The ground fighting situation was now so grave that on 30 June Air HQ Egypt sent a ‘Most Immediate’ signal to all squadrons to the effect that: ‘Every available aircraft is immediately to be made serviceable, to be armed and where applicable be made ready to carry bombs. Major inspections may be ignored during the present crisis.’ The following day, ‘B’ Flight of No 6 Squadron began its withdrawal from LG 91 back to Shandur and a couple of days later, on 3 July, Howard managed to get airborne for thirty minutes in a Hurricane I, to practise low flying. He was putting in more hours swimming in the Suez Canal than he was in a Hurricane! On 4 June he had another forty minutes of low flying; on the 6th fifty-five minutes formation flying and then on the 7th, wonder upon wonders, he finally got to fly in a Hurricane IID: first forty minutes familiarisation in BD136, then thirty minutes in BD979 during which he fired the machine guns. To round off what must have felt like his best day so far, he carried out a one-hour, twenty-minute operational patrol in Hurricane Mk I, Z4350, over the Alexandria port area. Next day Howard had forty-five minutes formation flying in IID, BD979, and on 10 July he was let loose in IID, BD136, to fire its 40mm cannon on the range for thirty minutes – he was delighted with his performance, too. The main part of the squadron was still mounting operational sorties from LG 91 Amriya as part of No 239 Wing, where the squadron war diarist noted: ‘so far all is well and we are holding the Alamein Line all right. Every day we are here means we are getting safer as our defences are getting reinforcements from the 9th Army and the Australians.’ Everyone was optimistic that the Germans could be held then thrown back. Even Howard wrote: ‘the general opinion out here is that we shall be in Tripoli in six months.’ He had another sortie over the range firing the 40mm cannon in IID, BD979, on 11 July.
With the ground situation still fluid, on 28 July the squadron was ordered to LG 89, but this strip was still in the Amriya area – one of a number of LGs in this general vicinity – and described as ‘just across the road’ from LG 91. Here the squadron, under the control of No 244 Wing, occupied the LG alongside No 7 Squadron, South African Air Force (7 SAAF), who operated Hurricane Mk Is with bombs, and it was intended that the two squadrons should co-operate in due course.
In a letter to his parents dated 1 August, Howard told them of his couple of days’ leave in Alexandria and how it had been ‘damn nice to have a bath’. He also mentioned that the two ground crew of his aircraft came from Boston, Lincolnshire, and since Howard flew his first operational sortie in a Hurricane IID on 6 August, it seems likely he would have moved out into the desert a few days earlier. The squadron war diarist recorded that first sortie as follows:
6.8.42. At about 08.30 this morning, Wg Cdr Porteous [squadron CO], Sqn Ldr Weston-Burt, Flt Lt ‘Pinky’ Bluett, Carswell and Sgts Robey and Wilcox, carried out an anti-tank sweep over the southern sector of the German front but located no target. It was the initiation run for the last two named and here’s hoping they all have better luck next time. A similar ‘nursery’ sweep was made at 12.17 hours with same result and the participants were Fg Off Julian Walford, Plt Offs MacDonald, Jones, Freeland, Clark and Sgt Hastings.
In his next letter home, dated 7 August, Howard only remarked that he was very fit and losing some weight, he thought; he would not have been able to get any comments on operational matters past the censor anyway. On the 11th, however, he wrote to say his flight had returned to base – believed to mean Shandur – for a week’s ‘rest’. The squadron diary stated that on 9 August, ‘C’ Flight had moved to Shandur for a week’s refresher training, so it can be construed by this that Howard was in ‘C’ Flight.
A training incident on the firing range at this time illustrates just how ‘hairy’ one of these 40mm firing runs could be. On 14 August it was noted in the squadron diary:
Plt Off Petersen crashed Hurricane IID at 11.00 hours while firing at a screen target. He was slightly injured and the accident attributed to failing to pull up in time after firing. The attack was being carried out at ten feet and the starboard wing root and airscrew struck one of the railway lines [an upright] supporting the target. Landing was made wheels up and the aircraft was Cat B.
‘C’ Flight returned to LG 89 on 16 August and, interestingly, on that date it was also mentioned that signal exercises had been carried out between Wadi Natrum and the Delta, to discover if it was possible to vector aircraft (IIDs) on to ground targets by using a Forward Fighter Control unit. In another organisational change, as from 19 August 1942, No 7 South African (SA) Wing was formed and from that date No 6 Squadron came under its administrative as well as operational control. The squadron’s holding of aircraft was increased to twenty (IID); two Hurricane Is were to be allocated for training and one flight was to be retained at Shandur for training. This latter would be designated ‘D’ Flight.
Howard’s real baptism of fire came at the close of the Battle of Alam el Halfa in which Erwin Rommel mounted what became his last major offensive against the Eighth Army. This battle was the result of a German effort to surround British forces gathered in the area of El Alamein. The Battle of Alam el Halfa began on 30 August 1942 and lasted until 6 September when Rommel’s attack was repulsed. Rather than chase his enemy, Montgomery took this opportunity to hold this line of defence in order to consolidate and train his forces and assimilate intelligence presented to him by the top secret ‘Ultra’ system, so that he could make an all-out attack on Rommel at a time of his own choosing.
On 31 August all squadrons received a personal signal from the air officer commanding (AOC-in-C) that, ‘Everyone must do his utmost and more than his utmost. The enemy this time can and must be finally crushed.’ However, things had quietened down somewhat for No 6 Squadron at LG 89 – to the extent that in a letter dated 1 September, Howard wrote: ‘It is still pretty hot here and … a lot of dust storms. We don’t do much out here except read and play cards and we do a lot of both these.’ Things changed later that day: the commanding officer (CO) led an attack by three IIDs against three tanks and thirty mechanised transport vehicles, but with little visible result. A similar operation was mounted the next day but once again the tanks could not be found, although two of the three pilots hit an armoured car and machine-gunned some troop transports.
As the German forces began to fall back, on 3 September No 6 had a good day when six IIDs attacked eight enemy tanks and other armoured vehicles, claiming hits on five tanks, one armoured car and a lorry. Howard was not on that particular op, but his chance came on 5 September, when six IIDs set out to engage a formation of enemy tanks. Flying Hurricane IID, BP168, Plt Off Clark was one of six aircraft led by Wg Cdr Porteous that took off from LG 89 at 10.12 to attack a group of nine enemy tanks located north of Lake Maghra. Fifteen minutes later, ground control instructed Porteous to orbit the target area and change altitude due to a formation of enemy fighters in the vicinity. No 127 Squadron provided top cover with its Hurricane IIBs and engaged twenty-five Bf 109s and Macchi MC202s. This was a potentially dangerous situation for the IIDs of No 6, so the controller ordered them and their close escort squadron to return to base where they all landed safely at 11.12, without having engaged the tanks.
By this time the German thrust had run out of steam, Montgomery sent a signal thanking the RAF for its splendid co-operation during the operations that began on 31 August and No 6 was back twiddling its thumbs – while Montgomery made ready for the next, key battle. This hiatus brought yet another reorganisation when, on 8 September, No 7 (SA) Wing and its squadrons, including No 6 Squadron, were ‘rested’, its squadrons – with the exception of No 6 – moved away to Kilo 8, Heliopolis. No 6 Squadron, probably because it had only been back in ‘the line’ for a couple of months, was ordered to remain at LG 89 under the temporary control of No 243 Wing. For the next three weeks it was to maintain one flight at operational readiness; one flight on refresher training at Shandur; and one flight on seven days’ leave. ‘D’ Flight still functioned as the ‘training flight’ at Shandur. As a re
sult of all this, Howard spent his leave in Cairo, ‘having a marvellous time, playing squash quite a lot at the Gezira Club and spending no end of money’.
At the beginning of October 1942 it was back to the serious business. The Alamein Line had stabilised but German armour was still probing Allied defences, so Howard Clark went back into action on 5 October. Escorted by twelve Hurricanes of No 238 Squadron, he and two other IIDs took off at 09.00 to attack three enemy armoured cars somewhere in the southern sector. No 1 (SAAF) Squadron provided top cover and it took on several Bf 109s that tried to intercept the ground attack formation. The armoured cars proved impossible to locate but various other vehicles were hit before the three IIDs returned to base.
With the general lack of activity, Howard started to grow a moustache ‘for something to do’. There was even some rain to cool things down a bit: ‘it is the first [rain] I have seen since I left West Africa in April. It makes everything a terrible mess in the desert and runs into our tents and dugouts.’ A sign that things were beginning to hot up again came on 9 October when No 274 Squadron arrived at LG 89 and set up camp on the north-west corner of the airfield. Next day, No 127 Squadron flew in to LG 89 and occupied the south-east corner. Both these squadrons operated the Hurri-bomber.
No 6’s CO, Wg Cdr Porteous, had spent much time recently in Cairo, discussing yet more reorganisation with senior officers at HQ. He returned to LG 89 on 11 October with the news that No 6 Squadron was to reduce to two-flight status. Confirmation came in a signal on 13 October ordering No 6 Squadron and No 7 (SAAF) Squadron (both IID) to sever connections with No 7 (SA) Wing and operate as an independent, purely anti-tank wing, with operational control being exercised by Wg Cdr Porteous, who would report to HQ 211 Group. No 7 (SAAF) Squadron duly took up residence at LG 89 on 19 October. Coinciding with this latest shuffle was another exercise, lasting several days, involving the squadron in the Wadi Natrum area with the aim of trying out methods of ground control, this time including the use of AMES (radar) equipment, for its ground attack operations.
At midnight on 20 October, all leave was stopped. Then, at 14.30 on 23 October, Wg Cdr Porteous called all squadron pilots and officers together in the mess for a briefing about the forthcoming offensive and he read out the following message from the AOC-in-C:
For the defence of Egypt I called for a supreme effort. You gave and gave magnificently. We now pass to the offensive. Once again it is for each one of us wherever our duty calls us, to do our utmost and more. Our duty is clear, to help our comrades in the Army in their battle and relentlessly to smash the enemy in the air, on land and at sea. With the inspiration of a great cause and cold determination to destroy an evil power, we now have our great opportunity to strike a decisive blow to end this war. On with the job.
At 22.00 that same night, Montgomery’s offensive to drive Rommel’s forces out of North Africa began with the opening barrage of the Battle of El Alamein (sometimes referred to as the Second Battle of El Alamein). Fifteen Hurricane squadrons were involved, in addition to many other bomber and fighter types, providing day- and night-fighter cover, ground strafing and dive-bombing. However, the most effective ground attack aircraft was the Hurricane IID, as flown by No 6 Squadron and No 7 (SAAF) Squadron – the latter having re-equipped from No 6 Squadron’s holdings. Although Howard did not participate in operations during the next few days, both squadrons were soon in the thick of battle on the 24th, No 6 Squadron claiming at least sixteen enemy tanks. On the 26th it claimed five tanks, five armoured cars, a half-track and a lorry; on the 28th they scored two tanks, two half-tracks, seven lorries and a wireless truck; and on the 29th three lorries and a half-track. Flak was intense on all these ops but only two aircraft were lost with both pilots escaping safely. On the 28th the squadron was ordered to detach six IIDs to LG 37 to give support to the 9th Australian Division. ‘A’ Flight’s seven aircraft were sent to fulfil this mission but returned a day later without having been called into action.
On 2 November 1942 a general signal was received by the squadron:
Eighth Army broke through enemy positions this morning. All units to check mobility.
When the Allied breakout from El Alamein came on 2 November, the enemy retreated in earnest. The coast road became packed with every type of transport heading west and every RAF fighter was immediately put to work strafing the road. On the 3rd, No 6 was refused permission to join in but was allowed to go free-hunting for anything that moved in the southern sector. No air escorts were needed now as there were no enemy aircraft about and, operating in twos, threes and sixes, the squadron claimed twelve lorries, three semi-tracked vehicles and a tank transporter. Another sortie later that day accounted for six tanks, one armoured car and seventeen lorries. The lethal effectiveness of the Hurricane IID’s 40mm cannon was confirmed by a German prisoner who, during interrogation, described how his company of twelve tanks was decimated in a surprise attack by aircraft firing AP shells. He said six tanks were knocked out and left in flames, while the other six, though hit several times, were able to retreat to their lines. One of these tanks was hit by six cannon shells and the turret of another had a hole punched right through it by an AP shell. The prisoner said the appearance of British tank-busters came as a great surprise and they caused panic wherever they materialised.
By 5 November 1942 the enemy was in full retreat westwards. With the success of the Allied seaborne landings in Operation Torch, German forces were now squeezed from both east and west into a pocket in Tunisia where they would eventually capitulate. During November No 6 Squadron moved ‘A’ Flight with six aircraft and ground staff forward to landing ground LG 172. This was located near Hammam close to the Egyptian coast, still 30 miles east of El Alamein but 25 miles west of Amriya. The detachment was kept at instant readiness to move further forward, but the call never came. Howard and a number of other pilots in the squadron had seen no air action during the Battle of El Alamein and it was becoming ever clearer, to the aircrew at least, that the day of the tank-buster was temporarily suspended.
Much of this enforced period of inactivity was taken up with sorties by lorry all over the recent battlefields around Alamein to find and examine knocked-out enemy tanks and other armour so that the pilots could see the effects of their 40mm cannon up close. The CO and his deputy, Sqn Ldr Donald Weston-Burt, also spent a great deal of time and effort producing detailed reports, such as: (1) ‘Operations of No 6 Squadron RAF – Hurricane IID aircraft’; (2) ‘Training of Pilots since July 1942’; (3) ‘Individual claims of direct hits’; and (4) ‘Handling notes – Hurricane IID aircraft’ – all of which were sent to Air HQ (AHQ) Western Desert in the hope of stimulating the higher authority’s view of the value of IID operations.
The squadron did not take kindly to being left out of the action against Rommel and his tanks, particularly when, on 6 December, the following signal was received from HQ Middle East:
Two Flights of No 6 Squadron to rearm with Hurricane IICs and to be transferred to the operational control of AHQ Egypt for shipping protection and fighter operations duties. Third Flight is to remain at Shandur as a Hurricane IID Training Flight.
The CO, Wg Cdr Porteous, was not amused and on 6 December sent a letter to AHQ Egypt:
A considerable number of tanks appear to be in Tunisia and it is suggested that if this unit could be sent to Tunisia to fill the role of an anti-tank squadron with Hurricane IIDs, we might be of value to our own forces. The Squadron at the present time is very well trained in the above tactics and operations, both in air and ground crews, and it would appear to be rather a waste of effort if this training could not be utilised to some good purpose. It is understood there would be considerable difficulties in transporting the unit from the Middle East to Tunisia, but possibly this could be overcome.
The same day, the CO was instructed to fly to Edku (or Idku) airfield ‘to confer with the station commander concerning the move of the squadron [from LG 172 to Edku]’. The order stood but everyone was d
isappointed with the change of role, prompting several pilots to apply for posting to squadrons ‘where they could take a more aggressive part against the enemy’. These applications were deferred mainly on the grounds that, since No 6 would now work to ‘normal’ fighter squadron establishment, there would need to be a reduction in flying personnel anyway. The change of role took effect on 1 January 1943, when No 6’s ‘D’ Flight at Shandur was also disbanded and its personnel dispersed. The Hurricane IIDs were to be handed over to No 109 Maintenance Unit at Abu Seuir to be given a thorough servicing. Howard Clark was one of the pilots staying with No 6 and received further good news on 23 December 1942 when he was promoted to the war substantive rank of flying officer, backdated to 25 September. In a letter home, Howard commented: ‘they should pay into my bank account £6 more now and there should be a lump sum for the back-pay.’ Christmas 1942 was celebrated by the squadron in fine – and wet – style, but the next day, 26 December, saw the first convoy patrol flown by Flt Lt Bluett and Fg Off Carswell.
Even when AHQ WD had ordered the transition and the squadron had actually moved to Edku, Wg Cdr Porteous still did not give up trying to have the squadron deployed as a IID tank-buster unit, bombarding AHQ with signals trying to get them to change their mind – but without success. Thus, on 9 December No 6 Squadron joined No 219 Group at Edku, which was on the coast about 20 miles east of Alexandria, where it was to be equipped with Hurricane IICs, each armed with four 20mm cannon. These Hurricane IICs had previously been fitted with just two 20mm cannon in an effort to improve their combat performance, but now AHQ decreed that since there were few to no enemy fighters to contend with and targets would be mostly enemy bombers, the aircraft were to be returned to four-cannon configuration. What actually took place was that a new signal from AHQ WD required No 6 Squadron to adopt a two-flight status in which one flight would be equipped with Hurricane IICs and the second flight would retain some of the original Hurricane IIDs. The training flight at Shandur was disbanded, its aircraft sent to Helwan and its personnel to Edku, where the overall squadron strength was to be reduced to twenty-six pilots and the remainder posted away. Another signal on 25 January would order the complete removal of IIDs to No 2 Aircraft Repair Unit at Helwan and replacement with IICs.
They Spread Their Wings Page 3
