by Greg Baughen
5
The Beginnings of a Revival
The evacuation of 200,000 British and over 100,000 French troops from Dunkirk gave the Allies some cause for hope. Originally, Allied commanders thought they would do well to lift 40,000 off the beaches; to have over 300,000 trained troops to redeploy seemed to be nothing short of a miracle. They would need time to reequip the troops and get them back into the front line, but if the remaining French forces in France could hang on, the Allies might yet be able to stabilise the situation.
If they could not hang on, Britain would be on her own and in very serious trouble. Even with the resources of the Empire, victory would be impossible and defeat highly probable. The next few days would be crucial. The Germans forces were elated, but exhausted after their victorious 200-mile advance—if their next offensive failed, German units would have to be rested and brought up to strength before a second attempt could be made, which would give the Allies much-needed time. The French believed that, if they could hold the next German offensive for a week, the situation would look very different.1 Everything hinged on the next few days.
The French Army had lost forty divisions in the battle so far, including some of their best equipped. Just sixty divisions remained, with the only British contribution a single infantry division (the 51st Highlanders). General Weygand, the new commander of the Allied forces, correctly decided that there was no point in trying to fight a war of manoeuvre with the Luftwaffe dominating the skies. Instead he organised a defence in-depth along the Somme and Aisne, where every village and hamlet became a strongpoint, which would carry on fighting even if surrounded. Obsolete and mothballed 75-mm cannon were rushed from stores and liberally distributed along the front as makeshift anti-tank guns. The German Panzers and Stukas would be as formidable as ever, but at least they would not come as a surprise. In the air, the French Air Force was beginning to get first-rate American Boston and Maryland light bombers, and the excellent Dewoitine D.520 was reaching more fighter squadrons. However, if they were to stand any chance of holding off the Wehrmacht, they would still need all the help the RAF could provide.
Barratt was all too aware of this. He accepted that the French had been right about his AASF being unbalanced. If his Battles were going to make a significant contribution to the coming struggle, it would have to be by day, with a fighter escort. It was no good attempting to sweep vast areas of airspace clear of enemy fighters or just patrolling the areas the bombers were attacking, the fighters had to accompany the bombers. To use the Battles by day, Barratt needed more fighters.
This was a lesson that the Air Staff were still reluctant to accept, even though the unescorted Blenheims of No. 2 group had also been suffering very heavy losses. As late as 19 May, after nine punishing days, the Air Ministry still seemed to be putting the cart before the horse by suggesting close escorts for bombers would not be possible until the RAF had air superiority.2 However, the sheer scale of losses forced the Air Staff to change its policy. From the 20 May Blenheims operating from Britain began to get a close escort and losses dropped dramatically. Barratt’s Battles needed the same; the three Hurricane squadrons he had were not enough to protect the six Battle squadrons.
Barratt presented the Air Ministry with a stark choice: either the AASF became a properly balanced force with sufficient fighters to escort its bombers, or the entire force returned to Britain. He made it clear that, given the desperate situation the French were in, the latter was not a serious option. Barratt also insisted that these fighter reinforcements had to arrive before the German offensive resumed—it was no good throwing in more RAF squadrons when the ground forces were already in retreat.3 These pleas made little impact on a government and Air Staff terrified by what German bombers might do to targets in Britain if the country’s air defences were weakened by sending more fighters to France. Barratt did not get his extra fighters; he did not even get reinforcements to bring his three Hurricane squadrons up to strength. He would use as many of the Battles by day as his fighter resources allowed, but the rest would have to operate by night.
There was never much doubt about where the Germans would strike. They had established bridgeheads over the Somme at Abbeville, Amiens, and Péronne, and were clearly building up their forces in these areas. The AASF was trying to slow down this build up, although not always in a way that was likely to produce the most useful results. On the night of 31 May–1 June, the Battles were out in force but, perversely, targets included bridges across the Rhine near Mainz, nearly one hundred miles east of the Meuse. With both the French and Germans feverishly packing their front lines for a battle that could only be days away, bombing such distant targets was not the priority. The bridgeheads at Abbeville, Amiens, and Péronne were much easier to find than towns on the Meuse or Rhine and they were packed full of German forces preparing to strike. Anything that happened to be passing through Mainz, or even the Ardennes, would have little bearing on the fighting that would be taking place over the next few days.
Even these nocturnal efforts were severely disrupted by the decision to move the Battle squadrons from the Troyes region to airfields around Tours, 150 miles west of Paris. Basing squadrons so far from the front meant that they were much safer from air attack, but the move still seemed a little overcautious. They were already 100 miles behind the nearest front from their airfields around Troyes; from Tours, the nearest front was some 200 miles away. It would be a major navigational exercise just to find the front line. The targets that the Battles were bombing in the Ardennes were a further 100 miles beyond that. It scarcely seemed the time to be moving squadrons so far from the front. It was particularly bizarre that No. 12 Squadron had to move from its base at Échemines to Sougé, north of Tours, but still had to use Échemines as a forward airfield for operations.
At least a couple of squadrons (Nos. 103 and 150) managed a few night sorties against targets in the Ardennes and Germany while these moves were underway. On the night of 3–4 June, it seems only No.12 Squadron flew any sorties, managing five against railway lines near Trier. On the 4th, the eve of the German assault, operations were suspended to give squadrons time to carry out maintenance and organise billeting. Once again, the squadron records make frequent mention of the need to ‘settle in’.4 The lack of urgency is striking. There seemed little awareness that a crucial battle was about to begin.
On the morning of 5 June, the German Army launched powerful assaults from all three Somme bridgeheads. The attacks from Amiens and Péronne threatened Paris directly and this was where the French defences were strongest. This time there was no immediate breakthrough; French resistance was fierce and German progress slow. Barratt had just eighteen serviceable Hurricanes and these were fully employed defending Rouen. There had been no daylight Battle operations since the 28th and, given Barratt’s determined stance on the escort issue, it would have been no surprise if he had continued to use the Battles solely by night. Nevertheless, with the French throwing everything into the battle, he felt duty bound to do his best, even if it meant Battles flying unescorted.
The first intervention by the Battles did not come until the evening of the 5th, when the struggle had already been raging for close on eighteen hours. At 7.30 p.m., eleven Battles from Nos. 150 and 12 Squadrons used Échemines as a forward base to bomb German units on the Péronne–Roye and Amiens–Montdidier roads. Many of the crews dispatched failed to find any worthwhile targets. This seems strange when such a large-scale offensive was underway, but it is quite possible that the front line was so far away that they failed to find it. Some of the Battles tried to attack French tanks in the Tricot region, south of Montdidier and twenty-five miles behind the front. French fighters intervened and must have been puzzled when the bombers beat a hasty retreat away from the front line.5
Battle operations France June 1940.
Échemines and other airfields would continue to be used as forward bases for day and night sorties. There were complaints that facilities there were poor and tha
t operating so far from the main bases was difficult, but it was scarcely an exposed forward airfield in the normal sense of the word. Until a few days before it had been a main base. The Germans had expanded their bridgeheads by the evening of the 5th, but the French line was holding. On the night of 5th–6th, Battles bombed the airfield at Guise, just behind the front, but another eleven continued their offensive against targets in the Ardennes. Again, this was of no immediate benefit to the French soldiers desperately clinging on to their positions on the Somme.
On the second day of the offensive, the Germans continued to apply enormous pressure all along the Somme front. Fighter reinforcements did finally arrive, and the replacement planes and pilots brought all three Hurricane squadrons up to full strength, but it was nowhere near enough to meet all the tasks the fighters were required for. As a reminder of the RAF’s other responsibilities, the 51st Division, which had been suffering ferocious dive-bombing attacks, sent a delegation to BAFF HQ to demand better air cover. Battles operated against German forces advancing from Péronne, with nine leaving Échemines at 4.30 p.m. to attack enemy columns on the Ham–Péronne Road and others bombing motorised transport and tanks between Péronne and Roye. A flight of Hurricanes from No. 73 Squadron covered the Battles, but it was scarcely an adequate escort. They could not prevent Bf 109s breaking through to two of the Battles, but they managed to beat off their assailants and no bombers were lost. As on the previous day, the BAFF bombing effort was limited and arrived very late in the day.67 The nocturnal Battle operations were now switched to targets closer to the front, where there was at least a chance they could influence events. Battle pilots were gaining in experience and more of them were beginning to fly lower in search of targets; sorties flown from Harbouville on the night of the 6th–7th targeted a bridge over the Somme north of Abbeville and roads leading out of Abbeville and Amiens. The circumstances could not have been more trying. German raids on their airfield disrupted the first attempt to take off at 11.45 p.m., and the second attempt at 1.15 a.m. A third raid caught planes returning from the mission, and this damaged two or three. Twelve Battles operating from Échemines bombed airfields and other military targets near Laon, Guise, and St Quentin, with one pilot claiming to have a hit a petrol dump at Laon. Overall, the damage inflicted was probably not great, but at least the bombers were operating where any damage inflicted might help the troops in the front line.
On the evening of the 6th, the French were still holding the line but the pressure was increasing, in particular south of Abbeville, where resistance to Rommel’s 7th Panzer was weakening dramatically. The next day, twenty-two Battles tried to relieve this pressure by bombing convoys in a wide area between the road from Abbeville to Blangy-sur-Bresle and Poix. The Battles bombed from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, which kept them out of range of small arms fire, but exposed them to the many Bf 109s operating in the area. Once again, a flight of AASF Hurricanes from No. 73 Squadron was all that were available for escort.8 This was clearly inadequate, although it would seem that the Hurricanes were at least flying with the Battles, one Battle crew witnessing a luckless Hurricane brought down by anti-aircraft fire.9
When fighter escorts were available, the Battles approached the target in formation before attacking individually and making their own way home. If escorts were not available, the Battles flew singly or in pairs and relied on their manoeuvrability to evade any fighters encountered. The Battles were not trying to hit targets too far beyond the front line, so they did not have to retreat far before the Messerschmitts might be tempted to abandon the chase. Several Battles did manage to shake off their pursuers on the 7th, but three were shot down.10 Attacking tactical targets was still a dangerous business, but at least it was not as suicidal as it had been in the early days of the campaign—in the first three days of the latest offensive, Battles had flown forty-two daylight sorties and only three planes had been lost. The escorts were still inadequate and the Battle’s unprotected fuel tanks were still an unnecessary Achilles heel, but the squadrons were working out ways of making the best of the situation.
The loss rate was approaching a more acceptable level, but the scale of effort scarcely matched the seriousness of the situation. In the first three days of the offensive, the seventeen available French day bomber groups had flown over 300 sorties. Barratt did not feel he could risk any more of his Battles by day with the limited fighter resources available. By the 8th, the situation on the ground was looking ever more precarious. To make matters worse, while the French clung on along the Somme, reconnaissance was picking up a build-up of German forces further south along the Aisne. The Germans were clearly preparing to strike east of Paris. During the night of 7–8 June, eight Battles attacked the Laon–Soissons road, where tanks had been spotted. However, the situation much further north was becoming so serious, this had to be the priority. Between Amiens and Péronne, the French Army was still blocking the road to Paris, but north of Amiens the French line was buckling. Poix fell on the evening of the 7th.
At 1.30 p.m. on 8 June, twelve Battles bombed columns in the Abbeville–Longpré–Poix–Aumale region. The escort consisted of just seven AASF Hurricanes and these could not prevent the loss of three Battles. Two hours later, eleven more Battles set off to renew the attack, even though their fighter escort did not turn up. There were plenty of targets to choose from; pilots reported that the German columns of tanks and motorised transport stretched five miles. One Battle failed to return.
There was no shortage of fighting spirit amongst the Battle squadrons. Plt Off. Thorougood from No. 103 Squadron was returning home after delivering his attack when he came across a large formation of Ju 87 Stukas. He fearlessly dived his Battle through the formation, damaging one enemy plane, before being set upon by the Bf 109 escort. His gunner, Plt Off. Webber, was wounded, but he claimed one of the assailants. The battered Battle escaped but Thorougood had to make an emergency landing south of Paris.11 Sgt Popplestone of No. 150 Squadron was on the way home from his mission, when he spotted a Ju 88, which he gamely attempted to shoot down.12 Pilots fearless enough to take such risks deserved more than a single fixed machine gun to deliver their attacks. Two more Hurricane squadrons arrived from Britain to bring the total available in France to five. It was a welcome reinforcement but it was also precisely what Barratt had warned against—sending more fighters when it was too late.13
During the night of 8–9 June, efforts to relieve the pressure on the northern front continued. Eight or nine Battles bombed crossings over the Somme at Abbeville and Amiens, with another seven operating in the Laon area, where the build-up north of the Aisne continued to cause concern. German forces believed to be sheltering in nearby forests were the target. The French had good reason to be concerned: the Panzers that had failed to make the breakthrough at Amiens and Péronne were being been switched to the Aisne front.
The situation in the north was now desperate; German forces had broken through and were heading for Rouen unopposed. The forces still holding out further to the north along the Bresle and further south between Amiens and Péronne were being outflanked. On 9 June, Battles were supposed to attack armoured columns, mechanised artillery, and troops near Argueil, but the available Hurricanes were desperately trying to protect the British Highlanders, and could not be spared for escort duties. The mission was therefore cancelled. It was a decision that demonstrated escorts were now considered essential—but with so few fighters and the situation so desperate, it was not easy to maintain this resolve.14
The situation on the ground now began to deteriorate rapidly. On the 9th, Guderian launched his offensive across the Aisne. Again, initially the French defences held and German progress was slow, but the French Army was now hopelessly stretched and their left wing on the Channel coast was already shattered. On the night of 9th–10th, ten Battles attacked bridges and roads in Abbeville and Amiens, while nine operating from Échemines bombed communications near Laon. The bombers showered incendiaries on Forêt de Saint Gobain, just w
est of Laon, in the hope of forcing out the German forces believed to be sheltering there, and also picked out lorries heading south with their headlights blazing.
Early in the afternoon of 10 June, twelve Battles attacked columns approaching Vernon on the Seine. One Battle was lost and another damaged, the latter apparently by a Hurricane. Later in the afternoon, another twelve Battles attacked motor transport near Vernon, a bridge at Pont St. Pierre, and another bridge over the Seine a little further south. It seems that there was no available escort available, as all fighters were required to cover the evacuation from Le Havre, but all the Battles returned. Fifteen more Battles attacked similar targets during the night, but another seven returned to crossing points over the distant Meuse.15
From the 11th, the rapid German advance in the north meant that it was no longer necessary to use forward airfields, which at least removed one complication for the Battle squadrons. A dawn attack on the 11th saw twelve Battles bomb crossings over the Seine, south of Les Andelys. Just after midday, six escorted Battles attacked more bridges in the region and, later in the afternoon, another sixteen Battles attacked similar targets, again with an escort. In the evening, the French naval commander in Le Havre asked for attacks on tanks believed to be advancing towards the port, and so six more escorted Battles were sent out. They could not find the reported tanks, but a couple of armoured fighting vehicles were spotted and attacked. In fact, the Panzers, having reached the coast, had turned east to complete the encirclement of the French 9th Corps and the 51st Highlanders Division. In these missions, the Battles flew at least thirty-eight sorties with two, possibly three, planes failing to return. Twenty-four Battles were supposed to continue the attack in the area south of Rouen during the night, but poor weather prevented all but five from taking off.16
