noted that the president publicly referred to China for the first time as “an
adversary” though the president went on to describe China as a “potential
partner in the international community if it follows the rules.” Highlighting
his administration’s rebalance policy of reengagement with countries in the
Asia-Pacific region as a means to compete with China in security, economic,
and other terms, the president went on to emphasize, “We believe China can
be a partner, but we’re also sending a very clear signal that America is a
Pacific power, that we are going to have a presence there. . . . And we’re
organizing trade relations with countries other than China so that China starts feeling more pressure about meeting basic international standards.” 37
The Obama government’s reengagement policy toward the Asia-Pacific
indeed underlined a stronger American determination to compete more
broadly for influence in the region. 38 The security aspects of the so-called rebalance policy or pivot to Asia received high-level attention by the president, secretary of defense, and secretary of state. They explained in speeches
throughout the Asia-Pacific region and in the release of a defense planning
document in January 2012 the purpose and scope of US redeployment of
forces from the Middle East and other areas to the Asia-Pacific and the
determination of the American leaders to sustain and advance US security
relations and power despite anticipated cuts in overall US defense spending.
Actual advances in US force deployments remained modest though the
scope, tempo, and intensity of US military interactions with the region con-
tinued to grow.
American diplomatic activism in support of its interests was registered
with an impressive advance in senior US leaders headed by President Obama
traveling to the region and participating actively in bilateral relations as well as existing and newly emerging regional groupings that involved the United
States. Problems impacting US interests in regional stability, freedom of
navigation, and relations with allies and partners saw the American leaders
take an active role in discussing ways to manage and hopefully ease tensions
over sensitive sovereignty and security concerns in disputed maritime territo-
ries along China’s rim.
As President Obama indicated in his remarks in the October 2012 debate,
the United States also was more active in competing in support of its eco-
nomic interests as part of the reengagement with Asia. A highlight of US
interest was the proposed TPP free-trade accord involving the United States
and countries on both sides of the Pacific in an arrangement seen as moving
American interests forward in regional and international trade liberalization.
The proposed agreement was viewed as competing with groupings favored
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
229
by China that required less trade liberalization and that excluded the United
States.
The Obama government’s reengagement in Asia ran up against rising
Chinese assertiveness and coercive and intimidating actions to protect and
advance Chinese sovereignty and security interests in disputed territories
along China’s rim. The Chinese actions were influenced and strongly sup-
ported by patriotic elite and public opinion that viewed the US activism as a
justification for China to take more coercive actions to protect and advance
its interests. In effect, the US and Chinese initiatives represented the most
important challenge or test of the durability of cooperative Sino-American
engagement during 2012, and the testing would continue until the end of
Obama’s term.
The pattern of assertiveness showed remarkable features in defending
Chinese disputed claims in the South China Sea and the East China Sea in
2012. 39
Round One
The first round of Chinese assertiveness over territorial issues in 2012 in-
volved the South China Sea. Following Chinese disagreement with the Phil-
ippines in April over the attempt of Philippine officers to arrest Chinese
fishermen in disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, Chinese
authorities used impressive and extraordinary demonstrations of Chinese se-
curity, economic, administrative, and diplomatic power to have their way in
the South China Sea, including the following:
• China employed its large and growing force of maritime and fishing secur-
ity ships, targeted economic sanctions out of line with international norms
and WTO rules, and repeated diplomatic warnings to intimidate and
coerce Philippine officials, security forces, and fishermen to respect Chi-
na’s claims to disputed Scarborough Shoal.
• China showed stronger resolve to exploit more fully contested fishing
resources in the South China Sea with the announced deployment of one
of the world’s largest (thirty-two-thousand-ton) fish-processing ships to
the area and the widely publicized dispatch of a fleet of thirty fishing boats
supported by a supply ship to fish in disputed South China Sea areas.
• China created a new, multifaceted administrative structure backed by a
new military garrison that covered wide swaths of disputed areas in the
South China Sea. The coverage was in line with China’s broad historical
claims, depicted in Chinese maps with a nine-dashed line and encompass-
ing most of the South China Sea. The large claims laid out in Chinese
maps also provided justification for a state-controlled Chinese oil compa-
ny to offer nine new blocks in the South China Sea for foreign oil compa-
230
Chapter 10
nies development that were far from China but very close to Vietnam.
Against this background, little was heard in Chinese commentary of the
more moderate explanation of Chinese South China Sea territorial claims
made by a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson on February 29, 2012,
who said that China did not claim the “entire South China Sea” but only
its islands and adjacent waters.
• Chinese authorities later prompted some alarm in the South China Sea
when provincial authorities announced that Chinese maritime police
patrols would board and hold ships carrying out illegal activities in the
claimed Chinese areas of the South China Sea. And Vietnam and the
Philippines as well as Taiwan joined India and other countries in con-
demning new Chinese passports that showed the South China Sea and
other disputed areas along the rim of China as Chinese territory.
• China advanced cooperative relations with the 2012 Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair, Cambodia, thereby ensuring that with
Cambodia’s cooperation, South China Sea disputes did not receive promi-
nent treatment in ASEAN documents in the annual ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting in April and later ASEAN-related meetings in November. A re-
sult was strong division in ASEAN on how to deal with China that re-
sulted in unprecedented displays of ASEAN disunity at those meetings.
Chinese officials and official Chinese media commentaries endeavored to
bound and compartmentalize the South China Sea disputes. Their public
emphasi
s remained heavily on China’s continued pursuit of peaceful devel-
opment and cooperation during meetings with Southeast Asian representa-
tives and those of other concerned powers including the United States. Thus,
what emerged was a Chinese approach having at least two general paths:
1. One path showed to South China Sea claimants, notably the Philip-
pines and Vietnam, who disputed Chinese territorial claims, and oth-
ers in Southeast Asia, as well as to their supporters in the United
States and elsewhere, how powerful China had become in disputed
South China Sea areas; how China’s security, economic, administra-
tive, and diplomatic power was likely to grow in the near future; and
how Chinese authorities could use those powerful means in intimidat-
ing and coercive ways short of overt use of military force in order to
counter foreign “intrusions” or public disagreements regarding Chi-
nese claims.
2. Another path forecast ever closer “win-win” cooperation between Chi-
na and Southeast Asian countries, ASEAN, and others including the
United States. It focused on burgeoning China–Southeast Asian trade
and economic interchange and was premised on treatment of South
China Sea and other disputes in ways that avoided public controversy
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
231
and eschewed actions challenging or otherwise complicating the ex-
tensive Chinese claims to the area. In this regard, China emphasized
the importance of all concerned countries to adhere to efforts to imple-
ment the 2002 Declaration of the Conduct of the Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC). It duly acknowledged recent efforts supported by
ASEAN to reach the “eventual” formulation of a code of conduct
(COC) in the South China Sea, implying that the process of achieving
the latter might take some time.
In sum, China set forth an implicit choice for the Philippines, Vietnam,
other Southeast Asian disputants of China’s South China Sea claims, AS-
EAN, and other governments and organizations with an interest in the South
China Sea, notably the United States. On the one hand, based on recent
practice, pursuit of policies and actions at odds with Chinese claims in the
South China Sea would meet with more of the demonstrations of Chinese
power along the lines of path 1, above. On the other hand, concurrent Chi-
nese leaders’ statements and official commentary indicated that others’ mod-
eration and/or acquiescence regarding Chinese claims would result in the
mutually beneficial development seen in path 2.
The Philippines, Vietnam, and other disputants of Chinese claims did not
seem to be in an advantageous position in the face of Chinese power and
intimidation. ASEAN remained divided on how to deal with China. And
options of the United States and other concerned powers to deal effectively
with the new situation of greater muscle short of military use of force in
Chinese policies and practices regarding the South China Sea remained to be
determined.
Round Two
The second round of Chinese assertiveness on sensitive sovereignty and
security issues came with a dispute, more widely publicized at the time, with
Japan over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. 40 Even more so than in the recent case in the South China Sea, China’s response to a perceived affront by Japan
involved a variety of extralegal measures sharply contrary to international
norms. The Japanese government had endeavored to avoid a crisis prompted
by Japanese politicians hostile to China who sought to buy three of the
contested islands and develop them in ways sure to antagonize China. In-
stead, the Japanese government intervened and purchased the islands. The
purchase triggered an extraordinary Chinese reaction. It included trade sanc-
tions and failure to provide security of Japanese people and property in
China. As large anti-Japanese demonstrations, fostered by well-orchestrated
publicity efforts of Chinese authorities, emerged in more than one hundred
Chinese cities, the security forces tended to stand aside as agitated Chinese
232
Chapter 10
demonstrators destroyed Japanese properties and manhandled Japanese citi-
zens. The displays of violence were eventually mildly criticized by Chinese
official media commentary, but the publicity organs of China were full of
support of Chinese peoples’ “righteous indignation” against Japan as the
widespread violence spread throughout the country. Meanwhile, the Chinese
authorities deployed maritime security forces and official aircraft, and took
legal steps that showed Japan and other concerned powers that the status quo
of Japan’s control of the islands had changed amid continued challenge from
China employing security forces and other means short of direct use of
military force.
Chinese popular and elite opinion reacted positively to the Chinese ac-
tions in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. Chinese media contin-
ued to strongly criticize alleged US efforts to support American allies and
partners against China and to exploit Chinese differences with neighboring
countries in order to advance American influence in the Asia-Pacific region.
Meanwhile, some Chinese officials also viewed approvingly the reaction of
the US government to the crises in the disputed seas in 2012. They advised
that the Obama administration leaders seemed less willing in 2012 to con-
front China on such assertive actions regarding territorial disputes, in
contrast to what they saw as a more prominent and assertive US stance
against Chinese interests regarding the territorial disputes in 2010. 41
Overall, Chinese commentary and elite and public opinion had a strong
stream arguing that China was successful in its muscular reactions to US
allies, the Philippines and Japan, despite the widely touted US reengagement
with the Asia-Pacific. It triumphed with effective use of often extralegal
coercive measures to advance China’s territorial claims and show firm re-
solve against perceived challenges. Some foreign and Chinese specialists
also observed that unlike the debates and various policy options stressed in
Chinese commentary during a period of assertiveness in 2009–10, the actions
and commentary regarding the South China Sea and the East China Sea in
2012 showed effective coordination and little sign of debate even though the
Chinese actions involved extraordinary use of coercion, intimidation, and
extralegal means well beyond the pale of international norms said to be
respected by the Chinese government. 42
Subsequent developments in the East China Sea disputes saw the election
of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leader Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister,
defeating the discredited Democratic Party in elections in late 2012. Abe was
firm in the face of Chinese pressure. Japan’s experienced coast guard
forces—backed by Japan’s modern and well-trained naval and air forces—
were up to the new challenges posed by China’s coast guard fleet. The
Obama government welcomed Abe’s ascendance. America shifted from a
mediating role to
a tougher stance critical of China’s coercive behavior. 43
The US position overlapped closely with Abe’s defensive but firm stance
Taiwan and East Asian Maritime Disputes
233
toward China. China stridently attacked Abe as he sought support against
Chinese pressures by strengthening defense at home and seeking support in
visits to all members of ASEAN as well as India, Australia, and others. In
contrast, President Obama, visiting Japan in April 2014, embraced close
collaboration with Japan in Asia and underlined America’s defense commit-
ment to all areas under Japanese administrative control, including the Senka-
ku (Diaoyu) Islands. Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the United States in April
2015 advanced defense cooperation and international coordination between
the two allies. President Obama took the opportunity to rebuke China for
“flexing its muscles” to intimidate neighbors and gain control of disputed
territory. 44
In sum, while China continued coast guard and naval and air intrusions, it
had no success in trying to intimidate Japan, backed firmly by the United
States. A highlight of Chinese assertiveness was Beijing’s November 2013
announcement that it would establish an air defense identification zone
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea to include the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu)
Islands. Outside of China, the ADIZ was widely interpreted as a challenge to
Japanese administration of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. Washington
weighed in strongly against China’s actions. 45 The United States and Japan coordinated closely and at a high level in their individual and collective
responses to the new situation. American officials expressed appreciation for
Japan’s measured response in what could have been a combustible situation.
Stymied in the East China Sea, Beijing found it easier to advance against
weaker Southeast Asian states and a less resolute America. On the one hand,
domestic nationalism and demands for a less deferential and more activist
Chinese foreign policy drove Chinese policy. The Xi government’s widely
publicized policies met with domestic approval as they advanced Chinese
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