On 5 March, respected statesman Winston Churchill gave a speech at Westminster College, in Fulton, Missouri. Accompanied on the platform by President Truman, Churchill expressed his belief that the world had changed irrevocably, and coined a phrase that would epitomize the Soviet-dominated fiefdom. He told the audience of students:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow.
In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization . . . I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines.
The Central Intelligence Agency was created by a National Security Act passed by Congress on 26 July 1947 and began operating in September, replacing the Central Intelligence Group which had been brought into existence in January 1946, once Truman appreciated that coordination of the various sources of intelligence data was vital. Admiral Sidney Souers, General Hoyt Vandenburg and then Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter were successive Directors of Central Intelligence during the CIG years, with Hillenkoetter transferring over to the CIA on its formation.
It’s fair to say that the CIA was not an immediate success. According to some reports, they simply weren’t up to the job. There’s a story that is still told in Berlin about the early days of the Agency’s involvement there: networks of agents would be set up secretly operating within the Soviet sector, in accordance with normal espionage principles, but then all those involved were invited to a cocktail party at the American base. This was great in terms of boosting morale for the agents – but it meant that all the Stasi, or the NKVD, had to do was arrest one person, and they could ascertain the identities of not just their one or two contacts, but potentially a whole host of them.
A similar error of judgement caused the loss of multiple teams during the Korean War: ethnic agents who were going to be parachuted into mainland China were trained and lived together, and inevitably shared information about their missions. Betrayal of one team would lead to betrayal of others.
There certainly appeared to be a sorry litany of key world events that the fledgling agency failed to predict, which were highlighted by an article in the New York Herald Tribune in August 1950. Much of this work was carried out by the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE), which would pay the price for the various failures when the Agency was reorganized in late 1950.
This began with the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948. The Communists had become the single largest political party in Czechoslovakia in the elections held in 1946, with Klement Gottwald taking office as prime minster under President Edvard Beneš. Even though Beneš hoped to maintain diplomatic links with the West, the Communists took control of key ministries and started a drive towards total power. In September 1947, the newly formed Cominform (a group comprising members from the Communist parties around the world which aimed to spread the communist creed worldwide) noted that Czechoslovakia was the sole East European country in which ‘the complete victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie’ had not been achieved.
Action against non-communist ministers was stepped up, leading to the mass resignation by twenty-one of them in February 1948. Beneš was pushed into a corner, unable to back the non-communists for fear of the Red Army using a communist-backed insurrection as a pretext to invade. Gottwald threatened a general strike unless Beneš created a communist-led government – still technically a coalition, since it included the Communist Party, and the (pro-Moscow) Social Democrats. It meant that Czechoslovakia was now in the Soviets’ hands, and the elections held that May were purely for show.
The CIA weren’t expecting things to develop so quickly – a refrain that would be heard frequently under Hillenkoetter’s leadership – and they sorely misread the intentions behind the actions. ‘The timing of the coup in Czechoslovakia was forced upon the Kremlin when the non-Communists took action endangering Communist control of the police. A Communist victory in the May elections would have been impossible without such control,’ Hillenkoetter told Truman in a letter on 2 March, while on 10 March, a report suggested that ‘the Czech coup and the [Soviet’s] demands on Finland [for a ‘treaty of mutual assistance’ – a prelude to a takeover] . . . do not preclude the possibility of Soviet efforts to effect a rapprochement with the West’.
Three months later, the American government was shocked by a communiqué issued by the Cominform on 28 June, expelling Yugoslavia from its ranks. ‘The leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism,’ it stated. The Communist Party had placed itself ‘outside the family of the fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau’. The CIA had not put the various pieces of intel together to foresee Stalin splitting with someone regarded as one of his staunchest allies, Yugoslav prime minister Marshal Josip Tito.
In fact, the relationship between the two men had been rocky for some time, despite some surface signs of trust, such as the Cominform placing its headquarters in Belgrade. Tito had his own very clear ideas about how much he wanted his country to be under Soviet domination – he was happy to cooperate with Russia, and to emulate such concepts as the Five-Year Plan (Stalin’s grandiose centralized economic plans), but they would be implemented in a way that suited Yugoslavia, not the USSR. There were tensions over Tito’s use of troops in Albania, and his plans for a joint Yugoslav-Bulgarian Balkan Federation, which Stalin at first denounced, and then suddenly demanded be speeded up (possibly so he could plant pro-Moscow Bulgarians in strong positions in the joint organization).
Letters were flying between Moscow and Belgrade, with Tito eventually pointing out that ‘No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the Soviet Union, he can in no case love less his country, which is also building Socialism.’ Moscow announced on 12 June that Belgrade would no longer be hosting the Danube navigation conference, claiming the city would have ‘difficulty in providing the necessary facilities’, a charge the Yugoslavs denied. The split followed two weeks later – and would lead to Yugoslavia ploughing a different course from other Communist countries for many years to come.
Although the CIA had noted developments, they were criticized for not predicting the cataclysmic nature of the split, and the potential for change within the Soviet-dominated countries. In his written response to President Truman following the Herald Tribune article, DCI Hillenkoetter would point out:
CIA noted that Tito was taking energetic steps to purge the Yugoslav Communist Party of diversionists, and on 10 June reported that the Yugoslav government was groping for a policy that would make it ‘the Balkan spearhead of evangelical and expansionist Communism’. When Yugoslavia defied the USSR on June 20 by insisting that the Danube Conference be held at Belgrade, the CIA estimated that the Kremlin faced a serious problem in reconciling within the Satellite states the conflict between national interests and international Communism.
In other words, yes, they did spot what was going on, but no one could have guessed it would be that serious.
The split between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was thrown into shadow by the
start of another major rift between Russia and its former wartime allies, with the blockade of the non-Soviet sectors of Berlin that began in earnest on 24 June 1948. However, on this occasion, the accusation that the CIA failed to give adequate warning of this was not just unfair – it was manifestly wrong.
As part of the Potsdam Treaty which divided Germany into four sectors – run by Britain, France, the US and the USSR – Berlin itself was similarly divided. This was a constant thorn in Stalin’s side: it provided a staging-post for American and British intelligence deep in the heart of Soviet East Germany; disaffected and reluctant citizens could find a haven from Communism by claiming asylum there and it was a reminder that Stalin had failed to achieve everything he wanted from the end of the war. The Western sectors were heavily reliant on cooperation from the Soviets, and when Stalin took exception to the way in which Britain, France and America were advancing with democracy and a new currency within occupied Germany, he decided that he wanted the allies out of Berlin. Pressure on what he regarded as the weak point of the coalition might also lead to a permanent split between the various states.
A policy of harassment began: trains travelling between the non-Soviet parts of Germany and Berlin were stopped and searched; a Soviet Yak-9 fighter came too close to a British airliner, killing all aboard. On 19 June 1948, the Russians stopped all rail traffic into the city; four days later, road and barge traffic was also halted. Then they cut the electricity supplies to West Berlin. It could have been a prelude for war, but all analysis indicated that if the Western powers held firm, Stalin would eventually back down. An incredible feat of logistics ensured that the blockade of Berlin, while still materially affecting everyone within the city, never brought the Western powers near to capitulation. For ten months, a constant stream of aircraft brought supplies along the internationally agreed air corridors over East Germany, keeping the Berliners alive.
Three months before the blockade began, at a time when the Soviets were carrying out military manoeuvres and beginning their harassment, DCI Hillenkoetter briefed President Truman:
The USSR . . . cannot expect the US and the other Western Powers to evacuate [Berlin] voluntarily. The USSR, therefore, will probably use every means short of armed force to compel these powers to leave the city.
These devices may include additional obstruction to transport and travel to and within the city, ‘failure’ of services such as electric supply, reduction of that part of the food supply which comes from the Soviet Zone . . . [T]he day-to-day developments in the immediate future will test the firmness, patience, and discipline of all US personnel in Berlin.
As a prediction of the nearly year-long crisis, it couldn’t really be bettered. It certainly seemed as if Stalin wasn’t being served with nearly as good intelligence from his people in Berlin, since he fatally underestimated the resolve of the coalition, and had little option but to back down and eventually reopen the borders.
The Cold War wasn’t the only consideration for the CIA in 1948. Events in the Middle East were the focus of attention, as Jewish forces fought tooth and nail to create an independent state of Israel. On numerous occasions during that year, it seemed as if the Arab forces would deal a decisive blow to the nascent state, which had been declared on 14 May 1948, and recognized by the US and the USSR. However, the tenacity of the Jewish people – together with aid from foreign countries, sometimes in direct breach of United Nations declarations – ensured their survival. Hillenkoetter answered criticisms that the CIA hadn’t predicted the outcome by pointing out that no one could have anticipated the amount of overseas aid that Israel would receive.
What proved to be one of the biggest mistakes the early CIA would make came with regard to the Soviet atomic programme. Neither the CIA nor the FBI was fully aware of the extent of the spy rings that had been set up during the Second World War to elicit the information – although Alan Nunn May had been arrested following the Gouzenko revelations, he was proud in later life that he never betrayed any of his colleagues to the security forces. The Venona transcripts showed that there were others involved, but there wasn’t clear evidence as to whom – and without that information it was impossible to judge what could have been passed across.
Although the Western allies had tried to prevent German atomic scientists from being inducted to the Soviet programme at the end of the war, they knew that some key German personnel, including Dr Nicolaus Riehl of the Auer Company, Professor Gustav Hertz, and Professor Adolf Thiessen, were in Russian hands. Intelligence reports concluded that Germany’s foremost cyclotron constructor, as well as an expert in the biophysics of radiation, were also working for them. Four East German scientists who defected to the West in 1947 helped to fill in some of the gaps, and evidence obtained by covert CIA operatives suggested that plutonium production was taking place at Elektrostal, a small town about sixty miles east of Moscow, using material produced at the IG Farben plant near Berlin.
Unfortunately, the CIA’s own analysts didn’t pay much heed to that information, and instead relied on pre-war geological analyses which stated that the Soviet Union wouldn’t be able to threaten America’s near-monopoly on suitable ore. In October 1946, the CIA’s Office of Reports and Estimates suggested that ‘It is probable that the capability of the USSR to develop weapons based on atomic energy will be limited to the possible development of an atomic bomb to the stage of production at some time between 1950 and 1953. On this assumption, a quantity of such bombs could be produced and stockpiled by 1956.’ The ORE admitted its projections were ‘educated guesswork’ but based it on ‘the current estimate of existing Soviet scientific and industrial capabilities, taking into account the past performance of Soviet and of Soviet-controlled German scientists and technicians, our own past experience, and estimates of our own capabilities for future development and production.’ Although the information received regarding the Soviets progress brought the projected date forward to a certain extent, the earliest possible date was still being given as ‘mid-1950’ with mid-1953 being the most probable. That report was dated a mere five days before the Soviets exploded their first atomic device, nicknamed Joe-1 at Semipalatinsk, a site in north-eastern Kazakhstan, on 29 August.
Internally at the CIA, the failure to predict the timing of the test firing was described as an ‘almost total failure of conventional intelligence’ by assistant director Willard Machie. Summoned before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on 17 October, Hillenkoetter maintained that ‘I don’t think we were taken by surprise’ – an assertion that didn’t go down too well with the members of the committee.
‘Our estimates were not too far off,’ Hillenkoetter said, explaining that the CIA assumed that the Russians didn’t begin work on an atomic programme until after the explosion at Hiroshima in August 1945, but it was now clear that they had started in 1943 – so the ORE’s estimate of five years from start to finish was still accurate. He also noted that now the Russians had exploded a bomb, it meant that they could better correlate the various pieces of information that they had. (One Senator pointed out that even ‘the Russians themselves didn’t know that they had the bomb until it went off’, unconsciously echoing the concerns of Soviet ministers at the time, who sought reassurance that there had been the distinctive mushroom cloud before reporting to Stalin.)
At least one of the Senators present caught the mood: ‘We have not had an organisation adequate to know what is going on in the past and [the DCI] gives me no assurance that we are going to have one in the future.’
Failing to predict the rise of the Communist party and the declaration of the People’s Republic of China was another charge levelled against Hillenkoetter by the Herald Tribune. Once again this wasn’t accurate: the Agency had been repeatedly pointing out that the nationalist forces in China were disintegrating, and the rise of the Communist party under Mao Tse Tung was a corollary of that.
In the words of a later deputy DDI at the CIA, John Gannon:
[There was] a widely h
eld but incorrect perception that the job of intelligence officers is to predict the future. That is not the case. Only God is omniscient, and only the Pope is infallible; intelligence officers are too savvy to compete in that league. Rather, the function of intelligence is to help US decision makers better understand the forces at work in any situation, the other fellow’s perspective, and the opportunities and consequences of any course of action so that US policymakers can make informed decisions.
Hillenkoetter’s job at the CIA was made much harder by the lack of cooperation that he received from other intelligence agencies. As he told President Truman, ‘The [military] services withhold planning and operational information from the CIA and this hampers the CIA in fulfilling its mission.’ The FBI could be obstructive, and the military sections overestimated Soviet capabilities in their own fields to ensure their own departments received the necessary support.
It wasn’t all bad news: the CIA were able to prevent a Communist party victory in the 1948 Italian elections. This wasn’t the spy work of the Second World War, sneaking behind enemy lines. However, for an American government seriously worried about the spread of Communism, it was equally important, and for the agents actively involved in passing money to contacts and other clandestine activities, it wasn’t that different in reality.
A Brief History of the Spy Page 5
