by Brian Vale
The percentage that Captain Searle received for providing this service would have been around £6000!
From the viewpoint of local British merchants, Hardy's position seemed legalistic and unhelpful. Particularly when compared with that of the United States Navy, whose reaction to finding an American ship in Chilean hands was to take it back by force! In letters to his local merchant community, Hardy told them quite clearly that the Chilean blockade of Peru was illegitimate, but advised them that to avoid trouble it should not be challenged, and that ships and cargoes should keep well clear of the ports in question.20 Hardy had good reason to give this advice, for he knew that many of the ships involved were liable to seizure because they were indulging in dubious commercial practices. He phrased it delicately in letters to the Admiralty, writing 'the employment of British capital is obliged to be coloured and introduced in various shapes.'21 What he meant was that, faced with complicated Spanish colonial import regulations on the one hand, and novel Chilean blockading rules on the other, British ships were resorting to a number of shady devices in order to disguise the true origin of their cargoes. These included unloading and reshipping goods at Gibraltar, and carrying two different sets of manifests and papers. O'Higgins and the Chilean Government knew this too, and its blockading decrees explicitly prohibited such practices. But the last thing they wanted were international complications over the arrest of foreign merchantmen. Naval officers who were sensitive to the complications -like Commodore Robert Forster who commanded the blockade from February until July 1821 - realised it too and refrained from scrutinising their papers too closely. Unfortunately, Lord Cochrane was incapable of exercising such subtlety and, to the embarrassment of the Chilean Government, seized neutral vessels without inhibition, exposing with relish the irregularities he found.22
By this time, the position of the royalists in Peru was becoming desperate. Foreign observers were struck by the contrast between the prosperity of liberated Chile and the impoverishment of Peru. In Valparaiso, the harbour was packed with shipping, the customs wharfs were piled high with goods, and the anchorage filled with ships unloading foreign merchandise and loading wine and corn. In Peru it was a different story. In Callao, the customs houses were empty, the wharfs were neglected and the few ships at anchor were corralled by gun-boats. The countryside was impoverished after years of war, and the population was depressed, gloomy and suspicious.23 There was also a general hostility to foreigners, especially the British whose nationals could be seen manning the Chilean warships and whose government was widely believed to be helping the rebels in order to advance its own sinister intentions in the region. In January 1821, Captain William Shirreff, who had arrived with Andromache to replace Hyperion, even proposed that all British merchants in Lima, together with their property should seek sanctuary on his frigate until the conflict was over. After assurances of protection from the Viceroy, the offer was declined.24 A month later, two officers from Conway were arrested and accused by five sworn witnesses of being members of Cochrane's squadron. Although the charge was blatantly false, the authorities were so frightened by the mob that it took Captain Basil Hall weeks to get them released. The upshot was a ban on officers of the Royal Navy from setting foot ashore.25
Chapter 9
THE CAPTURE OF THE ESMERALDA
In directing naval operations off the coast of Peru, Cochrane was not content with routine blockade duties. As usual, he wanted to achieve something more spectacular. Callao, as before, bristled with guns and was defended by a squadron of warships and gunboats headed by the 40-gun frigate Esmeralda, which was armed with a mixture of 12- and 24-pounder cannon and equipped with sufficient stores for a three-month voyage. The other two major Spanish units, Prueba and Venganza, had sailed on 10 October and had been in Arica embarking troops when news was received of Cochrane's arrival off Callao and of the resumption of the blockade. After a council of war, the two captains had decided to head north for San Blas and Acapulco rather than risk a confrontation with the Chilean squadron.1 Esmeralda therefore became the focus of Cochrane's attention. The destruction of the Spanish frigate would be both a major blow to royalist morale and a triumph for the revolutionary forces. How could he do it? Cochrane's answer, in a plan of typical audacity, was for the squadron's boats to enter the heavily fortified anchorage under the cover of darkness and carry her off in typical Royal Navy style.
Cochrane chose the night of 5 November for the attack, and made his preparations with his usual skill and attention to detail. Some 240 volunteers were selected, all wearing white with blue armbands to aid recognition and carrying pistols, cutlasses and boarding axes. Groups of men were given specific tasks to perform after the frigate had been captured - topmen to release the fore, main and mizzen topsails; axemen to cut the anchor cable; and keepers to secure the squadron's boats. Of these, 14 were to be used in the assault, operating in two divisions. The first, which was to board the Esmeralda on the starboard side, was under the command of Cochrane and Captain Crosbie, supported by Lieutenants Esmond, Brown, Morgell, Robertson and Wynter of the O'Higgins. The second, which was to attack the frigate's port side, was under Captain Guise, seconded by Lieutenants Bell and Freeman of Lautaro, and Lieutenants Grenfell and Gilbert of Independencia.
With night well advanced, at 10.30 p.m. the boats pushed off from their mother ships and headed under muffled oars for the gap in the heavily chained boom that sealed off the harbour. Overwhelming an unwary guardboat on the other side, the attackers slid silently through the black water to where the unsuspecting Esmeralda lay anchored. They reached the frigate undetected in the darkness, clambered up the sides and launched themselves at the startled defenders, Lord Cochrane in the lead being knocked back into his boat by the butt of a sentry's musket. Many of the Esmeralda's crew had been sleeping on the deck so, although initially taken by surprise, they were able to give a good account of themselves. But the momentum of the Chilean attack was irresistible. After a bloody hand-to-hand struggle on the quarterdeck with swords and pistols against parties led by Guise and Cochrane who had boarded at the port and starboard sides, and those of
Grenfell and Bell who had climbed up the frigate's quarters and over the poop, the Spaniards were forced back to the forecastle where they held out until Guise and Crosbie rallied their men and charged along the gangways. Guise then cleared the lower deck of troops who were firing upwards through the hatches. The Esmeralda's surviving crew dropped their weapons, and Captain Coig surrendered his ship.
Unable to make head or tail of what was happening in the darkened harbour, the shore batteries had been initially confused by the lights Cochrane hoisted into Esmeralda's yard arms in imitation of those shown by neutral warships in the harbour. But the deception had not lasted long. Guided by the clash of steel and the flash of small arms, the Spanish guns began to lay down a heavy fire to prevent the ship's removal. Cochrane had announced that he intended to use the captured frigate as a platform from which to attack other vessels in the harbour and had ordered that, as soon as Esmeralda had been secured, Lieutenants Esmond and Morgell of O'Higgins should board the brigs Pezuela and Maipú, while Lieutenants Bell and Robertson of Lautaro and Grenfell of Independencia cast adrift the nearest hulks and merchantmen.2 Whether he seriously believed that such a difficult feat was possible is difficult to say. At least one experienced observer, Captain Basil Hall of Conway, doubted it, and thought it was just rhetoric to inspire the men.3 In the event, it proved an impossible ambition: fired by the adrenalin of victory, the British seamen broke into the spirit room and - not for the first time - became dead drunk; while their Chilean comrades began to loot the ship. Indeed, when John Pasco Grenfell and the other lieutenants tried to coax their men into the boats to attack the other ships, they flatly refused, saying that they had done quite enough.4 In these circumstances Martin Guise, who had taken command when Cochrane was shot in the thigh during the final stages of the struggle, decided to cut the frigate's cable and sail her out. This he d
id, passing on the way HMS Hyperion and the USS Macedonian, which had been admiring witnesses to the whole episode - the former silently observing the studied neutrality that Captain Searle's orders required; the latter ringing with cheers and encouragement.
Their pro-Chilean demonstration did the Americans no good. The royalists were convinced that Cochrane could only have carried off the Esmeralda with some form of help from the British and Americans. Spanish historians think the same today, and a recent study still maintains that 'the contribution of the cited frigates (Hyperion and Macedonian) which were anchored within the chains securing the port was to provide intelligence, avoid raising the alarm, rescue patriot seamen who got into difficulties, and raise recognition lights so they could be copied by the captors of Esmeralda in order to confuse our ships and shore batteries.'5 As a result, Captain Downes, who was ashore at the time, was forced to seek refuge in the Governor's Palace, while a boat's crew from the Macedonian landing next day to buy provisions was attacked and murdered by a vengeful mob.
The cutting out of the Esmeralda was one of Lord Cochrane's finest achievements. Captain Searle called it 'a most brilliant affair ... commanded by Lord Cochrane in person, in which he carried (Esmeralda) together with a gunboat, from under the batteries and out of the line of defence, and in less than half-an-hour and under sail. This was done so quick and in so masterly a style that I had scarcely time to get out of the line of fire.'6 It was also a deadly encounter, with the Chileans losing 11 killed and 31 wounded including Cochrane and Grenfell. Spanish losses were estimated at 56 dead, 70 wounded and 204 prisoners. Paroissien, who was no stranger to the aftermath of battles, boarded the prize two days later to arrange an exchange of prisoners and found the decks still bloody and littered with remains. It was, he wrote, 'a sight too horrible to describe'.7
The capture of the Esmeralda left Lord Cochrane undisputed master of the coast. The Spanish frigates Venganza and Prueba were still at large in the Pacific, but after the affair in Callao they played no further role and went entirely on the defensive. San Martin immediately recognised the significance of the event and reported the cutting out of the Esmeralda to O'Higgins in glowing terms, writing:
It is impossible for me to eulogise in proper language the daring enterprise of 5 November, by which Lord Cochrane has decided the superiority of our naval forces, augmented the splendour and power of Chile and secured the success of this campaign. I doubt not that His Excellency the Supreme Director will render the justice due to the worthy chief, the officers and other individuals who have had a share in that successful action.8
Six weeks later, San Martin went further, and decreed that the name of the Esmeralda should be changed to Valdivia in honour of Cochrane and of his victory in capturing that stronghold.9
Chapter 10
THE VALDIVIA COURT MARTIAL
The news that Esmeralda was to be renamed Valdivia came as a surprise to Captain Martin Guise who had been moved with his crew to the captured frigate from Lautaro. He was also disappointed. Guise expressed his regret when he was told the news by Lord Cochrane himself on the flagship's quarterdeck, explaining that the new name did nothing to commemorate the victory that the capture of the frigate itself represented. In his reply, Cochrane seemed to agree.1 His officers were also disappointed and, on 2 February 1821, wrote to Guise, lamenting that the new name did nothing to recognise their efforts, pointing out that half of those who had captured the frigate had not been present at the attack on Valdivia, and asking him to use his influence with Lord Cochrane to obtain a reconsideration. Likewise, while they approved of Chilean ships being named after revolutionary heroes like San Martin and O'Higgins, they objected to the name of Pedro de Valdivia, one of the most oppressive of Spanish conquistadors!
Cochrane later claimed in his Narrative of Services that San Martin had proposed calling the ship Cochrane and that the officers wanted Guise.2 There is no evidence or likelihood that either assertion is true. The letter was signed by all the surviving wardroom officers - Lieutenants Robert Bell and Henry Freeman, Purser James Frew, Surgeon James Michael and Assistant Surgeon Hugh Kernan.3 Guise could detect nothing disrespectful in the letter, but to be on the safe side, he asked the opinion of Lieutenant Colonel Miller, an intimate of Cochrane who had also overheard his conversation with the Vice Admiral on the O'Higgins. Miller said he could see nothing wrong either4 - so Captain Guise sent the letter on with a covering note.
But Lord Cochrane was furious. Still convinced that he was surrounded with plots and disaffection, Cochrane saw the letter as part of a conspiracy masterminded by Spry. Reporting the incident to O'Higgins, he wrote:
No sooner has Captain Spry returned to the squadron than the old plotting commenced again. ... I am quite vexed to be placed again in a position by this meddling, malicious little man in which I must either support my challenged authority as an officer or renounce the command. Captain Spry thinks I have kept him too long at Huacho and has taken this mode to induce others to insult me.5
The fact that Spry and Galvarino were miles from Callao at the time did not dent Cochrane's conviction that he was behind the protest. And, given the chance, Cochrane seized on the opportunity to strike at what he saw as a conspiracy and ordered that the officers of the Esmeralda be court-martialled. Stunned by the over-reaction, Guise wrote assuring the Vice Admiral that no disrespect had been intended and that he would never have sent on the letter if he had thought it to be the case. In reply, Cochrane denounced the officers' 'real' intentions, adding that if Guise was 'resolved to defend, or make party, with persons who have so conducted themselves, then either you or I must resign'.6
Guise repeated that his officers were innocent of any insubordination or lack of respect and pleaded with Cochrane to see them personally and to delay any court martial until after the attack on Callao planned for the end of February. When that failed, he wrote to say that it would be impossible for him to serve further if he was to be 'deprived of those officers with whom I have long served, and who have all distinguished themselves under my command' and forced to accept unknown men in their place. But Cochrane refused to budge so, taking him at his word, Guise resigned.7
Guise had gone, but Cochrane's attitude to his officers remained implacable. He was unmoved by either protestations of innocence or their service records. All had taken part with Guise in landings on the Peruvian coast and in the cutting out of the Esmeralda, and Bell had been present at the capture of the Maria Isabel in 1818. Likewise Freeman, who had been a master's mate in the Royal Navy during the Bombardment of Algiers by Lord Exmouth in 1816, had played a prominent role in Cochrane's attack on Callao with rockets and explosion vessels. Many were surprised that at such a crucial moment, time was being wasted on an apparently trivial matter. Cochrane knew that the court martial would disrupt his plans for the next attack, but he still refused to postpone it. His followers ensured that Guise was unjustly blamed for the delay.
The court martial took place on 2 March 1821 before Captains Wilkinson, Crosbie, Prunier and Cobbett, with Robert Forster acting as President. The result had been fixed in advance by Cochrane's entourage who had drafted the charges so as to make a guilty verdict inevitable. There were three - first, sending the letter of 2 February, which excited disrespect to the commander-in-chief by denigrating the victory at Valdivia and which, second, tried to spread dissatisfaction by misrepresenting the name 'Valdivia'; and, third, by 'insolently' interfering in the renaming of the frigate and holding conversations derogatory to Cochrane. Thus, to prove the charges, all the prosecution had to do was to show the letter had been written.
It was not Cochrane's finest hour. Indeed, the transcript of the court martial reflects the triviality of the incident and hardly disguises the embarrassment of all involved. The cross examination of Martin Guise is illustrative:
Question - On your receiving the order from the Admiral on his first making known to you that the name of Esmeralda was to be changed to that of Valdivia, did you make
any remarks to his Lordship on the subject?
Answer - In the presence of Lt Colonel Miller I told the Admiral on his informing me the ship's name was to be altered to that of Valdivia that I was sorry for it for I thought Esmeralda was a pretty name and that if it was altered, the manner of her being captured would be forgotten; he answered me by saying "so was he" or words to that effect.
Q - Have you reason to think that the officers of the Valdivia were aware that his Lordship coincided in that opinion?
A - Yes, because I informed them myself.
Q - Did the order state that the name of Valdivia was changed by the order of the Captain General San Martin?
A - I cannot quite recall but I think it did.
Q - From what passed between you and the Admiral, did you have reason to think that it (the letter) would give any offence to his Lordship or show any disrespect?
A - No certainly not.
Q - Do you consider the letter sent to you a respectful representation on the subject?
A - I do consider it perfectly so.
Q - After forwarding the letter to his Lordship, when did you see him?
A - I think it was two or three hours after.
