by Brian Vale
Prevost painted an over-optimistic picture. As time went on, the difficulties of managing such heterogeneous crews increased, and the lack of cohesion in the officer corps became clear. True there were some 40 foreign sea officers who were present for the whole of the campaign: but there was an equal number who came, served for short periods, and then went. To unite such a group and instil a common ethos required extraordinary qualities.
At first, Cochrane did wonders for the newly formed Chilean Navy. His social position as the son of an earl and his reputation as a fighting captain gave him an unquestioned authority. Under his influence, the Chilean Navy adopted the regulations, signals and behaviour of the British Navy; and his aggressive tactics soon gave the squadron successes and achievements of which it could be proud. But as time went on, the negative side of his character became more and more pronounced. Maria Graham was later to write 'the state of the Chilean Navy required a man of prudence as well as courage, of temper as well as firmness ... and (Lord Cochrane's) gentle and courteous manner ... was admirably calculated to conciliate all parties'.2 Alas, there is no evidence she was right. Cochrane may have exerted great personal magnetism on those immediately around him, but he seemed unable to inspire those who were not. With close friends or inferiors he was affable and interesting, but others remember him as being tall and round shouldered with an awkward manner and a monosyllabic mode of speech that was uninspiring.
The officers of the Chilean Navy came from a variety of backgrounds and had been appointed in a variety of ways. Cochrane's first task in imposing his authority was to take control of the appointment of officers and to insist that all communication between individuals and the Ministry of Marine went through him. There was some resistance to this; but by August 1820, it had become accepted that the appointment of all officers to the fleet had either to be proposed or approved by Lord Cochrane. Unfortunately this was not enough. To ensure the loyalty and cohesion of the squadron when it was not engaged in warlike operations required qualities of leadership that Cochrane did not seem to possess. Indeed, things were made worse by his personal style of working - notably his favouritism towards his followers, his lack of interest in routine administration, and his consequent reliance on a widely mistrusted staff. As a contemporary observer, John Thomas, so delicately put it Lord Cochrane's 'extraordinary mind does not appear formed for those small details, a strict attention to which is indispensable to good discipline'.3 The position was not helped by an unease in the squadron about the fairness with which Cochrane was distributing prize money. There were constant rumours that he was more concerned with getting his own share than with securing the rights of others.4 Thomas again put it in a nutshell when he wrote of Lord Cochrane that 'to pronounce an accurate opinion of a character full of inconsistencies and, under the greatest extremes, of all that is good, and all that is bad, is no easy task. ... He is brave to excess, kind and indulgent to his followers ... and most fertile in snares and plans for entrapping and defeating the enemy. ... With these extraordinary talents he possesses those of the keenest calculator in money matters, and pecuniary calculations maintain an ascendancy in his thoughts.'5
The result of all this, was that the Chilean officer corps did not behave like a Nelsonian 'Band of Brothers'. As reflected in the words of contemporary observers like John Thomas, they had ability and experience as fighting seamen, but standards of reliability and discipline could be poor. There were many examples of captains trying to act independently, disobeying orders to go in search of prizes unless under Cochrane's immediate supervision, and of leaving their ships without permission - often in order to lobby for promotion ashore. There was also constant bickering between individuals. Off Callao, Lieutenant Bealy publicly accused Wilkinson of the San Martin of cowardice; Claudius Charles, recently appointed to command the Rising Star when she arrived, had two blazing rows with Captain Ramsey in front of the whole crew when he was a passenger on Chacabuco, during which he denounced him as a drunkard and challenged him to a duel; Lieutenant Woolridge, on receiving orders to help water a transport, told Captain Delano to go to hell; and Lieutenant Ford Morgell, at regular intervals, was censured no less than three times by Captains Carter, Cobbett and Crosbie for insolence and insubordination.6 None of these incidents provoked more than a mild reprimand from the commander-in-chief. At times, Cochrane's own behaviour was little better. Almost as soon as he arrived, he was involved in an altercation with Captain Carter when he attempted to move members of the Intrepido's Argentine crew to the O'Higgins. In the public row that followed, Cochrane accused Carter of 'learning his logic in the bogs of Ireland', to which Carter - who was well known for both his rowdy socialising and hasty temper -snapped back that he at least 'had understanding and firmness enough not to be made a dupe in a Stock Exchange fraud' and put his hand on his sword hilt.7 There was even an argument with his 'follower' Robert Forster when Cochrane resumed command of the blockade of Callao in July 1821 and ordered him away on a cruise. A furious Forster boarded the flagship and confronted Cochrane, accusing him of sending him away after six months of blockade duty so as to deprive him of the prize money that would accrue when the port fell.8
Cochrane was not helped by the system of patronage he operated at the time. In the Royal Navy it was common for senior figures to attract groups of adherents, or 'followers', round them - men on whom they could rely, and who received special favours in return for their loyalty and support. In Chile, Cochrane acquired such a group. Some were excellent men - like Thomas Sackville Crosbie who later followed him to Brazil and Greece; John Pascoe Grenfell, who became a Brazilian admiral; and William Miller of the marines who became a Peruvian General. Others were not. There were people like Henry Cobbett -nephew of Cochrane's old radical ally William Cobbett -who browbeat his subordinates in Chile just as he had bullied Marryat in Cochrane's frigate in 1809; Ford Morgell, a brave, even rash officer, but one who was notorious for his quarrelsome nature and his addiction to gambling; and, of course, Cochrane's staff - Stevenson, Dean and Hoseason. The last two were to cause Cochrane endless difficulties and were eventually to sue him for huge sums of money. Dean was always on the lookout for ways of adapting Cochrane's financial affairs to his own advantage, and was later described by John Miers as 'a complete swindler who has proved to be a monster of ingratitude for your friendly services towards him'.9 Admittedly, Miers never had a good word to say about anybody, but by the time he wrote these words, Dean had provided ample evidence of the devious way in which he operated. Stevenson's problem was that he was a gossip and inexperienced in naval matters and procedures. Indeed, his handing of the squadron's prize affairs was partly responsible for the general discontent.
Likewise, while Cochrane treated followers such as Morgell and Dean with indulgence - and seemed to find it difficult to dismiss or reprimand even the most inept - his attitude to others was cold and distant. And, after the initial euphoria of his arrival in Chile, the restless and suspicious elements in his personality began to assert themselves. Essentially Cochrane saw the world and its inhabitants in terms of black and white - those who were not for him must be against him. It took little for a person to be put in the latter category, and his inner circle kept him fully informed as to likely suspects. Cochrane, who was depressed by the reverses off Callao, began to believe that he was being secretly criticised by disloyal subordinates. As early as December 1819, he was writing 'I know to the marrow all who are about me; as well as the conduct and character, and the secret acts and plots, of others who little suspect it.'10
Outside the writings of Cochrane's intimates, there is no evidence to support these suspicions. Indeed, the performance of the squadron in action off the coasts of Peru had been admirable, and the chief suspects - Captains Guise and Spry - had taken leading parts in the various engagements. Guise had been wounded in the initial foray against Callao and had led the attack on Pisco, while Spry had been praised in Cochrane's dispatches for the attempt with rockets and explosion vessels.
But once his suspicions were aroused, Cochrane was always able to find evidence to justify them. Guise, for example, had been disappointed when the job of senior captain went to Forster. Cochrane soon convinced himself that Guise was so resentful that he and his followers were plotting to get him the supreme command.11 This was actually an astonishing allegation since Blanco Encalada was clearly the only possible successor.
Likewise, Guise was neither secretive nor a plotter. If anything he was too open and honest. A proud man, who was accustomed to mixing with senior and aristocratic officers, he was neither overawed by Lord Cochrane nor afraid to speak his mind. Towards the end of 1819, for example, Guise was unwise enough to question Cochrane's allocation of prize money. He was concerned that during the blockade of Callao and the raids on the Peruvian coast, Cochrane had appointed no captain to the O'Higgins, and was therefore claiming not only the commander-in-chief's one-eighth share of prizes taken, but the captain's two-eighth's as well! The brig Potrillo, for example, captured at Valdivia, carried $19,360 in specie of which $9680 was retained by the Chilean Government and the remaining $9680 paid to the captors. From the government's half, Cochrane received the agreed admiral's share of $1210; and from the captors' half he claimed both the admiral's and captain's shares - that is, $3630. In other words, the prize money payment Cochrane received totalled $4840 - the same amount as was shared between all the other officers and men put together.12 Guise thought this was unfair and reminded Cochrane that as a British Member of Parliament he had denounced officials for holding two jobs and two salaries simultaneously.13 This touched a raw nerve. It was also a sensitive area, since the shortages of money and delays in pay that had caused trouble on the Lautaro and the Chacabuco in Cochrane's first months of command continued to haunt the squadron until the end.
Guise's plain speaking on the subject did him no good. Cochrane resented any kind of criticism - and remembered it - so that 35 years later, when writing the Narrative of Services, he added Guise's name to those whom Stevenson's book had accused of disaffection and plots. But at the time, no one saw him in this way. Contemporary descriptions of him are favourable, John Thomas noting that, in addition to being a good seaman, his manners and civility made him respected and admired by all who met him.14 Even Cochrane's partisans, Stevenson and Maria Graham described him as 'a good natured, gentlemanlike man'.15 As a result, they refused to believe he could be the villain of the piece, and found it more comfortable to believe that his follower, the humbly born Captain Spry, was his evil genius. John Tooker Spry was from an obscure branch of a Cornish family who had joined the Royal Navy as a Second Class Ship's Boy on Nimrod in 1803, and had eventually risen to Midshipman. After service in the Channel, Spry arrived in the West Indies in 1805 but, lacking influence, had spent the next four years being passed from Nimrod to Wolverine, Pelouis, Neptune and then Slatira without promotion. His luck, however, changed in 1810, when he was posted to the cutter Liberty, then commanded by Lieutenant Martin Guise. Guise made Spry a sub-lieutenant and encouraged him to take the lieutenant's examination and achieve promotion on 17 July 1813. He finished the war with commissioned service in various vessels on the North America station.16 From this time on, Spry accepted Guise as his patron, and accompanied him to Chile as commander of the former Hecate in 1818.
Neither Spry's lowly background nor his equally lowly stature seemed to have endeared him to the inner circle of the aristocrat Lord Cochrane. Reflecting their view, Maria Graham (who never met him), described him as an adventurer and 'a low minded man'.17 Unfortunately, the republican atmosphere of Chile had made Spry free with his views, and his private conversations had been reported back. At the time, Lord Cochrane had shrugged off the allegations that Spry and Worster had criticised his use of his title, and that they had 'caballed' over 'two commodores' - but the seed of suspicion had been planted and Spry had been identified as one of those who were 'against' him. The reputations of both Guise and Spry were subsequently damned in the memoirs of Cochrane and his partisans and the animosity was soon extended to cover all the officers who served under them in Lautaro and Galvarino.
It is difficult to read the details of Cochrane's campaign against Guise, Spry, Worster, Alvarez Jonte and other subordinates without a feeling of unease and sympathy for them. On the other hand, it is difficult not to feel sympathy for Cochrane himself. His self doubt and his suspicious temperament not only compromised the careers of others; it destroyed his own peace of mind and made it impossible for him to enjoy his own undoubted achievements. Indeed, in the period following Valdivia, Cochrane's obsession that there were plots and dissension within the squadron made it impossible for him to relax and bask in the glory of an astonishing victory. Instead he convinced himself that his supposed detractors - notably Spry - were part of the Zenteno-inspired conspiracy to have him court-martialled, and that only news of the capture of Valdivia had prevented it. There is no evidence for any of this, nor any likelihood that it is true. Indeed, it would have been physically impossible for Spry to have been involved as he was absent on blockade duty in Peruvian waters from September 1819 until 24 February 1820 - well after news of Cochrane's triumph at Valdivia had arrived in Valparaiso.18
Matters came to a head on 11 July 1820, when Cochrane had Guise arrested and demanded a court martial. He was charged with 'endeavouring in ... various acts of disobedience ... to set at defiance and bring into contempt the authority of his superior officer, the commander-in-chief'. The papers relating to the case, however, reveal little of substance. What is clear is that Cochrane's entourage had been watching Guise for months in order to accumulate complaints against him. These were then assembled into a dozen charges, the most serious being - that 'on a certain date' he had failed to report the arrest and release of an American brig; that he had been negligent in discharging a lieutenant; that he had allowed an officer ashore without reporting it; that he had been slow in sending boats to a vessel in difficulties; that he had allowed his crew to be paid before that of the O'Higgins; and that he had detained a ship although 'Lautaro did not have the guard'. And with Guise under arrest, Cochrane's men were able to search the frigate's books for mistakes. This led to two more charges - failing to report deficiencies in carpenters' stores, and 'falsifying', that is, miscalculating, crew numbers.19
Whatever it thought of the charges, the Chilean Government was not prepared to be distracted from its preparations for the invasion of Peru. They had better things to do than become sidetracked by the court martial of an experienced and able captain. They therefore refused Cochrane's request and restored Guise to command. Cochrane again threatened to resign. But the Chileans had no intention of losing their greatest maritime asset either, and urged the Vice Admiral to remain. Zenteno wrote :
At a moment when the services of the State are of the highest importance and the personal services of Your Lordship indispensable, the Supreme Director with the profoundest sentiments of regret has received your resignation which, should it be admitted, would involve the future operations of the army of liberty in the New World in certain ruin, and ultimately replace in Chile, your adopted home, the tyranny which Your Lordship abhors. ... HE the Supreme Director commands me to inform Your Lordship that should you persist in resigning command of the squadron which has been honoured by bearing your flag - the cause of terror and dismay to our enemies and to the Glory of all true Americans - it would be a day of universal mourning in the New World.20
Cochrane decided to stay, and agreed with Guise to let bygones be bygones. Indeed, Guise was further mollified by being promoted to the rank of captain-of-navio. But the atmosphere immediately deteriorated once again when Cochrane's entourage excluded Lautaro from a prize money distribution made to the rest of the squadron on 25 July!21 Rumours that their chief had offered his resignation had, however, been received with dismay by many officers, and his followers quickly rallied in support. Although they presumably assumed that there was a nobler reason for the threat than annoyance at the governmen
t's refusal to court-martial Guise, on 18 and 19 July, five serving captains and 15 lieutenants signed petitions pledging support and threatening to resign in sympathy with their commander-in-chief. They even put their commissions in his hands to surrender with his own.22 This was gratifying for Cochrane, although he could not have failed to notice that four captains and eight lieutenants had not added their names.
Then came another distraction. The proposed Guise court martial had accidentally entangled John Tooker Spry. Ironically, when Cochrane arrested Guise, he had moved Spry - who had recently been promoted - to Lautaro to replace him. But when, two days later, Guise was restored to his ship, the unfortunate Spry had to be moved again. Spry was now a captain-of-frigate and there was only one post at this level of seniority which was vacant and, indeed, had been for over a year - that of captain of the O'Higgins and therefore Flag Captain to Cochrane himself. The Minister of Marine - probably knowing nothing of Cochrane's antipathy to Spry and anxious to get on with the invasion - innocently thought he could kill two birds with one stone by moving him into it. But Cochrane was furious, seeing it as part of the great Zenteno inspired conspiracy against him. In the Narrative of Services, he disingenuously writes 'I had nothing against Captain Spry personally ... but had great doubts as to the reason for the appointment ... perhaps to prevent me doing anything beyond keep the Spanish in check.'23 In fact, when Spry boarded the flagship to take up his post, he was astonished when Cochrane publicly denounced him for being a spy like Alvarez Jonte.24 Once again, the government, anxious to get on with the invasion preparations, bowed to Cochrane's wishes and agreed to replace Spry with one of his followers, Commander Thomas Sackville Crosbie -even though he had to be specially promoted to captain in order to fill the post.
