warned against using textbooks that spread “Western values” and making
remarks that “defame the rule of the Communist Party.” 36
According to the Congressional Research Service and the Department of
State, a concurrent crackdown included detentions and arrests of well-known
bloggers, investigative journalists, outspoken academics, civil society lead-
ers, human rights attorneys, and ethnic minorities. Many of them had no
apparent political agenda or for years had avoided criminal charges. An
estimated 160 to 200 activists were arrested or detained in 2013, and this
trend accelerated in 2014. In July 2015 roughly 300 human rights lawyers
and activists were arrested, detained, or put under surveillance. Many of the
lawyers were released after receiving warnings to cease their activities, but
several remained in detention or their whereabouts remained unknown. As of
the end of 2016, 16 individuals detained as a result of the July 2015 roundup
remained in pretrial detention at undisclosed locations without access to
attorneys or to their family members. 37
Other focal points of Chinese authorities cracking down on dissent in-
volved a number of extraterritorial disappearances occurring during
2015–16. As disclosed in the State Department’s human rights report, jour-
nalist Li Xin, who fled to India in 2015 after allegedly leaking documents
detailing the CCP’s propaganda policies, went missing on a train in Thailand
in January and later reappeared in China in custody of security officials. He
told his wife by telephone that he had returned voluntarily, but Thai immigra-
tion officials told the media they had no exit record for Li. Five men working
in Hong Kong’s publishing industry disappeared between October and De-
cember 2015. In addition to being Hong Kong residents, two had foreign
citizenship, which was ignored by the Chinese government in its repression
efforts. Gui Minhai was a Swedish citizen and was taken while he was in
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
251
Thailand; Lee Bo was a British citizen taken from Hong Kong. Media cover-
age of the cases noted that the men worked for a publishing house and
bookstore in Hong Kong that was known for selling books critical of the
CCP and its leaders. In a televised “confession” released by Chinese author-
ities, Gui Minhai said he had “voluntarily returned” to China to “bear the
responsibility” for a traffic accident that supposedly occurred more than a
decade before. Another bookseller, Hong Kong resident Lam Wing Kee, was
detained at the border crossing into Shenzhen in October 2015 and released
after five months. Upon his return to Hong Kong, Lam immediately recanted
his televised confession, saying it was scripted and recorded under extreme
pressure. He also said he was forced to sign away his legal rights when he
was taken to Ningbo by men who claimed they were from a “central special
unit.” With the exception of Swedish citizen Gui Minhai, the other detained
booksellers were released during the year but remained under surveillance,
travel restrictions, and the threat of punishment after returning to Hong
Kong. In early 2017 Gui’s location—presumably under incommunicado de-
tention in the mainland—remained unknown. 38
Meanwhile the government still had not provided a comprehensive, cred-
ible accounting of all those killed, missing, or detained in connection with
the violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. As reported
by the Department of State, the Dui Hua Foundation said that Miao Deshun,
the last known political prisoner dating from the Tiananmen era, was re-
leased during 2016. Many activists who were involved in the 1989 demon-
strations and their family members continued to suffer official harassment.
Chen Yunfei, arrested in 2015 for visiting the grave of a Tiananmen victim,
was formally brought to trial in July 2016 on charges of “picking quarrels
and provoking troubles.” Chengdu authorities subsequently postponed his
trial without explanation. In December a rescheduled hearing was also re-
portedly delayed after Chen dismissed his lawyers, citing their harassment at
the hands of local security officials outside the courthouse. Others who at-
tempted to commemorate the protests and associated deaths were themselves
detained or otherwise targeted. In late May 2016, seven activists who ap-
peared in a photograph marking the massacre’s twenty-seventh anniversary
were detained on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking troubles.”
They were released several weeks later. In June, Chengdu activists Fu Hailu,
Zhang Junyong, Luo Yufu, and Chen Bing were detained for allegedly creat-
ing and marketing a liquor whose label commemorated the 1989 crackdown.
They faced charges of “inciting subversion” and were held in the Chengdu
Municipal Detention Center. 39
Government officials continued to deny holding any political prisoners,
asserting that persons were detained not for their political or religious views but because they violated the law. Authorities, however, continued to imprison citizens for reasons related to politics and religion. According to the
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Department of State, tens of thousands of political prisoners remained incar-
cerated, most in prisons and some in administrative detention. The govern-
ment did not grant international humanitarian organizations access to politi-
cal prisoners. 40
As reported by the Department of State, political prisoners were granted
early release at lower rates than other prisoners. The Dui Hua Foundation
estimated that more than one hundred prisoners were still serving sentences
for counterrevolution and hooliganism, two crimes removed from the crimi-
nal code in 1997. Thousands of others were serving sentences for political
and religious offenses, including “endangering state security” and “cult” of-
fenses covered under Article 300 of the criminal code, crimes introduced in
1997. The government neither reviewed the cases of those charged before
1997 with counterrevolution and hooliganism nor released persons jailed for
nonviolent offenses under repealed provisions. 41
State Control of Information
The state authorities directly control the largest mass media outlets; they
pressure other media regarding major or sensitive stories, and they impose
severe measures against state critics. The CCP and government have contin-
ued to maintain ultimate authority over all published, online, or broadcast
material. Officially, only state-run media outlets have government approval
to cover CCP leaders or other topics deemed sensitive. While it did not
dictate all content to be published or broadcast, the CCP and the government
had unchecked authority to mandate if, when, and how particular issues were
reported or to order that they not be reported at all.
As disclosed by the Department of State and other observers, 42 the government continued to strictly monitor the press and media, including film
and television, via its broadcast and press regulatory body, the State Admin-
istration of Pre
ss, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT). The
Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) regulates online news media. As
of 2017, all books and magazines continue to require state-issued publication
numbers, which are expensive and often difficult to obtain. As in the past,
nearly all print and broadcast media as well as book publishers are affiliated
with the CCP or government. There are a small number of print publications
with some private ownership interest but no privately owned television or
radio stations. There are growing numbers of privately owned online media.
The CCP has directed the domestic media to refrain from reporting on certain
subjects, and traditional broadcast programming requires government ap-
proval. The SAPPRFT has announced that satellite television channels may
broadcast no more than two imported television programs each year during
prime-time hours and that imported programs must receive the approval of
local regulators at least two months in advance.
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-China Relations
253
In a well-publicized February 19, 2016, visit to the three main state and
CCP news organizations—the Xinhua News Agency, CCTV, and the Peo-
ple’s Daily—President Xi said, “Party and state-run media are the propaganda battlefield of the party and the government, [and] must bear the surname
of the party. All of the party’s news and public opinion work must embody
the party’s will, reflect the party’s ideas, defend the authority of the Party
Central Committee, [and] defend the unity of the party.” 43
China has the world’s largest number of Internet users, estimated at more
than 730 million people. 44 The Congressional Research Service said that the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), with one of the most
thorough and aggressive Internet censorship systems in the world, has at-
tempted to control and monitor Internet use in China, with mixed results.
Internet users have developed ways to circumvent censorship, and politically
sensitive news and opinion often get widely disseminated, if only fleetingly,
due to the sheer volume of online traffic. The government and Chinese
netizens have engaged in a game of cat and mouse, with new communica-
tions technologies and services and novel censorship circumvention methods
challenging the government’s technological and human efforts to control the
Web, followed by new government regulations and counter efforts, and then
a repeat of the cycle. The state has the capability to block news of events and to partially shut down the Internet. In Xinjiang, the government blocked the
Internet for ten months following the ethnic unrest of 2009, and it continues
to do so in selected areas of the country from time to time. The monitoring
and disruption of telephone and Internet communications reportedly were
widespread in Xinjiang and Tibetan areas in 2013. Google services, includ-
ing Gmail, were intermittently blocked in 2014. 45
Censorship of microblog posts reportedly increased fivefold during the
height of the Hong Kong democracy protests in September 2014. Continu-
ously blocked websites, social networking sites, and file sharing sites include Radio Free Asia; Voice of America (Chinese language); international human
rights websites, including those related to Tibet and Falun Gong; many Tai-
wanese news sites; Facebook; Twitter; and YouTube. Many English-lan-
guage news sites, including the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal, are generally accessible or occasionally or selectively censored. The New
York Times and Bloomberg websites have been blocked since 2012 after they reported on the personal wealth of Chinese leaders. In 2014 access to the
BBC was interrupted. 46
As reported by the Congressional Research Service, commonly barred
Internet searches and microblog postings include those with direct and indi-
rect or disguised references to Tibetan policies; the Tiananmen suppression
of 1989; Falun Gong; PRC leaders and dissidents who have been involved in
recent scandals, events, or issues that authorities deem to be politically sensitive; discussions of democracy; sensitive foreign affairs issues; and sexual
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material. Other major areas that authorities target for occasional censorship
include the following: controversial policies and government wrongdoing,
public health and safety, foreign affairs, civil society, and media and censor-
ship policies. 47
Other developments highlighted by the Congressional Research Service
include reported assessments that the majority of Internet users in China do
not engage the medium for political purposes, or that they accept the govern-
ment’s justification that it regulates the Internet in order to control illegal, harmful, or dangerous online content, services, and activities. A reported two
million censors, mostly young college graduates, are employed as “public
opinion analysts” in the government and at major Internet service providers
to scan messages already screened by computer and delete or block posts
with sensitive or inappropriate political or social content. And the govern-
ment reportedly also has employed tens of thousands of students and other
Internet commentators, known as the “50 Cent Army,” to post pro-govern-
ment comments and express views critical of the United States and democra-
cy on websites, bulletin boards, and chat rooms. Meanwhile, US communica-
tions and media companies are being excluded from China unless they com-
ply with Chinese demands to put their servers inside the country, hand over
proprietary codes, and comply with the censorship of content. 48
Religious and Ethnic Issues
American media and other foreign sources have shown that the extent of
religious freedom varies widely within China. Participation in officially
sanctioned religious activity has increased in recent years. The PRC Consti-
tution protects “normal” religious activities and those that do not “disrupt
public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational
system of the state.” Chinese regulations enacted in 2005 protect the rights of registered religious groups to publish literature, collect donations, possess
property, and train and approve clergy. In 2008 the State Administration for
Religious Affairs (SARA) established a new unit to supervise folk religions
as well as religions outside the five officially recognized major religions
(Buddhism, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Daoism, and Islam), includ-
ing the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints. The foreign media and other accounts asserted that these laws
grant the government continued broad authority in determining what reli-
gious groups are lawful and to deny protections to others. 49
As reported by US government agencies and various US and other
foreign media, the religious and religious-ethnic groups that have clashed the
most with the state in recent years have been unregistered Protestant and
Catholic congregations, Tibetan Buddhists, and the Uighur Muslims in the
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The International Religious
Issues of Human Rights in Contemporary US-C
hina Relations
255
Freedom Act of 1998 (PL 105-292) established the United States Commis-
sion on International Religious Freedom to monitor religious freedom around
the world and make policy recommendations to the president and Congress.
Based largely on Commission reports, the State Department has annually
identified China as a “country of particular concern” on account of “particu-
larly severe violations of religious freedom.” This designation has subjected
China to US sanctions in accordance with provisions of PL 105-292, which
have involved bans of US exports of crime control and detection instruments
and equipment to China. 50
Chinese Christians
American-based interest groups, American media, and US government re-
ports disclose that Christians in China find increasing acceptance in Chinese
society and, within limits, from the Chinese government. The Chinese lead-
ership at times has acknowledged the positive roles that Christianity has
played and can play in promoting social development and welfare. Yet it
remains wary of the Christian church’s power as a source of autonomous
organization potentially challenging Communist rule. 51
By some estimates of foreign specialists and reporters, the number of
Christians in China ranges from about forty million to more than sixty mil-
lion, with nearly two-thirds gathering in unofficial churches not approved by
the Chinese authorities. A rise of religious memberships in China is attrib-
uted by foreign reports to the greater freedom and affluence among many
Chinese and the need to cope with dramatic social and economic changes. 52
Many unofficial Protestant churches, also known as “house churches” or
“home gatherings” by the government, lack legal protection and remain vul-
nerable to the often unchecked authority of local officials. According to
reports from American agencies, interest groups, media, and other foreign
sources, in some regions and large cities, particularly in southern China,
unregistered congregations meet with little or no state interference, while in
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