be put into better perspective. The Battle had been declared obsolete because it lacked the defensive firepower to fight its way through to its target in daylight, but it now seemed that neither the Blenheim, Hampden, nor Wellington could do any better. The Wellington was as obsolete as the Battle. Alternatively, neither was obsolete, and the problem was the Air Staff definition of ‘obsolete’. The inability to fend off enemy fighters was not a reflection of how obsolete a bomber was. There was no bomber in the world that could battle its way through well-organised fighter defences without an escort. By Air Staff criteria, every single bomber design in the world was obsolete. It was not the bombers that were obsolete; it was the Air Staff thinking that was wrong. With better armament and self-sealing tanks, the Wellington and Hampden were excellent day bombers—but they needed an escort. The same was true of the Battle; like the Wellington and Hampden, it needed a fighter escort to operate effectively.
The losses suffered on 18 December did not shake the Air Staff’s belief in strategic bombing, nothing could do that. The strategy just needed to be tweaked. If bombers could not penetrate by day, they would have to attack by night. Even before the 18 December raid, the Air Staff had been moving towards this conclusion. The losses suffered by the Wellingtons clinched the argument. It was a desperate measure to preserve the strategic bombing strategy. All the evidence gathered throughout the inter-war years demonstrated that precision bombing by night was impossible, but the need to maintain the strategic bombing strategy overrode the evidence. Night attacks were the only way of keeping the Air Staff’s bombing strategy on track.
It was a change of policy that had unexpected implications for the Fairey Battle. The inability of the Battle to contribute anything to the daylight strategic air offensive had been one of the main reasons for switching it to tactical bombing. The situation had now changed. If Bomber Command was going to operate under cover of darkness, there was no reason why the Battles could not join them. The decision to make the AASF part of Barratt’s BAFF was inconvenient but not irrevocable, and the Air Staff felt sure that, once the war started for real, the government would soon see the error of its ways. If London was being bombed and the Western Front was quiet, the cabinet would soon approve the return of the AASF to Bomber Command control. The AASF Battles had to be ready to play their part in the bombing exchange that the Air Staff still believed would decide the war.
There was a new confidence in the Battle as a strategic bomber. The committee attempting to rationalise aircraft production was still waiting to find out if the bomb aiming and navigational equipment could be removed from the Battle. In December, a rather frustrated note asked if the ‘strategical situation’ had been clarified yet.56 The Air Ministry was able to confirm it had: the role of the Battle had been changed again. It might now have to perform missions of up to 250 miles inside enemy territory under the cover of darkness, so the autopilot, bomb aiming, and navigational equipment would all be needed. New instructions were soon on the way to Barratt. He was told that his Battles might now be expected to operate by night deep inside enemy airspace, either attacking industrial targets or dropping mines on German waterways.
What actually happened to the additional armour the Battle was supposed to get is not clear. It seems the sets of armour were sent to France but there is no record of it ever being fitted. A 1943 investigation, as part of the process of writing the official history of British war production, concluded that the Battle never had anything beyond the initial 85 lb to protect it against fighter attack.57 There was no explanation, but the need to keep the Battle ready for long-distance night operations was a very good reason for not weighing the bomber down with more armour.
Instead of concentrating on preparing Battles for low-level daylight strikes on German columns, crews were involved in an intensive programme of night flying. Battle crews were sent off on 200-mile cross-country night flights. Accidents were frequent and the feeling among the aircrew was that flying the Battle by night was not practicable, especially the low flying that would be required for the proposed mining of German waterways.58 The problems became so severe, the Air Ministry Accidents Investigation Branch recommended that night flying on Battles should cease, but this recommendation was ignored.59 As additional practice, Battles dropped leaflets in Germany in areas where they might soon be dropping bombs.
Training for tactical air support was not abandoned. Early in 1940, Bomber Command was still emphasising the importance of dive-bombing to the AASF in France and training units in the UK. The AASF was asked to carry out some additional trials: the Air Ministry wanted to know if dive-bombing from higher altitudes (diving from 7-8,000 feet and releasing at 4,000 feet) was a realistic option. No. 105 Squadron was set the task but the trials were halted before much data had been gathered, as the crews were needed for ‘training of a more urgent kind’. Precision daylight bombing was not the priority.60
The drift towards a more strategic orientated bomber force gathered pace when, on 2 April 19
40, Air Marshal Charles Portal took over from Ludlow-Hewitt at Bomber Command. During his time in command, Ludlow-Hewitt’s attitude to using the Battle tactically had tended to fluctuate. There would be no more fluctuations in Bomber Command policy under Portal. He was convinced that using any bombers to support ground forces would just waste the lives of valuable aircrews. He predicted 50 per cent losses if it was tried and warned that if he was ordered to carry out such missions, it was ‘likely to have disastrous consequences on the future of the war in the air’.61 He wanted all available bombers, including the Battles, used to attack German industry.
One way of doing this was the proposed mining campaign. The new W-Mine was about to enter service and was expected to have a devastating effect on German output; they were to be dropped from 300 feet into German waterways, where they would be swept along until they hit something. The Battle could carry sixteen of them and the idea was to drop them in the Rhine between Bonn and Heidelberg. The French were appalled by what they saw as a complete misuse of the AASF; they were also unhappy that Barratt was receiving instructions to attack German factories.62 Barratt took all this as confirmation of a spineless French attitude, but in fact the French just wanted the bombers used to support Allied ground forces rather than bomb German cities and mine their rivers.
Just weeks before the German offensive, Barratt was told that his Battles might soon be required to bomb objectives as far afield as Cologne, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. Twenty-four targets were listed as suitable for the Battles, including electricity plants, chemical works, armament factories, and marshalling yards.63 The Battles were still ready to strike German columns as soon as the expected German offensive was underway, but RAF commanders were already looking ahead to more worthy ways of using the bomber force. Training for night missions continued apace.
