espionage targeting US firms. Security issues focus on the buildup of Chi-
nese military forces and the threat they pose to US interests in Taiwan and
the broader Asia-Pacific. Political issues include China’s controversial
record on human rights, democracy, religious freedom, and family planning
practices. Sovereignty questions involve disputes over the status of Taiwan,
Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, and the often intense disputes in contested
territory along China’s eastern and southern rim that involve maritime transit
and security issues of importance to the United States. Foreign policy dis-
putes focus on China’s support for states deviating from US-backed norms,
notably including at various times North Korea, Sudan, Myanmar (Burma),
Iran, Syria, Cuba, Zimbabwe, and Venezuela; and Chinese trade, investment,
and aid involving resource-rich and poorly governed states in Africa and
other parts of the developing world, which undermines Western sanctions
and other measures designed to pressure these governments to reform. 13
The following chapters show that these differences reflect conflicting
interests and values that often bedeviled US-China relations before the estab-
lishment of the PRC in 1949 as well as since that time.
On the US side:
• US policy and practice demonstrates the strong rationale to seek change in
China in directions favored by the United States. This values-based
American approach often clashes with the realities in US-China relations,
arguing for greater US policy pragmatism.
• US government and nongovernment opinion shows wariness and is disin-
clined to accept China until and unless it accommodates satisfactorily to
US values and norms.
Introduction
7
• US exceptionalism prompts US policy makers backed by broader
American opinion to often see their actions in morally correct terms, so
they have a tendency to play down or ignore the negative implications of
their actions for China and Chinese interests.
• Nongovernment actors play a strong role in influencing policy, reinforcing
the need for US government policy to deal with domestic US determinants
in relations with China as well as the international aspects of those rela-
tions. These nongovernment actors tend to reinforce the three above-noted
elements of a US values-based approach to China seen as less accommo-
dating to Chinese policies and practices at odds with US norms.
• The long-standing US strategic interest in China saw a prolonged reluc-
tance to undertake the risks, costs, and commitments of leadership in
relations with China until forced to do so by the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor at the start of World War II. This period disappointed those in
China seeking help from the United States. Since then, US leadership and
resolve generally has continued amid often great sacrifice and trauma,
caused in particular by repeated, sometimes very costly, and often unpre-
dicted shifts in China. The resulting distrust in Sino-American relations
seems strong.
On the China side:
• China’s “victim mentality,” a long-standing dark view of foreign affairs
strongly propagated by the Chinese government, compels China to sustain
and advance national power and independence in order to protect its inter-
ests in the face of perceived acquisitive and often duplicitous world pow-
ers, notably the United States.
• Chinese exceptionalism places the PRC clearly in the lead in the small
group of countries that view their foreign behavior in more self-righteous
ways than the United States does. Concurrent with the state-fostered “vic-
tim mentality,” Beijing fosters a view that effectively sways opinion
among the Chinese elite and populace that China is always morally correct
in its foreign decisions. Information on China’s many episodes of aggres-
sion and coercive practices for self-interest is suppressed or controlled. In
this view, disputes between China and other countries are not China’s
fault; they arise because of erroneous policies of other countries or sinister
manipulation by larger powers, notably the United States. Since China is
never at fault, the PRC has never recognized making a mistake in foreign
affairs.
• China shows particular worry about the leading world power (usually the
United States) and how it will use its presence and influence along Chi-
na’s periphery, broader international influence, and involvement in Chi-
8
Chapter 1
nese internal affairs to enhance its own power and influence at the expense
of Chinese interests and influence.
• As China rises in international power and influence, the leading power
(the United States) is seen to be inclined to constrain and thwart the rise in
order to preserve its dominant position.
• Chinese suspicions and wariness toward the United States and toward
foreign affairs in general are reinforced by strong currents of nationalism
and Chinese domestic politics sensitive to perceived foreign pressures or
impositions.
Adding to these determinants and values is the fact that the United States
and China are big countries—the world’s most powerful. Their approaches to
each other will not be easily changed by smaller powers or other outside
forces.
Meanwhile, the checkered record of the United States and China in man-
aging their differences in the interest of pragmatic cooperation since the
Nixon-Mao breakthrough more than forty years ago has given rise to experi-
ences on each side that add to bilateral wariness and friction. They include:
• Taiwan: Private and until recently secret Nixon administration interaction
with China shows US leaders at the outset giving assurances to China
about Taiwan that appeared to open the way to unification on terms agree-
able to China. Subsequently, Chinese leaders were repeatedly confronted
with US actions that were at odds with earlier US promises and impeded
Chinese ambitions regarding Taiwan. Chinese distrust of US policy, espe-
cially regarding Taiwan, became deep and long lasting, and continues
today.
• Secrecy: Beginning with Nixon, various US administrations determined to
hide US concessions on Taiwan and other sensitive issues through secret
diplomacy with China in order to keep Congress as well as US media and
other interested Americans in the dark on these sensitive questions. One
result was repeated backlash from these forces against US administration
China policy. Such backlash was seen in congressional action drafting the
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and congressional and media reaction to the
George H. W. Bush handling of China policy after the Tiananmen incident
of 1989. The perceived duplicity of the US administration on sensitive
issues of China policy has led to continued suspicion among congressional
officials, the media, and other US opinion leaders regarding the purpose
and implications of sensitive US policies toward China. The US domestic
backlash and suspicion poses a significant drag on US administration
efforts to move forward on sensitive issues in US-China relations.
• Respective costs and benefits: Debate in the United States and China
repeatedly centers on whether one side or the other is gaining dispropor-
Introduction
9
tionately in the relationship while the other side defers and makes conces-
sions. The Chinese government, given its authoritarian system, has done a
better job than the United States in keeping such debate from spilling over
publicly to affect policy in negative ways. Nonetheless, the tendency of
both sides to be wary of being taken advantage of by the other remains
strong.
• Nongovernment actors: Elites in the Chinese and US governments have
been the key decision makers in Sino-American relations. However,
foreign policy in the United States, and particularly US policy toward
China, has a long history of American nongovernment forces influencing
policy. These groups and individuals have been especially important when
broader international and domestic circumstances do not support a particu-
lar elite-led policy toward China. Thus, they were very important in the
years after the Tiananmen incident and the end of the Cold War. Chinese
leaders for their part say they are constrained by patriotic public opinion in
China, which they aver runs counter to Chinese compromises on Taiwan
or other sensitive issues in the interests of fostering better US-China rela-
tions.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS BOOK
The review offered here synthesizes and analyzes the views of various as-
sessments regarding the background, issues, and trends in Sino-American
relations. It shows enormous changes over time, with patterns of confronta-
tion, conflict, and suspicion much more prevalent than patterns of accommo-
dation and cooperation. The past four decades have featured sometimes re-
markable improvements in relations as leaders on both sides have pursued
practical benefits through pragmatic means. That the base of cooperation is
often incomplete, thin, and dependent on changeable circumstances at home
and abroad is evident as the societies and governments more often than not
show salient differences over a variety of critical issues involving security,
values, and economics. Even during periods of public cooperation, probing
below the surface shows officials, elites, and public opinion on both sides
demonstrating persisting suspicion and wariness of the other country and its
possible negative intentions or implications affecting Sino-American rela-
tions.
The purpose of the book is not to argue against continuing efforts in both
the United States and China to promote a positive trajectory in Sino-
American relations. Such efforts are viewed as reasonable and based on
common interests of both countries in seeking greater cooperation. Nor does
it argue against US and Chinese public disagreements and competition in
peaceful pursuit of their respective interests. Instead, this volume conveys the
10
Chapter 1
perspective of experienced policy makers and specialists on both sides who
understand that perceived advances or setbacks in Sino-American relations
involve only part of a complicated relationship. It seeks to assess more fully
the complexity of the relationship, so improvements and frictions in official
relations between the two nations are placed in balanced context.
Partly because of the salience of US-China relations for international
politics, political scientists and other experts devote impressive effort to
understanding the relationship and charting its future trajectory, notably us-
ing international relations (IR) theories. Nevertheless, experience with many
past failed predictions and often unexpected twists and turns in the relation-
ship argues against adherence only to one IR theory in addressing Sino-
American relations. Prominent IR scholar Aaron Friedberg early in this cen-
tury usefully showed how different American and other IR specialists viewed
China’s rising power and influence through the lens of realism, liberalism, or
constructivism—the leading theories in the IR field.
Indeed, the complex American relationship with China has many features
that may best be assessed using different perspectives from IR theory. Deep-
ening strategic competition and a massive security dilemma between China
and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region underline forces and phe-
nomena that seem best understood through a realist lens. At the same time,
American stress on open trade and investment, related social and political
liberalism, and deepening Chinese engagement with the existing world order
seem best assessed through a liberal perspective in IR theory. In addition, a
fundamental reason US efforts to engage and change China’s policies and
practices have occurred on the US side and have been resisted on the Chinese
side has to do with a profound gap between the national identity in China and
that in the United States, a topic well explained by constructivist IR theory.
While written by a specialist who sees US-China dynamics best viewed
through a realist lens, this study sees the wisdom of using an eclectic ap-
proach in applying IR theory to explain varied developments in US-China
relations. Meanwhile, the complexities and perceived shortcomings in as-
sessing Sino-American dynamics discussed above lead this author to employ
throughout the book the type of contextual analysis used by US government
and other policy and intelligence analysts. The author’s intention is to offer a comprehensive assessment of the various determinants seen in the context of
Chinese and US decision making in order to provide (1) a realistic view of
why and how government officials and others influential in decisions rele-
vant to the United States-China relationship have made their choices and (2)
a realistic view of the implications of those decisions. Those determinants
take into account the changing interplay of power, interests, development,
identity, norms, and values present in different countries and regions.
Introduction
11
OUTLINE
This book assesses determinants—historical and contemporary—that explain
the uncertain situation prevailing today between areas of convergence and
areas of divergence in contemporary US-China relations. It also thoroughly
examines those issues (i.e., areas of convergence and divergence) and offers
a likely forecast for US-China relations.
Proceeding from this introductory chapter, which provides a summary of
some findings and explains the purpose and scope of the book, chapters 2
through 7 treat the historical development and status of US-China relations
with an eye toward discerning historical determinants relevant to contempo-
rary US-China relations. Chapters 8 through 11 examine four major issue-
areas in contemporary US-China relations, endeavoring to discern determi-
nants relevant to the status and outlook of the relationship. Chapter 12 con-
cludes the study by articulating an outlook for Sino-American relations.
Chapter Two
Patterns of US-China Relations
Prior to World War II
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the United States played a limit-
ed role in Chinese affairs. Initial American traders and missionaries had no
choice but to accommodate the restrictive and sometimes capricious prac-
tices of Chinese regulation of trade and other foreign interaction at Canton in southeastern China, part of the Chinese government’s broad Tribute System
restricting and regulating Chinese interaction with foreigners. 1
The US government followed the lead of Great Britain, France, and other
powers that used wars to compel the declining Qing dynasty (1644–1912) to
meet foreign demands and grant privileges to foreigners, including
Americans who did not take part in the fighting. Americans in China sup-
ported and benefited from the resulting Treaty System. The emerging new
order gave foreigners extraterritoriality, the right to reside in China under
foreign laws and jurisdiction. The series of foreign treaties imposed on China
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries opened Chinese ports to
foreign commerce and residence; established equal diplomatic relations be-
tween the foreign powers and China, with foreign diplomats stationed in the
Chinese capital, Peking; allowed foreign missionaries and others to live and
work throughout China; provided for concessions of land and development
rights that made parts of China, like Shanghai, into foreign-ruled enclaves;
and allowed foreign military forces to patrol Chinese coastal and inland
waterways and eventually to deploy ground forces in China to secure their
interests. The treaties also marked the loss of substantial pieces of Chinese
territory to foreign ownership. 2
A few American companies made significant profits in China trade, but
the scope of US trade and investment there remained very small. Christian
missionaries comprised the largest and most influential group of Americans
13
14
Chapter 2
in China until the start of World War II, but for much of the period they
numbered only in the hundreds. 3
American diplomats, merchants, and missionaries reacted with concern as
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