by Henry Landau
The Mixed Claims Commission met on 18 September 1930 at The Hague to render a judgment on the evidence presented by Germany and the United States in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases.
The umpire was the Honourable Roland W. Boyden; the Honourable Chandler P. Anderson was the American commissioner; and the German commissioner was Dr Wilhelm Kiesselbach. On behalf of the government of the United States there appeared: the Honourable Robert W. Bonynge, American Agent, and Mr H. H. Martin, Counsel to the American Agent. On behalf of Germany: Dr Karl von Lewinski, German agent; Dr Wilhelm Tannenberg, counsel to the German agent; and Mr T. J. Healy, assistant counsel.
After making appropriate reference to the Peace Palace in which they were assembled, an edifice dedicated by the donor, Andrew Carnegie, to the cause of peace and the settlement of international controversies by judicial tribunals, Mr Bonynge outlined the charge:
That during the period of American neutrality, the Imperial German government, in accordance with the policy now admitted to have been inaugurated by the Foreign Office of the Imperial German government, authorising and directing sabotage against munitions and munition plants in the United States, did employ, through its agents thereunto duly authorised, men who actually set fire to the Black Tom terminal and to the Kingsland plant of the agency of Canadian Car & Foundry company.
He then went on to point out the difficulties which Germany had set up in the way of the American investigators to prevent their obtaining information, and quoted the numerous instances of obstruction and lack of co-operation, and stressed specific instances.
What the outcome of the Black Tom and Kingsland cases will be, no one yet knows. It is one thing to feel convinced that Germany is guilty in both cases; it is another thing to prove it in an international court of law, which almost inevitably is inclined to believe the word of a government as against that of individual witnesses. Furthermore, German agents did not stand on street corners and advertise what they were doing. By 1916 Germany’s sabotage directors in the United States had become veterans in the field and were sufficiently well versed in secret service methods to cover up their tracks. A Hinsch would not reveal his identity to a Kristoff. He would employ just the methods that Graentnor used.
Starting out on a cold trail nearly six years after the destruction of Black Tom and Kingsland, and after most of the German agents and officials involved had scattered to the four corners of the globe, the American investigators have had an almost superhuman task. Precious years had been lost during which many of the contemporary clues had disappeared. The Germans had also been given a breathing spell; and by 1924, the period when the investigation really got under way, the German secret service had once again come to life, the backbone of the German government had been stiffened, and both were ready to fight tooth and nail.
Had the American investigators been on the scene in Berlin just after the Armistice their task would have been simple. They could have demanded and would have received the sabotage documents which the German government has since either destroyed or secreted. Proof that the German secret service files were intact at the period was furnished by a British officer attached to the Inter-Allied Control Commission, who examined the archives and took the Edith Cavell file, which he still has in his possession.
It has also been especially difficult for the American lawyers to convince the three judges of the Mixed Claims Commission that a sovereign country such as Germany would resort to fraud and trickery; yet such artifices are the stock-in-trade of all secret services; and in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases the American claimants have had to cross swords with the German secret service. The German government is the façade; it is her secret service which has supplied the organisation which has kept a close eye, not only on all the German wartime sabotage agents involved, but also on the movements of the American investigators. In the opinion of this author, who spent several years of his life combating the German secret service, the methods it has employed fighting the American claimants run true to form.
In no large country other than the United States could Germany have carried out the wholesale sabotage campaign which she conducted there during the neutrality period. Even a country like Holland, caught between the Germans and Allies as though in a nut-cracker, would not have tolerated for a moment any spy or sabotage activity conducted against her. The secret services of all the belligerents used Holland as a spy base during the war, but all of them were extremely careful to avoid any act which might have been interpreted as directed against the Dutch. Her police knew the identity and whereabouts of the directors of the various secret services, and, precarious though Holland’s position was, they would quickly have been held responsible for any hostile acts of their agents.
The weakness of the United States both then and now is that there was, and still is, no American counter-espionage service. The Department of Justice does investigate whatever reports of suspected spy activities are sent in from time to time by private citizens, but there is no check-up on spies in any way comparable with that which exists in other countries. Foreign spies can operate there in comparative safety.
At least $150,000,000 damage was done in the United States by sabotage agents during the war – not to mention the huge loss in potential profits caused by the destruction of factories holding millions of dollars’ worth of contracts. The same objectives exist today and are just as vulnerable. Twenty men willing to give their lives could probably put the Panama Canal out of action. Furthermore, germ warfare was in its infancy twenty years ago. But tremendous strides have been made since, both in developing more deadly and concentrated strains of disease bacteria and in perfecting superior and easier methods of disseminating them. It would be too late to start organising a counter-espionage defence after the outbreak of hostilities, for in a few days a handful of agents could initiate a nation-wide epidemic of plague, cholera, or other deadly diseases. A grim portent of this coming form of attack is the recent news from Spain that several secret agents have been sentenced to death for spreading sleeping sickness and typhus behind the Insurgent lines.
A counter-espionage service cannot be created overnight. Its efficiency depends on an experienced personnel, on the possession of accurate records of suspects, on watching these suspects, and on piecing together information obtained from all parts of the country. Twenty-four hours after the declaration of war in 1914 every suspected German spy in France either was under lock and key or had been escorted across the frontier.
Foreign key agents for sabotage and espionage are already in the United States waiting; and when needed others will be quickly recruited from among those Fascist, communist, or other alien organisations which, through the chance of war, happen to be lined up on the side of the enemy. All this was demonstrated during the war. Foreign spy activities in Mexico are also of special interest. We have seen how Mexico was used as a spy base during the war, and it is probable that today, even in time of peace, it is still being used as such.
Apart from protecting naval and military secrets from the foreign spy, and being ready to combat the saboteur in the event of war, an American counter-espionage service would amply justify its existence by keeping a watchful eye on internal subversive movements. In addition it would serve to co-ordinate all pertinent information collected by the various law enforcement agencies of the government, by the local police forces, reserve army intelligence officers and the American Legion. Under present conditions such information tends to be hidden in water-tight compartments. The immigration and naturalisation service, the FBI, and finally the secret service division of the Treasury could all be used as channels of information and action without in any way interfering with their present functions.
When we turn to the field of secret service, we find the United States in an even weaker position. She is the only large nation that does not employ such a service to obtain the war plans of prospective enemies and learn about their new weapons. The small intelligence units maintained by the army and
navy are the only organisations of the kind, and their principal object is to serve as a nucleus for expansion in time of war. The military intelligence, a small section of the general staff, consists of a few officers and stenographers. When we consider that its yearly grant is only $30,000, we are not surprised to learn that its sole function is to act in an advisory capacity to the staff and to digest the information from foreign press clippings and such data as the military attachés are able to gather by keeping their eyes and ears open. The cryptographic bureau, which functioned so efficiently during the latter part of the war and immediately afterward, has been discontinued.
Today, nearly every European country not only has large and active military and naval intelligence services, as well as effective counter-espionage organisations, but also a central secret service operating an army of spies whose reports are distributed to the navy, army and Foreign Office.
The combined efforts of American armament manufacturers, research laboratories, and the specialists of the army and navy have probably succeeded in keeping equipment up to date and may possibly have developed some surprise weapons of their own; but in these times of rapid changes it is truly dangerous for any country not to be fully posted on the military developments of the rest of the world. It is futile to think that weapons which are considered inhuman will not be employed. Military experts and foreign statesmen agree that all international laws will be broken and the most destructive weapons that can be devised will be used. Effective defence against new weapons can be prepared only if they are known in advance.
Before the war, there was an interchange of information between the different international armament manufacturers. The result was that the heavy siege guns used by the Germans in their attacks on Liège and Antwerp were the only weapons of any importance which were not common to all armies at the outbreak of hostilities in 1914. Today almost every country has an Official Secrets Act which prevents the interchange of information.
Spying is undoubtedly on the increase. Hardly a week passes without the European press reporting some important spy arrest; and yet those who have secret service experience realise that these newspaper reports only reflect the bubbles at the surface – that underneath, secretly and cautiously, extensive spy organisations are being established in every country.
In France alone more spies have been caught since the Armistice than were arrested throughout the whole of Europe during the twenty-five years preceding the war.
For an annual expenditure of less than 1 per cent of what America lost from German sabotage during the neutrality period a secret service and counter-espionage organisation could be maintained – the peer of any in the world. This indeed seems a low rate of insurance to pay for rendering the United States safe from military surprise and from the ravages of subversive agents both foreign and domestic.
Copyright
First published in Great Britain in 1938 by Jarrolds Ltd.
This edition published in Great Britain in 2015 by
Biteback Publishing Ltd
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Copyright © Henry Landau 1938, 2015
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ISBN 978-1-84954-958-5
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