by Glen Johnson
Left unstated wasn’t a demand but a belief held by the US side.
Both the president and his secretary of State thought that ridding Iran of its nuclear weapons capability wouldn’t just empower moderate elements within Iran but would prompt more work with Rouhani’s government on regional matters.
Both also believed—though they were reluctant to say it out loud amid the negotiations—that reaching a deal would spark a yearning for greater freedom and engagement with the West. This would come from Iranians who stood to benefit both from the end of sanctions and their country’s reentry into the community of nations.
“When Nixon went to China, Mao was still in power. He had no idea how that was going to play out,” President Obama told a group of reporters in August 2015—a month after the Iran deal was completed. “[President Nixon] didn’t know that Deng Xiaoping would suddenly come in and decide that it doesn’t matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice, and the next thing you know you’ve got this state capitalism on the march,” he added. “You couldn’t anticipate that.”219
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SECRETARY KERRY’S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT in the Iran negotiations began in earnest in October 2013, several weeks after his exploratory meetings with Foreign Minister Zarif at that year’s UN General Assembly.
The venue was Geneva, the Swiss city that was home to the League of Nations, the predecessor to the UN. “Genève” had a reputation as the diplomatic hub of proudly neutral Switzerland.
The Iranians preferred to hold the talks in such “UN cities,” which explained why we ended up meeting not only in Geneva, Lausanne, and Montreux, Switzerland, but also Rome and Vienna. They also hosted UN operations and had their own diplomatic histories.
Geneva was a familiar venue for us, too, given the time we spent there in September 2013 negotiating the Syria chemical weapons agreement with the Russians. We were used to the InterContinental Hotel, with its hilltop view of Lake Geneva and Mont Blanc when the weather was clear enough to let you see into France.
As with our time in Israel, we also were used to the routine of visiting Switzerland.
We’d fly into Cointrin International Airport and be enveloped by heavy security. The locals were resolute in their commitment to avoid any incidents on their neutral territory and spared no expense to prevent them. We were in a protective cordon wherever we went.
One thing we never got used to, ironically enough, was the prices in Switzerland. Spaghetti Bolognese, a staff staple, cost $35 a plate at Geneva hotels. Cheeseburgers were just as expensive.
We took to buying premade sandwiches at the local Migros and Coop convenience stores, or dashing down the street to Chez Ma Cousine. The restaurant sold roast chicken with potato wedges and a salad for $20 a plate. It was the best deal in town.
All of this elicited little sympathy from my college roommate John Stanton, who happened to live in Geneva. For every price we complained about, he came back with the tale of buying a $17 box of dishwasher soap or spending $120 for a Thanksgiving turkey no bigger than a chicken.
(Top) A return to a Swift Boat dock on Saigon River. (Bottom) With Bob Kerrey at Rex Hotel.
(Top) A tribute to Anne Smedinghoff in Kabul. (Middle) Hosting British foreign minister in Boston. (Bottom) Exiting French Foreign Ministry in Paris.
(Top) Looking out on Baghdad. (Middle) Visit to mosque in Astana, Kazakhstan. (Bottom) Bilat lunch with Philippines president Duterte.
(Top) John Kerry locates spot of infamous firefight on Bai Hap River in Vietnam. (Bottom) A final handshake with former Viet Cong soldier Vo Ban Tam.
(Top) Walking past Churchill and other past British prime ministers while leaving No. 10 Downing Street. (Bottom) Deplaning at Golden Hour at Stansted, UK.
(Top) Posing with young Russian girl before meeting with President Putin in Sochi. (Middle) Closeup view of tanker transiting Miraflores Locks on Panama Canal. (Bottom) Greeters waiting in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
(Top) Watching markswoman near Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. (Middle) Touring shrine in Laos. (Bottom) Checking out antique car in Havana.
(Top) Touring Lodi Gardens, India. (Middle) Meeting with young people in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Bottom) US embassy Bishkek Halloween party.
(Top) A call from the Leader of the Free World atop a Swiss mountain. (Bottom) A granddaughter looks on as Secretary Kerry signs climate change agreement at UN.
(Top) A man and his moment: John Kerry boards one of the planes he will use to travel 1.4 million miles as secretary of State. (Bottom) Arriving in Saudi Arabia.
(Top) Elephant selfie in Nairobi, Kenya. (Middle/Bottom) A playful exchange with a pair of greeters in traditional dress after Secretary Kerry arrived at Foreign Ministry in Colombo, Sri Lanka.
(Top) Gathering thoughts from Condi Rice, John McCain, James Baker, and others after funeral in Saudi Arabia. (Middle) A meeting with Pope Francis at the Vatican. (Bottom) President Obama visits State.
(Top) Briefing reporters on Iran deal. (Middle/Bottom) Paying respects after Charlie Hebdo/Hypercacher terror attack in Paris, at Brussels airport.
(Top) Touring Hemingway’s house in Cuba. (Middle) Hometown Diplomacy stop in Boston by Australian foreign minister. (Bottom) Tarmac soccer break.
(Top/Middle) Hardball/Softie: Meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu on David Citadel balcony overlooking Old City, and an introduction to his late dog, Kaiya. (Bottom) Familiar view (of Tel Aviv) from my window seat on the world.
(Top) Sailing across onetime frozen bay to receding glacier near Svalbard, Norway. (Middle) Greeting hosts at second Our Ocean conference in Valparaiso, Chile. (Bottom) Ridiculous Hold Room in Qatar.
(Top/Middle) A man always in motion: at Orly Airport, Paris; in London City Hall. (Bottom) Leaving UN Headquarters, New York.
(Top) An impromptu walk in Washington, DC. (Middle) Reviewing notes before UN meeting. (Bottom) Airborne meeting with staff.
(Top) Mary Rezaian looks on as her son Jason thanks Secretary Kerry for his freedom. (Middle) Office confab with David Wade and others. (Bottom) An award from German foreign minister Steinmeier.
The first round of talks with Iran, aimed at crafting an interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action, began with meetings held on two successive days, October 15 and 16, 2013. We flew back to Geneva on November 8, 2013, amid word that Deputy Secretary Bill Burns, Biden national security adviser Jake Sullivan, and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman were close to resolving final sticking points with their Iranian counterparts.
Nonetheless, the talks sputtered and Secretary Kerry and his fellow ministers left two days later. We returned to Geneva on November 23, 2013, for a marathon negotiating session we hoped would seal a deal that would let us get home for Thanksgiving.
Kerry met with Foreign Minister Zarif and a third party instrumental to the talks, Catherine Ashton. A British baroness, Ashton was the de facto European Union foreign minister as the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy.
Kerry then met one-on-one with Zarif, had a meeting with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, and then a series of trilats and various bilats. In between, he killed time shopping for chocolates at Auer, his favorite Swiss candy store, and, at one point, marveling at roses the hotel staff had placed in his room.
“Flowers are a real gift,” the secretary told us. “We take them for granted, but when you stop and really think about all the varieties, it’s amazing.”220
About 9:30 p.m., Kerry spoke with President Obama. He told him Zarif had agreed to everything sought by the P5+1, with one exception. The president must have replied, “Congratulations,” because Kerry next said, “Well, thanks, but it’s a big exception.”221
It centered on whether the Joint Plan of Action would acknowledge Iran had a “right” to enrich uranium, which could complicate the final negotiations about curbing enrichment.
The discussions continued through several more rounds of bilats and trilats, as well as a midn
ight pizza delivery to the secretary’s suite. Kerry, Burns, and Sherman worked on several rounds of language with the Iranians before the deputy secretary went to meet with his counterpart.
He told him Kerry had the authority from President Obama to reach a final deal on the language he was carrying.
In an artful dodge, the final agreement was ambiguous on Iran’s right to enrich, allowing both sides to argue they had won that point.
At 1:45 a.m. on November 24, 2013, Burns returned to the secretary’s suite and asked us, “Can you get the secretary, please?”
When Kerry walked out of his bedroom, his deputy told him, “We have an agreed-upon text.”
The Joint Plan of Action, the prelude to the final Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was complete. The parties assembled at the nearby Palace of Nations and held a news conference at 3:45 a.m. to outline the agreement. The secretary came back to the hotel at 5:30 a.m. for a set of round-robin interviews with our traveling television correspondents.
We left the InterCon and headed to the airport at 9:30 a.m., having slept little more than one hour during the twenty-four hours we were in Geneva.
As expected, Zarif later told reporters the agreement recognized Iran’s right to enrich. Kerry replied, “There is no inherent right to enrich.” He said in one of a series of interviews the agreement “states that they could only do that by mutual agreement, and nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on.”222
En route to London on the way back from Geneva, Kerry told reporters he believed the personal rapport he’d built with Zarif had helped this first round of negotiations.
“Sometimes, you have to talk to people like they’re people,” the secretary said.223
He described his counterpart, an English-speaking, US-educated, former Iranian ambassador to the United Nations, as businesslike and respectful.
“He has a job; I have a job,” Kerry told the reporters.224
It was the beginning of a relationship that would vacillate between professional and pugilistic as each man tried to get the best deal for his country.
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WE BEGAN 2014 WITH a fast start, flying off to Israel on New Year’s Day for another round in the flagging Middle East peace talks. We flew back to Geneva the following week to talk with the Iranians about the particulars for implementing the Joint Plan of Action.
It was the bridge to any final agreement curbing Iran’s nuclear program.
The negotiations took place January 9–10, 2014, with the aim of implementing the interim agreement on January 20, 2014.
Israeli leaders had been harshly critical of the negotiations even before they began. They said Iran was playing the West for sanctions relief, allowing it to continue sponsoring terrorism and political upheaval in the Middle East. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu labeled the interim deal “a historic mistake.”225
The complaints lost some of their sting, though, when the Israelis heard the terms of the JPOA.
It required that all uranium enriched beyond 5 percent be diluted or converted to uranium oxide, making it less likely it could end up in a bomb.226
Iran also agreed it wouldn’t install any new centrifuges—spun to enrich uranium—and that 50 percent of the centrifuges already installed at Natanz would be left inoperable. At the Fordow enrichment facility, the restriction was even greater. Seventy-five percent of its centrifuges had to be left inoperable.227
Meanwhile, the IAEA was granted access to the once-secret Natanz and Fordow plants for the first time. Some sections would be monitored by cameras twenty-four hours a day.228
In return, Iran was granted sanctions relief valued at $7 billion, including the release of $4.2 billion in frozen oil revenues. The money was to be paid out in monthly installments of $550 million, a guard against the country grabbing the cash and then violating the terms of the agreement.
The two sides agreed the interim deal would last six months. That was enough time, they hoped, to complete a fuller, follow-on agreement. It would be known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, indicative of its sweeping scope.
In a twist, though, the success of the JPOA slowed down, undermined, and even threatened progress toward this final, comprehensive agreement.
First, Congress demanded to know what was in the interim deal. It was a reasonable request for transparency, but it proved to be a burden amid the continuing negotiation about the Comprehensive agreement.
President Obama, Secretary Kerry, and members of the negotiating team were forced to trumpet the interim agreement back in Washington and outline its merits in testimony before Congress.
“This is a very delicate diplomatic moment, and we have a chance to address peacefully one of the most pressing national security concerns that the world faces today, with gigantic implications of the potential of conflict,” the secretary told members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 10, 2013. “One path could lead to an enduring resolution in international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. The other path could lead to continued hostility, and potentially to conflict.”229
He concluded: “We have an obligation to give these negotiations an opportunity to succeed.”230
Unfortunately, outlining all the United States won in the interim agreement also highlighted all Iran had given up. That created problems for the Iranian negotiators when they returned to Tehran.
During a May 3, 2014, conference held—pointedly enough—at the former US embassy in Tehran, hard-liners issued a joint statement placing demands on their own negotiating team.
“What we are saying is that this [negotiating] team is entering the talks with a soft position and a diplomacy of smiling, which is not appreciated in a country like Iran that has given martyrs and struggled many years for the victory of its Islamic Revolution,” said Mohammad Hossein Karimi-Ghadoosi. The parliamentarian and leading figure of the hard-line Islamic Endurance Front made the comment to LobeLog, a blog focused on US foreign policy in the Middle East.231
The second way the interim agreement impeded a permanent one is that opponents of the nuclear deal—primarily Israel—began to latch onto the JPOA. They said it was good enough and didn’t have to be superseded by a final, more far-reaching comprehensive agreement.232
“He was wrong. And today he is saying, ‘Oh, we should extend that interim agreement,’” Kerry said in reference to the opposition initially raised by Prime Minister Netanyahu. The secretary spoke while testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 25, 2015.233
Iran, however, noted it made the interim deal only as a prelude to a final enduring agreement. That meant US negotiators had to return to the table and sit across an Iranian team determined to win back concessions in the final agreement.
The resulting dynamic: an Obama administration tantalizingly close to an agreement it felt would be a major foreign policy win, facing a delegation from Iran—whose people are famously shrewd negotiators—seeking to exploit that interest by holding out.
One measure of the allies’ interest in reaching an agreement? The P5+1 parties repeatedly extended the deadline for moving from the interim agreement to a final deal.
When the interim deal was enacted on January 20, 2014, the parties agreed to a six-month period for negotiating the final deal. That ended July 20, 2014. They then extended it to November 24, 2014—the first anniversary of the interim deal signed in Geneva.
When that deadline also neared, they moved the date again to July 1, 2015. Even that slipped to July 7, 2015, then July 10, 2015, and again to July 13, 2015. The final agreement wasn’t sealed by all parties until the early morning hours of July 14, 2015.
That said, Iran’s interest in striking a deal was evident in its willingness to continue living by the interim agreement even as the deadline for the final one slipped. Iran was getting some sanction relief, true, but not the full gains it sought.
All that kept continuous pressure not just on the Americans, but also on P
resident Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif to wrap up the talks.
Secretary Kerry alluded to some of the criticism he faced on March 9, 2015, while addressing a meeting of his assistant secretaries at the State Department.
“We are not desperate to make a deal,” he told the group. “Would I like one? Yes, because the consequences of not getting one are not pretty.”234
The secretary reiterated he’d “walked away” from the talks—refusing to fly from London to Geneva after one particularly stagnant negotiating session at the deputy level—“and I am prepared to walk away again, if I have to.”235
On April 2, 2015, following six days of high-level talks at the Beau-Rivage Palace hotel in Lausanne, Iran tentatively agreed to the framework for the final deal. It not only accepted restrictions on its nuclear program lasting varying amounts of time, but also agreed to a heightened regimen of inspections of its nuclear facilities.236
While it was an achievement building momentum toward the final deal, Kerry apologized to his assistant secretaries for his long absence during the talks in Switzerland.
He also complained that much of the debate since the interim agreement had been “captivated by a complete lack of information and facts.”237
Nonetheless, Kerry told the State Department team: “We can’t get around that until the final agreement, and some ambiguity is needed to get a final deal.”238
