prepared to make major sacrifices in order to pursue respective paths in the
debate, and indeed US policy ultimately sacrificed official relations with
Taiwan and took the unprecedented step of ending a defense treaty with a
loyal ally for the sake of the benefits to be derived from official relations
with the PRC, notably with regard to assisting the United States in dealing
with expanding Soviet power. 48
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
109
The major protagonists in the US domestic debate over policy toward the
PRC and Taiwan in the Nixon-Reagan (1972–83) period argued their case
mainly because they were sincerely concerned about the serious implications
and consequences of the direction of US policy in this triangular relationship.
Partisan interests and the influence of interest groups or constituent groups
also played a role, but less so than in the US China policy debate of the
1990s. The fact that a Democrat-controlled Congress took the lead, in the
Taiwan Relations Act and in other legislative actions, in modifying the per-
ceived oversights and excesses of the Democratic Carter administration,
which tilted in favor of Beijing and against Taiwan in the late 1970s and
1980, showed that partisan interests played a secondary or relatively unim-
portant role in the US domestic debate. Significantly, this pattern persisted
even after the Democrat-controlled Congress rewrote and passed the Taiwan
Relations Act in April 1979. Democratic senators and representatives re-
mained active in resisting the Carter administration’s continuing perceived
“tilt” toward the PRC and away from Taiwan. Among notable critics and
skeptics of the US policy at the time were such Democratic senators as Adlai
Stevenson, John Glenn, Richard Stone, and George McGovern. 49
The congressional opposition of the day did reflect an important element
of institutional rivalry between the executive branch and the Congress that
colored US domestic debate over foreign policy during this period. Congress
appeared determined to protect its perceived prerogatives in US foreign poli-
cy, while US administration officials were equally determined to protect the
prerogatives of the executive branch in foreign affairs. 50
Although the US domestic debate became more prominent and important
in influencing the course of US policy toward China and Taiwan and related
issues after the Tiananmen incident and the end of the Cold War in the late
1980s and the early 1990s, major features of the debate were markedly dif-
ferent from the debate in the 1970s and early 1980s. The differences under-
lined that the resolve and commitment of the critics generally was weaker in
the 1990s than in the 1970s. 51
• US policy makers in the executive branch and the Congress were confi-
dent of US power and influence in the world, especially now that the
Soviet empire had collapsed—a marked contrast from the strategic uncer-
tainty that had underlined the US policy debate in the 1970s and early
1980s.
• In the 1970s, US officials faced and made major sacrifices in pursuit of
US policy toward the PRC and Taiwan. The protagonists in the US China
policy debate after the Cold War had little inclination to sacrifice tangible
US interests for the sake of their preferred stance in the US-PRC-Taiwan
triangle or other China policy–related questions. Thus, those in Congress,
the media, and elsewhere in US domestic politics who were vocal in
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Chapter 5
seeking an upgrading in US treatment for Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-
hui—demanding he be granted a visa to visit Cornell University in 1995—
largely fell silent when Beijing reacted to the visit with forceful actions in
the Taiwan Strait that posed a serious danger of US-China military con-
frontation. The majority of congressional members who opposed the an-
nual waiver that granted continued MFN tariff treatment to Chinese im-
ports had no intention of seeking a serious cutoff of US-China trade. They
often explained that they were merely endeavoring to send a signal, to the
administration and to China, over their dissatisfaction with US and Chi-
nese policies.
• Many were active in the US domestic debate for partisan or other ulterior
motives—a marked contrast from the 1970s, when the foreign policy is-
sues themselves seemed to be the prime drivers in the US domestic debate.
Clinton used the China issue to attack the record of the Bush administra-
tion, only to reverse course after a time in office, returning to the engage-
ment policy of the previous president. The strident rhetoric coming from
Republican congressional leaders critical of the Clinton administration’s
engagement policy in its second term seemed to have similarly partisan
motives. Labor-oriented Democrats used the China issue to discredit the
pro-business leanings of the leaders of the Clinton administration, while
social conservatives in the Republican Party focused in on China’s forced
abortions and suppression of religious freedom to embarrass their party
leaders and prompt them to devote more attention to the social conserva-
tives’ political agenda in US domestic politics. 52
• Reflecting the less serious commitment by critics in the 1990s was the fact
that the US China debate notably subsided whenever the United States
faced a serious foreign policy challenge. Thus, the vocal congressional
debate over China policy stopped abruptly following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990, and the Congress remained quiet about China throughout
the US “Desert Shield” and “Desert Storm” operations. Once the war was
over and the need for Chinese acquiescence in the United Nations over the
US-led war against Iraq ended in 1991, the China debate resumed immedi-
ately, with many Democrats in Congress and elsewhere seeking to use the
China issue for partisan purposes in order to tear down President George
H. W. Bush’s then-strong standing in US opinion polls regarding his han-
dling of foreign affairs. As noted earlier in this chapter, the September 11,
2001, attack on America also dampened the US China debate, which was
then focused notably on the threat to US interests posed by a rising China.
After several months, media organs like the Washington Times and some
in Congress resumed lower-key efforts to focus on the China threat, while
pro-Taiwan groups tried to use the rebalancing of Bush administration
policy in directions more favorable to China, by arguing for concurrent
favorable US treatment for Taiwan. 53 These moves were small and of little
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
111
consequence; they seemed to underline the weakness of US critics of
China or advocates of policies opposed by China in a US foreign policy
environment focused on dealing with terrorism-related issues. 54
CHINESE PRIORITIES AND CALCULATIONS:
MANAGING CRISIS-PRONE RELATIONS
Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, the shifts in US policy prompted
by the US debate over China poli
cy after the Cold War posed major and
repeated challenges for Chinese leaders. Once it became clear to Chinese
leaders that the strategic basis of Sino-American relations had been destroyed
by the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and that it
would take a long time for political relations to return to more moderate
engagement after the trauma of the Tiananmen incident, Chinese leaders
worked throughout the 1990s to reestablish “normalized” relations with the
United States on terms as advantageous as possible to China. With the US-
China summits of 1997 and 1998, relations arguably were normalized, but
they remained far from stable. Chinese leaders continued to give high prior-
ity to managing differences with the United States while benefiting from
advantageous economic and other ties with the US superpower. 55
Throughout the post–Cold War period, Chinese officials reflected varying
degrees of suspicion regarding US intentions and remained well aware of
fundamental ideological, strategic, and other differences with the United
States. 56 In general, Chinese officials settled on a bifurcated view of the United States. This view held that US leaders would extend the hand of
“engagement” to the Chinese government when their interests would be
served, but that US leaders were determined to “contain” aspects of China’s
rising power and block aspects of China’s assertion of influence in world
affairs when such aspects were seen as contrary to US interests. The Chinese
emphasis on cooperating with the “soft” US “hand of engagement” or de-
fending against the “hard” US “hand of containment” varied. The general
trend from 1996 to 2001, and after adjustments in US-China relations in
2001, was to give more emphasis to the positive and less emphasis to the
negative on the part of both the Chinese and US administrations. 57
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton were clear about US differ-
ences with China in several key areas. Despite Chinese disapproval, the
United States was determined to expend such a vast array of resources on
defense that it would remain the world’s dominant power, and the dominant
military power along China’s periphery in East Asia, for the foreseeable
future. The United States would continue to provide support, including so-
phisticated arms, to Taiwan; and the United States endeavored to use grow-
ing government, commercial, and other nongovernmental contacts with Chi-
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Chapter 5
na, as well as other means, to foster an environment that promoted political
pluralism and change in the authoritarian Chinese communist system.
For its part, Beijing strove for a post–Cold War world order of greater
multipolarity; China would be one of the poles and would have greater op-
portunity for advantageous maneuvering than in a superpower-dominated
order. China strove for a gradual decline in US power and influence in East
Asia and globally, and Beijing called for cutbacks in US military sales and
other support to Taiwan in order to help create advantageous conditions for
the reunification of the island with mainland China. Finally, CCP leaders
were determined to maintain the primacy of their rule in the face of econom-
ic, social, and political challenges at home and abroad, including challenges
supported by the United States.
A critical problem for Chinese leaders in dealing with the United States in
the 1990s involved mixing their strategies and goals with those of the United
States in ways advantageous to China. In general, the Chinese approach
focused on trying to work constructively with US power, concentrating on
areas of common ground, building interdependent economic relations, and
minimizing differences wherever possible. This was difficult to achieve, es-
pecially when US policy concentrated on the stark differences between the
United States and China over human rights, Taiwan, weapons proliferation,
and trade issues. In some instances, Chinese officials chose to confront the
United States with threats of retaliation if the United States pursued pressure tactics against China. For the most part, however, Chinese leaders bided their
time, endeavoring to avoid complications that would ensue from protracted
confrontation with the United States. At bottom, they believed that China’s
growing economy and overall international importance would steadily win
over foreign powers to a cooperative stance and encourage politically impor-
tant groups in the United States, especially business groups, to press for an
accommodating US approach to China.
Following this general line of approach in the 1990s, Beijing managed to
end the diplomatic isolation that stemmed from the Tiananmen crackdown,
weakened the Clinton administration advocates of conditioning MFN tariff
treatment of Chinese imports to the United States, and prompted the presi-
dent to end this policy in 1994. With the Sino-American summits of 1997
and 1998, Beijing clearly established the Chinese leaders as legitimate and
respected actors in world affairs. 58
Chinese officials duly noted during the 1990s and later that they had few
illusions about beneficent US policy toward China. But they repeatedly af-
firmed to Western specialists and others that they—whether they personally
liked it or not—also saw Chinese interests best served by trying to get along
with the United States. They cited the following reasons: 59
Tiananmen, Taiwan, and Post–Cold War Realities, 1989–2000
113
• The United States remained the world’s sole superpower. As such, it
posed the only potential strategic threat to China’s national security for the
foreseeable future. A confrontation with such a power would severely test
China’s strength and undermine Chinese economic and political pro-
grams.
• As the world’s leading economic power, the United States had markets,
technology, and investment important for Chinese modernization. It also
played an important role in international financial institutions heavily in-
volved in China; Western financial actors and investors viewed the status
of US relations with China as an important barometer determining the
scope and depth of their involvement in China.
• Internationally, establishing cooperative relations with the United States
facilitated smooth Chinese relations with Western and other powers that
were close to Washington. Antagonistic US-China relations would mean
that China would have to work much harder, and presumably offer more
in the way of economic and other concessions, to win over such powers.
• The United States continued to play a key strategic role in highly sensitive
areas around China’s periphery, notably Korea, Japan, the South China
Sea, and especially Taiwan. It controlled sea lanes vital to Chinese trade.
Cooperative US-China relations allowed Beijing to continue to focus on
domestic priorities with reasonable assurance that its vital interests in
these sensitive areas would not be fundamentally jeopardized by antago-
nistic actions by the United States. Indeed, good US-China relations
&
nbsp; tended to increase Chinese influence in these areas.
On balance, the record of Chinese relations with the United States in the
1990s showed considerable achievement for China. Beijing reestablished
extensive high-level contacts with the US administration and saw the end of
most Tiananmen-related sanctions against China. By 1998, the Clinton ad-
ministration appeared sincerely committed to pursuing a policy of generally
accommodating engagement with China. Administration officials in the
United States endeavored to work closely with the Chinese government to
reduce differences over US world primacy, the American strategic posture in
East Asia, US support for Taiwan, and Washington’s support for political
pluralism in China. Chinese officials took satisfaction in the fact that the
improvement in relations resulted much more from shifts toward accommo-
dation of China’s rising power and influence by the US administration than
from adjustments by the Chinese government in dealing with issues sensitive
to the United States.
While assessments among Chinese officials differed regarding the status
and outlook of US-China relations, the prevailing view in 1999 was one of
caution. There remained plenty of evidence that US policy continued to have
elements of containment along with the seemingly accommodating engage-
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Chapter 5
ment. Political forces in the United States, many interest groups, and the
media still lined up against Chinese interests on a range of human rights
concerns, strategic issues, Taiwan, and economic questions. Many Chinese
officials remained suspicious of the ultimate motives of some members of
the Clinton administration as well. As a result, Beijing was privately wary as
it continued to seek advantages by building cooperative relations. 60
The Challenges of Shifting US Policies
The Clinton administration decision in 1993 to condition MFN status for
China on China’s progress in human rights issues posed a major problem for
the Chinese leadership. It was met indirectly by the rapid growth of the
Chinese economy, which attracted strong US business interest, and the inter-
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