in the Asia-Pacific would fail, as the vast majority of those countries did not want to choose between good relations with China and good relations with
the United States. 17
The prominence and initial success of the rebalance almost certainly in-
fluenced the Chinese leadership’s most significant changes in Chinese
foreign relations since the death of Deng Xiaoping. Deng had stressed that
China should bide its time in foreign affairs and focus on domestic modern-
izations. However, after the 2008 economic crisis and subsequent recession,
China’s comprehensive national power was rising remarkably as the United
States and its allies faced protracted problems at home and abroad. Against
that background, Beijing shifted to an assertive foreign policy exacerbating
long-standing Chinese differences with the United States and others that was
more in line with the China-centered nationalism prevalent in Chinese elite
and public opinion. The shift came about with the transition from the com-
paratively weak and risk-averse collective leadership of Hu Jintao to the
strong-man rule carried out by Xi Jinping, who took over leadership of the
communist party in 2012. 18
Xi Jinping’s Challenges to America
The record of Chinese policy and behavior under the rule of President Xi
shows repeated choices that have placed other foreign and domestic priorities
above his avowed but increasingly hollow claims to seek a positive relation-
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Chapter 7
ship with the United States. These actions made it increasingly clear that in
Xi’s view, positive US ties would come on condition of America avoiding
opposition to new priorities in Chinese foreign relations under President Xi.
Those priorities focused notably on Asia, where China’s rising prominence
seemed to provide a basis for more assertive actions challenging the United
States. 19
By putting the United States “on notice” that the United States had to give
way to China’s practices at odds with US interests, the Xi government even-
tually prompted President Obama and his government to be, by 2014, much
more vocal in issuing often strident complaints. As President Xi ignored the
complaints, leaving it to the foreign ministry to reject them, frustration with-in and outside the US government grew. There was toughening of behavior
in some areas, with tensions rising in particular in nearby Asia. A significant debate emerged inside and outside the government, with those favoring a
tougher policy toward China in the ascendance. 20
Xi Jinping began the process of changing Chinese policies with major
implications for the United States as he prepared to take control of Commu-
nist Party and state power in 2012. The caution and low profile of the previ-
ous leaders were viewed with disfavor. Chinese policies and practices be-
came much more active, assertive, and bold. Xi received enormous publicity
from Chinese propaganda and media outlets; his image as a decisive leader
prepared to act strongly in the face of American and other criticism was
welcomed by Chinese opinion, both public and elite. Chinese reassurance
and restraint in dealing with the United States and others were played down
since, according to officials in China, they had conveyed Chinese weakness
to Asian rivals and the United States. The subsequent string of Chinese
actions and initiatives, listed here, were truly impressive: 21
• The government orchestrated the largest mass demonstration against a
foreign target ever seen in Chinese history (against Japan over disputed
islands in September 2012). It followed with intense political, economic,
and security pressure on Japan unseen since World War II.
• China used coercive and intimidating means to extend control of disputed
territory at neighbors’ expense, notably in the disputed South China Sea.
Chinese officials dismissed and rebuffed US and other complaints that
their actions upset regional stability.
• Chinese advances were supported by ever-expanding Chinese capabilities
backed by the impressive and growing economic and military power of
China. The Chinese military capabilities were arrayed against and focused
on the American forces in the Asia-Pacific region.
• Russian President Putin’s shift against the United States and the West
coincided with Xi’s rise to power. The Russian and Chinese leaders in-
creasingly converged most prominently on the desire to serve as a counter-
Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping
155
weight to perceived US preponderant influence and to constrain US pow-
er. China saw Russia as a useful counterweight to US power, and Russia
valued Sino-Russian cooperation for the same reason. They worked separ-
ately and together to complicate and curb US power and influence in
world politics, economy, and security. They supported one another in their
respective challenges to the United States, allies, and partners in Europe,
the Middle East, and Asia. These joint efforts also involved diplomatic,
security, and economic measures in multilateral forums and bilateral rela-
tions involving US adversaries in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. The two
powers also supported one another in the face of US and allied complaints
about Russian and Chinese coercive expansion and other steps that chal-
lenged regional order and global norms and institutions backed by the
United States. 22
• Despite increasing US complaints, the new Chinese government contin-
ued manipulative economic practices, cyber theft, and reluctance to con-
tribute regional and global common goods.
• China used its large foreign exchange reserves, massive excess construc-
tion capacity, and strong trading advantages to develop international
banks and to support often grandiose Chinese plans for Asian and global
infrastructure construction, investments, loans, and trade areas that ex-
cluded the United States and countered American initiatives and support
for existing international economic institutions.
• Xi Jinping tightened political control domestically in ways grossly offen-
sive to American representatives seeking political liberalization and better
human rights conditions in China.
Official Chinese media highlighted Xi’s leadership; he was depicted in
glowing accounts directing multifaceted Chinese initiatives abroad with con-
fidence and authority in pursuit of his broad vision of a unified, powerful,
and internationally respected China—what Xi and the Chinese publicists
called the “China Dream.” Complaints by neighbors, the United States, and
other powers concerned with the negative impacts of Xi’s actions were re-
buked or scorned. 23
Obama and Xi’s China: Measured Resolve, Limited Impact
President Obama proved to be less than fully effective in dealing with the
various challenges posed by Xi Jinping’s policies and practices. His adminis-
tration gave top priority to supporting the overall positive US approach to
engagement with China. Differences usually were dealt with in private con-
sultations. Even if they seemed important, they were kept within carefu
lly
crafted channels and not allowed to “spill over” and impact other elements in
the relationship. Thus, the Obama government eschewed “linkage”—that is,
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Chapter 7
the seeking of US leverage to get China to stop behavior offensive to the
United States by linking the offensive Chinese behavior to another policy
area where the United States would threaten actions adverse to important
Chinese interests.
The administration tended to focus on the success of US-China coopera-
tion on such global issues as climate change, where recent shifts in Chinese
domestic energy efficiency and pollution policies made Chinese priorities
more in line with those of the Obama government and thus facilitated US-
China agreement. Meanwhile, various American government department
representatives had a wide range of cooperative interactions with their Chi-
nese counterparts. They understood that, contrary to the practice of the Oba-
ma government, the Chinese government was prone to link—specifically, to
punish the American or any other offending foreign government with adverse
action in a policy area important to that government, in retaliation against
actions by the American or other foreign government that China deemed
offensive. Rather than risk China cutting off their department’s positive
interchange, these US officials tended to favor the Obama government’s
approach of giving top priority to the positive overall relationship and man-
aging differences within narrow channels and usually with private talks. 24
Critics of the Obama government’s approach argued that its reticence
failed to dissuade China to stop offensive behavior undermining important
American interests. They averred that Beijing could easily read the US
government’s caution and take incremental steps forward and at odds with
US interests without much worry about negative consequences. They iden-
tified particularly with the 2016 US election campaign rhetoric and the ad-
monitions of Hillary Clinton in her avowed determination to halt the incre-
mental Chinese advances made by Beijing as it “gamed” the United States on
economic, security, and political issues important to the United States. 25
The Obama government’s reticence despite deepening frustration with
China’s advances at American expense showed during summit meetings in
Washington in September 2015 and March 2016. 26
The international nuclear security summit in Washington from March 31
to April 1, 2016, featured positive interaction between President Obama and
President Xi. Both leaders pledged increased international nuclear security;
and both promised to sign the Paris Agreement on climate change on April
22, the first day the United Nations accord would be open for government
signatures. The agreements were central elements of the outgoing US presi-
dent’s historical legacy. Consistent with past practice, other issues, including growing differences over the South China Sea, were handled largely behind
closed doors during one of only two one-on-one meetings President Obama
held with a foreign counterpart during the summit.
The cooperative atmosphere in US-China relations had deteriorated in the
previous two years, and forecasted tensions over key differences seemed
Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Xi Jinping
157
accepted in Washington as unavoidable consequences of America’s need to
protect important interests from negative Chinese practices. 27 However, President Obama also seemed to clarify the priority of South China Sea
disagreements with China; his administration’s actions showed that the presi-
dent judged that this most prominent area of bilateral differences had not
reached a level where it would be allowed to spill over and negatively affect
other sensitive areas in the relationship, like Taiwan, or jeopardize the coop-
eration with China that the United States sought.
As reviewed above, President Obama rarely criticized China during his
first six years in office. However, he became outspoken from 2014 on about
Chinese behavior. President Xi ignored the complaints, which were dis-
missed by lower-level officials. Ignoring Obama’s complaints, President Xi
repeatedly emphasized a purported positive “new model of major country
relations” with the United States; American critics increasingly saw Xi play-
ing a double game at America’s expense. 28
After a strained US-China summit in Washington in September 2015,
Obama had less to say about China. Rather, he and his administration took
stronger actions, exemplified by the following:
• Much stronger pressure than seen in the past to compel China to rein in
rampant cyber theft of American property.
• Much stronger pressure than seen in the past to compel China to agree to
international sanctions against North Korea.
• China’s continued militarization of disputed South China Sea islands fol-
lowed President Xi’s seemingly duplicitous promise, made during the
September summit, not to do so. In tandem came much more active US
military deployments in the disputed South China Sea, along with blunt
warnings by US military leaders of China’s ambitions.
• More prominent cooperation with allies Japan, the Philippines, and Aus-
tralia, along with India and concerned Southeast Asian powers that
strengthened regional states and complicated Chinese bullying.
• US action in March 2016 halted access to American information technolo-
gy that impacted China’s leading state-directed electronics firm ZTE. The
company reportedly had earlier agreed, under US pressure, to halt unau-
thorized transfers to Iran of US-sourced technology, but it then clandes-
tinely resumed them.
• The US rebuked negative Chinese human rights practices in an unprece-
dented statement to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2016 that
was endorsed by Japan, Australia, and nine European countries.
However, the impact of the actions was less than appeared at first. The
public pressure regarding cyber theft and Chinese support for sanctions
against North Korea subsided once bilateral talks on cyber theft began and
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Chapter 7
China went along with tougher UN sanctions against North Korea. Cutting
off ZTE was reversed after a few days of secret consultations. Much later,
during the early Trump administration, came the news that the United States
had negotiated a punishment with ZTE that required payment of a fine of
more than $1 billion. 29 The rebuke in the Human Rights Council turned out to be a one-time public occurrence. Meanwhile, the so-called Taiwan issue in
Sino-American relations became more sensitive following the landslide elec-
tion in January 2016 of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Tsai
Ing-wen and a powerful majority of DPP legislators. Avoiding actions that
might “rock-the-boat,” the Obama government eschewed controversy and
emphasized constructive cross-strait dialogue.
In sum, the Obama government’s greater resolve against China’s chal-
lenges seemed to end up focusing on one issue area: the South China Sea
some Southeast Asian nations, in response to China’s destabilizing and coer-
cive measures. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Pacific Commander
Admiral Harry Harris repeatedly spoke of China’s “aggressive” actions and
what Harris called Chinese “hegemony in East Asia.” They and other defense
officials pointed to US military plans “to check” China’s advances through
deployments, regional collaboration, and assistance to Chinese neighbors.
American officials also expected a Chinese defeat in a ruling later in the year (noted below) at the arbitral tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, that undermined the broad and vague Chinese claims used to
justify expansion in the South China Sea.
As seemed likely at the time, the opportunistic and incremental Chinese
expansion in the South China Sea continued. From China’s perspective, the
benefits of Xi’s challenges continued to appear to outweigh the costs. Not-
ably, President Xi was viewed in China as a powerful international leader,
while President Obama appeared weak. China’s probing expansion and in-
timidation efforts in the East China Sea ran up against firm and effective
Japanese efforts supported strongly by the United States; and they were
complicated for Beijing by China’s inability to deal effectively with provoca-
tions from North Korea. The opportunities for expansion in the South China
Sea were greater, given the weaknesses of governments there. And adverse
judgment in July 12 in the case at The Hague was effectively dismissed by
Beijing, with the United States offering few public objections to China’s
flaunting its egregious opposition to the legally binding ruling.
What these developments showed was that the Obama government’s ef-
forts to counter China in the South China Sea were significant. However, it
was obvious to Beijing and anyone else paying attention that they were
carefully measured to avoid serious disruption in the broader and multifac-
eted US-China relationship. The American government signaled that such
measured resolve was likely to continue to the end of the Obama govern-
US-China Relations (3rd Ed) Page 28
